This article analyses the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as a high-stakes geopolitical bypass, where Beijing’s pursuit of energy security through a fragmented Myanmar risks permanent regional instability.

Key Takeaways

• The Strategic Bypass: The Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and the Muse-Mandalay railway provide China with a critical “back door” to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the naval vulnerabilities of the Straits of Malacca.

• Institutional Dependency: Myanmar increasingly functions as a “sub-contractor” state, with the junta setting up special committees to expedite Chinese projects like the Muse-Mandalay railway despite a complete lack of territorial control.

• Local Marginalisation: Large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Kyaukphyu SEZ threaten the livelihoods of over 5,000 fishing households and risk the relocation of 20,000 people, fuelling deep-seated local resentment.

The Strategic Imperative: Bypassing the Straits

For Beijing, Myanmar represents not merely a neighbouring state but a critical geographic solution to a persistent strategic vulnerability. China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma”, its dependence on energy imports transiting the narrow and potentially contested Strait of Malacca, has compelled policymakers to conceptualize the Bay of Bengal as an alternative strategic corridor. Within this framework, the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port in Rakhine State functions as a central node.

The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is designed to operate as a dedicated conduit for China’s economic and energy security. By linking the Rakhine coastline directly to Yunnan Province through operational oil and gas pipelines (established in 2013 and 2017, respectively) and the proposed Muse–Mandalay railway, China can circumvent contested maritime zones, particularly those in the South China Sea. This infrastructure significantly reduces geopolitical exposure while enhancing logistical efficiency.

The Role of the Junta: A Centralised Partner in a Fragmented State

Recent reporting indicates that Myanmar’s military government is actively attempting to demonstrate its strategic relevance to Beijing. The junta has established a dedicated administrative body to expedite the Muse–Mandalay railway project, which is intended to connect the Chinese border with central Myanmar. This initiative reflects a broader pattern in which military leadership emphasises the continuity of Chinese-backed infrastructure projects despite ongoing internal conflict.

However, China’s engagement in Myanmar is becoming increasingly fragmented. While Beijing traditionally favours a centralised, top-down governance model, the authority of the military government is progressively eroding. Of Myanmar’s total foreign investment stock of approximately $43 billion, China accounts for roughly 32% (approximately $14 billion). A transition toward a decentralized or federal political system could compel China to renegotiate existing agreements with multiple subnational actors, thereby increasing political and contractual complexity.

The “Subcontractor” Model and Labor Enclaves

The governance structure of major infrastructure projects in Myanmar reveals a pronounced asymmetry in power relations. Within the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), the China-based CITIC Consortium retains dominant decision-making authority. In contrast, the Myanmar state assumes a more limited role, functioning effectively as a “subcontractor” responsible for land acquisition and regulatory facilitation. At the same time, China provides capital investment, technological expertise, and, in many cases, labor.

This model has generated significant local contention, particularly because it relied on imported Chinese labor. By circumventing domestic labor markets, such practices restrict employment opportunities for local populations, thereby limiting the distribution of economic benefits. At the same time, local communities remain disproportionately exposed to environmental degradation and social disruption.

The Myitsone Dam project further exemplifies these dynamics. Situated at the headwaters of the Irrawaddy River, the country’s “spinal cord” was structured to export 90% of its electricity to China, fuelling concerns of resource extraction without domestic benefit. According to International Rivers, the venture was a lopsided partnership: the China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) was to retain 70% of the profits, leaving only 20% for the Myanmar government and 10% for the local firm Asia World as a service fee. This lopsided profit-sharing highlights Myanmar’s role as a junior partner in its own strategic development.

Community Concerns and Territorial Control

Residents in Kyaukphyu express deep dejection as the deep-sea port project, a 4,200-acre cornerstone of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” moves forward with little community transparency. Despite the port providing Beijing a critical strategic bypass to the Bay of Bengal for oil imports, the joint venture remains heavily asymmetric, with China controlling 70% of the project compared to Myanmar’s 30%. As the two governments prepare to begin construction on a 600-acre site this year, villagers face widespread job losses and remain marginalised from the decision-making process.

It is estimated that over 5,000 households may lose access to fishing grounds, while the International Commission of Jurists warns that up to 20,000 individuals could face displacement. These developments have contributed to rising local discontent.

The Conflict and Governance Focus

The current landscape of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is defined by a profound disconnect between official administrative authority and de facto territorial control. While the State Administration Council (SAC) in Naypyidaw acts as the formal gatekeeper, signing high-level addendums to revive the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and forming committees to expedite the Muse-Mandalay Railway, its actual power is increasingly confined to isolated urban centers. In a strategic shift to win local compliance in Myitkyina, the junta is now promising that the majority of the electricity generated will remain in Myanmar for domestic and residential use from the Myitsone Dam mega-project, which was suspended in 2011 over environmental and humanitarian concerns. By projecting a narrative of “business as usual,” the junta attempts to maintain the image of a stable investment partner despite losing significant ground to resistance forces.

In contrast, the physical security of these corridors is now dictated by Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government (NUG). In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) has achieved what the Institute for Strategy and Policy- Myanmar describes as full or partial control over the majority of Chinese projects, effectively encircling the Kyaukphyu SEZ. Similarly, the Three Brotherhood Alliance maintains a stranglehold on the Northern Shan State transit routes due to China’s intervention in 2025. In total, the regime has reclaimed about 11.3% of the territory it lost in Northern Shan State, securing control over 44.4% of the Mandalay–Muse trade route. Meanwhile, the NUG challenges the SAC’s legal legitimacy by warning Beijing that agreements signed with an illegal junta may not be honoured by a future democratic government. Through its “10-Point Policy,” the NUG offers a tactical alternative, promising to safeguard legitimate Chinese investments while firmly rejecting “lifeblood“ sacrifices like the Myitsone Dam. This creates a fragmented reality where China must balance its long-term infrastructure goals against the shifting frontlines of a nation in revolt.

Historical Continuity: From 1988 to the Lancang–Mekong Fund

China’s relationship with Myanmar’s military establishment can be traced to the post-1988 period, during which Beijing emerged as a principal economic and political partner for a regime isolated by Western sanctions. Over time, this relationship has evolved into a multilayered framework encompassing both large-scale infrastructure investments and smaller development initiatives.

Between 2017 and 2025, Myanmar received 132 projects valued at approximately $38.6 million through the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Special Fund, with over 100 projects implemented. This funding mechanism enables China to extend its influence at the local level while simultaneously supporting the military government’s broader strategic infrastructure agenda.

Implications and Recommendations

1. The Risk of the “Stability Trap.”

China’s current approach reflects a strategic gamble predicated on the assumption that the military government can eventually restore stability and secure key economic corridors. However, continued support for the junta risks entrenching conflict dynamics by positioning Chinese investments as targets for resistance groups. Failure to address local grievances, particularly those related to environmental degradation and socioeconomic exclusion, may result in long-term instability that undermines the viability of these projects.

2. Navigating the “Civilian” Pivot

The anticipated shift to an “elected” government, likely generals in civilian attire, will mirror the Thein Sein era, where project suspensions are used as tactical “reform” signals to lift Western sanctions. To mitigate this, China must move beyond fragile military-to-military deals toward a legalised investment framework ratified by parliament. By insisting on multi-stakeholder oversight, Beijing can gain “political insurance,” ensuring projects aren’t used as bargaining chips by a pseudo-civilian regime desperate to prove its independence or legitimacy.

3. Engagement with Territorial Stakeholders

China should broaden its diplomatic engagement to include EAOs and the National Unity Government (NUG). Agreements concluded solely with a central authority lacking territorial control are inherently fragile, both legally and operationally.

4. Reform of the Labor Model

To reduce local opposition, the current subcontractor model should be restructured. Future project phases, including the Muse–Mandalay railway and Kyaukphyu SEZ, should incorporate mandatory local employment quotas alongside investments in vocational training to enhance workforce capacity.

5. Environmental Accountability

All major infrastructure initiatives should be subject to transparent and independent Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs). These assessments must include enforceable provisions capable of halting projects if significant risks to ecosystems, such as mangrove forests or local water systems, are identified.

Sevil Khikmatova is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and a Policy Analyst at STEAR with a focus on climate governance and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Around one million Rohingya refugees have been living in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district since the large-scale persecution by Myanmar’s armed forces in Rakhine State in 2017. However, the camps are facing significant reductions in international humanitarian aid, increasing Bangladesh’s burden to sustain the livelihoods and security of the refugee population. This article examines the policy challenges surrounding Rohingya repatriation and explores options for the long-term and sustainable management of the refugee camps.

Key Takeaways

• The 2026 hearings at the International Court of Justice increase international accountability for the persecution of the Rohingya. Still, they do not address the current long-term humanitarian conditions faced by Rohingya refugees living in camps in Cox’s Bazar.

• Rohingya refugee camps are experiencing significant reductions in international humanitarian aid, creating growing challenges for both the refugees and the host country, Bangladesh.

• Bangladesh continues to advocate for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State, but any sustainable solution will require strong international coordination and guarantees of safety and rights for returnees.

The Rohingya: the background

The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority who are primarily located in the Rakhine State (formerly Arakan State) in western Myanmar, particularly in the northern townships bordering Bangladesh. Despite their long presence in the country, they have been denied citizenship under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, which excludes them from the list of officially recognised ethnic groups. As a result, the Rohingya have been rendered effectively stateless and have faced decades of discrimination, restrictions on movement, and periodic violence by the Tatmadaw, the armed forces.

Most Rohingya lived in Rakhine State, a coastal region bordering Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal. The situation escalated dramatically in August 2017 when the Myanmar military launched large-scale “clearance operations.” These operations resulted in mass killings, sexual violence, and the destruction of villages. Estimates suggest that at least 6,700 people were killed in the first month alone, while more than 730,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.

According to the United Nations, the Rohingya are widely described as the “most persecuted minority in the world.” Today, the Cox’s Bazar region hosts the largest refugee settlement globally, with more than one million Rohingya living in camps. Meanwhile, approximately 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, where they continue to face severe restrictions on movement, access to healthcare, and economic opportunities.

Refugees in Bangladesh also experience significant challenges, including restrictions on employment, limited access to education, growing security concerns, and increasing exposure to climate-related disasters. As international humanitarian funding declines partly due to shifting global priorities and evolving donor policies, particularly under the second administration of Donald Trump, which has emphasised reduced foreign aid commitments and an “America First” approach, Bangladesh faces mounting pressure regarding the long-term hosting of Rohingya refugees. Consequently, a key policy debate has emerged: whether Bangladesh should pursue the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar or continue hosting them while seeking alternative, durable solutions.

International Legal Context: The ICJ Case

The year 2026 marked an important moment for the Rohingya community as proceedings continued before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The case, The Gambia v. Myanmar, concerns alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The case was filed by The Gambia, which argues that Myanmar committed acts of genocide against the Rohingya population during the military operations of 2016 and 2017. During hearings, Gambian representatives presented witness testimony describing widespread violence, including killings, sexual assault, and the burning of villages.

Myanmar, however, rejects these allegations. Its representatives argue that the military operations were legitimate counter-terrorism measures carried out in response to attacks by armed groups in northern Rakhine State. Myanmar also disputes the reliability of evidence presented by international investigators and maintains that questions related to citizenship and identity are unrelated to genocide claims.

The NUG claims to represent the democratic will of the Myanmar people and has distanced itself from the military’s policies toward the Rohingya. It generally supports accountability for crimes committed during the military operations. It has expressed concern that allowing the junta to represent Myanmar in international courts could undermine the principles of the United Nations and the rule of law.

Domestic attitudes toward the Rohingya in Myanmar

Another complication in the case concerns who legitimately represents Myanmar before international institutions. Following the 2021 Myanmar military coup, a parallel government known as the National Unity Government (NUG) was formed by elected lawmakers and activists.

Domestic public opinion in Myanmar has also played a significant role in shaping attitudes toward the Rohingya and the genocide case. Among many within the Buddhist majority, perceptions of the Rohingya are strongly influenced by religious nationalism and Islamophobia. These concerns have been amplified by nationalist movements such as the 969 Movement and organisations like Ma Ba Tha.

In addition, the Rohingya are widely portrayed as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, often referred to as “Bengalis,” rather than as an indigenous ethnic group. Influential monks, including Ashin Wirathu, have helped spread anti-Muslim narratives through sermons and social media campaigns. These narratives have contributed to the denial or justification of violence against the Rohingya, with military operations often framed domestically as necessary counter-terrorism measures.

Camps in Bangladesh: humanitarian, environmental, and security concerns

Despite increasing international legal attention to the Rohingya crisis, legal proceedings do little to address the immediate humanitarian conditions faced by refugees in Bangladesh. The camps in Cox’s Bazar remain extremely overcrowded and are highly dependent on international humanitarian aid.

Refugees face severe restrictions on employment and education, while access to healthcare and formal schooling remains limited. At the same time, Bangladesh faces growing financial and security pressures related to the long-term hosting of such a large displaced population.

Environmental risks further complicate the situation. Both Bangladesh and Myanmar rank among the countries most vulnerable to extreme weather events. Cox’s Bazar is particularly prone to cyclones, floods, and landslides. The Cyclone Mocha damaged thousands of shelters and affected millions of people across the region.

Another relocation site, Bhasan Char, currently hosts around 32,574 Rohingya refugees but lies only about two meters above sea level, making it highly vulnerable to storm surges and sea-level rise.

These environmental risks contribute to secondary displacement and have pushed some Rohingya to undertake dangerous maritime journeys. In 2023 alone, around 4,500 Rohingya attempted irregular sea crossings, with more than 569 reported missing or dead. According to UNHCR, the number of Rohingya fleeing by boat increased to 9,195 in 2024, which is more than double the number recorded the previous year.

In addition to humanitarian and environmental challenges, the prolonged presence of a large refugee population has generated growing security concerns both for the refugees and for Bangladesh. The camps in Cox’s Bazar creatе conditions that increase vulnerability to crime, trafficking, and the activities of armed groups. One group that has drawn particular attention is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed organisation that originally emerged in Rakhine State. Although the majority of Rohingya refugees are civilians with no involvement in militant activities, the presence of armed factions and criminal groups has contributed to instability within the camps and raised national security concerns, urging Bangladesh to start the repatriation.

Bangladesh’s leadership has increasingly framed the protracted refugee situation as a long-term security and governance challenge. During discussions with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus reiterated the government’s position that “the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar remains the only sustainable solution to the crisis.” Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which means that it is not legally bound by the international framework that defines refugee rights and state obligations, thus hosting the Rohingya primarily on humanitarian grounds.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Prioritise safe and voluntary repatriation with international guarantees.

Bangladesh should continue advocating for safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar. However, the repatriation should occur only under internationally monitored conditions, guaranteeing security, citizenship rights, and freedom of movement or a safe zone for refugees.

2. Increase international responsibility sharing

The Rohingya crisis should not be solely Bangladesh’s burden. Donor states and international organisations must increase financial humanitarian contributions to Cox Bazar’s camps and support long-term assistance programs that target disaster risk prevention and access to livelihood opportunities.

3. Strengthen security governance in camps

Bangladesh should strengthen security governance in camps to address criminal networks, human trafficking, and armed group activity. However, security policies should not go against the human rights of refugees.

4. Reassess engagement with Myanmar’s evolving political landscape

Recent political developments in Myanmar, including a military-organised election led by Min Aung Hlaing following the 2021 Myanmar coup, may signal a shift from direct military rule to a nominally civilian government. While this transition could be presented internationally as a step toward legitimacy, in practice, the leadership and power structures are likely to remain unchanged, particularly regarding Rohingya rights.

Bangladesh and the international community should therefore approach engagement cautiously, ensuring that any negotiations or repatriation initiatives are based on verifiable improvements on the ground rather than formal political changes alone.

Sevil Khikmatova is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and a Policy Analyst at STEAR with a focus on climate governance and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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The Myanmar Junta is planning a sham election not as a democratic transition but as a political strategy to consolidate military power, which can lead to more instability without genuine political dialogue.

Key Takeaways

• The junta’s upcoming elections are not a genuine democratic transition but a carefully staged performance to project an image of normalisation and legitimacy.

• With restrictive laws, the junta dissolved key political parties, and the exclusion of vast conflict-affected regions. Rather than reducing tensions, the result is likely to intensify Myanmar’s ongoing civil war and deepen the humanitarian crisis.

• A sustainable path toward peace requires the inclusion of the NUG and other opposition actors through meaningful political dialogue.

Introduction

Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s military junta has faced international condemnation and domestic resistance. After four years of civil wars and economic crisis, the junta plans to hold a multistage election as proof of its commitment to democracy. Junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced that it will hold general elections in late 2025 and early 2026. He presents these polls as fulfilling the “ASEAN five-point roadmap” to restore order and civilian rule. The junta also lifted the state of emergency and changed its name from the “State Administration Council” to “State Security and Peace Commission” and appointed itself as “Acting President”, aiming to shed its pariah status.

The elections come amid the civil war, years of airstrikes, mass arrests, repression of opposition parties and war crimes, where thousands have been killed as a pro-democracy rebellion takes on a heavily armed military. Yet the junta insists these elections progress toward “free and fair elections”. The movement is designed to manufacture legitimacy for the junta. The upcoming polls are only to whitewash the junta’s crimes against humanity. The junta’s sham election will only intensify the already dire human rights and humanitarian crisis, cementing the junta’s backing of China’s influence risk entrenching military dominance.

The Junta’s Democratic Narrative

The junta repeatedly claims that the 2025 elections reflect its commitment to democratic norms under the 2008 Constitution. It maintains that the coup was justified due to so-called “election fraud” in the 2020 polls, a claim discredited by international experts, independent observers, and domestic political actors.

The Junta regime highlights technical preparations, such as a partial census in 2024 and voter list updates, to present an image of professionalism and inclusiveness for polls. To reinforce this narrative, the junta appointed a new Union Election Commission (UEC) led by loyalist Than Soe.

Internationally, Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s high-profile trips to China, India, Russia, and Belarus aim to earn diplomatic endorsement. Junta statements at regional forums emphasise “progress,” portraying Myanmar as slowly returning to normalcy. Domestically, small-scale amnesties and repeated claims of holding elections only in “secure areas” attempt to depict the military as a stabilising institution willing to return power.

The 2008 Constitution reserves 25% of parliamentary seats for the military. This enables the military to hold veto power over any constitutional amendment. This entire so-called election process is crafted to guarantee military victory regardless of the vote.

Reality of Repression and Control

Despite democratic claims, the junta has intensified opposition suppression before the so-called election. The junta increases its attacks on civilians to expand its territorial and administrative control in advance of its sham election. The junta has committed numerous abuses, including crimes against humanity against protesters and activists, and war crimes in ethnic minority areas. Since the coup, the junta has launched more than 2,700 airstrikes, dramatically increasing year after year.

On 29 July 2025, the junta enacted the “Law on the Prevention of Obstruction, Disruption, and Sabotage of Multiparty Democratic General Election” and criminalised the criticism, protests or disruption of any part of the electoral process. The law states “three to five years in prison for election sabotage; five to 10 years for damaging ballot boxes, polling stations, or voting machines (or life imprisonment if committed as a group): and 10-20 years for causing serious injury to voters, polling staff, candidates, or election officials”, restricting freedom of expression and speech. The authorities have arrested 94 people under the new law since August, including at least 4 children and several prominent personalities from the film industry, to intensify fear among the civilians.

On the other hand, the junta raised requirements for parties to participate in elections to oppress the opposition parties according to the “Political Parties Registration Law”. The junta also made various amendments; the 1st amendment on 30 January 2024, the 2nd amendment in July 2025 and the 3rd amendment on 21 September 2025 to win seats for the military-backed or allied in the upcoming polls. The new amendments restrict the minimum number of party members, the minimum number of nationwide offices, large financial deposits and prohibit anyone convicted of a crime from joining a party. Moreover, the political parties have to re-register within 60 days or be dissolved.

As a result, the law dissolved 40 political parties which failed to imply including the famous National League for Democracy (NLD), amid their landslide win in the 2020 general election. Moreover, the UEC also disbanded four re-registered political parties: National Democratic Force Party (NDF) for not having enough members, Mon Women’s Party (MWP), Union Farmer-Labour Party and the Democratic Party of National Politics (DNP) for not having the required number of offices. All these efforts show the regime do not want to bring democracy but to act against the potential contenders and enforce their own rules.

To enhance the election process, the military administration granted amnesty to more than 3,000 people for opposing their regime and dropped charges against more than 5,500 others on November 27, 2025. According to the Assistant Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) – AAPP, over 22,000 political prisoners still languish in jails, including the infamous political leader Aung San Suu Kyi. More than 6,100 women and 629 children have been arrested since the 2021 coup, showcasing that the junta’s amnesty is an effort to cover their sham election.

Despite the military efforts, many experts, international governments and the United Nations state that the upcoming polls could never be free and fair. UN rights office spokesman Jeremy Laurence said, “This military-controlled ballot will be conducted in an atmosphere rife with threats and violence”. Usage of electronic voting machines, electronic surveillance technology utilising AI-biometric tracking, raises fraud concerns as civil society, media, and observers are barred.

The National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic armed groups reject the upcoming elections and call for decisive ASEAN actions, labelling the polls illegitimate. Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) documents failures against international standards for the upcoming polls, from voter suppression to a level playing field. ANFREL also warn that the election can only bring the country to fall deeper into conflict.

Why the Elections Cannot Solve the Crisis

The upcoming polls fail to address Myanmar’s fundamental political crisis. They ignore the core issues that have fueled conflict for decades: military domination, lack of federalism, and the public’s overwhelming rejection of the coup. The United States Institute of Peace states that over 92% of the population supports the NUG. The junta, on the other hand, rejects NUG, CRPH and defence forces, labelling them as terrorist groups. This designation blocks any form of political communication or negotiation between the parties and further entrenches the conflict.

Moreover, the elections will be held only in areas under military control, excluding large parts of the country administered by resistance forces or ethnic organisations. The result of the upcoming polls is predictable, as the military-backed or allied parties will hold the power, and this cannot solve the prolonged civil war and humanitarian crisis. This can only formalise the Myanmar military regime and deepen domestic conflict and instability.

Apart from that, views from international communities remain divided. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the European Union have imposed sanctions on Myanmar in response to the coup and have not recognised the Junta’s sham election plan. Even ASEAN faces a diplomatic dilemma over the upcoming sham election. The ASEAN stated that they will not send any monitors to the upcoming elections, and the junta regime should prioritise peace over elections, accept the upcoming polls, and it is undeniable that the military’s only hope is that the elections will end widespread opposition to their grip on power.

Conclusion

The 2025 elections are a political performance designed to legitimise Myanmar’s military rule and not restore democracy. Through the coordinated propaganda, restrictive laws, and selective amnesties, the junta is showcasing the appearance of democratic progress amid the systematic repression of its opposition parties.

The upcoming polls cannot resolve Myanmar’s political crisis as they exclude genuine political actors and aim to entrench military dominance. The current political situation cannot be solved by offering legitimacy to the brutal regime. Only real political reforms and settlements can bring peace and stability. The further political settlements and democratic transition processes must include NUG and opposition actors and end military violence for a sustainable nation-building process. It is undeniable that the current sham election is designed to legitimise power for the junta’s generals.

Mhue Aung is a final-year CDM student with over two years of experience in humanitarian work. He is currently a migrant worker in Thailand.

Grappling with polycrisis, Myanmar is falling behind in its efforts to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the targets set under its own Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP).

Key Takeaways:

• Emergence and Evolution of Sustainability: The concept of “sustainability” emerged around the 17th century during the Enlightenment era, when a choice arose between profit-oriented industrialisation and a sustainable community

• Historical Factors from the precolonial era to recent years, Influencing Myanmar’s Sustainability Context: from dependencies of agriculture during the monarchy to long-lasting civil war after independence.

• Although efforts were made along with the democratisation of the country but the progress faced severe setbacks after the 2021 coup, and implementing the SDGs is struggling in Myanmar due to polycrisis, calling for action for the next generation.

A brief history of Sustainable Development

The world has transformed from the very beginning and is still changing. But with the emergence of humankind 2,000,000 years ago, the dynamics of change in the world were shifted. Although the very first man depended on nature for their survival, later man tried to shape the world. In the 17th century, the Enlightenment era, a man had to choose whether to go for profit-oriented industrialisation or a sustainable community with less material development. Since that time, the term “sustainability” has emerged. But due to colonialism, competition among countries, and technological advancement, it led to industrialisation and excessive resource extraction. But in the 18th century, society became aware of the effect of it and started thinking that human society should live within its limits. A concept that the growth of the global economy should not continue indefinitely, but should be maintained at a point where people are satisfied and happy. This concept led to the development of 3E: environment, economy, and equity. But the exploitation still goes on, entering the 20th century, and the people became aware of environmental degradation after World War II. In the 1950s, environmental groups started warning of the consequences of plastics, chemicals, synthetics, pesticides, and fossil fuels.

The remarkable release of “Silent Spring” in 1962 made people aware of the effects of pesticides, called for action and public movement, followed by the first “Earth Day” in 1970. The policy level considerations were foundational in this era, like the enactment of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act in the United States. The international effort was through the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in 1972 in Stockholm. In 1992, the Rio De Janeiro Earth Summit participants discussed environmental degradation, strategies for sustainable development, and set Agenda 21, the comprehensive action plan, followed by the 1997 Kyoto protocol through relentless effort. The introduction of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals to be met by 2015, then the setting of 17 Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) in 2015, which come with targets set to be met by 2030.

Understanding of sustainability

To meet those 17 sustainable development goals is not that simple; the practice and understanding of those goals is critical. Although there are good examples of implementing SDGs in lower-income countries, developed countries have more chances of achieving these goals. Indeed, in 1996, Dobson said there were over 300 definitions of sustainable development. And these two words, “sustainable development,” became the policy slogan of today’s era. These terms cover a broad definition, and this phenomenon became problematic in the effort to be understood by the general public. In 1987, the Brundtland Report, the origin of the widely cited definition of sustainability, defined the words as “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” But it is still missing an important qualifying test, which leads to a broader definition, understanding, and practice of it.

The Context of Myanmar

In the context of Myanmar, the current effort of implementing sustainability is heavily influenced by the past, since the precolonial era. While the Western world was extensively practicing industrialisation, Myanmar, under a monarchy, was largely dependent on agriculture and had never seen industrialisation on a full scale. After the exile of the last monarchy, the country was administered as part of British India. The British bought systemic forest management, infrastructure development, but the social issues were largely neglected, and the economy was mainly foreign profit-oriented, as the country became part of an export-oriented enterprise of Western colonialism. During the post-colonial era, started long-lasting civil war started, followed by the 1962 coup led by General Ne Win. The country was ruled by socialism. During this era, the Western world experienced rapid economic development, known as “The Golden Age of Capitalism,” and the concept of sustainable development. But in Myanmar, the Ne Win dictatorship dove into an endless war, while the education system was centralised, and education resources were strictly controlled by the government. The economy was run under socialism, along with nationalisation of the consumer industry, although the compensation board was established. But due to their verdict, the amount compensated was minimal. And followed by the demonetisation of high-value currency notes, the economy had fallen. the un According to this context, it was unimaginable for sustainable development as the people are struggling in poor living conditions. The policy setting and management are highly centralised and were considered under the theme of nationalism. Following the 1988 uprising that caused atrocities by the Myanmar Military, power was handed to Than Shwe in 1992, whose board started a market economy, allowing foreign investment, but the people of Myanmar are still thriving under a military regime. The education system is still highly centralised and just runs as part of military propaganda. Apart from it, as the military was continuing the civil war with many ethnic armed groups, there were a lot of human rights violations and war crimes.

In 2010, the democratisation movement brought the concept of sustainability, as stated by H.E. Dr Sai Mauk Kham in 2012 at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, “Myanmar believes in Green Economy and Green Growth as a new development policy.” But the government of Myanmar at that time was heavily shadowed by the military, and still, the exploitation of human rights is going on. The economic index was seen as a significant increase, along with reentering the global economy after reducing sanctions. The education sector also initiated reform, supported by many civic organizations. The concept of environmental management has been considered at the policy-making level. After the first democratisation era, followed by the NLD government, when was a lot of effort in sustainability, especially in the environmental sector, setting the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan(2018-2030), together with master plans for achieving those goals. The transformation of the business sector has also been boosted. But the government is still unaware of social well-being, and the most remarkable is the genocide against the Rohingya. Impacting the country’s effort on sustainability goals. After the 2021 coup, the country had fallen into a full-blown polycrisis, with severe environmental degradation due to increased resource exploitation to feed the war.

Challenges in building Sustainable Myanmar

Recognizing the historical context, the movement of sustainability in Myanmar is very young. Educating people about sustainability is critical for implementing the SDGs, but in a country facing an unstable economy, centralised education, and human rights issues, the concept of sustainability is not even within in policy-making level and thus hinders reaching the concept to the general public. Also, practicing sustainability at the community level is an objection. The country with an electricity coverage of around 40% of its population can’t convince its people not to use biomass as an energy source. The decade-long degraded education system cannot provide enough information for the rising generation about the sustainability of the future. While the daily income is less than 2 dollars, people cannot be optimistic about a sustainable approach like EPR (Extended Producer Responsibility). The industrial sector of Myanmar is still practicing CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility) programs as philanthropic work rather than a pathway to responsible business, which could also be linked with the public attitude toward CSR works. In combination with those situations, from a lack of basic education to poverty, the country hosts locally to regionally threatening actions, most obviously, of rare-earth mining, although Myanmar is the third largest exporter of REE, while most of the mines are in war-torn areas with no regulation to follow, along with other resource extraction, fuel the risk of country’s sustainability. Myanmar is also located in a disaster-prone region, which makes most of its area vulnerable, severely affected by climate change. Last but crucially, the country urgently desires to find an equal and inclusive peace, while representing that every voice, to eliminate the ongoing world’s longest civil war. Without peace, the above-mentioned sector will simply cannot be implemented.

Conclusion

Overall, the situation in Myanmar is still in polycrisis for achieving sustainable development. Although the nation is in crisis, the pathway to sustainability can still be fulfilled, and also should not be forgotten. Even if we, the people, can surpass this political crisis, the last thing our posterity will inherit will be a chaotic land.

Thuta Aung is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc), holds a B.Sc. in Geology, and is currently pursuing Environmental Science at Chiang Mai University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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In September 2025, the world marks a remarkable milestone: the 1,500th anniversary of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. For many, this commemoration is primarily religious, honouring the life of Islam’s final prophet. Yet beyond faith and devotion, Muhammad was also a political leader, strategist, and resistance figure whose legacy speaks directly to today’s global aspirations for peace, justice, and inclusive institutions, as envisioned in Sustainable Development Goal 16. His leadership offers enduring lessons for societies grappling with oppression, conflict, and fragmentation, which remain especially relevant for Myanmar’s struggle to overcome authoritarian rule and build a just, inclusive future.

Muhammad as a Resistance Leader

Muhammad began his mission in a hostile environment. Mecca’s elite families, guardians of the Kaaba and beneficiaries of the city’s trade monopoly, viewed his message as threatening their religious authority and economic order (Armstrong, 2006). For thirteen years in Mecca, he and his followers endured persecution, social boycott, and violence. Yet he chose a path of patient endurance, strategic alliances, and calculated steps rather than outright confrontation.

When survival in Mecca became impossible, Muhammad planned the Hijra, the migration to Medina in 622 CE. This was not a retreat but a deliberate act of resistance: preserving his community, avoiding annihilation, and repositioning himself in a new political space. In Myanmar’s terms, it mirrors the relocation of activists, students, and leaders to liberated areas or across borders, ensuring continuity of struggle even under existential threat.

The Constitution of Medina: Building Alliances

Upon arriving in Medina, Muhammad became a spiritual guide and a political architect. The Constitution of Medina (622 CE) was a groundbreaking charter that united Muslims, Jews, Christians, and polytheists into a single political community. It recognised their distinct identities but bound them under mutual obligations, defence, and justice.

For Myanmar’s resistance, this is a striking lesson. The Spring Revolution has mobilized diverse actors: Bamar pro-democracy forces, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), students, and grassroots communities. Yet fragmentation remains a critical challenge. Muhammad’s model demonstrates that unity does not require uniformity. Alliances can be built on shared survival, mutual respect, and common defence, while differences are acknowledged rather than erased.

In contemporary Myanmar, a “Charter of Resistance” modelled on this principle could formalise alliances between EAOs and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), ensuring commitments to protect civilians, respect diversity, and prevent internecine conflict.

The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah: Strategic Diplomacy

Perhaps one of Muhammad’s most profound political moves was the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 CE). At first glance, it didn't seem very comfortable, granting concessions to the Quraysh, including delaying the Muslims’ right to pilgrimage. Yet Muhammad accepted it, recognising the long-term advantages of peace and legitimacy (N. Sk, 2024). Within two years, the truce enabled unprecedented outreach, conversion, and political strength.

For Myanmar, the parallel is clear: strategic pauses and negotiations can serve resistance, not betray it. Diplomatic engagement with regional actors, ASEAN, or even military factions at the local level may appear as a compromise. Yet, if framed carefully, such diplomacy can expand legitimacy, buy time, and weaken the enemy’s political stranglehold. The key lesson is patience and vision: not every setback is defeat; sometimes, restraint is a strategy.

Ethics of Resistance: Restraint and Mercy

Even in conflict, Muhammad emphasised moral boundaries. Traditions record his instructions to armies: do not kill non-combatants, destroy crops, or harm religious figures (Time, 2016). When he eventually re-entered Mecca as a victor in 630 CE, he chose forgiveness over revenge, granting amnesty to those who had once persecuted him (Sultan, 2014).

For Myanmar’s armed resistance, these ethics are crucial. Reports of abuses by both the junta and some resistance elements risk undermining the moral legitimacy of the revolution. Myanmar’s struggle is not only military but also psychological and moral. Just as the Prophet’s mercy transformed enemies into allies, the resistance must embed justice and restraint to win trust among communities, including those still hesitant or fearful.

Lessons for Myanmar’s Armed Resistance

Muhammad accepted armed struggle when it became necessary. At Badr (624 CE), Uhud (625 CE), and the Battle of the Trench (627 CE), he fought defensively to secure survival. Yet these engagements were marked by strategy, discipline, and moral clarity rather than vengeance (Armstrong, 2006).

Myanmar’s PDFs and EAOs similarly face a dilemma: fighting a brutal military while avoiding cycles of indiscriminate violence. Lessons from Muhammad’s resistance include strategic relocation (Hijra), which preserves the movement through relocation and avoids premature confrontation that could annihilate forces. Alliance Building (Constitution of Medina): Formalise military coordination with inclusive political agreements. Defensive Posture (Badr, Uhud): Prioritise defence and survival over conquest or territorial ambition. Ethics in War: Uphold codes of conduct to protect civilians, religious institutions, and humanitarian norms, and Reconciliation (Conquest of Mecca): Prepare for political reconciliation once the tide turns; mercy can consolidate victory better than punishment.

Ethnic Alliances and Myanmar’s Plural Society

Muhammad’s most significant political achievement was weaving tribes and faiths into a pluralistic polity. For Myanmar, where decades of ethnic conflict have scarred trust, this lesson is urgent.

The National Unity Government (NUG) has sought to forge alliances with EAOs, but credibility gaps remain. Drawing from Medina, alliances must be military but also constitutional and inclusive. Agreements should guarantee autonomy, cultural rights, and equal participation. Just as Medina’s charter recognised Jews as part of the “ummah - society” without erasing their faith, Myanmar’s new political compact must affirm ethnic nationalities as equal partners in the union, not subordinate minorities.

Moral Framing vs. Military Tactics

A central lesson from Muhammad’s leadership is integrating moral vision with political realism. He combined strategic military defence with uncompromising justice and mercy. For Myanmar, this means the resistance to firepower cannot be reduced. Military advances must be embedded in a larger narrative: the struggle for justice, dignity, and a future where all communities, Bamar, Kachin, Karen, Rakhine, Chin, Shan, Rohingya, and many more, stand as equals. If Myanmar’s resistance becomes only about guns, it risks mirroring the junta’s brutality. However, if military tactics are coupled with a clear moral and inclusive framework, they can inspire enduring legitimacy.

Toward a Vision of Victory

For Muhammad, victory was not merely defeating the Quraysh militarily but establishing a just and inclusive order. Similarly, for Myanmar, victory must be measured not only in the junta's collapse but also in creating a system where authoritarianism cannot reemerge.

Muhammad’s insistence on justice, his ability to transform enemies into allies, and his vision of plural coexistence provide a roadmap. Myanmar’s resistance must think beyond immediate battlefields, toward building a future state that embodies justice, equality, and reconciliation.

As the world marks 1,500 years since the birth of Prophet Muhammad, his legacy speaks powerfully to Myanmar’s present. He endured persecution, built alliances across divides, embraced diplomacy when strategic, fought defensively when necessary, and upheld ethics and mercy even in victory.

For Myanmar, struggling through one of its darkest chapters, the lessons are clear:

• Build inclusive alliances, respecting diversity.

• Balance armed resistance with moral restraint.

• Use diplomacy and patience as tools of strength.

• Envision victory not just as regime change, but as justice, dignity, and reconciliation.

Fifteen centuries later, Prophet Muhammad’s resistance leadership remains a beacon for Muslims and all who seek freedom against tyranny. Like his, Myanmar’s struggle demands resilience, vision, and the courage to lead with strength and mercy.

References

• Armstrong, K. (2006). Muhammad: A prophet for our time. HarperCollins.

• N. Sk. (2024). Prophet Muhammad’s political philosophy – Part II: Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. Islamonweb.

• Sultan, S. (2014, December 24). The problem with “Moderate Islam.” Time.

• Time. (2016, March 24). Jihadists don’t understand the Qur’an. Time.

• Wikipedia. (2025). Political aspects of Islam. Wikipedia.

• Wikipedia. (n.d.). Muhammad in Mecca. Wikipedia.

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Harry Myo Lin is a Myanmar expert based in Austria with extensive experience across Myanmar and Asia, specialising in peace-building, International Relations, inter-religious dialogue, and promoting freedom of religion and belief.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

The opinions expressed in these articles do not represent the official stance of SRIc - Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre. The Sabai Times is committed to publishing a range of perspectives that may not align with editorial policy.

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International aid should not be a chance to be exploited by the Myanmar junta, and delivering humanitarian assistance must be supported through international and trusted non-government organizations.

Key Takeaways:

1. While focusing on helping the affected Myanmar people, international organizations and foreign governments should be aware that they do not recognize Myanmar’s Junta's legitimacy and condemn the current bombing and military actions.

2. The UN and other nations should use neutral humanitarian organizations to provide relief aid to contribute equally to all affected areas.

3. History has shown that the military regime obstructed the disaster relief efforts for exploitation.

The catastrophic earthquake of 7.7 magnitude in central Myanmar resulting thousands of casualties and significant damages across the nation, especially in Sagaing, Mandalay, Naypitaw, and several other places. On the other hand, Myanmar’s Junta is taking advantage of this crisis as a chance to build legitimacy and initiate diplomatic tools. For the military junta, international aid is an opportunity to leverage diplomatic recognition. International governments should ensure that all humanitarian assistance reaches affected communities.

Background Information

Myanmar is famous for its Earthquake Geographical location among geologists, and many scholars have warned about the great potentiality of a great earthquake. A devastating earthquake happened in Myanmar on March 28, 2025, and caused over 3,000 casualties and led to the collapse of numerous historical and residential buildings. The National Unity Government outstated a two-week partial ceasefire and relief plan with CDMers if the junta guarantees their safety. Many international governments have pledged to send rescue teams to Myanmar, but there is no sign of a national rescue plan by SAC released yet. Meanwhile, the air strikes have continued in numerous areas, resulting in more causalities during this.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing declared a State of Emergency in the affected area and requested international assistance after the earthquake. The SAC also used this disaster to strengthen its legitimacy by phone conversations with international government leaders, hosting international rescue teams, and accepting international assistance. The Junta uses natural disasters as a chance to communicate with different governments after long-time international diplomatic isolation.

The National Union Government announced a military pause for quake response except for defensive actions. Meanwhile, the Myanmar Army is continuing attacks on different areas, including the earthquake-affected places, resulting in a significant worsening of an already acute situation. The international governments should condemn these inhumane war crimes, which can lead to tremendous devastation. Death tolls are rising while most international governments wait to get the junta’s approval to rescue.

Myanmar military junta’s history of obstructing International Aid

It is notable that even though humanitarian assistance is essential for rescuing Myanmar’s earthquake victims, the Military Government has failed many times in responding to natural disasters in time and has a dire record of exploiting natural disasters. During Cyclone Nargis, the military blocked international relief aid to maintain control and prevent external interference from preserving their sovereignty. As a result, more than 100,000 people died. In the 2022 Cyclone Mocha, the military also blocked aid for storm victims to avoid political leverage and prevent opposition mobilization. From these examples, the international governments should reconsider directly supporting humanitarian assistance through junta regarding the de facto power in disaster-affected areas.

Strategic Approach to Humanitarian Aid

While the international governments try to help Myanmar’s earthquake-affected population, they must learn from the historical event. It is undeniable that collaborating with local authorities is currently the quickest way to rescue people living under rubble. However, the most effective and efficient way to support the people has to be a clear and systematic message, not helping the junta. The Australian government announced it would provide immediate humanitarian relief through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). International emergency humanitarian assistance should be delivered in time while not accepting the military regime as a legitimate government. It should condemn the brutal air strikes and not take this devastating earthquake as an opportunity to expand the Myanmar military junta's legitimacy.

The world must act as fast as it can to deliver humanitarian aid while rejecting any attempts by the military junta to exploit this scheme for political gain in the upper hand. This devastating earthquake should not serve as an opportunity to strengthen the regime that continues to commit war crimes against its people.

Aung Thet Paing Hmue is a final-year CDM student with over two years of experience in humanitarian work. He is currently a migrant worker in Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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On March 28, as Myanmar’s Muslims knelt in prayer during Ramadan’s holiest Friday, the ground beneath them split open. A 7.7 magnitude earthquake tore through central Myanmar, flattening neighborhoods in Mandalay and burying entire communities. Two days later, survivors dig through rubble with their hands, hospitals lie in ruins, and the world’s silence is deafening. This is not just a natural disaster—it is the culmination of decades of systemic discrimination, militarized neglect, and global apathy.

The quake struck at the precise moment mosques were most crowded. Hundreds died instantly under collapsing roofs—structures the governments had long forbidden worshippers to reinforce. “We pleaded for years to repair cracks, to add beams,” said a Sagaing imam, his voice trembling as he gestured to a mound of debris where his mosque once stood. “They said no. Now my congregation is gone.” Nearly 450 deaths are confirmed, but survivors whisper the true toll is far higher. These were not random tragedies. They were political choices. Myanmar’s military junta, which has systematically targeted religious minorities for decades, turned places of worship into death traps. The earthquake merely finished the job.

There are no rescue teams, cranes, or hope in the aftermath. The junta, accused of ethnic cleansing and war crimes, has abandoned its people. Youth volunteers who once mobilized during crises have fled conscription or been jailed. “We have shovels and desperation—that’s all,” said a 24-year-old former teacher digging through the ruins of a monastery where hundreds of monks perished. Hospitals, already gutted by the regime’s neglect, lack even basic supplies. “We’re using torn curtains as bandages,” a nurse confessed, her hands stained with blood. The junta’s legacy is a nation stripped of infrastructure and empathy, where disaster response is an act of solitary defiance.

But this earthquake did not strike a blank slate. It shattered a country already fractured by civil war, where junta airstrikes have displaced millions and children learn to duck before they learn to read. Ancient cultural landmarks—the Ava Bridge, the Mahamuni Pagoda, centuries-old monasteries, churches, temples, and mosques—have crumbled, erasing history alongside lives. “These sites held our stories,” said an 82-year-old grandma, staring at the dust where her village temple once stood. “Now we are ghosts in our land.” The quake’s aftershocks are literal and metaphorical: trauma layered on trauma, magnifying grief. Families who escaped junta violence now sleep in fields, fearing landslides will finish what soldiers started.

The world’s response will define this moment. International aid agencies face a moral quagmire: collaborate with a murderous regime that steals aid or bypass it to support local networks operating in the shadows. History offers a grim lesson. After Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the junta diverted relief supplies, leaving over 100,000 to die. Today, the stakes are higher. Myanmar’s civil society—battered but unbroken—pleads for direct support. “Don’t wait for the regime’s permission,” urged a volunteer with an underground rescue group. “We’re drowning now.” Grassroots medics, community kitchens, and ad-hoc rescue teams need funding, not sympathy. ASEAN and the UN must act without the junta’s consent. Every hour of delay is a death sentence.

This catastrophe is a test of global conscience. To view it as merely a “natural disaster” is to ignore the man-made rot beneath: a regime that engineers suffering and a world that too often tolerates it. Myanmar’s people are not asking for pity. They demand solidarity—the kind that bypasses tyrants and empowers those fighting to survive. Donate to trusted local organizations. Pressure governments to reject junta-controlled aid channels. Amplify the voices of those the regime tries to silence. The earthquake was inevitable in a land stripped of its right to prepare; the suffering that followed was not. As survivors dig graves with their hands, the world must decide: Will it watch, or will it finally act?

Harry Myo Lin is a Myanmar commentator on Southeast Asian politics and human rights.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

The opinions expressed in these articles do not represent the official stance of SRIc - Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre. The Sabai Times is committed to publishing a range of perspectives that may not align with editorial policy.

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The EU’s proactive and inclusive approach to Myanmar’s crisis, amid a potential US policy shift under Trump 2.0, makes it a critical advocate for democracy, human rights, and sustainable democracy in Myanmar.

Key takeaways:

1. With a possible shift toward isolationist policies under a second Trump administration, the EU must fill the leadership void, using targeted sanctions, diplomatic tools, and support for the National Unity Government (NUG) to uphold democratic efforts in Myanmar.

2. The EU should recognize the NUG while linking recognition to reforms, like adopting a federal charter and ensuring inclusivity, particularly addressing the citizenship rights of marginalized groups like the Rohingya.

3. The EU should strengthen efforts for military accountability through sanctions, support for international legal actions in the International Criminal Court, and collaboration with partners like ASEAN to challenge the junta and advocate for federal democracy.

The EU has taken a strong stance on Myanmar’s crisis, implementing targeted sanctions on junta leaders, an arms embargo, and restrictions on surveillance technology exports. These measures and support for civil society underscore its commitment to Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces. EU-backed initiatives, such as the LIFT (Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund), STEP Democracy, My Justice, Joint Peace Fund, MADE in Myanmar, and a newly launched EU Mobility Program for Myanmar with a €4.8 million grant, also reflect a comprehensive approach to fostering resilience and empowerment.

US retreat under Trump?

While coordination with the United States remains vital, isolationist policies under the incoming Trump administration could weaken US engagement, jeopardizing initiatives like the Burma Act and sanctions against military entities—and, indeed, proactive EU efforts. The Heritage Foundation, a think tank close to the Trump team, recently critiqued the Biden administration’s $45 million allocation for a “diversity and inclusion” scholarship program in Burma, labeling it an example of wasteful government spending. Additionally, Senate Republican Leader McConnell, a long-time supporter of Burma’s democracy, stepped down from his position as Senate Republican Leader.

Any decrease in US engagement with Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement would leave a significant gap in international pressure on the junta, particularly regarding issues like a return to democracy, refugee resettlement, and military accountability. However, Trump’s nomination of Sen. Marco Rubio as Secretary of State could signal hope for renewed US engagement in Myanmar, given his prior involvement in Senate actions opposing the Myanmar junta.

EU’s multilateral strategy

On the other hand, the EU does have diplomatic tools of its own. It could, for instance, increase recognition of the National Unity Government (NUG), the anti-junta government. Informal recognition of NUG representation offices by EU member states and existing NUG offices in France and the Czech Republic would have symbolic and practical significance. Symbolically, it would reaffirm the EU’s rejection of the junta’s legitimacy and support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement. Practically, it would provide the NUG with greater access to financial aid, logistical support, and international resources. The EU could also enable the NUG to issue temporary passports to Myanmar nationals in Europe, similar to what South Korea has done. This would make it easier for Myanmar nationals to travel and study in the EU, while reducing refugee-related administrative burdens on the EU. These steps would additionally enhance the NUG’s credibility and operational capacity.

Recognition, however, must be tied to reforms, including the NUG adopting a transitional federal constitution, repealing the 1982 Citizenship Law, and ensuring full citizenship rights for marginalized groups, particularly the Rohingya. The NUG must also address atrocities committed by some affiliated groups, such as the Arakan Army’s attacks on the Rohingya. The EU’s November 2024 statement at the UN General Assembly underscored its concern over worsening human rights abuses in Myanmar, including hate speech, village destruction, and the use of civilians as human shields by both the military and the Arakan Army.

The EU’s primary responsibility, though, is to ensure accountability for the military’s human rights abuses. Continued sanctions targeting its economic networks, along with support for international efforts to prosecute those responsible for the Rohingya genocide, are essential. The EU should continue to back initiatives at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC) to ensure that perpetrators of war crimes and genocide are held accountable for their actions. The EU can also work to amplify the UN-led Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and other human rights organizations’ efforts to document atrocities and build international momentum for accountability.

To amplify its impact, the EU must collaborate closely with international partners. Coordination with the U.S remains vital, even under the “America First” policy shift. Strengthening ties with ASEAN, despite its limitations, is equally critical. Working with regional democracy advocates like Indonesia and Malaysia, the ASEAN Chair in 2025 could help bolster multilateral pressure on Myanmar’s junta. Additionally, the EU should continue aligning with global partners like the UK to challenge the veto power of China and Russia in the UN Security Council, advocating for stronger measures against the regime. Through these efforts, the EU can enhance its role in promoting an inclusive resolution to Myanmar’s crisis, supporting federal democracy and sustainable peace in the region.

Myanmar’s struggle for democracy is at a critical crossroads. In the face of a potential US retreat, the EU’s role becomes even more pivotal. By continuing to apply diplomatic and economic pressure on Myanmar’s military junta, supporting the NUG, and advocating for human rights and inclusive governance, the EU can lead efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar. Conditional recognition of the NUG, strategic partnerships with ASEAN, and unwavering commitment to justice for victims of atrocities in ICC and ICJ will send a clear message that the international community stands with the people of Myanmar.

Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) originally published this piece in February 2025.

Tin Shine Aung is the Consulting Director at the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). In addition to his professional roles, Tin Shine Aung is pursuing a PhD in Sustainability Science at the University of Lisbon, Portugal.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Contact: sabaitimes@shwetaungthagathu.com

Key Takeaways:

1. The abrupt termination of USAID leaves millions without essential aid, worsening health, education, and human rights conditions globally, especially in Myanmar.

2. USAID’s closure weakens U.S. influence, allowing China and Russia to expand their soft power through aid and infrastructure investments.

3. The decision, driven by Trump and Elon Musk, prioritizes internal politics over global security, risking disease outbreaks, economic instability, and weakened democratic institutions.

Introduction

In today’s world, national interest has become a relentless battle for power, where winning takes precedence over humanity. Leaders make decisions from high offices, absorbed in economic gains and global dominance, often blind to the human cost of their policies. With a single stroke of a pen, livelihoods are shattered and futures erased. The recent Trump administration’s abrupt termination of USAID is more than a bureaucratic decision—it is a devastating blow to millions. As Myanmar’s people endure civil war and humanitarian crises, this policy shift adds yet another layer of suffering. This article examines the decisions, their controversies, and the dire consequences for Myanmar’s people.

History of USAID

Established in 1961 under President John F. Kennedy, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was created to streamline U.S. foreign aid efforts. Inspired by the Marshall Plan, it aimed to combat poverty, promote economic growth, and counter Soviet influence during the Cold War. Its formation marked the start of the "decade of development," setting the foundation for six decades of U.S. global assistance.

USAID operated with an annual budget approved by Congress through the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriation. In FY2023, it managed over $40 billion, distributing funds through grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts with NGOs, international organizations, and foreign governments. While USAID prioritized local partnerships for sustainable impact, political and economic factors often influenced its operations.

Global Support Highlights

Since its founding, USAID has been the world’s largest aid donor, distributing $43.8 billion in FY2023 alone. It funded critical sectors such as governance ($16.8 billion), humanitarian assistance ($10.5 billion), and health ($7 billion), alongside investments in economic growth, agriculture, infrastructure, and environmental sustainability. Operating in approximately 130 countries, USAID shaped global development, supporting regions from Sub-Saharan Africa to Asia and Europe.

Among its landmark achievements, USAID played a pivotal role in eradicating smallpox, advancing child survival campaigns, and revolutionizing agriculture through the Green Revolution. It has been instrumental in the fight against HIV/AIDS, with the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) saving over 26 million lives. USAID also led major disaster responses, from the Haiti earthquake to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war.

USAID in Myanmar

USAID’s involvement in Myanmar has evolved through shifting political landscapes and humanitarian crises. Although its mission closed in 1989, the U.S. continued supporting Burmese refugees along the Thailand border. Health programs resumed in 1998, expanding significantly after Cyclone Nargis in 2008. A full USAID Mission was re-established in 2012, deepening U.S. engagement. After the 2021 military coup, USAID redirected $42.4 million away from projects that could benefit the regime, prioritizing humanitarian relief.

Over the years, USAID has supported health, democracy, human rights, food security, and economic development. It funded independent media, peace efforts, and education programs like the Diversity and Inclusion Scholarship Program (DISP). The agency also responded to crises, such as Typhoon Yagi in 2024, allocating $3 million in aid. Since 2012, the U.S. has committed nearly $1.5 billion to Myanmar’s democratic transition and economic reforms, with over $1.3 billion directed toward the Rohingya crisis since 2017. In 2024, USAID provided $238 million to Myanmar, with 47% ($111.86 million) dedicated to humanitarian assistance.

And to highlight one of the impactful USAID support projects in Myanmar, since 2011, Shae Thot project has improved health, food security, and water access for 1.34 million people in Myanmar. It provided 644,000 with clean water, trained 66,000 farmers, and empowered 1,360 villages with $2.1 million in community-led initiatives.

Trump is Back: Power Play

Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 election marked a dramatic political comeback, bringing sweeping policy changes. On his first day in office, January 20, 2025, he issued an executive order imposing a 90-day freeze on all foreign aid to assess alignment with his "America First" agenda. This move set the stage for dismantling USAID, which Trump—backed by adviser Elon Musk—labeled a “criminal organization” plagued by waste and ideological bias.

The administration justified USAID’s closure by alleging mismanagement, claiming funds were misused on diversity and gender-related initiatives. Despite representing less than 1% of the federal budget, foreign aid was seen as inefficient. By late January, USAID’s online presence was erased, and senior officials were placed on leave. By February 23, nearly all USAID staff were placed on administrative leave, with plans to cut 1,600 positions.

Following a six-week review, on March 10, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the cancellation of 83% of USAID programs, terminating 5,200 contracts deemed misaligned with U.S. interests, and did not mention which programs were being cancelled. The remaining programs will shift to the State Department.

Ending Aid: Human Cost

Global Impact

The abrupt funding freeze forced major NGOs, including Mercy Corps and the International Rescue Committee, to shut down healthcare services and lay off staff. Doctors of the World Turkey dismissed 280 workers and closed 12 field hospitals in Syria. Confusing waiver conditions further destabilized aid operations.

Essential healthcare programs—including maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS treatment, and malaria prevention—were severely cut. The World Food Program shut down its Southern Africa office, disrupting food aid for millions.

In a series of leaked memos, Nicholas Enrich, USAID’s acting assistant administrator for global health, warned of catastrophic consequences if aid cuts persist. Projections include 1 million starving children losing nutrition access, a 39% rise in malaria deaths, soaring tuberculosis rates, and unchecked outbreaks of Ebola and avian flu. Enrich stressed that the cuts threaten global stability and U.S. national security, urging immediate restoration of funding.

Local Impact

The termination of USAID funding devastated Myanmar’s most vulnerable, who are in dire need of humanitarian aid due to the civil war. Scholarships were revoked, democracy and human rights programs collapsed, and anti-trafficking and environmental projects ceased. Clinics along the Thai-Myanmar border permanently shut down, leaving refugees without medical care. And starting next month, over one million people in Myanmar, including 100,000 displaced Rohingya, will lose lifesaving food aid from WFP due to a $60 million funding shortfall, worsening hunger amid escalating conflict.

Since the 2021 coup, the number of Myanmar refugees in Thailand’s border camps has surged by 31%, reaching over 100,000 as of December 2024, according to The Border Consortium. And these refugees and displaced persons are struggling to access medical care, with shortages of supplies like oxygen leading to preventable deaths. The International Rescue Committee, which supports 80,000 refugees, and the Thai Border Consortium, which relied on 60% of its funding from the U.S., faced severe setbacks. With nearly 20 million people in Myanmar projected to require aid in 2025, the sudden loss of U.S. assistance deepened the crisis.

The real human cost is stark. Wah K’Ler Paw, a 30-year-old refugee in Thailand’s Mae La camp, lost dialysis access when funding was cut and passed away on February 16th. Over 400 Burmese students saw their scholarships revoked, forcing them to reconsider their academic futures. Exiled journalist Su, who ran Than Lwin Khet News, lost all funding, threatening Myanmar’s independent press. The abrupt aid halt has worsened economic hardship and eroded trust in international commitments, leaving millions at risk.

Responses and Controversy

The dismantling of USAID sparked widespread condemnation from officials, humanitarian groups, and international partners. Senior USAID officials warned that halting funds would jeopardize lifesaving aid. While some acknowledged the need for reform, they argued that shutting down USAID would weaken global humanitarian efforts and U.S. influence.

Since its inception, USAID has straddled the line between development and U.S. strategic interests, facing criticism over its effectiveness and political motivations. The Trump administration, with Elon Musk’s backing, accused it of pushing a “radical-left agenda,” citing diversity and climate programs. Supporters argued its closure weakens U.S. influence, benefiting China and Russia. With USAID dismantled, China is expanding its soft power, filling aid gaps with infrastructure investments, signaling a geopolitical shift in global development.

Canada, the U.K., Australia, and the EU were urged to increase funding, while Thailand pledged support for displaced refugees. Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) expressed shock, reaffirming their commitment to the revolution despite losing U.S. support. Legal challenges against the aid freeze temporarily lifted the funding halt, but a Supreme Court ruling later complicated relief efforts, leaving humanitarian groups struggling to operate.

Conclusion

The abrupt dismantling of USAID has left millions without essential aid, disrupting global healthcare, education, and human rights efforts. The loss of funding risks a resurgence of preventable diseases deepens economic instability and weakens democratic institutions while paving the way for increased Chinese and Russian influence. In response, donor nations must step up, ensuring aid continuity and prioritizing local capacity building. Congressional oversight and reforms may be necessary to restore credibility.

Beyond policy and geopolitics, this crisis underscores a fundamental truth: the most vulnerable suffer when power is placed in the hands of leaders who prioritize protectionism over humanitarianism. The erosion of decades of humanitarian progress is a stark reminder of what happens when humanity is sacrificed for political gain. In these uncertain times, those who uphold humanity and democracy must stand united, dedicating their efforts to advancing human rights, strengthening democratic principles, and embracing collective responsibility as the path forward.

Dr. Htet Khaing Min, a medical doctor, is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). He recently led Remote Health Projects, focusing on Community Health Worker programs in the border regions of Naga and Karen States.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Introduction

As Myanmar likely will move toward a post-coup transition in 2025, rebuilding the nation requires a comprehensive and strategic approach. The country’s deep-seated divisions, economic instability, and social fragmentation call for a framework that addresses immediate humanitarian concerns and long-term peacebuilding.

By applying Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs to conflict transformation, this article provides policymakers and stakeholders with a structured understanding of how unmet needs fuel conflict and how fulfilling them can foster reconciliation and stability. Drawing from successful post-conflict examples in Aceh, South Africa, and Colombia, we outline practical applications that can guide Myanmar’s path to sustainable peace. From economic justice and governance reforms to interfaith dialogue and trauma healing, this article highlights how a needs-based approach can rebuild trust, empower communities, and ensure a democratic and inclusive Myanmar.

Theoretical Framework: Maslow’s Hierarchy and Conflict Dynamics

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs

Conflict transformation, a process aimed at addressing the root causes of violence and fostering sustainable peace, requires a deep understanding of human motivation and needs. Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, a seminal psychological theory, provides a structured framework to analyze how unmet needs perpetuate conflict and how fulfilling them can promote reconciliation. By bridging psychological principles with peacebuilding methodologies, addressing physiological, safety, belonging, esteem, and self-actualization needs can dismantle cycles of violence and empower individuals and communities. Maslow’s theory posits that human needs are arranged hierarchically, with basic physiological and safety needs forming the foundation, followed by social belonging, esteem, and self-actualization (Maslow, p. 370–96). Lower-level “deficiency needs” (D-needs) must be “more or less” met before higher “growth needs” (B-needs) become salient (Maslow, p. 69). However, Maslow later acknowledged flexibility in the hierarchy, noting that needs can overlap or reorder based on individual and cultural contexts (Maslow, p. 68).

Figure 1: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Linking Unmet Needs to Conflict

Structural conflicts, such as colonialism, patriarchy, or economic exploitation, often arise from systemic deprivation of basic needs. The Dependency-Power-Violence (DPV) Triangle illustrates this: involuntary dependency on dominant groups creates power imbalances, which, when sustained, justify violence as a means to fulfill unmet needs (Arai, p. 30). For instance, marginalized communities deprived of physiological needs (food, shelter) or safety (employment, healthcare) may resort to violence to reclaim agency (Arai, p. 30). Similarly, dehumanization—a key conflict dynamic—stems from polarised groups denying each other’s humanity, often due to perceived threats to their safety or esteem (Conflict Dynamics, p. 1).

Figure 2: The DPV Triangle. Source: Arai (Adapted from Lederach, 2005).

Conflict Transformation Through a Needs-Based Lens

Conflict transformation strategies must address both immediate needs and structural inequities. Johan Galtung’s concept of structural violence—systemic harm caused by unjust institutions—aligns with Maslow’s emphasis on deficiency needs (Galtung, 2010, p. 157–188). By ensuring access to resources (physiological/safety), fostering inclusive communities (belonging), and empowering marginalized voices (esteem/self-actualization), practitioners can dismantle cycles of violence.

Practical Applications for Myanmar

Transitioning from Theory to Practice

Applying Maslow’s hierarchy to Myanmar’s post-coup transition requires a needs-based approach to rebuilding the nation after the military is defeated. Myanmar will face a reconstruction period, requiring a careful strategy to address the economic, social, and psychological scars of military rule. By looking at successful post-conflict models from Aceh, South Africa, and Colombia, we can propose practical steps for Myanmar’s transformation.

1. Addressing Physiological and Safety Needs: Economic Justice and Stability

Land Rights and Economic Redistribution: Myanmar’s history of land dispossession and economic control by the military must be addressed through comprehensive land reforms. Inspired by South Africa’s post-apartheid land restitution program, Myanmar can implement policies that return land to displaced ethnic minorities and provide economic opportunities to former resistance fighters and war-affected populations.

Employment and Financial Stability: A post-conflict Myanmar will need economic stabilization programs similar to Aceh’s reintegration projects for ex-combatants. These programs can provide former resistance fighters with vocational training and employment opportunities, reducing their reliance on armed struggle. Microfinance programs, modeled after Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank, can be extended to rural Myanmar to empower women and local businesses.

2. Building Belonging and Esteem: Social Reconciliation and Healing

Interfaith and Ethnic Dialogue: Religious and ethnic divisions fueled by military propaganda will require structured reconciliation efforts. In Colombia, interfaith dialogue and truth commissions were crucial in rebuilding community trust. Myanmar could create community dialogue forums in the different potential federal unit areas where religious and community leaders engage in trust-building initiatives, learning from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

Education and Media Reform: To dismantle ethnic and religious prejudices, education reform is essential. Curriculums should be redesigned to promote pluralism, civic education, and human rights awareness, following Rwanda’s model of post-genocide education reform. Media regulations must ensure that hate speech is countered, similar to Germany’s strict anti-hate speech laws, preventing extremist ideologies from resurfacing.

3. Empowering Self-Actualization: Grassroots Leadership and Civic Engagement

Decentralization and Local Governance: A post-coup Myanmar should avoid over-centralization of power. The governance model can be inspired by Indonesia’s post-Suharto decentralization, where local communities were given greater control over governance. Local councils, led by former resistance leaders and civil society actors, can provide a sense of ownership in rebuilding Myanmar.

Arts-Based Peacebuilding: Creative expression is a powerful tool for social healing. Sri Lanka’s Butterfly Peace Garden demonstrated how art, theater, and storytelling help trauma-affected youth reconcile with past conflicts. Myanmar’s traditional cultural arts (e.g., Zat performances, poetry, songs, animations, movies, murals, etc) can be used to create shared narratives of unity and national renewal.

Challenges and Considerations

Cultural and Contextual Adaptation: Maslow’s hierarchy, developed in Western individualistic contexts, may not fully align with Myanmar’s collectivist society. Efforts must respect communal identities while ensuring individual agency.

Power Asymmetry and Structural Barriers: While symbolically powerful, women’s inclusion in peace talks may remain tokenistic unless patriarchal norms are actively challenged. Quotas for female participation, modeled after Liberia’s post-war governance reforms, can help address systemic barriers.

Psychological and Trauma Considerations: A conflict-affected society like Myanmar will have profound psychological wounds. Addressing trauma healing and mental health services is essential to preventing cycles of violence. Programs modeled after Bosnia’s post-war psychosocial interventions could help address collective trauma and ensure sustainable reconciliation.

Balancing Immediate Needs and Long-Term Goals: Simultaneously addressing urgent survival needs and long-term democratic restructuring will be critical. Myanmar’s transition must prioritize stability and justice, ensuring that governance structures do not replicate past inequalities.

Conclusion

A needs-based approach provides a holistic framework for Myanmar’s post-coup transition. By addressing economic justice, social reconciliation, and grassroots leadership, Myanmar can lay the groundwork for sustainable and inclusive peace. Learning from global post-conflict transformations, Myanmar’s future must be shaped by policies that bridge psychological well-being with structural reforms, ensuring a resilient and democratic society. Policymakers and all stakeholders must work collectively to achieve this vision of national renewal.

Harry Myo Lin is a Myanmar expert with extensive experience across Myanmar and Asia, specializing in peacebuilding, interreligious dialogue, and promoting freedom of religion and belief.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

The opinions expressed in these articles do not represent the official stance of SRIc - Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre. The Sabai Times is committed to publishing a range of perspectives that may not align with editorial policy.

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Myanmar’s progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) has been set back by political instability, economic challenges, and environmental degradation following the 2021 military coup.

Key Takeaways:

1. Myanmar’s political instability, worsened by the military coup and escalating conflict, has undermined progress in governance and peace-building efforts, making MSDP Goal 1 (peace and stability) unattainable.

2. The coup has significantly weakened Myanmar’s economy, with declining GDP, rising food insecurity, and restricted trade, creating substantial barriers to achieving MSDP Goals 2 (economic stability), 3 (job creation), and 4 (Human Resources & Social Development).

3. The military and other EAOs’ exploitation of natural resources has caused severe environmental degradation, while limited resources have constrained sustainable conservation efforts, jeopardizing progress on MSDP Goal 5 (environmental sustainability).

Introduction

Myanmar, a developing country, approved the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) in 2018 to guide its efforts toward achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Using 2017 as a baseline, Myanmar achieved notable progress across various SDG sectors during 2018 and 2019. However, in 2020, numerous challenges and crises severely hindered its progress. The country now ranks 120th out of 166, with stagnating progress, data gaps, and declining trends in the peace and environmental sectors. Only slight improvements have been observed in SDG Goals 1, 6, 8, 9, and 12, reflecting significant areas for improvement in government management and leadership.

1. Governance Sector

1.1 State Administration Council (SAC)

Since the military coup in 2021, the State Administration Council (SAC) has forcibly seized power, overturning the democratically elected government and violating agreements with Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). The military has conducted violent campaigns against civilians and EAOs, deploying bombs, airstrikes, and other heavy weaponry. These actions have caused significant loss of life, widespread property destruction, and displaced over three million people, creating a nationwide crisis of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Attempting to obscure these realities, the military organized a superficial “national peace forum” in Nay Pyi Taw involving select EAOs allied with the regime. This forum failed to address critical peace issues or halt military aggression. Reports from ISP Myanmar indicate over 7,000 airstrikes affecting more than 156 townships since the coup, directly undermining MSDP Goal 1, which emphasizes peace and stability as foundations for national development.

As a result, most EAOs have withdrawn from the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Only a coalition of seven EAOs remains engaged with the military, underscoring a significant breakdown in trust and cooperation. This failure highlights the regime’s inability to honor commitments or foster sustainable peace.

1.2 National Unity Government (NUG)

In response to the military coup, the National Unity Government (NUG) was established in April 2021 by elected representatives from the 2020 general election. Its primary objectives are to dismantle military rule, restore democracy, and transition Myanmar to a civilian-led federal system.

The NUG has formed the People’s Defense Force (PDF) to resist the military junta, protect civilians, and coordinate armed resistance. The PDF collaborates with EAOs such as the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), reflecting efforts to build a united front despite resource limitations and differing strategies among resistance groups.

Seeking international recognition and support, the NUG has gained backing from entities like the French Senate, though global recognition still needs to be improved. The NUG continues diplomatic efforts to expose the junta’s human rights violations while advocating for democracy and inclusivity, aligning with MSDP goals.

1.3 Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)

Numerous EAOs have resumed armed resistance against the military since the coup, withdrawing from the NCA in response to the regime’s actions. Notably, prominent groups such as the Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF), and All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) have denounced the coup and re-engaged in combat, asserting that the military's actions nullified the NCA.

The Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BTA) - comprising the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) - launched “Operation 1027” in October 2023. This offensive has significantly reshaped post-coup conflict dynamics, capturing substantial territory and highlighting the growing strength of EAOs.

While these developments demonstrate increased EAO resistance capabilities, the military retains control over critical urban areas and strategic locations, ensuring ongoing conflict. Airstrikes, forced conscription, and external influences like China’s strategic interests complicate the conflict further. Despite territorial gains by PDFs and EAOs, fragmented governance and lack of coordination with the NUG hinder a cohesive resistance.

2. Socioeconomic Sector

2.1 State Administration Council (SAC)

The military coup triggered profound economic and social instability. Myanmar’s GDP has plummeted from approximately $78 billion in 2020 to $64 billion in 2023, marking an 18% contraction. This decline is attributed to reduced foreign investment, trade disruptions, and restrictive policies.

In May 2024, the Ministry of Commerce's Department of Trade issued measures tightening requirements for import licenses, enforcing legal actions against goods arriving without the necessary documentation. These policies have disrupted supply chains and contributed to inflation. Consequently, the prices of essential goods have surged, with data indicating that grocery prices have tripled compared to 2020. Meanwhile, wages remain stagnant, exacerbating food insecurity and poverty. International businesses withdrawing from Myanmar have led to widespread job losses, shrinking the formal economy. These trends signal failure in achieving MSDP Goals 2 (Economic Stability), 3 (Job Creation), and 4 (Human Resources & Social Development).

2.2 National Unity Government (NUG)

Despite limited resources, the NUG has implemented alternative tax systems to generate revenue in areas under its control. These funds are used to sustain essential public services and stabilize communities. The NUG collaborates with EAOs and local networks to facilitate trade and resource-sharing, mitigating the junta’s economic disruptions.

The NUG also addresses the needs of IDPs, coordinating aid to alleviate starvation and economic deprivation. According to UNHCR, international funding still needs to be increased, with only 32% of humanitarian aid needs met by September 2024. These efforts, though constrained, align with MSDP goals and reflect attempts to foster economic resilience.

2.3 Role of CSOs, NGOs, and INGOs

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), NGOs, and UN agencies are crucial in responding to humanitarian and economic crises. CSOs focus on grassroots support, while NGOs like the Livelihoods and Food Security Fund (LIFT) assist with food security and social protection. However, restricted access to conflict zones, limited funding, and military-imposed constraints hinder their efforts.

International agencies such as OCHA, UNHCR, and WFP provide essential aid, though their operations face significant funding gaps. By September 2024, only 32% of OCHA’s $1 billion funding appeal had been met, leaving millions without sufficient assistance. The inability of humanitarian organizations to fully address the crisis exacerbates economic instability, joblessness, and the failure to recover economically, significant obstacles to fulfilling these MSDP goals.

3. Environmental Sector

3.1 State Administration Council (SAC)

Since the coup, the military has prioritized resource extraction over environmental sustainability, contributing to widespread deforestation and biodiversity loss. As of the 2024 environmental report, Myanmar ranks 177 globally, with a 27.1% score mentioning a failure to comply with the MSDP plan. Furthermore, projects like the Myitsone hydroelectric dam, previously halted due to environmental concerns, are being reconsidered under the junta, threatening ecosystems and displacing communities significantly, threatening more than 5 million people living in low-lying and coastal regions. These actions prioritize short-term economic gains, exacerbating environmental degradation and undermining MSDP objectives. According to Global Forest Watch, from 2002 to 2023, deforestation in Myanmar has intensified, with satellite data revealing that 16% of the country’s total tree cover was lost during this period. This has led to the displacement of thousands of people and significantly undermined livelihoods in the affected regions.

3.2 National Unity Government (NUG)

The NUG emphasizes sustainable resource management, empowering local communities through its Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC). Initiatives such as mangrove restoration projects in the Irrawaddy Delta align with MSDP Goals 4 and 5. However, ongoing conflict limits measurable outcomes.

3.3 Role of CSOs, NGOs, and INGOs

Local CSOs, such as the Myanmar Environmental Rehabilitation and Conservation Network (MERN), focus on forest conservation, biodiversity, and climate resilience, including mangrove restoration in the Irrawaddy Delta. Despite military-imposed restrictions, these organizations continue rehabilitating ecosystems and raising environmental awareness. However, illegal logging and resource exploitation by the military and some EAOs complicate their work.

International agencies like UNDP and WWF support Myanmar’s environmental policies. The UNDP has assisted in promoting Myanmar’s National Environmental Policy, while WWF has raised awareness about deforestation and illegal resource extraction. Agencies like IUCN provide technical support for conservation projects and sustainable practices. Despite their efforts, the ongoing conflict and instability hinder progress toward the environmental goals of the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP), including land degradation and sustainable resource use.

Case studies of affected communities, such as those displaced by the Myitsone Dam, should be integrated to improve environmental governance. More vital coordination between CSOs, INGOs, and global partnerships is essential to align efforts with the MSDP and address Myanmar’s role in regional climate policies.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s ongoing conflict and political instability have severely impacted its progress in governance, socioeconomic stability, and environmental sustainability. While efforts by the NUG, EAOs, and civil society provide some hope, the challenges posed by the military regime and some EAOs, resource limitations, and international funding gaps highlight the urgency for coordinated action to realign with the MSDP and achieve sustainable development.

The following actions need to be performed immediately to address these challenges effectively.

1. International backing for humanitarian efforts must be enhanced, empowering local CSOs, UN agencies, and NGOs to address urgent needs, particularly for displaced populations.

2. Greater diplomatic pressure is needed on Myanmar’s military regime and their affiliated EAOs to encourage peace talks and restore democratic governance.

3. Including civil society from the NUG control area in policymaking will ensure local voices are heard and pave the way for sustainable peace.

4. New policies should curb environmental damage caused by the military’s resource exploitation and advocate for sustainable, community-led conservation initiatives in NUG and EAO control areas such as Kachin and Karen States.

5. Resolving Myanmar’s ethnic and political tensions through strengthened conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms will be crucial for sustainable progress.

By addressing these areas, Myanmar can work toward rebuilding a stable, democratic, and sustainable future while making meaningful strides toward achieving its SDGs and MSDP objectives.

Phyo Thura Aung is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). He passionately advocates for social change in Myanmar while advancing his academic journey in Vietnam.

Harry Myo Lin contributed to the peer review process as an external reviewer.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup highlights the devastating intersection of political conflict, environmental vulnerability, and systemic governance failures.    

Key Takeaways:

1. Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis stems from the combined impacts of conflict-driven displacement, climate change, and political instability, leaving millions without shelter, food, or healthcare. 

2. Military restrictions on NGOs and civil society obstruct humanitarian efforts, while bureaucratic barriers and security risks worsen access issues. Strong collaboration with local networks is essential to ensure aid delivery to vulnerable populations.

3. Economic collapse and rising food prices have caused severe food insecurity, leaving millions without adequate nutrition. Addressing this crisis demands integrated food security programs, agricultural rehabilitation, and governance reforms to address its root causes.

This analysis examines the multifaceted challenges that have exacerbated the crisis, focusing on displacement, climate change, restricted access to aid, and food insecurity, providing insight into the complex dynamics at play.

Conflict and Displacement

The political turmoil following the 2021 military coup caused massive internal displacement. Due to political unrest, humanitarian crises, and environmental degradation, an estimated 18.6 million people in Myanmar—primarily women and girls—need immediate assistance. Combined with climate change-related disasters, millions were left without shelter, food, or medical services, making Myanmar one of the most challenging places for humanitarian access. 

In addition to the 2.6 million people displaced by the ongoing conflict, the poverty line has doubled since 2021. Only 45% of Myanmar’s 2023 humanitarian response plan has been funded, leaving nearly 2 million without essential assistance. Armed conflicts between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and different ethnic groups caused further displacement, triggered by the coup’s violent suppression of protests.  

Over a million people have been impacted by climate change-related disasters, worsening the crisis by destroying infrastructure and causing severe flooding from typhoons and monsoon rains. Insecurity, damaged infrastructure, and restricted access due to ongoing conflict present significant challenges for humanitarian organizations attempting to reach displaced populations. Additionally, political instability complicates the distribution of essential services like food, housing, and healthcare.

The socioeconomic ramifications of displacement are extensive. Prolonged instability disrupts education, erodes human capital, and weakens community structures, posing long-term risks to Myanmar’s development. Addressing these challenges requires a holistic approach that balances immediate humanitarian needs with investments in sustainable recovery.

Climate Change Effects

Myanmar remains highly vulnerable to climate change, intensifying the frequency and severity of climate change-related disasters like cyclones and flooding. These challenges significantly impact Myanmar’s economy, society, and environment.

The growing frequency and intensity of climate change-related disasters like flooding and cyclones underscore the pressing need to address climate change’s root causes and effects. Geographical vulnerabilities further worsen its impacts, particularly in the most affected regions.

Local communities and livelihoods face serious risks, especially in rural and coastal areas with heavy dependence on agriculture and natural resources. Disasters exacerbated by climate change impact public health, water resources, and food security, presenting interrelated problems that demand comprehensive solutions.

Adaptive strategies adopted by the government and local communities aim to build resilience against climate change. These strategies, alongside international support, are vital for mitigating its effects. Meanwhile,  deforestation and environmental degradation emphasize the importance of sustainable practices to reduce vulnerabilities to climate change and climate change-related disasters.

Myanmar’s inability to address the root causes of climate vulnerability reflects broader governance challenges. Limited institutional capacity, lack of enforcement of environmental regulations, and weak coordination with international actors hinder efforts to build resilience against climate change. Scaling up climate adaptation strategies and integrating them with disaster risk reduction initiatives is essential to mitigate the impact on vulnerable populations.

Restricted Access

The military’s restrictions on international NGOs and local civil society organizations severely hinder aid delivery, particularly in conflict-affected areas like Kachin, Karen, Rakhine, and Shan States. Aid organizations face significant bureaucratic hurdles, including navigating military checkpoints and, in some places, being forced to cease operations entirely. Given the military's history of killing and detentioning aid workers, their safety is a significant concern. The stakes for international organizations attempting to deal with the situation are raised, and the environment for humanitarian operations becomes hostile.

The breakdown of Myanmar’s healthcare system after the coup has worsened health conditions in disaster-affected regions. Restricted access to medical services, disrupted supply chains, and the lack of clean water have made communities more vulnerable to preventable diseases like malaria. Climate change-related disasters such as floods and landslides have damaged healthcare facilities and impeded transportation, complicating access to care further. 

Many local organizations struggle to meet international donors' financial and operational requirements. New local organizations often need more documentation and policies to apply for grants, which delays their ability to secure funding. Additionally, the overall funding for humanitarian efforts in Myanmar needs to be expanded, further complicating the situation. Many activists face threats in the restricted environment where civil society organizations operate, forcing them to operate underground. Moreover, the international aid efforts to support Myanmar's civil society could be improved by the need for tailored assistance and flexible funding mechanisms to address the country's unique challenges.

Despite these challenges, local organizations are crucial in reaching displaced communities and finding innovative ways to help. International health organizations continue to support crisis responses, partnering with local health initiatives and delivering emergency medical assistance. Volunteers and medical professionals have stepped up to address urgent medical needs, providing care and distributing essential supplies under challenging conditions. To improve aid effectiveness, international stakeholders must prioritize negotiations with authorities to facilitate access and address bureaucratic barriers. Strengthening the capacity of local civil society organizations and enhancing community-led initiatives are also critical strategies to overcome restricted access and ensure aid reaches those in need.

Food Insecurity

The combination of economic breakdown, conflict, and climate-change-related disasters has pushed millions into severe food insecurity. Farmers have lost crops due to floods and conflict, while rising food prices have made access to proper nutrition increasingly tricky.

In conflict-affected regions, displacement, disrupted supply chains and destroyed agricultural infrastructure have significantly reduced food availability. Flooding, drought, and conflict-related restrictions on field access have caused farmers to lose crops, lowering yields and harvests. Areas like Kachin, Karen, and Shan States have experienced substantial disruptions in agricultural activity, worsening food insecurity. 

Rising food prices have further compounded the crisis, leaving many families unable to afford a nutritious diet. Traditional food supply chains have been disrupted, forcing reliance on less reliable alternatives. Initiatives such as food distribution programs, agricultural support, and livelihood restoration efforts are being implemented to address the crisis.

Despite military restrictions and ongoing conflict, international organizations continue to support Myanmar’s food security efforts through funding, technical assistance, and humanitarian aid. The food crisis threatens Myanmar’s long-term economic recovery and social stability, necessitating sustained global support.

Integrating agricultural rehabilitation programs with conflict resolution efforts is essential to address food insecurity effectively. These measures should include re-establishing supply chains, investing in resilient farming practices, and promoting food access through community-driven distribution systems.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s post-coup humanitarian crisis reveals the devastating interplay between conflict, climate change, and systemic vulnerabilities. The challenges of displacement, restricted access, food insecurity, and climate-induced disasters require urgent and coordinated international efforts.

Strategic partnerships between international organizations, local actors, and regional bodies are crucial for shaping long-term solutions. Beyond immediate humanitarian relief, addressing structural issues such as governance, environmental degradation, and economic instability is imperative to ensure sustainable recovery and resilience in Myanmar.

Naw Seng is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). His expertise lies in community development and human rights, and he is currently advancing his academic journey with Management Studies in Indonesia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Amid the ongoing struggles in Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, Muslim Imams, often overlooked, are playing a pivotal role.

Guided by their deep faith and the teachings of Islam, they advocate for justice, equality, and resistance against tyranny, drawing on the principles found in the Quran and the life of Prophet Muhammad. Despite their low profile, these religious leaders remain committed to upholding fundamental human rights, even as Myanmar's military regime deepens its reign of terror.

Since the February 2021 coup d'état, Myanmar’s military has unleashed widespread atrocities, leading to an escalating humanitarian crisis. The United Nations estimates that over 17.6 million people now require humanitarian aid, with 1.6 million displaced and more than 55,000 civilian structures destroyed. Military tactics, including systematic aerial and artillery bombardments, have targeted both armed resistance groups and civilian populations, especially in contested regions like northern Shan and Rakhine states.

Entire villages have been leveled, leaving communities in despair. One group that has borne the brunt of the military's brutal campaign is Myanmar's Muslim population. Already marginalized and subjected to systemic discrimination, they have faced not only the general brutality experienced by all dissenters but also religiously motivated persecution. This is particularly true for the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State, who have endured decades of state-sponsored violence, ethnic cleansing, and apartheid-like conditions.

Even beyond Rakhine, Muslim communities across the country are stigmatized and targeted, with the military often using religious tensions to justify their oppressive actions. Reports from international organizations, such as Amnesty International, confirm that Muslims face frequent violence, arbitrary arrests, and systematic deprivation of their rights.

In the face of such adversity, the role of Muslim Imams in the Spring Revolution has been transformative, though underreported. Their engagement is not merely a political stance but is deeply rooted in Islamic teachings that call for justice, community welfare, and standing up against oppression. Central to their faith is the Quranic command to "be persistently standing firm in justice, witnesses for Allah, even if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives..." (Quran 4:135).

This verse compels them to support efforts restoring rights and correcting wrongs, providing religious justification for their involvement in the revolution.
The life of Prophet Muhammad further strengthens their resolve: "The greatest struggle is to speak the truth in front of a tyrannical ruler." In Myanmar’s current turmoil, this teaching emboldens Imams, reinforcing their moral obligation to confront the military regime and voice the plights of the marginalized.

The concept of Ummah, or the global Muslim community, extends their responsibility beyond just religious or ethnic boundaries. It fosters a sense of solidarity with all those suffering under oppression, regardless of their background. This has inspired prominent Imams such as Sheikh Soe Nay Oo, Faisal Khattab, and Hassan Al-Qadri to take active roles in the revolution. Sheikh Soe Nay Oo, for example, highlights the religious obligation of Muslim leaders to "stand up against the tyranny inflicted upon the innocent."

At the same time, Imam Faisal Khattab emphasizes Islam’s call to defend human dignity, reflecting the life of Prophet Muhammad as an advocate for the marginalized. Their participation is not just symbolic; it is a practical expression of their faith. Imam Hassan Al-Qadri's involvement sends a powerful message that the universal Islamic values of peace, justice, and protection of the oppressed transcend mere religious identity and have a critical role in social and political movements.

However, this involvement of Muslim leaders has not insulated them from targeted repression. The military’s deeply entrenched Islamophobia, compounded by societal discrimination, continues to make Muslims in Myanmar vulnerable to violence and exclusion. Several International human rights groups have documented the state’s systematic efforts to marginalize Muslim political leaders and prevent their communities from fully participating in the national discourse.

Despite these challenges, the involvement of Imams in the Spring Revolution underscores the importance of recognizing the role of all religious and ethnic communities in Myanmar's struggle for freedom. For Myanmar to achieve sustainable peace, the contributions of Muslims and other marginalized communities must be acknowledged. The National Unity Government (NUG) and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) have been instrumental in creating a new, inclusive Myanmar framework.

However, they must ensure that the Muslim community, whose contributions to the Spring Revolution have been significant, are fully integrated into the political process. Their involvement is essential to fostering a pluralistic, just, and peaceful vision of Myanmar.

It is crucial that the broader Myanmar society, as well as international stakeholders, understand that true peace cannot be achieved without addressing the deep-rooted religious and ethnic divisions that have long plagued the country. The recognition of Muslim’s roles in the Spring Revolution—and their inclusion in the nation's future political roadmap—is not just a matter of justice but a prerequisite for a sustainable coexistence in a democratic Myanmar.

Harry Myo Lin is a Myanmar expert with extensive experience across Myanmar and Asia, specializing in peacebuilding, interreligious dialogue, and promoting freedom of religion and belief.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

The opinions expressed in these articles do not represent the official stance of SRIc - Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre. The Sabai Times is committed to publishing a range of perspectives that may not align with editorial policy.

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This piece was originally published in Eurasia Review.

Overlooked Global Conflicts

Many ongoing conflicts around the world are receiving limited media coverage, with global attention focused predominantly on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas war. However, other severe crises are unfolding, including the civil war in Myanmar and the Rohingya genocide, which seem to be overlooked.

While global media recently marked the 7th anniversary of the Rohingya genocide, it’s essential to ask whether the focus should solely be on commemorating the atrocities that happened seven years ago or if more attention should be directed toward the current plight of the Rohingya to prevent the more devastating situation? Are they still suffering from displacement, persecution, and genocide? And how is the ongoing civil war in Myanmar affecting their lives? Should the international community and media outlets prioritize coverage of the Rohingya’s ongoing struggle and the civil war, which continues to devastate lives across Myanmar, instead of concentrating on past events?   

Distinct Crises, Shared Suffering

It is neither fair nor ethical to compare the suffering of one group of victims to another, as every conflict and humanitarian crisis carries its unique horrors and complexities. This article does not intend to weigh the plight of the Rohingya against that of the Gazans. The nature of these conflicts, the devastation they have caused, and the vulnerability of their victims are distinct. Both groups have endured profound suffering, but how these crises are brought to the world’s attention by the victims themselves is different. One key issue is the accessibility of victim groups to global media platforms to raise their concerns and share their stories directly. The conflict in Gaza and the broader Israel-Palestine issue have historically received widespread media attention, bringing out solid international reactions and mobilizing solidarity campaigns. 

Gazans, while deeply vulnerable, have been able to bring their plight to the global consciousness, in part due to the sustained media coverage of Al-Jazeera from the inside of Gaza strips and the support of Muslim communities and civil society groups worldwide. For instance, in Gaza, many local Palestinian journalists, such as those from Al-Jazeera, continue to cover events on the ground, even at significant personal risk. These journalists offer firsthand accounts of the conflict, ensuring that the world remains informed about the humanitarian crisis within the strip. Despite the ongoing blockade and immense challenges, international humanitarian organizations and some media outlets still manage to reach Gaza with limited access, facilitating the flow of information and aid. This continuous media presence allows the voices of Gazans to be amplified, giving the victims a platform to share their suffering and concerns directly with the global audience. 

Media and Accessibility for Rohingya Genocide

In contrast, the situation for the Rohingya in Myanmar, particularly in areas like Maungdaw and Buthidaung in Rakhine State, is far more restricted. There are no professional journalists or trained media personnel from within the Rohingya community to provide coverage of the atrocities they face.

The information flow depends mainly on citizen journalism by Rohingya – who risk their lives documenting and sharing what is happening in their communities. This reliance on untrained civilians creates significant challenges in verifying reports and limits the reach of their stories in the global media. 

Escalating Conflict in Rakhine State

The Rohingya crisis has been compounded by the actions of armed rebel groups like the Arakan Army (AA), which has intensified conflict in Rakhine State. The AA has attempted to seize control of critical towns like Maungdaw and Buthidaung, leading to further instability and violence in these regions. During these offensives, many Rohingya neighborhoods have been set ablaze, displacing even more people who were already living in vulnerable conditions.

Recently, a Rohingya woman who fled to Bangladesh shared on CNN how AA soldiers raped her and killed her husband. While there are many accusations that the AA is driving out Rohingya communities from these cities and more Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, information is scarce, and the lack of media presence inside Rakhine state makes it difficult to fully understand the scale of the destruction and the motivations behind it. Meanwhile, Rakhine media personnel are openly threatening on social media that Rohingya-majority areas like Maungdaw in Rakhine state will face conditions similar to those in Gaza. 

Misinformation and Bias in Reporting

In addition, there are concerns about bias in certain major local media outlets, which have been criticized for spreading misleading information and propaganda. For example, the publication recently of an interview with the chief of (AA) with The Irrawaddy News, during which he made several false claims, including accusing a Muslim-owned construction company, Naing Group, of being associated with the Rohingya ethnic group. He went further to allege that this company was behind the creation of ARSA, a Rohingya militant group supposedly formed to counterbalance the growing influence of the Tatmadaw and AA in Rakhine State. According to well-known facts, the Naing Group is not connected to the Rohingya community at all. Many people from Yangon, where the company is based, are aware that the board of directors of Naing Group is not of Rohingya descent; they are, in fact, from Mon State, a completely different ethnic group in Myanmar. Following the spread of these false allegations, the company was forced to issue a public statement clarifying the ethnic background of its board members, highlighting that none of them are Rohingya.

The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) must unequivocally condemn the Arakan Army’s atrocities against the Rohingya. By failing to do so, the NUG risks repeating the same mistakes made by the previous National League for Democracy (NLD) government under Aung San Suu Kyi’s de facto leadership. Such a stance could severely damage the NUG’s international legitimacy during the Myanmar democratic revolution. 

Manipulation of Information in Conflict Zones

The fact that even public information, such as the ethnic background of a company’s leadership, can be so grossly misrepresented by local media outlets is deeply concerning. Suppose such basic facts can be twisted or misreported. In that case, it raises serious questions about the credibility of information being disseminated about the situation in conflict zones like Rakhine State, where independent media access is severely restricted and the Rohingya population is vulnerable. With no independent media present to verify reports, there is a legitimate concern that the AA may be distorting the reality of what is happening in Rohingya-populated areas. These false narratives not only exacerbate the plight of the Rohingya but also fuel dangerous misinformation that can further marginalize and target the already persecuted group. 

Another critical concern is the absence of international civil servants (third-party witnesses) and independent journalists in Rakhine State, especially when compared to the ongoing presence of UN officials in Gaza. This lack of third-party witnesses (non-Rakhine and Rohingya) and reliable reporting may allow armed groups like the Arakan Army (AA) or Tatmadaw to manipulate public perception, distorting the true nature of the violence in the region. 

Need for Focused Global Attention

This is particularly alarming given that the Rohingya genocide is currently under trial at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and recent Mizzima editorials questioning whether the situation could be labeled “Genocide 2.0” raises concerns about a new phase of persecution. Unlike the existence of Al-Jazeera and third-party witnesses in Gaza, there are no international media outlets inside Buthidaung and Maungdaw, and it is not fair to say that all the evidence is not enough to say AA is not responsible for this atrocity.

AA must allow third-party organizations like the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), or independent media to enter the AA control area for fact-finding. The global community and media outlets must shift focus not only to commemorate past atrocities but also to address the ongoing crises affecting the Rohingya and the broader Myanmar population. A lack of media coverage, compounded by misinformation and limited access to conflict zones, has left the Rohingya genocide underreported. As Myanmar’s civil war continues to devastate lives, more attention is urgently needed to ensure that the Rohingya’s current plight is recognized and meaningful action is taken to prevent further suffering.

Showe Showe is the pseudonym of an independent Burmese political analyst.

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The opinions expressed in these articles do not represent the official stance of SRIc - Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre. The Sabai Times committed to publishing a range of perspectives that may not align with editorial policy. Contact: sabaitimes@shwetaungthagathu.com

This piece was originally published in The Halal Times.

Myanmar, a Southeast Asian country and a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has a Muslim population of nearly 5% of its total. The country is facing significant challenges in the availability of halal-certified foods. In response to the growing demand from the Muslim community and the expansion of processed foods, Myanmar has seen its religious organizations begin issuing halal certificates. Currently, five main organizations issue halal certification in Myanmar. However, the lack of a central or supreme Muslim authority has resulted in a fragmented system with no standardized guidelines, national halal logos and procedures, or reference laboratories for the certification process. While these organizations base their certifications on the Quran and Sunnah, the absence of centralized authority and standardized practices has led to widespread confusion among Burmese Muslims.

Overview of Myanmar Halal Industry

This confusion is further escalated by the lack of transparency and validated guidelines, leading to differing interpretations and practices among the organizations. Muslims following guidance from Jamat Ulama El-Islam use certified foods from these organizations, while those adhering to the Islamic Religious Affairs Council follow different certifications. Other organizations such as Myanmar Muslim Ulama Organisation and All Myanmar Moulvi (Ulama Al HAQ) Organisation also issue certifications, creating a situation where some Muslims rely on certified foods from all sources, while others avoid certifications altogether, opting instead to purchase food only from Muslim-owned businesses. Many businesses simply label their products as “Halal,” and this Halal tag is sometimes even seen on products made with restricted items such as pork. Recently, a new entity called Myanmar Halal Service (MHS) has emerged, though its status as a business entity or non-profit organization remains unclear. This entity has promised to develop a more systematic halal certification process by involving Islamic scholars and academics. However, instead of consolidating the existing certification bodies, Myanmar Halal Service has positioned itself as a separate certification authority. It claims to follow the Halal Standard Guideline, MHG 001/2022, but there is no publicly available information about this guideline, and the organization does not have a website. The absence of a unified system has created significant challenges in ensuring the consistent availability of halal-certified food in Myanmar, impacting the confidence and trust of the Muslim community in the existing certification processes.

Institutionalized Marginalization of Burmese Muslims

In addition, Burmese Muslims continue to endure severe oppression and face restricted access to education and other basic human rights. Since the 1962 military coup in Burma, the Burmese Muslim community has faced a range of institutionalized discrimination. Muslims have been largely excluded from civil service roles, except for a few departments such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. These departments are classified as less significant by the military government as they do not directly contribute to state revenue, and their budgets are among the lowest compared to other ministries like the Ministry of Defence. Due to a shortage of teachers and healthcare workers, Muslims are still permitted to serve in these sectors but are rarely promoted beyond positions such as Lecturer or Professor. Administrative roles such as Rector or Director are entirely off-limits to them. As most Muslims within various administrative departments, including the defense forces, have retired, their presence in governmental administration has been almost entirely eradicated, further marginalizing the community and deepening the systemic discrimination they face. For instance, institutionalized discrimination within the Ministry of Immigration has led to many Muslims, despite being born and having lived in Myanmar for generations, being denied citizenship ID cards and instead being issued only other forms of verification ID. Without citizenship IDs, numerous Burmese Muslims and Rohingya are unable to pursue higher education, and some are even denied their diplomas upon completing their bachelor’s programs.

Challenges in Harmonizing National Halal Standards

Despite the “ASEAN General Guidelines on the Preparation and Handling of Halal Food,” Myanmar’s authorities have largely disregarded these regulations. This neglect stems from the pervasive marginalization of Muslims within the country’s administrative framework. Since the preparation and handling of halal food are perceived as concerns exclusive to the Muslim community, the guidelines have not received the necessary attention or enforcement by the relevant authorities. Furthermore, this marginalization extends to a lack of awareness among many Muslim organizations within Myanmar, which remain uninformed about these important ASEAN guidelines that could significantly improve halal food standards in the country. Adding to the complexity is the educational background of many Muslim scholars in Myanmar. Burma became part of British India following the British conquest of Burma in 1885, leading to stronger connections between Muslims in India and Burma. Consequently, most of these scholars have been educated in South Asia, particularly in countries like Pakistan and India, where the Hanafi School of Thought predominates. These scholars, who often speak Urdu, maintain strong connections with South Asian religious communities and institutions. As a result, they may not recognize or adhere to guidelines based on the Shafi’i School of Thought, which is more commonly followed in Southeast Asia, including in ASEAN guidelines.

This divergence in Islamic jurisprudence creates significant challenges for the Muslim community in Myanmar, particularly when it comes to defining what is considered halal. For instance, in the Hanafi School of Thought, seafood such as squid and octopus are not considered halal, while they are deemed permissible under the Shafi’i School of Thought. This difference in interpretation leads to confusion and inconsistency in halal certification and food practices among Burmese Muslims. The lack of a unified approach to halal standards further complicates efforts to establish a cohesive and reliable halal certification system within the country. This fragmentation within the Muslim community, coupled with insufficient governmental support, makes standardizing halal practices particularly difficult. The lack of a cohesive framework means that establishing and maintaining uniform halal standards is a significant challenge. Moreover, the absence of standardized guidelines, reference laboratories, and cooperation among different religious institutions highlights the urgent need for innovative and sustainable solutions.

Call for Innovation and Sustainability

Myanmar's current halal certification system lacks key sustainability features, constraining progress on the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This deficiency affects the quality and consistency of halal food, leading to consumer doubts about whether products truly meet halal standards. These issues are not just about food quality but also impact Myanmar’s broader development objectives. The MSDP aims for food security and environmental protection growth, but the lack of sustainable practices in halal certification prevents alignment with these goals and the SDGs. Moreover, the system’s shortcomings reflect more profound issues of religious marginalization. It fails to address the diverse needs of the Muslim community, highlighting difficulties in integrating various Islamic practices into a unified national framework. To address these challenges, Myanmar needs a more integrated approach that combines religious practices with sustainable development. A certification system that incorporates sustainability would improve halal food quality, support development goals, and better serve the Muslim population.

Tin Shine Aung is the Consulting Director at SRIc and a Researcher at ITI. He mentors for the YSEALI 2024 Fellowship Program and is pursuing a PhD in Sustainability Science at the University of Lisbon, focusing on "Sustainability Literacy."

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

The opinions expressed in these articles do not represent the official stance of SRIc - Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre. The Sabai Times is committed to publishing a range of perspectives that may not align with editorial policy.

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In Myanmar, the military has adeptly employed Buddhism as a tool for leveraging its political power. This practice can be described as “Saffron Washing,” a nod to the concept of “greenwashing,” where entities falsely present themselves as environmentally friendly. This article explores how Myanmar’s military has strategically used Buddhism to legitimize its rule and maintain control while also examining the broader implications of this manipulation. 

Before diving into the details, it is essential to revisit the nation’s history and understand its deep connection with the growth of Buddhism. Various Burmese dynasties utilized Buddhism to solidify their political power. According to historical records, Buddhism arrived in Burma (Myanmar) in the late 11th century and was patronized by the monarchy. King Anawrahta utilized Buddhism as the cornerstone to consolidate his political power and establish the Pagan dynasty of Burma (849-1297 CE). Since then, Buddhism has become the primary religion. 

This piece was initially published in The Diplomat, and read the full article on The Diplomat.

Tin Shine Aung is the Consulting Director at the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). In addition to his professional roles, Tin Shine Aung is pursuing a PhD in Sustainability Science at the University of Lisbon, Portugal.

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Despite the tireless efforts of non-profits, NGOs, and community-based organisations dedicated to advancing gender equality and social inclusion, women’s participation in key sectors across Myanmar remains alarmingly low. The diverse obstacles include inadequate access to quality education, unequal opportunities, and cultural and religious taboos. These issues significantly impede women’s ability to contribute to sustainable development and affect the country’s overall progress.

In many parts of Myanmar, particularly in rural and marginalised areas, women and girls encounter barriers to obtaining quality education. Financial restrictions within families, cultural norms that devalue women’s education, and pervasive gender-based violence all contribute to the exclusion of women from educational opportunities. Consequently, many women are confined to domestic roles, lacking the skills and knowledge to make meaningful societal contributions.

Economic inequality compounds these challenges, especially in the unstable political and economic climate. The lack of educational access directly impacts women’s economic opportunities. Limited financial resources prevent women from achieving economic independence, perpetuating cycles of poverty and dependence. This economic disparity further restricts their participation in skill development, decision-making processes, and leadership roles, impeding their progress in driving sustainable development.

Moreover, despite ongoing advocacy efforts, women remain significantly underrepresented in leadership positions, decision-making bodies, and influential sectors such as politics, business, and academia. This underrepresentation is a significant barrier to creating inclusive and sustainable development, as the perspectives and contributions of women are often overlooked in these critical areas.

These struggles, deeply rooted in cultural and social norms that prioritise traditional gender roles, continue to restrict women’s opportunities. Women are often expected to prioritise family responsibilities over personal or professional development, making engaging in activities that contribute to sustainable development difficult. These norms are powerful in rural areas, where change is slower and resistance to gender equality is higher.

Myanmar’s ongoing conflicts have disproportionately affected women, particularly those from ethnic minority groups. Women in conflict-affected areas face heightened risks of violence, displacement, and loss of livelihoods. These challenges make it even more difficult for them to access education, healthcare, and economic opportunities, further marginalising them from the development process.

In summary, addressing these critical issues is essential for a sustainable future. Can the country truly achieve a sustainable future without gender inclusion and a focus on intersectionality?

The lack of educational access directly impacts women’s economic opportunities. Limited financial resources prevent women from achieving economic independence, perpetuating cycles of poverty and dependence.

Naychi Thel Kyaw Tun is a Program Manager at the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a YSEALI Academic Fellow in Society & Governance at Western Washington University in the United States. She has been admitted to pursue her master’s in Development Studies at the University of Melbourne in Australia.

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