The Myanmar Junta is planning a sham election not as a democratic transition but as a political strategy to consolidate military power, which can lead to more instability without genuine political dialogue.
Key Takeaways
The junta’s upcoming elections are not a genuine democratic transition but a carefully staged performance to project an image of normalisation and legitimacy.
With restrictive laws, the junta dissolved key political parties, and the exclusion of vast conflict-affected regions. Rather than reducing tensions, the result is likely to intensify Myanmar’s ongoing civil war and deepen the humanitarian crisis.
A sustainable path toward peace requires the inclusion of the NUG and other opposition actors through meaningful political dialogue.
Introduction
Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s military junta has faced international condemnation and domestic resistance. After four years of civil wars and economic crisis, the junta plans to hold a multistage election as proof of its commitment to democracy. Junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced that it will hold general elections in late 2025 and early 2026. He presents these polls as fulfilling the “ASEAN five-point roadmap” to restore order and civilian rule. The junta also lifted the state of emergency and changed its name from the “State Administration Council” to “State Security and Peace Commission” and appointed itself as “Acting President”, aiming to shed its pariah status.
The elections come amid the civil war, years of airstrikes, mass arrests, repression of opposition parties and war crimes, where thousands have been killed as a pro-democracy rebellion takes on a heavily armed military. Yet the junta insists these elections progress toward “free and fair elections”. The movement is designed to manufacture legitimacy for the junta. The upcoming polls are only to whitewash the junta’s crimes against humanity. The junta’s sham election will only intensify the already dire human rights and humanitarian crisis, cementing the junta’s backing of China’s influence risk entrenching military dominance.
The Junta’s Democratic Narrative
The junta repeatedly claims that the 2025 elections reflect its commitment to democratic norms under the 2008 Constitution. It maintains that the coup was justified due to so-called “election fraud” in the 2020 polls, a claim discredited by international experts, independent observers, and domestic political actors.
The Junta regime highlights technical preparations, such as a partial census in 2024 and voter list updates, to present an image of professionalism and inclusiveness for polls. To reinforce this narrative, the junta appointed a new Union Election Commission (UEC) led by loyalist Than Soe.
Internationally, Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s high-profile trips to China, India, Russia, and Belarus aim to earn diplomatic endorsement. Junta statements at regional forums emphasise “progress,” portraying Myanmar as slowly returning to normalcy. Domestically, small-scale amnesties and repeated claims of holding elections only in “secure areas” attempt to depict the military as a stabilising institution willing to return power.
The 2008 Constitution reserves 25% of parliamentary seats for the military. This enables the military to hold veto power over any constitutional amendment. This entire so-called election process is crafted to guarantee military victory regardless of the vote.
Reality of Repression and Control
Despite democratic claims, the junta has intensified opposition suppression before the so-called election. The junta increases its attacks on civilians to expand its territorial and administrative control in advance of its sham election. The junta has committed numerous abuses, including crimes against humanity against protesters and activists, and war crimes in ethnic minority areas. Since the coup, the junta has launched more than 2,700 airstrikes, dramatically increasing year after year.
On 29 July 2025, the junta enacted the “Law on the Prevention of Obstruction, Disruption, and Sabotage of Multiparty Democratic General Election” and criminalised the criticism, protests or disruption of any part of the electoral process. The law states “three to five years in prison for election sabotage; five to 10 years for damaging ballot boxes, polling stations, or voting machines (or life imprisonment if committed as a group): and 10-20 years for causing serious injury to voters, polling staff, candidates, or election officials”, restricting freedom of expression and speech. The authorities have arrested 94 people under the new law since August, including at least 4 children and several prominent personalities from the film industry, to intensify fear among the civilians.
On the other hand, the junta raised requirements for parties to participate in elections to oppress the opposition parties according to the “Political Parties Registration Law”. The junta also made various amendments; the 1st amendment on 30 January 2024, the 2nd amendment in July 2025 and the 3rd amendment on 21 September 2025 to win seats for the military-backed or allied in the upcoming polls. The new amendments restrict the minimum number of party members, the minimum number of nationwide offices, large financial deposits and prohibit anyone convicted of a crime from joining a party. Moreover, the political parties have to re-register within 60 days or be dissolved.
As a result, the law dissolved 40 political parties which failed to imply including the famous National League for Democracy (NLD), amid their landslide win in the 2020 general election. Moreover, the UEC also disbanded four re-registered political parties: National Democratic Force Party (NDF) for not having enough members, Mon Women’s Party (MWP), Union Farmer-Labour Party and the Democratic Party of National Politics (DNP) for not having the required number of offices. All these efforts show the regime do not want to bring democracy but to act against the potential contenders and enforce their own rules.
To enhance the election process, the military administration granted amnesty to more than 3,000 people for opposing their regime and dropped charges against more than 5,500 others on November 27, 2025. According to the Assistant Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) – AAPP, over 22,000 political prisoners still languish in jails, including the infamous political leader Aung San Suu Kyi. More than 6,100 women and 629 children have been arrested since the 2021 coup, showcasing that the junta’s amnesty is an effort to cover their sham election.
Despite the military efforts, many experts, international governments and the United Nations state that the upcoming polls could never be free and fair. UN rights office spokesman Jeremy Laurence said, “This military-controlled ballot will be conducted in an atmosphere rife with threats and violence”. Usage of electronic voting machines, electronic surveillance technology utilising AI-biometric tracking, raises fraud concerns as civil society, media, and observers are barred.
The National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic armed groups reject the upcoming elections and call for decisive ASEAN actions, labelling the polls illegitimate. Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) documents failures against international standards for the upcoming polls, from voter suppression to a level playing field. ANFREL also warn that the election can only bring the country to fall deeper into conflict.
Why the Elections Cannot Solve the Crisis
The upcoming polls fail to address Myanmar’s fundamental political crisis. They ignore the core issues that have fueled conflict for decades: military domination, lack of federalism, and the public’s overwhelming rejection of the coup. The United States Institute of Peace states that over 92% of the population supports the NUG. The junta, on the other hand, rejects NUG, CRPH and defence forces, labelling them as terrorist groups. This designation blocks any form of political communication or negotiation between the parties and further entrenches the conflict.
Moreover, the elections will be held only in areas under military control, excluding large parts of the country administered by resistance forces or ethnic organisations. The result of the upcoming polls is predictable, as the military-backed or allied parties will hold the power, and this cannot solve the prolonged civil war and humanitarian crisis. This can only formalise the Myanmar military regime and deepen domestic conflict and instability.
Apart from that, views from international communities remain divided. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the European Union have imposed sanctions on Myanmar in response to the coup and have not recognised the Junta’s sham election plan. Even ASEAN faces a diplomatic dilemma over the upcoming sham election. The ASEAN stated that they will not send any monitors to the upcoming elections, and the junta regime should prioritise peace over elections, accept the upcoming polls, and it is undeniable that the military’s only hope is that the elections will end widespread opposition to their grip on power.
Conclusion
The 2025 elections are a political performance designed to legitimise Myanmar’s military rule and not restore democracy. Through the coordinated propaganda, restrictive laws, and selective amnesties, the junta is showcasing the appearance of democratic progress amid the systematic repression of its opposition parties.
The upcoming polls cannot resolve Myanmar’s political crisis as they exclude genuine political actors and aim to entrench military dominance. The current political situation cannot be solved by offering legitimacy to the brutal regime. Only real political reforms and settlements can bring peace and stability. The further political settlements and democratic transition processes must include NUG and opposition actors and end military violence for a sustainable nation-building process. It is undeniable that the current sham election is designed to legitimise power for the junta’s generals.
Mhue Aung is a final-year CDM student with over two years of experience in humanitarian work. He is currently a migrant worker in Thailand.
This nails the core danger: “election” as a costume for power, not a mechanism for consent. The most chilling part is how normal the script sounds—phases, parties, procedures—while the country remains at war and meaningful opposition is engineered out. Thank you for naming the difference between governance and legitimacy.
-Noble