How Conflict Economies and Political Volatility Drive Myanmar’s Deforestation
SRIc Insights By Khant Eaint Hmoo
Key Takeaways:
Deforestation in Myanmar is closely connected to political transition, militarised governance, and extractive economic policies. Myanmar lost about 12,000 km2 of forest cover nationwide between 1990 and 2000, the worst period of forest loss under the military regime. Forest destruction increased in 2008 and accelerated after 2017, coinciding with rare-earth exports to China.
Resource extraction and conflict economies continue to be a major cause of environmental degradation. Rare-earth mining, jade extraction, logging, agribusiness expansion, and hydropower projects expanded through networks of military actors, ethnic armed organisations, border militias, domestic cronies, and foreign investors, particularly in Shan, Kachin, and Tanintharyi.
The impacts are severe and multidimensional: loss of biodiversity, carbon emissions, river contamination, soil erosion, and the displacement of Indigenous and forest-dependent communities, threatening Myanmar’s long-term environmental and human security.
Introduction
Myanmar possesses one of Southeast Asia’s most ecologically significant forest systems, including tropical rainforests, montane forests, mangroves, and biodiverse river basins. However, decades of authoritarian governance, armed conflict, weak environmental regulation, and extractive economic development have transformed Myanmar into one of the region’s most alarming deforestation hotspots. This article will discuss the causes and effects of Myanmar’s deforestation in the prominent political cycle.
Historical Triggers of Military Rule (1990–2008)
The decade of greatest deforestation in Myanmar was from 1990 to 2000, under the military regimes of the SLORC and SPDC. FAO said the country lost 12,000 km2 of forest cover nationwide in this decade alone. Forests became an important source of income for the military government, which relied on timber exports, especially teak, to fund military campaigns, state expansion, and patronage networks.
Military-linked companies and politically connected elites frequently received logging concessions with minimal environmental oversight. In ethnic border zones like Kachin, Shan, and Karan States, the forest became linked with conflict and military control. Poor governance, corruption, and militarised extraction have accelerated forest loss and opened up pristine forest areas to commercial exploitation.
Military-Backed Economic Reforms and Agribusiness Expansion (2008–2015)
Deforestation increased again after 2008 as Myanmar opened its economy and pursued market-oriented reforms. Under President Thein Sein and the military-backed USDP government, large-scale land concessions were granted to domestic groups, foreign investors, and crony companies for agricultural business, mineral mining, hydropower, and infrastructure development.
Commercial agriculture became one of the major drivers of forest conversion. In Tanintharyi Region, large rainforest areas were cleared for large-scale oil palm concessions, including the controversial Myanmar Stark Prestige Plantation (MSPP), which has been linked to forest clearance as well as land and labour rights concerns affecting Karen communities. Roads, special economic zones, and infrastructure corridors also expanded into previously forested areas. At the same time, major infrastructure projects such as the Dawei Special Economic Zone (DSEZ), the Dawei Deep-Sea Port, and the Dawei–Thailand Road Corridor expanded into previously forested areas. Although these projects were promoted as part of economic modernization, many lacked proper environmental assessments and displaced local communities without adequate compensation.
Commercial agriculture became one of the major drivers of forest conversion. In Tanintharyi Region, large rainforest areas were cleared for large-scale oil palm concessions, including the controversial Myanmar Stark Prestige Plantation (MSPP), which has been linked to forest clearance as well as land and labour rights concerns affecting Karen communities. Roads, special economic zones, and infrastructure corridors also expanded into previously forested areas. At the same time, major infrastructure projects such as the Dawei Special Economic Zone (DSEZ), the Dawei Deep-Sea Port, and the Dawei–Thailand Road Corridor expanded into previously forested areas. While environmental and social impact assessment processes were undertaken or proposed for some of these projects, civil society organizations and environmental groups raised concerns regarding the adequacy, transparency, and public accessibility of these assessments, as well as the extent of meaningful community consultation and compensation for affected populations.
The NLD Government: Reform Efforts and Structural Challenges (2015–2021)
When the National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power in 2016, the government introduced stronger environmental policies. A nationwide logging ban was implemented between 2016 and 2017, timber extraction quotas were reduced, and gemstone mining licenses in Hpakant were suspended to reassess environmental impacts.
Despite these reforms, the government faced major structural limitations. Myanmar’s economy remained dependent on natural resource exports such as jade, natural gas, timber, and agricultural products. At the same time, economic cooperation with China continued through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).
Large infrastructure projects and mining operations accelerated forest loss by extracting sites, roads, and waste disposal areas, while also contaminating rivers and degrading ecosystems through chemical runoff, erosion, and sedimentation. For example, rare-earth mining activities in Kachin State have been associated with forest clearance, toxic waste generation, and water contamination linked to extraction processes. The expansion of rare-earth mining during the late NLD period laid the foundation for a dramatic increase in production after the 2021 military coup. By the mid-2020s, Myanmar had emerged as one of the world’s largest suppliers of rare-earth elements, second only to China and the United States in some production estimates. Most of these minerals were exported to China for processing, while many mining sites operated in contested areas of Kachin State where environmental regulation and government oversight remained weak. Numerous reports have documented the involvement of Chinese-backed operators and highlighted concerns regarding inadequate environmental safeguards, toxic chemical use, deforestation, and water pollution associated with rare-earth extraction.
The NLD government also lacked full control over conflict-affected border regions. In states such as Kachin and Shan, ethnic armed organizations, militias, border guard forces, and military actors operated independently of the central government. Following the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015, some regions experienced a temporary reduction in armed clashes, creating expectations that environmental governance and resource management might improve. However, evidence suggests that many extractive activities continued during this period. As a result, illegal logging, jade mining, and other forms of resource exploitation persisted despite the relative decline in violence in certain areas
Rare-Earth Mining and Deforestation in Border Regions (2017–Present)
Rare-earth mining has emerged as one of the most destructive environmental issues in Myanmar since 2017. As global demand for rare-earth minerals increased, Myanmar became an important supplier to China. According to the Institute for Strategy and Policy - Myanmar (ISP- Myanmar), the country exported approximately USD 3.6 billion worth of rare-earth minerals to China since 2017, including nearly USD 4 billion after the 2021 military coup.
Most mining activities are concentrated in Kachin State and northern Shan State near the Chinese border. The rapid expansion of rare-earth extraction has caused severe deforestation due to road construction, land clearing, excavation, and tree cutting for fuelwood used in mineral processing. Satellite images and environmental monitoring reports indicate clear areas of forest loss around the mining zones. There has been significant expansion in the mining area from 2018 onwards, from about 26,000 hectares in April 2018 to 46,700 hectares in April 2024. By the end of 2024, they had identified nearly 400 sites for rare earth mining in Kachin State.
Ecological and Social Consequences of Deforestation
Deforestation in Myanmar has produced serious environmental and social consequences. Biodiversity loss is one of the most immediate concerns, as Myanmar’s forests contain many endangered species and ecologically sensitive habitats. Forest destruction fragments ecosystems, disrupts food chains, and threatens wildlife survival.
Deforestation also contributes to climate change. Forests act as important carbon sinks by absorbing and storing carbon dioxide. Large-scale forest clearance releases this stored carbon back into the atmosphere, worsening greenhouse gas emissions and reducing regional climate resilience.
At the same time, arsenic levels in some areas of the Salween River were found to be at 0.55 mg/l, which is 55 times the safe limit. Likewise, the river, which starts east of Mong Hsat township, Shan state, and flows into Thailand as the Kok River, was also found to be highly contaminated with arsenic due to rare-earth and gold mining. Due to the rivers’ flow across national boundaries, the downstream communities in the northern parts of Thailand have been impacted by contamination, which has become a growing concern for water quality, public health, agriculture, and fisheries.
This reflects that the environmental consequences of unsustainable resource extraction activities in Myanmar have become a regional matter and need to be addressed through more cooperation and environmental governance between Myanmar and neighboring countries such as Thailand and China. Forest loss also increases soil erosion, land degradation, and vulnerability to landslides, especially in mountainous conflict zones. Declining soil quality threatens agricultural productivity and food security for already vulnerable rural populations.
The 2021 Coup and the Expansion of Conflict Economies
The 2021 military coup accelerated environmental destruction across Myanmar. According to Global Forest Watch (GFW), more than $1.45 billion in official forest product imports from Myanmar have been reported since the coup, with China accounting for 64%. The collapse of governance systems, intensified armed conflict, and weakened environmental enforcement created conditions for widespread illegal logging and unregulated mining. Natural resources increasingly became part of Myanmar’s conflict economy. Armed groups, elites, and military authorities relied on timber, minerals, and land concessions to finance operations and maintain territorial control.
Among the major hotspots of deforestation, Global Forest Watch (GFW) recorded from 2002 to 2025 that Myanmar lost 830 kha (kilo-hectares) of humid primary forest. Deforestation there has been driven by mining, infrastructure projects, and commercial agriculture. Tanintharyi experienced large-scale forest clearance linked to oil palm and rubber plantations, while Kachin became heavily affected by jade extraction, rare-earth mining, and illicit logging.
Conclusion
Overall, Myanmar’s deforestation crisis is broadly a reflection of weak governance, conflict economies, geopolitical competition and resource dependence. Without greater political stability, stronger institutions and more accountable resource governance, there is little chance of achieving environmental protection. All stakeholders including the National Unity Government (NUG), should operate within their capacities to reduce dependency on unsustainable resource extraction and ensure that environmental sustainability becomes an integral part of Myanmar’s long-term recovery and development efforts to prevent environmental destruction in the long term.
Implications and Recommendations
Strengthen environmental governance, including the Central government, EAOs, and NGOs, through independent monitoring systems, satellite tracking, and stronger enforcement against illegal logging and mining activities.
Improve regulation of rare-earth mining and cross-border mineral trade, particularly through greater transparency and environmental accountability in Myanmar-China supply chains.
Regional organisations such as ASEAN should play a more active role in addressing the Myanmar crisis and its environmental consequences through supporting mechanisms,
Recognise and protect Indigenous land rights by involving local communities in forest management and resource governance processes.
Promote sustainable livelihoods such as community forestry, sustainable agriculture, and renewable energy while linking environmental protection with broader political stability and governance reforms.
Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.