In conflict-affected Myanmar, engaging men in SRHR programming offers a critical yet challenging pathway toward transforming entrenched gender norms and hegemonic masculinities.

Key Takeaways:

• Effectiveness of men’s engagement in gender transformative SRHR programming is assumed to be shaped by the intersection of socio-cultural norms and ongoing politically unstable conditions, including poverty and conflict.

• Local grassroots organisations play a critical role in delivering SRHR awareness and challenging hegemonic masculinities, but their programs are constrained by donor-driven priorities, limited institutional capacity and resources, gender-sensitive expertise, time, and insecurity.

• Impact of these interventions may be interrupted, as social stigma, including local perceptions towards gender equality, can influence the extent of male participation in SRHR programming.

What is SRHR

The programme for gender equality has long been framed around the empowerment of women and the promotion of women’s rights, particularly within Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) initiatives. While this focus has contributed meaningfully to expanding women’s agency and participation, many scholars have argued that such approaches remain insufficient when relational drivers of gender inequality, especially the role of men in gender and development discourse, are left unaddressed. While sexual and reproductive health is a crucial part of social relationships, relating to physical, mental, and social well-being for human beings, these rights-based movements should advance human rights and gender equality. In terms of SRHR programming, it is not limited to local educational training, national awareness campaigns, or global feminist movements for reproductive rights.

Why male engagement is necessary (the importance of male engagement)

Since the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development as well as the 1995 Beijing Plan of Action, global gender and development agendas explicitly identified partnership with men as central to advancing gender equality and preventing violence against women and girls by foregrounding men’s roles in transforming unequal power relations. Therefore, engaging with men for gender equality means including men and boys not as perpetrators or bystanders, but as active allies and partners in SRHR programming to address structural inequality. Such engagement aims to improve intimate partner relationships, reduce gender-based violence, and support better family planning practices for future generations by reimagining masculinities. Existing research also shows that central to this work is challenging hegemonic masculinities and unequal power relations, moving away from dominant norms towards positive masculinities.

Male Engagement in the SRHR programming in Myanmar

While SRHR programming in Myanmar has historically emphasized women-related health issues, there have been growing efforts to involve men in these programs in recent years, reflecting broader global shifts towards gender-transformative interventions. However, there is limited knowledge of how these organizations navigate male engagement strategies in practice locally to challenge hegemonic masculinity as part of addressing unequal gender power relations, particularly in Myanmar. In addition, although a growing body of literature identifies cultural gender norms as key barriers to male engagement, fewer studies highlight how barriers to organizational practices are simultaneously shaped by broader socio-economic and political conditions. Since Myanmar is under an authoritarian regime and restrictions on civil society organizations on the ground, the possibilities and limitations of these approaches under the conditions of socioeconomic and political constraints require careful attention to create a better lifestyle and healthy relationships among family members and social relations.

Limitations of men’s engagement in SRHR initiatives

Despite growing international attention to engaging men and boys for gender transformative change in SRHR and violence prevention, evidence shows that such interventions remain relatively low, and often difficult to sustain, particularly in low- income and fragile settings. In Myanmar, deeply conservative gender norms, patriarchal ideology, and longstanding authoritarian rule create structural barriers to the meaningful engagement of men in gender and development interventions. Essentially, SRHR programs face conservative cultural norms and strong taboos around sexuality, which restrict SRH literacy, open discussion, and access to services. In this low-income and fragile setting, conflict and authorised military rule further undermine accountability mechanisms for SRHR programming, with severe disruption in rural conflict-affected areas, compared to urban settings in Myanmar.

In this regard, community-based and non-governmental organizations have become crucial providers of SRHR awareness training and educational workshops on the ground. International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 2023 reports highlight that their operations are working with chronic under-resourcing and limited civic space. Recent evidence and gap mapping validate that male engagement in SRHR interventions is deeply intersectional, shaped by political, economic, and sociocultural forces. This identifies a clear gap for research on how Myanmar’s current sociocultural and political factors influence whether men’s meaningful involvement in SRHR programs is restricted. Secondly, men’s primary provider roles and livelihood pressures will be one of the main reasons for low participation in these programmes.

Possibilities to create inclusive engagement

Therefore, meaningful engagement requires shifting their representation from perpetrators or passive bystanders to active allies and partners who can challenge structural inequalities and contribute to advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). Such engagement aims to improve intimate partner relationships, reduce gender-based violence, and support better family planning practices for future generations by reimagining masculinities. Based on the contextual conditions, engaging with men in programming can vary across regions. According to previous studies, SRHR programs would be more effective if they give training exclusively to men or women only, based on specific local contexts, culture, and tradition. Additionally, in order to encourage their participation, some organisations will provide family incentives/allowances for equal participation under socioeconomic constraints and the culture of men being in charge of the economic provider of the household, challenging them to fully participate in these awareness and education training. However, the effectiveness of men’s engagement is not determined by training alone but by the interaction of socio-cultural norms, organisational capacities, donor logics, and local perceptions of SRHR issues; not least, to create a sustainable practice of men’s engagement in these programs requires not only stable support from the government, which is currently challenging in Myanmar.

Conclusion

Having said that, the role of local organisations working towards SRHR programs is crucial in challenging hegemonic masculinity in the country where power is held by militarised masculinity, translating as power above by subordinating women is a primitive danger for Myanmar, which is already dominated by some toxic cultures, strengthening toxic masculinity by subordinating women. By ensuring the involvement of men in discussing the variety of topics around violence against women, family planning and consent, these programs will definitely create a safe space for men to question long-rooted ideas around decision-making and economic provider roles, contraceptive-related health issues for their partners, as well as the perspectives towards how real men should behave and how gender equality threatens men’s power authority. So that would lead to gender transformative change by potentially transforming household-level power relations, such as joint decision-making on SRHR-related decisions, men’s involvement in unpaid labor, attitudes towards GBV, which are central to gender equality, while we consider a localised approach to gender-transformative change.

Naychi Thel Kyaw Tun, a gender and minority rights advocate, is a Program Manager at the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and is currently pursuing a master's degree in Gender and Development Studies at the University of Melbourne, Australia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar’s polycrisis has collapsed NCD care through underfunding, health worker shortages, medicine scarcity, and attacks on healthcare.

• Existing responses show resilience but remain severely limited by resources and access constraints.

• Restoring NCD care requires not only technical health interventions but progress toward peace, stable governance, and intersectoral coordination.

Understanding NCDs

Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are long-lasting conditions arising from genetic, physiological, environmental, and behavioural factors, driven by modifiable risk factors including tobacco use, physical inactivity, unhealthy diet, and harmful alcohol use. NCDs require long-term management to prevent exacerbation and complications. NCDs are responsible for 74% of all global deaths, and a 2023 WHO report estimated that 25% of deaths among those aged 30 to 70 in Myanmar were NCD-related. Low- and middle-income countries with fragile health systems bear a disproportionate burden, and Myanmar is no exception.

Responses and Their Limitations

State Administration Council (SAC)

Myanmar’s health system comprises public and non-state actors (NSAs), with the public sector delivering around 86% of services. In 2017, the Ministry of Health and Sports adopted the WHO’s Package of Essential NCD (PEN) interventions, integrating screening, treatment, and referral into primary healthcare (PHC). However, the coup accelerated the collapse of Myanmar’s fragile health system, severely weakening PEN and causing Myanmar to miss key NCD targets. Contributing factors include equipment shortages, health worker shortages, frequent medicine stock-outs, and low public awareness, all driving high loss to follow-up, a key challenge for successful implementation.

Despite improved health outcomes and spending over 2010–2020, the junta has since allocated only 2.5% of the union budget to health while committing at least 1,846 incidents of violence against or obstruction of healthcare. Healthcare professionals who lost trust in the junta joined the civil disobedience movement (CDM), withdrawing from public service, a shortage further compounded by the junta’s detention, arrest, and killing of medical professionals, and barring facilities from hiring staff who opposed SAC or forcing them to shut down, with no state effort to address the gap.

Essential medicines are in short supply, available only in select private pharmacies at tripled price, driven by import licensing delays, customs restrictions, and barriers on goods movement. When supplies run out, clinicians rotate to alternative medications, but differing side effects destabilise patients and increase complication risks, creating critical gaps in care continuity. Community clinics could not open for new case-finding, and cancer patients were transferred to private facilities for continued treatment. Compounding this, the junta has denied prisoners access to basic NCD treatment, a violation of fundamental human rights. Security concerns and deep mistrust of the public sector further deter people from seeking care.

National Unity Government (NUG)

The NUG Ministry of Health (MOH) has adopted a decentralised approach, empowering local communities and frontline health workers. Although no NCD-specific data is available, the NUG delivers PHC through on-ground services in governed areas and Telekyanmar, a free telemedicine platform. Since 2021, over 1,000 facilities have been established across 190 townships, and underground, bomb-resistant hospitals are being constructed to protect staff and patients. Telekyanmar reaches 322 townships domestically and users across 50 countries, while health education content is regularly distributed online. To address workforce gaps, the NUG has invested in training, workshops, and volunteer recruitment, with 5,098 healthcare professionals currently serving nationwide.

The MOH has also coordinated with international donors, including joint advocacy with ethnic leaders. International response has been mixed. Most countries have kept engagement informal, while The United States, European Union, and European Parliament have moved closer, recognising the CRPH and NUG as legitimate representatives, and UN organisations have increasingly sought cooperation.

Despite this resilience, NUG health networks face severe constraints. The MOH has limited financial resources due to reduced funding from international donors. In addition, the supply of essential medicines is frequently disrupted because of the SAC’s strict control over medical supply to NUG-governed areas. Facilities in conflict zones are often underground, mobile, or improvised, leaving them vulnerable and limited in reach. Online services are hampered by inconsistent internet access, and workforce shortages persist due to limited clinical training opportunities and the continued killing and arrest of medical professionals.

Non-state Actors (NSAs)

NSAs, including local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), ethnic health organisations (EHOs), and private providers, play a significant role in healthcare delivery, particularly in fragile settings. Before the coup, the international community channelled technical and financial support largely, and NGOs supported PEN rollout, with slow but clearly directed progress, until the coup brought it to a halt.

The 2022 Organisation Registration Law has hindered humanitarian operations; hundreds of aid workers have been arrested, and the military restricts and monitors aid delivery. Donors have withdrawn funding to avoid subsidising the military government, suspending or reducing operations, worsened by USAID funding cuts affecting border area populations. Despite this, NSAs have demonstrated adaptive capacity by restoring parallel systems, using informal communication channels, maintaining buffer stocks, and adjusting supply chains and training models. Funding remains the primary constraint.

Patients favour private providers for accessibility, convenience, and the quality of communication and health education they offer. Some clinics serve low- and middle-income households through affordable consultations and free check-ups. However, the high cost of routine tests and specialist care deters some patients from recommended procedures, and access remains considerably low in rural or conflict-affected areas.

The Cost of Being Sick in a Broken State

As a Myanmar proverb goes, “an empty sack cannot stand upright“. Amid displacement and economic hardship, many are forced to prioritise food, shelter, and basic needs over healthcare, a trade-off that accelerates disease progression and undermines long-term wellbeing. Rising NCD costs impede poverty reduction, pushing out-of-pocket expenditure to 71.13%, and those already vulnerable get sicker sooner and die earlier than those in higher socioeconomic positions, creating a compounding cycle where illness deepens poverty and poverty worsens illness. The burden extends to caregivers, most often women and family members, who frequently reduce or leave paid work to provide care. For both patients and caregivers, chronic illness generates stress, anxiety, and depression, all largely unaddressed in a collapsing health system.

The Way Forward

Reforming PHC to integrate NCD prevention and management strengthens health system resilience, reduces costs, and optimises resources. A sustainable community-to-PHC referral system and regular follow-up are essential for medication adherence, and early detection of complications, as demonstrated by home visit programmes in Bhutan.

Community interventions that build health literacy encourage lifestyle changes, routine screening, and treatment adherence. Since most NCD risk factors are modifiable, raising awareness through print, broadcast, and online channels is crucial. Accurate risk perception motivates preventive behaviour, making public awareness a cost-effective entry point in resource-limited settings.

Sustained investment in manpower, supply chains, and technology is required. Uninterrupted medicine and equipment supply must precede PEN expansion. mHealth services, telemedicine, and digital platforms offer viable delivery options, and mobile-based CVD risk assessment tools proven feasible in rural India, could be adapted for Myanmar.

Capacity building for health facility staff should be included within PHC following WHO guidelines. Task-shifting to paramedics and community health workers is critical for high-risk identification, screening, and follow-up. Workforce allocation needs decentralisation to grant state and regional Health Directors greater authority over context-specific decisions. Effective NCD response requires coordinated action across public, private, and non-governmental sectors, spanning health, finance, education, agriculture, and transport.

Increased health spending must be implemented to reduce out-of-pocket expenditure. Aid should flow through multiple channels, prioritising local civil society actors in conflict-affected areas. Maintaining parallel funding streams has proven resilient when one channel fails, and flexibility remains central to effective humanitarian response.

Population-wide policy enforcement is necessary, covering smoking restrictions, health warnings on packaging, alcohol age and time restrictions, and taxation on alcohol, imported sugar, ultra-processed foods, and beverages. Regulating unhealthy food marketing and strengthening food labelling standards are equally critical for reducing modifiable risk factors at scale.

Monitoring NCD trends and risk factors guides policy priorities, making operational and implementation research a critical investment for evidence-based policymaking. Since NCD treatment gaps are deeply intertwined with socioeconomic, governance, and environmental crises, these recommendations can only yield meaningful results alongside progress toward peace and stable governance.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s polycrisis has systematically dismantled the conditions necessary for NCD care to function. Underfunding, attacks on healthcare infrastructure, workforce depletion, medicine shortages, and shrinking humanitarian access have pushed NCD patients further from care, deepening a cycle of poverty, inequality, and preventable suffering. Addressing this burden requires more than technical health interventions; it demands restored governance, sustained financing, community-centred care, cross-sectoral coordination, and a health system rebuilt on equity. Meaningful progress cannot be achieved without peace, yet Myanmar’s NCD patients cannot wait for perfect conditions. Therefore, all relevant stakeholders should take immediate action to address this issue.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Education is one of the most important foundations for sustainable community development. It is not only a process of acquiring knowledge but also a way to empower individuals, strengthen communities, and create opportunities for future generations. Sustainable development requires inclusive societies where people have the skills, confidence, and ability to participate in decision-making and contribute to positive change.

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals recognize quality education as a key factor for achieving sustainable development. Sustainable Development Goal 4 emphasizes the importance of ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all (United Nations, 2015). In Myanmar, education has a particularly important role because communities continue to experience social, economic, and political challenges that affect learning opportunities.

Despite these difficulties, education remains a pathway toward building resilient communities. By improving access to quality education, empowering young people, and promoting equal opportunities, Myanmar can strengthen its human resources and create a more sustainable future.

The Importance of Education for Community Development
Education contributes significantly to community development by improving people’s knowledge, skills, and ability to participate in society. Educated individuals are more likely to find employment opportunities, contribute to local development, and participate in solving community challenges. According to UNESCO (2021), education plays a central role in reducing inequalities and supporting sustainable development by developing individuals’ capabilities.

However, many communities in Myanmar face barriers to education. Rural areas, conflict-affected regions, and marginalized communities often experience limited access to learning resources, trained teachers, and educational facilities. Economic difficulties and social challenges can also prevent children and young people from continuing their education.

These barriers not only affect individuals, but they also influence the long-term development of communities. When young people lose educational opportunities, communities lose potential future leaders, professionals, and contributors. Therefore, supporting education is an investment in both individuals and society.

Education During Challenging Times in Myanmar
Myanmar has experienced significant social and political challenges that have affected many aspects of life, including education. In some areas, students and teachers face difficulties due to instability, displacement, and limited resources. During such circumstances, maintaining education opportunities becomes essential for protecting the future of communities.

In some conflict-affected areas of Myanmar, the expression “one hand holding a gun and the other hand holding a book” reflects the idea that security and education are both important concerns during difficult times. While this expression comes from a conflict context, it also highlights a broader message that education should continue even when communities face uncertainty.

Education during challenging periods provides more than academic learning. It helps individuals develop critical thinking, resilience, and problem-solving skills. UNICEF (2023) emphasises that education in emergencies can provide stability, protection, and hope for children and young people affected by crises.

Therefore, maintaining access to education is not only about continuing classes. It is also about supporting communities to remain strong and preparing future generations to contribute to rebuilding and development.

Education and Youth Empowerment
Young people are important actors in sustainable community development. Through education, youth can develop leadership skills, confidence, and the ability to participate actively in society. Supporting youth education creates opportunities for young people to become responsible citizens and future community leaders.

My experience as a Teaching Assistant at Young Ni Federal School helped me understand the importance of education in personal development. Supporting classroom and online learning activities showed me that education is not only about academic knowledge but also about creating a supportive environment where students can build confidence, communication skills, and motivation.

In addition, my involvement in youth education activities through Youth Society for Education strengthened my understanding of how educational opportunities can encourage young people to engage with their communities. These experiences showed me that even small educational activities can create meaningful impacts on individuals and communities.

Education, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunities
Sustainable community development cannot be achieved without inclusion. Education should provide equal opportunities regardless of gender, ethnicity, social background, or location. Inclusive education helps reduce inequality and allows more people to contribute to society.

Gender equality is especially important in education. When girls and women have access to education, they gain greater opportunities to participate in economic activities, leadership roles, and decision-making processes. UNESCO (2020) highlights that inclusive education is essential for ensuring that all learners have opportunities to succeed.

In Myanmar, supporting equal access to education requires cooperation among communities, educational institutions, and development organizations. Programs should consider the different challenges faced by learners and create supportive environments where everyone can participate.

The Role of Community-Based Education
Community participation is essential for creating sustainable education systems. Schools and organizations alone cannot solve all educational challenges. Parents, teachers, local leaders, and young people must work together to identify problems and develop suitable solutions.

Community-based education approaches are effective because they consider local needs and encourage people to take ownership of development activities. Development organisations can support communities through training, resources, and capacity-building programs.

According to the United Nations Development Program (2022), sustainable development requires inclusive participation and cooperation among different groups. Education programs that involve communities are more likely to create long-term positive impacts.

Recommendations
To strengthen education as a pathway toward sustainable community development in Myanmar, several actions should be considered.

First, improving access to quality education should be a priority, especially for vulnerable and underserved communities. Investment in teachers, learning materials, and safe learning environments is necessary.

Second, education programs should focus on both academic knowledge and practical skills such as communication, leadership, and critical thinking. These skills help individuals contribute effectively to their communities.

Third, partnerships among communities, government institutions, and development organisations should be strengthened. Collaboration can create more effective and sustainable education initiatives.

Finally, young people should be encouraged to participate in community development activities. Empowering youth through education can help create future leaders who contribute to positive social change.

Conclusion
Education is a powerful pathway toward sustainable community development in Myanmar. It empowers individuals, strengthens communities, and creates opportunities for future generations. Although Myanmar faces many challenges, education remains an essential tool for building resilience, equality, and social progress. My experiences in education and youth engagement have shown me that education can create meaningful changes in people’s lives. By promoting inclusive education, supporting youth development, and encouraging community participation, Myanmar can move toward a more sustainable and resilient future.

References
UNESCO. (2020). Global education monitoring report 2020: Inclusion and education – All means all. UNESCO. https://www.unesco.org/gem-report/
UNESCO. (2021). Reimagining our futures together: A new social contract for education. UNESCO. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/
UNICEF. (2023). Education in emergencies. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/education
United Nations. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development. United Nations. https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda
United Nations Development Programme. (2022). Human development report 2021/2022: Uncertain times, unsettled lives. UNDP. https://hdr.undp.org/

Khin Phyo Thu is a Bachelor of Political Science graduate from Mai Ja Yang College and is currently working as a Digital Resources and Information Management Intern at Inya Institute.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Key Takeaways:

• AI’s greatest gender-related risk in Southeast Asia is its ability to amplify narratives that have historically been used to mobilise violence and silence women.

• Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia demonstrate how AI is entering digital environments where gender is already weaponised for conflict, political competition, and social control.

• Current AI governance frameworks pay insufficient attention to the intersection of AI, conflict, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) concerns.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence has quickly become a central component of Southeast Asia’s digital future. Governments across the region are investing in AI infrastructure, developing national AI strategies, and positioning emerging technologies as engines of economic growth. Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have all identified AI as a strategic priority, while regional organisations increasingly discuss AI governance in terms of innovation, competitiveness, and digital transformation (see here).

At the same time, concerns regarding the societal impacts of AI have expanded beyond technical questions of privacy and algorithmic bias. International organisations, researchers, and civil society groups have warned that AI systems can reinforce existing inequalities, including gender inequalities. Much of this discussion has focused on representation, fairness, and inclusion within AI systems. While these concerns are important, they overlook a critical dimension of the Southeast Asian context.

Across the region, AI is not entering politically neutral environments. Instead, it is being introduced into information ecosystems shaped by conflict, polarisation, disinformation, and increasingly sophisticated forms of digital political competition (see here). In these environments, gender is not simply a social category affected by technological change. Rather, gender often functions as a political instrument through which actors mobilize support, construct threats, and undermine opponents.

This distinction matters because the most significant risk associated with AI may not be that it creates entirely new forms of gendered harm. Rather, AI may amplify existing practices through which gender has long been weaponized within conflict and political struggles. For instance, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia illustrate how this process is already unfolding across Southeast Asia.

Myanmar: When Gender Becomes a Conflict Narrative

Myanmar demonstrates that gender can play a central role in how conflict narratives are constructed and legitimised. Much of the international discussion surrounding Myanmar’s information environment has focused on the role of Facebook in facilitating anti-Rohingya hate speech and misinformation. Investigations conducted by the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission found that social media platforms contributed to the spread of inflammatory content and failed to adequately moderate dangerous speech in local languages. The mission concluded that Facebook had become a significant vehicle for the dissemination of hate speech and incitement against the Rohingya population. However, the role of gender within these narratives has received comparatively less attention.

Research examining digital disinformation in Myanmar has shown that rumours concerning violence against women frequently circulated online during periods of escalating communal tension. Stories portraying Muslim men as threats to Buddhist women became powerful mobilising tools within broader anti-Rohingya campaigns (see here). Allegations of sexual violence and threats against women were repeatedly invoked to frame violence as a form of protection rather than persecution. At the same time, gender-based discrimination also exists within the Rohingya community itself. Despite facing genocide and seeking justice, some members of the community have targeted Rohingya women activists through harassment and gender-based attacks( see here).

Artificial intelligence is often perceived as a neutral technology, yet its outputs are shaped by the data on which it is trained. Because AI systems learn from existing online content, they can reproduce and amplify societal, political, and gender biases embedded in that data. In conflict settings, these biases can reinforce harmful narratives rather than challenge them. As one interviewee cited in regional research on AI and conflict observed, rumours circulating on social media regarding violence against women often preceded violence on the ground. By the time claims could be verified or disproven, communal tensions had already escalated, and attacks had begun. The significance of this case extends beyond misinformation. It demonstrates how women’s bodies, safety, and social status can become symbolic battlegrounds within conflict. Gendered narratives were not peripheral to the conflict; they were part of the mechanism through which hostility was mobilised.

This experience raises important questions about the future role of generative AI. If recommendation algorithms helped amplify inflammatory rumours during the Rohingya crisis, generative AI may significantly increase the speed and scale at which similar narratives can be produced. AI-generated text, images, and videos can now be created at minimal cost and distributed across multiple platforms within minutes. In highly polarised environments, synthetic content does not need to be entirely believable to be effective. It only needs to reinforce existing fears and prejudices. The concern, therefore, is not simply that AI will spread misinformation. It is possible that AI may accelerate the production of gendered narratives that have historically contributed to violence.

The Philippines: From Disinformation to Political Intimidation

While Myanmar illustrates how gendered narratives can contribute to communal conflict, the Philippines demonstrates how they can be used to discipline and silence political opponents. Over the past decade, the Philippines has become one of the world’s most studied cases of digital political manipulation. Researchers have documented the emergence of organised online influence networks that combine political messaging, coordinated trolling, and algorithmic amplification to shape public discourse ( see here).

Women have often been among the primary targets. The experience of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Ressa and the journalists of Rappler provides one of the clearest examples (see here). Reporting by Rappler and independent researchers documented sustained online harassment campaigns involving misogynistic abuse, threats of sexual violence, and coordinated attacks intended to undermine credibility. Rather than focusing on professional performance or political positions, many attacks relied on gendered language designed to portray women as immoral, emotional, or untrustworthy. Importantly, these campaigns were not random expressions of online hostility. They functioned as political tools. The objective was not merely to insult individual women but to discourage criticism, weaken independent journalism, and shape public discourse ( see here).

Generative AI has the potential to transform these tactics. Political actors no longer need large teams to generate content continuously. AI systems can produce thousands of variations of narratives, social media posts, images, and videos targeted at specific audiences. Synthetic audio and video technologies further increase the possibility of reputational attacks based on fabricated evidence. In this sense, AI may not create a new form of political intimidation. Rather, it may dramatically reduce the costs associated with existing practices. What once required coordinated networks of operators can increasingly be automated, personalized, and scaled.

Indonesia: The Normalisation of Digital Gender-Based Violence

Indonesia highlights a third dimension of the challenge: the normalisation of digital gender-based violence. Organisations such as Komnas Perempuan and SAFEnet have documented a steady increase in online gender-based violence over the past decade. Women activists, journalists, academics, and human rights defenders frequently report harassment, doxxing, image-based abuse, and threats intended to discourage public participation ( see here). Similar patterns have also emerged among Rohingya communities, where some women activists have reportedly been targeted by members of their own community through online harassment, including the circulation of AI-generated images intended to discredit, intimidate, and silence their advocacy (see here). These cases demonstrate how AI-enabled abuse can reinforce existing gender inequalities and restrict women’s participation in civic and public life.

These patterns did not emerge with digital technologies alone. They are rooted in broader social and gender inequalities that continue to shape women’s participation in public life. Despite significant progress in women’s rights, Indonesian women continue to face discrimination linked to patriarchal norms, restrictive gender expectations, and unequal access to political and economic opportunities. Women who speak publicly on political, religious, or social issues are often subjected to heightened scrutiny and attacks on their morality, sexuality, or family roles rather than their professional qualifications or policy positions (see here). Researchers have noted that gendered stereotypes remain deeply embedded in both political discourse and everyday social interactions, creating an environment in which women are more vulnerable to intimidation and reputational attacks see here).

Unlike in Myanmar, these incidents are not primarily associated with armed conflict. Unlike in the Philippines, they are not always directly linked to organized political campaigns. Instead, they reveal how technology-facilitated gendered abuse has become embedded within everyday digital life. This trend is significant because it creates fertile ground for AI-enabled harm.

The growing availability of generative AI tools lowers the technical barriers required to create manipulated images, synthetic videos, and fabricated narratives. Activities that once required specialised expertise can now be carried out using publicly accessible applications. As a result, the production of harmful content is becoming increasingly democratised. The challenge is therefore not simply that AI creates new risks. It is that AI allows existing forms of abuse to be replicated more quickly, more cheaply, and by a wider range of actors. For women already navigating hostile online environments, this may further increase the costs associated with public participation.

Conclusion

The experiences of Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia demonstrate that AI is entering information environments where gender has long been used as a political tool. In Myanmar, gendered narratives helped mobilize violence; in the Philippines, they became instruments of political intimidation; and in Indonesia, they underpin increasingly normalized forms of digital abuse. Generative AI does not create these dynamics, but it enables them to be produced, distributed, and amplified at an unprecedented scale.

As Southeast Asian governments continue to develop AI governance frameworks, the challenge extends beyond questions of innovation and ethics. AI must also be understood through the lenses of conflict prevention, digital security, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Without such an approach, AI risks becoming a force multiplier for existing patterns of gendered harm and exclusion across the region.

Policy Recommendations

1. Integrate gender and conflict perspectives into AI governance to assess how AI may amplify disinformation, digital violence, and exclusion in fragile environments.

2. Strengthen local-language monitoring and response mechanisms to detect and counter AI-enabled gendered disinformation and online abuse.

3. Myanmar already suffered the first-ever social media-fueled genocide, and to prevent AI-fueled genocide or another mass crime, the UN or international organisations need to act to manage the AI regulation in the polycrisis context

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Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Myanmar is facing a severe and often hidden mental health crisis, shaped by ongoing conflict and systemic disruption. This article examines the key drivers, impacts, and current responses to mental health challenges within the country’s polycrisis context.

Key Takeawys:

• Myanmar’s mental health crisis is driven by conflict and systemic limitations, creating both visible and invisible burdens.

• Community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible short-term solutions.

• Long-term progress depends on political stability and sustained system strengthening.

Political unrest has severe effects on population health, particularly increasing the mental health burden. People living in conflict settings commonly experience anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, and suicidal thoughts. Evidence from Afghanistan and Ukraine also shows high levels of PTSD and depression in conflict settings.

In Myanmar, the ongoing conflict has led to a sharp rise in mental health problems. Depression and anxiety increased from 14.3% and 22.2% in mid-2021 to 61.39% and 58.02% by October, and by late 2022, one in four people experienced moderately severe to severe depression. Therefore, mental health remains a severe and often hidden public health crisis.

Mental Health in Myanmar’s Polycrisis Context

Mental health is not regarded as a priority due to competing needs, as families struggle to survive in a context of multiple overlapping crises. In 2021, a military coup overthrew the elected government, triggering widespread anti-coup protests across Myanmar. These peaceful demonstrations were met with violence, human rights violations, and attacks on civilians. Many people were killed, arrested, or displaced, and repression later expanded beyond protesters, with journalists being killed or detained. Women have also faced sexual violence, causing lasting psychological trauma. Forced conscription of adults aged 18 and above into frontline conflict pushed many young people to flee abroad or move to urban areas. At the same time, three in four Myanmar youths are no longer engaged in education or training due to unsafe learning environments, unaffordable educational costs, and limited scholarship opportunities, particularly among low- and middle-income families. As a result, many youths, who are essential to the country’s future resilience and recovery, face growing distress and anxiety over an uncertain future.

Ongoing conflict has displaced thousands of families, leaving them without adequate shelter or basic services, while also causing family separation. At the same time, the targeting of social service providers and the withdrawal of government workers under the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) have significantly weakened essential public services, including healthcare. Many CDM workers face arrests, torture, and threats against their families. Some are forced to move between safe houses for safety. In addition, the military regime has restricted passport issuance for CDM workers and increased questioning and detention at airports to prevent them from leaving the country. Without documentation and under constant risk of arrest or imprisonment, many CDM members continue to live in fear, insecurity, and anxiety.

Since the coup, inflation has risen to 28.58%, while the poverty rate reached 32.10%, leaving nearly one-third of the population in poverty. Agricultural productivity has declined by 16%, and around 15 million people are at risk of food insecurity. Meanwhile, the cost of essential goods and unemployment have both increased significantly. Salaries, however, have remained largely unchanged, making even daily commuting a financial burden. Many can no longer afford basic leisure or personal items. Some are forced to skip meals or reduce spending. Under such conditions, survival takes priority over mental health care, which costs between $7 and $12 per session.

Stigma is another major barrier. Mental health problems are often viewed as a source of shame, linked to evil spirits or karma, reflecting a limited understanding. Seeking professional care remains highly stigmatized, making people reluctant to access services. Many fear burdening others, hospitalization, or discussing their condition. As a result, individuals often endure problems silently and hide their condition, leading to underestimation of mental health needs.

The lack of adequate mental health care further worsens the situation. There is a major imbalance between professionals, facilities, and patients, especially between urban and rural areas. Only 1.4% of government health spending is allocated to mental health, and although the National Mental Health Policy (2021–2025) was approved, its implementation has stalled due to political unrest and limited resources. Consequently, stigma, low awareness, and limited access to care continue to deteriorate mental health outcomes.

At the same time, Myanmar citizens face additional crises such as COVID-19, cyclones, and earthquakes, causing loss of loved ones, livelihoods, and housing, creating compounded trauma. When these crises overlap, their impacts intensify, making recovery extremely difficult. Weak disaster governance and poor preparedness further worsen these impacts.

As a result, many Myanmar people are carrying invisible wounds. Rising prices have made simple activities unaffordable for many. Rising crime and worsening public transport have increased insecurity. Safety concerns also extend online, as user data has been handed over to the military. Daily life is further disrupted by power cuts, fuel shortages, and strict refuelling limits, while travel restrictions and detentions limit mobility. Anxiety has become a daily reality, driven by insecurity, forced conscription, limited opportunities, and uncertainty about the future.

The Hidden Costs of Mental Health Crisis

The psychological impact of the Myanmar polycrisis does not end with ceasefire agreements. It may contribute to trans-generational trauma, shaping families and communities. For example, people born in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide have experienced trauma passed down over time. Children are especially vulnerable, as violence and displacement impair development and learning. In some cases, trauma may alter gene expression, increasing the risk of future mental health problems and creating cycles of inherited distress.

Mental health issues not only affect a person’s mind but also their physical health. They can lead to alcohol and substance abuse, as well as other coping behaviors, and in severe cases, suicide. Anxiety and chronic stress can significantly reduce work productivity and income, while also placing emotional and economic burdens on families. High out-of-pocket healthcare costs further strain households. Over time, it contributes to reduced human capacity and increased pressure on the country’s overall economic and social systems.

Current Responses and Limitations

The institutional infrastructure, regulation, and oversight of mental health services in Myanmar remain limited, with a significant imbalance between care providers and patients. Individuals with severe mental distress require professional support at higher levels of the Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) care pyramid. Due to system neglect, cultural beliefs, and stigma, many rely on traditional approaches such as support from Buddhist monks, religious practices, or meditation. Online community groups also provide peer support. While useful for daily coping, these methods are not sufficient for severe conditions.

Mobile psychiatric clinics offer free services through periodic community visits, but this may increase workload and burnout among providers. Earlier efforts to integrate mental health into primary healthcare were also not fully implemented. The parallel government, NUG, prioritizes mental health by offering free telemental health services and awareness campaigns. However, the lack of in-person care limits support for frontline and on-ground individuals, especially those who have lost family members or suffered severe injuries, requiring intensive emotional support. For instance, some civilians have survived junta airstrike while losing family members. Such experiences leave survivors with severe trauma while caring for remaining family members with little or no access to mental health support.

NGOs and international organisations, such as UNFPA, also contribute through online platforms and training programs. At the same time, there has been a rise in short-term training courses, many lacking regulation and proper standards. Some individuals with minimal training offer services, raising safety and quality concerns. While approaches like Psychological First Aid are useful, they should be part of a broader system with proper training and supervision. More structured, evidence-based counselling programmes are needed.

Comments and Way Forward

Given the current polycrisis, community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible in the short term. However, long-term improvement requires a coordinated approach that includes policy reform, workforce strengthening, awareness, and integration into primary healthcare. Political stability is also critical due to its direct and indirect impacts on mental health systems and overall well-being. At the primary care level, clear guidelines and better training are required. Community volunteers can provide basic psychosocial support locally. Reducing stigma is critical. Community-based outreach, culturally appropriate education, and engagement with local and religious leaders are essential. Digital campaigns can reach wider populations. Mental health information should also be provided in multiple ethnic languages to reflect Myanmar’s diversity.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s mental health crisis is deeply shaped by the current polycrisis, making it widespread and complex. While existing responses provide some relief, they remain insufficient for long-term needs. Addressing this crisis requires coordinated efforts, along with improved political stability, to strengthen systems, reduce stigma, and expand access to care.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Key Takeaways

• AI strengthens state power in fragile authoritarian contexts by expanding capacity without sufficient accountability, increasing risks of surveillance and misuse.

• AI amplifies existing systems of propaganda by accelerating and scaling disinformation and narrative control.

• AI-driven development can deepen inequality due to unequal data representation, digital access gaps, and low levels of AI literacy.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly embedded in governance systems worldwide, reshaping public administration, security infrastructures, and service delivery mechanisms. Governments are adopting AI-driven tools not only to enhance efficiency but also to advance development objectives aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in healthcare, education, and economic growth.

In response, a growing number of jurisdictions have developed AI governance frameworks emphasising risk-based regulation, data protection, and ethical standards. Prominent examples include the frameworks advanced by the EU AI Act, the OECD AI Principles, and the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. These models promote transparency, accountability, and human-centred AI.

However, these frameworks largely presuppose the existence of stable democratic institutions, regulatory capacity, and accountability mechanisms. Using Myanmar as a case study, this article argues that AI does not simply enhance governance in fragile and authoritarian contexts; it also reshapes state power, amplifies information control, and risks reinforcing structural inequality.

Artificial Intelligence and Governance under Polycrisis

Artificial intelligence has the potential to transform development outcomes across sectors. In healthcare, AI supports disease detection and treatment optimisation; in agriculture, it enables precision farming and climate adaptation; and in education, it expands access through digital learning platforms. These applications highlight AI’s potential to support inclusive development. However, the effectiveness of AI depends heavily on governance conditions. Its impact is increasingly shaped by what scholars describe as a polycrisis, the intersection of multiple, overlapping crises such as political instability, economic disruption, technological change, and information disorder. In contexts like Myanmar, these crises do not occur in isolation. Political instability following the 2021 Myanmar Coup, combined with digital fragmentation, economic constraints, and social inequalities, creates a complex environment in which AI systems are introduced and deployed.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often framed as a tool for enhancing state capacity. Yet in contexts where governance structures are weak, it may instead produce unaccountable capacity. In Myanmar:

• Regulatory institutions are limited

• Legal safeguards are weak

• Oversight mechanisms are minimal

According to Access Now (2023), the rapid and unchecked deployment of AI systems, particularly in surveillance and public-sector decision-making, creates conditions in which these technologies operate without the necessary transparency, accountability, or safeguards. Rather than strengthening governance, AI risks reinforcing centralised control without checks and balances.

AI and Information Control in a Fragile Authoritarian Country

In authoritarian contexts, artificial intelligence is increasingly used to enhance information manipulation and political control. The governments of several countries have drawn on disinformation techniques originally pioneered in Russia to implement sophisticated information operations that spread messages via fake Facebook accounts and false news stories, in cases intentionally contributing to communal violence against religious minorities. Across the region, governments, activists, and non-state armed groups actively use social media to gain domestic and international support for their cause. Similarly, in Myanmar, propaganda and disinformation are not new; they have long been embedded in state and military communication strategies.

Recent reporting by The Irrawaddy shows how the military regime has institutionalised its information operations. For example, the junta has established a multilingual propaganda body to counter international criticism, demonstrating a coordinated effort to shape narratives beyond domestic audiences. In another case, the regime dismissed reports of civilian casualties as “fake news”, reflecting a broader strategy of denying accountability and controlling information flows.

These examples illustrate that information manipulation in Myanmar is already systematic and strategic. Social media platforms such as Facebook have further amplified this dynamic, enabling the rapid dissemination of misleading content and contributing to public confusion and polarisation.

The emergence of AI technologies significantly intensifies these existing practices. AI-generated content, including synthetic images, videos, and text, can:

• scale propaganda production rapidly

• produce highly realistic but fabricated content

• enable targeted and adaptive disinformation campaigns

Scholarly research on synthetic media highlights how these technologies can erode trust in information ecosystems and undermine accountability, particularly in environments with weak media literacy and restricted access to independent information (see Pawelec, 2022). Myanmar has long experienced state-led information control, but digital technologies have significantly expanded its reach. Social media platforms, particularly Meta’s Facebook, play a central role in shaping public discourse, often acting as the primary source of information.

A notable case in Myanmar illustrates how emerging technologies intersect with existing propaganda practices. The junta was accused of using deepfake technology to support corruption allegations against Aung San Suu Kyi, after releasing a video confession by a detained official. The footage triggered widespread public skepticism, with observers noting inconsistencies such as unsynchronised lip movements and unusual audio patterns. While experts debated whether the video was definitively a deepfake or a coerced statement, the incident highlights a critical issue: in low-trust and restricted information environments, the mere possibility of AI manipulation is enough to shape public perception and generate uncertainty.

At the same time, misinformation does not always require advanced AI. A recent report by Agence France-Presse found that social media posts falsely presented an old image of Aung San Suu Kyi as a recent photo, demonstrating how easily misleading content can circulate in Myanmar’s information environment. Public discourse has pointed to suspected manipulated or synthetic content, which has fueled speculation and public anxiety, particularly regarding high-profile political figures. In this context, AI acts as a force multiplier - scaling both the speed and reach of information manipulation. Such cases show that low-tech misinformation and high-tech AI-generated content exist on the same spectrum, reinforcing each other.

In Myanmar, where verification is already difficult due to censorship and limited media freedom, AI-generated or AI-suspected misinformation presents even greater risks. These risks are further amplified by the growing use of encrypted platforms such as Telegram, where military-linked channels and affiliated networks have been reported to circulate large volumes of unverified and, in some cases, AI-generated videos related to the ongoing conflict. In the wake of the 2021 coup, the military regime, or State Administration Council (SAC), quickly shifted its primary information operations from Facebook to alternative platforms, including Telegram, highlighting the adaptability of disinformation networks. The closed and decentralized nature of such platforms makes monitoring and verification significantly more difficult, allowing misleading or fabricated content to spread rapidly with limited accountability.

At the same time, there are rising concerns about the use of AI tools to generate non-consensual and sexually explicit content, particularly targeting women. Reports and public discussions indicate that manipulated or synthetic 18+ videos have been used to harass, intimidate, and discredit female activists, journalists, and public figures. These practices reflect a broader pattern in which digital technologies are weaponised along gendered lines, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and reinforcing social harms.

AI, Inequality, and Digital Literacy Gaps

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often presented as a tool for improving access to information and expanding opportunities. However, its impact is deeply shaped by existing social and digital inequalities. In contexts such as Myanmar, these inequalities are not only economic or geographic; they are also reflected in uneven access to digital knowledge, skills, and information systems. AI systems are fundamentally dependent on data, making them highly sensitive to existing structural inequalities. In fragile and linguistically diverse contexts such as Myanmar, these inequalities are not only social but also embedded in digital infrastructures.

Key challenges include:

• unequal access to digital infrastructure between urban and rural communities

• limited inclusion of minority groups and languages in digital systems

• significant gaps in digital and AI literacy across different segments of society

These factors influence who benefits from AI and who is left behind. Communities with limited connectivity or lower levels of digital literacy are less able to access AI-driven services, while also being more vulnerable to misinformation and manipulation.

A critical dimension of this challenge is the generational divide in digital and AI literacy. Younger populations, particularly in urban areas, are generally more active users of social media and digital platforms. They are more likely to engage with emerging AI tools and integrate them into everyday activities such as learning, communication, and content creation. However, this familiarity does not always translate into critical understanding. People need to have digital literacy to verify the information and not contribute to the rapid spread of misinformation.

In contrast, older generations often face barriers in accessing and navigating digital technologies. Limited exposure, lower confidence in using AI tools, and difficulties in evaluating online information can lead to exclusion from digital services or increased susceptibility to misleading content. In some cases, this results in dependence on informal information networks, which may further amplify misinformation.

Platforms such as Facebook and Telegram play a central role in shaping these dynamics. Information spreads rapidly across these platforms, often without effective verification mechanisms. In such environments, both overconfidence among younger users and limited digital literacy among older users contribute to an existing fragile information ecosystem.

These structural gaps shape how AI systems interpret and represent reality. When datasets exclude or simplify certain populations, AI outputs risk becoming systematically biased, incomplete, or misleading. A particularly illustrative example is Myanmar’s long-standing use of Zawgyi encoding, a non-standard font system historically used across digital platforms. Unlike Unicode, which is internationally standardised, Zawgyi is not fully compatible with modern computational systems. For example, during the transition period, Facebook reported that identical posts written in Zawgyi and Unicode were treated differently by its algorithms, affecting content visibility, moderation, and information retrieval. Google similarly noted measurable improvements in search and input tools following Unicode standardisation. This demonstrates a critical point: when linguistic systems are fragmented, AI systems inherit and reproduce that fragmentation.

Therefore, AI does not create inequality, but it encodes, scales, and amplifies existing disparities across data, language, and generational access. AI does not create inequality, but it can significantly amplify it.

Fragmented Governance and Emerging Actors

Myanmar’s governance landscape is increasingly fragmented, with alternative actors such as the National Unity Government (NUG) playing a growing role. While the National Unity Government (NUG) actively counters military narratives through official statements, social media engagement, and diaspora-supported networks, it does not yet operate a formalised AI governance or verification system. As a result, its responses to misinformation remain largely reactive and decentralized rather than systematic.

At the same time, the absence of trusted, institutionalised verification mechanisms combined with the proliferation of AI-generated and manipulated content contributes to a broader environment of information uncertainty. In such conditions, competing narratives circulate simultaneously, making it increasingly difficult for the public to distinguish credible information from misinformation.

This raises important questions about the future of AI governance:

• Can alternative actors develop more accountable digital systems?

• How can AI support service delivery in contested areas?

• What role can decentralised governance play in shaping technology use?

At present, these dynamics remain underdeveloped, highlighting a critical area for further research and policy engagement.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Context-Sensitive AI Governance Frameworks

Global AI governance models must be adapted to fragile contexts. This includes prioritising minimum safeguards, even in low-capacity environments, such as transparency standards and basic oversight mechanisms. Efforts to strengthen AI governance in Myanmar should also consider broader regional developments in Southeast Asia. Several countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, have already adopted national AI strategies or ethical frameworks to guide investment, innovation, and risk management (see). These initiatives highlight a growing regional trend toward integrating AI into economic development and public service delivery.

However, Myanmar remains significantly behind in terms of AI readiness, governance capacity, and digital infrastructure. At the same time, past cases such as the role of social media in amplifying violence against the Rohingya population underscore the risks of unregulated digital ecosystems

2. Investment in AI Literacy and Public Capacity

Improving AI literacy is essential to reduce misuse and vulnerability to misinformation. Targeted education initiatives should focus on:

• digital literacy

• critical media skills

• responsible use of AI tools

3. Addressing Data Inequality

Efforts should be made to ensure more inclusive data systems by:

• incorporating minority languages

• improving rural data representation

• supporting equitable digital infrastructure

4. Safeguarding Information Ecosystems

International organisations and civil society actors should prioritize:

• monitoring disinformation

• supporting independent media

• strengthening fact-checking systems

5. Supporting Alternative Governance Innovation

Emerging governance actors should be supported in developing:

• transparent digital systems

• accountable AI applications

• inclusive service delivery models

Ultimately, strengthening AI governance in Myanmar requires more than technical solutions; it demands coordinated efforts across institutions, society, and regional partnerships. Without such efforts, AI risks reinforcing existing patterns of inequality, misinformation, and political control. Ensuring that AI contributes to inclusive and accountable development will depend on sustained investment in capacity, trust, and governance.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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When Myanmar’s military seized power on 1 February 2021, the immediate consequences were political: mass protests, violent repression, and the collapse of a fragile democratic transition. Five years later, the deeper consequences are institutional. Myanmar is now experiencing a prolonged polycrisis, armed conflict, economic contraction, displacement, and humanitarian emergency, but at its core lies a crisis of governance.

Key Takeaways

• After five years of the military coup, Myanmar’s healthcare system has shifted from a fragile public service to a fragmented and increasingly privatised survival mechanism.

• Service disruption, funding instability, and institutional fragmentation have weakened Myanmar’s healthcare system.

• Workforce depletion, declining immunisation coverage, and rising out-of-pocket spending demonstrate a reversal in progress toward Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3).

Healthcare provides one of the clearest indicators of governance failure. Before the coup, Myanmar’s health system was fragile but was gradually improving. Public spending remained limited, yet vaccination coverage was rising, HIV and tuberculosis (TB) programs were expanding, and international partnerships were strengthening service delivery. The trajectory was uneven, but it was forward. Since 2021, that trajectory has reversed.

Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3) commits states to universal health coverage, financial risk protection, and epidemic preparedness. These are governance obligations requiring institutional capacity, fiscal prioritisation, territorial coordination, and professional autonomy. Myanmar’s post-coup experience demonstrates how quickly these foundations can erode.

This regression can be understood through three interrelated governance failures:

(1) collapse of access to healthcare;

(2) disruption of financing and financial risk protection; and

(3) institutional and territorial fragmentation driven by Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) participation and mass displacement.

1. Collapse of Access: Institutional Erosion and Service Breakdown

The most visible consequence of post-coup governance failure is declining access to healthcare. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), escalating conflict, displacement, and economic collapse have created a severe humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, with 19.9 million people requiring humanitarian assistance, including 12.9 million in need of humanitarian health services (WHO, 2025). Conflict-affected areas, including Sagaing, Rakhine, Kachin, Kayah, and northern Shan, face repeated disruptions to clinics, referral systems, and outreach services. Since 2021, approximately 433 attacks on healthcare facilities have been reported, according to WHO surveillance data (WHO, 2024).

Workforce depletion has critically weakened service capacity. Before the coup, Myanmar’s health workforce density stood at 17.8 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 population (WHO, 2024), already below the WHO benchmark of 22.8 required for SDG-compatible service coverage. By 2022-2023, reported figures fell to roughly 1.01 doctors and 1.96 nurses per 10,000 population (WHO, 2024). Nursing availability declined by an estimated 73 percent between 2019 and 2022 (WHO, 2024). These figures indicate systemic incapacity rather than temporary disruption.

Preventive services have similarly regressed. WHO and UNICEF WUENIC estimates show DTP3 coverage declining to around 48 percent in 2021 before partially recovering to 76 percent in 2023 (WHO, 2024). WHO estimates that around 1.2 million children in Myanmar are zero-dose or under-immunised, reflecting major disruptions to routine immunisation services following the political crisis (WHO, 2023). The WHO Global TB Reports (2024) document declines in TB case detection following the coup compared to pre-2021 notification levels. HIV testing and treatment continuity were also disrupted in conflict-affected regions (WHO, 2024f). Treatment interruptions increase risks of transmission and drug resistance, undermining previous gains.

Analyses in global health journals similarly highlight how conflict, health worker participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement, and infrastructure disruptions have collectively weakened routine healthcare delivery (BMJ Global Health, 2026; The Lancet, 2024).

2. Funding Disruption and the Re-Privatisation of Health Risk

Healthcare sustainability depends on financial protection as much as service availability. The 2023 Myanmar National Health Accounts show that 71 percent of total health expenditure was out-of-pocket (WHO, 2024g), among the highest in Southeast Asia. While public spending remained limited, international funding played a stabilising role in HIV, TB, malaria, and immunisation programs.

Several international humanitarian programmes have also been disrupted or suspended since the coup. Before 2021, international NGOs played a central role in supporting Myanmar’s health sector, particularly in HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria control, and maternal and child health services. However, political instability, operational restrictions, and new registration requirements have forced many organisations to scale back or suspend activities. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that Myanmar’s national HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis programmes effectively “shut down” after the coup as the public health system collapsed and partnerships with the Ministry of Health were disrupted (The New Humanitarian, 2021). Although other funding did not disappear entirely, coordination weakened, and long-term system strengthening stalled.

Simultaneously, domestic fiscal priorities shifted toward security expenditures amid economic contraction and declining tax revenues (WHO, 2024).Investigative reporting by Athan News has highlighted how public hospitals increasingly require patients to purchase medicines and supplies externally. The economic crisis has sharply increased household vulnerability. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study warned that the combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 military coup could push up to 25 million people, nearly half of Myanmar’s population, below the national poverty line, reversing over a decade of poverty reduction (UNDP, 2021). When 76 percent of health expenditure was already out-of-pocket prior to the coup, further fiscal retrenchment deepens financial vulnerability and shifts health risk directly onto households (WHO, 2024g). Financial risk protection, central to SDG 3, has eroded, widening inequality.

3. CDM Participation, Displacement, and Territorial Fragmentation

Institutional fragmentation represents the third structural driver of health system unsustainability. Following the coup, an estimated half of the public-sector health workforce participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), withdrawing from state institutions in protest against military rule (Amnesty International, 2021). The mass walkout of doctors, nurses, teachers, and other civil servants significantly disrupted public service delivery, including healthcare, education, and social welfare systems.

While the CDM has been a central component of resistance to military rule, the withdrawal of large numbers of public-sector professionals created additional pressures on already fragile service systems. These disruptions occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and amid escalating conflict, further constraining the health sector’s ability to maintain routine services and emergency response capacity. At the same time, conflict-related displacement has fragmented service delivery across regions, weakening referral systems and continuity of care.

Moreover, procurement systems and medical supply chains have deteriorated due to import licensing delays, transport insecurity, and currency instability. Restrictions on transporting medicines and medical equipment to conflict-affected and opposition-controlled areas have further complicated humanitarian delivery, particularly in territories outside military control. These constraints have contributed to shortages of essential medicines, including tuberculosis drugs and other life-saving treatments.

Conflict escalation has displaced millions. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 19.9 million people were estimated to require humanitarian assistance in 2025, including approximately 4 million internally displaced persons and 1.5 million refugees (OCHA, 2024). Displacement disrupts vaccination records, HIV and TB treatment adherence, maternal health services, and chronic disease management. Health systems depend on territorial coherence, stable populations, referral networks, and administrative coordination. In Myanmar, territorial control is increasingly fragmented, and service provision varies significantly by region.

Long-established ethnic health systems in areas administered by organisations such as the Kachin Independence Organization and the Karen National Union have historically maintained parallel healthcare governance structures and community-based service networks. These systems have helped sustain basic services in some conflict-affected regions. However, newly contested territories under resistance forces such as the Sagaing Region aligned with the National Unity Government often lack comparable institutional infrastructure (BMJ Global Health, 2026). In such areas, healthcare provision frequently relies on mobile clinics, community volunteers, or humanitarian actors, resulting in uneven coverage and limited continuity of care (BMJ Global Health, 2026; WHO, 2024). Prolonged fragmentation risks institutionalising geographic inequalities in access to healthcare.

Implications and Recommendations

Myanmar’s health crisis demonstrates that humanitarian assistance cannot substitute for governance recovery. Sustainable progress toward SDG 3 requires restoring institutional functionality alongside emergency support.

Protection of health workers and facilities must be prioritised to safeguard service continuity and professional autonomy. Financial risk protection mechanisms require stabilisation through accountable pooled financing that supports essential medicines and primary care, particularly for displaced and low-income populations. Strengthening transparency and oversight in health financing and procurement is also critical. Even before the coup, Myanmar’s health system faced governance challenges, including weak regulatory oversight and risks of corruption in procurement and pharmaceutical supply chains. Since 2021, institutional collapse and severe staff shortages have further weakened accountability, with reports indicating that patients in some public hospitals have been forced to pay informal fees or bribes to access treatment and basic services (Frontier Myanmar, 2023). Finally, adaptive coordination among state, ethnic, and community-based providers is necessary to mitigate fragmentation and expand equitable coverage.

Health outcomes will remain the clearest indicator of whether governance recovery is taking place. Without institutional resilience, fiscal prioritisation of social sectors, and territorial coordination, healthcare will continue shifting from a public good to a private burden borne disproportionately by the poor and displaced.

References

Amnesty International Thailand. (2021). After coup, Myanmar military puts chokehold on people’s basic needs.

BMJ Global Health. (2026). Health system disruption and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.

Frontier Myanmar. (2024). Myanmar’s public hospitals are failing their patients.

Human Rights Watch. (2025). Myanmar: Junta assault on health care hinders quake response.

Insecurity Insight. (2022). Myanmar: Attacks on health care in 2021 – Factsheet.

The Lancet. (2024). Health and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup.

The New Humanitarian. (2025). Myanmar healthcare and disease prevention are neglected casualties of war.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2021). COVID-19, coup d’état and poverty: Compounding negative shocks and their impact on human development in Myanmar.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2024). Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2023). Decreasing zero-dose children threefold amidst pandemic and political unrest in Myanmar.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024a). Myanmar External Public Health Situation Analysis.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024b). Global tuberculosis report 2024. Geneva: WHO.

Frontier Myanmar. (2023). “No remedy”: A broken public health system fosters neglect and corruption.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024c). Global Health Expenditure Database: National Health Accounts country profile.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Education in rural Myanmar remains a critical challenge shaped by limited resources, language barriers, economic hardship, and unequal access to qualified teachers, yet it also presents an important opportunity for youth-led initiatives to drive inclusive and sustainable development.

Quality education has long been a central challenge in rural Myanmar due to limited access to schools, a shortage of qualified teachers, and socioeconomic barriers. Myanmar has been struggling with political instability and educational disparities between rural and urban areas. Achieving quality education is fundamental to long-term development and inclusive growth. There are many reasons why students in rural areas cannot access quality education.

Firstly, quality education is strongly reliant on teachers’ competence and the effective allocation of resources. The Myanmar Ministry of Education reports that over 20% of rural teachers are unqualified and often lack formal teacher training or university degrees. Most rural teachers are local people who finished only secondary education. They only use the rote learning method rather than a critical one.

According to administrators from ethnic education departments, language barriers affect the quality of education. Burmese is the only language used in the national curriculum. As a result, ethnic students find it difficult to learn lessons, lag behind peers, and lose interest in learning.

Another one is the economic barrier in rural areas. Economic barriers deeply influence access to quality education in rural areas. Even though learning at a government school is officially free, families struggle with indirect expenses such as uniforms and school supplies. And also, parents with a low education level focus more on immediate survival ahead of long-term education.

Infrastructure shortage is another critical barrier to providing quality education. Many rural schools lack basic facilities such as teaching aids, electricity, clean water, sanitary facilities and safe classrooms. According to the World Bank’s report, more than 70% of rural people lack electricity, which makes it impossible for teachers to use contemporary teaching resources, and for students, it can limit their study time and academic advancement.

Quality education aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 4 and youth participation in local communities are an important part of solving these problems. Young people can be leaders, mentors and innovators who can change educational disparities. Youth-led initiatives use critical methods and localised curriculum textbooks and make education more relevant. Youth can create a robust education system that supports social empowerment and quality education by making investments in youth-led initiatives.

There are 3 ways to strengthen quality education by focusing on sustainable strategies for youth-led initiatives. These are (1) Developing youth leadership and capacities, (2) Encouraging volunteerism and community- based learning, (3) Incorporating youth voices into national education.

Strengthening youth leadership through training in digital literacy and sustainable development would equip them to contribute more effectively. Capacity-building programs offer leadership, educational innovation and social awareness. Expanding youth-led digital literacy initiatives can accelerate community-based learning solutions. Linking youth-led education to livelihood opportunities can increase family support for schooling and reduce the number of students who drop out because of economic barriers.

Volunteer networks, community-based training facilities, and youth-led non-governmental organisations are essential for long-term educational growth. These organisations have successfully reached out-of-school children. However, their long-term impact is still limited by their lack of government recognition. In order to formalise their contributions, non-formal education programs, civil society, and government agencies should work together more closely through certification frameworks, resource support, and policy integration.

To ensure equitable and culturally relevant education in rural Myanmar, it is crucial to invest in young educators, especially those from ethnic minority backgrounds. Both the demand for instruction that respects language and cultural diversity and the lack of trained teachers can be addressed by funding teacher training programs for these young people. Schools that prioritise mother-tongue-based multilingual education (MTB-MLE) and participatory teaching methods tend to achieve higher student engagement. Myanmar may foster a cycle of long-term local leadership and educational resilience by allowing young educators to serve in their own communities.

By establishing Youth Advisory Councils within the Ministry of Education, composed of representatives from diverse regions and ethnic groups, it would help a lot for educational disparities. These councils would offer suggestions for policy implementation, teacher preparation, and curriculum development. Youth representatives could be part of local village education committees that serve as a contact between local government, parents, and schools. This participative approach guarantees the lived reality of youth in rural and conflict-affected areas.

Empowering youth in rural areas is an investment for the country’s long-term stability. Youth engagement offers a potential way for advancing quality education and achieving the broader vision of an inclusive, resilient, and sustainably governed society.

Thiri San Min holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from East Yangon University. She is currently researching the Belt and Road Initiative and its impacts on Myanmar.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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In the Rohingya refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, education remains trapped between emergency relief and long-term sustainability, leaving an entire generation uncertain about its future.

Only a limited amount of education is available in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. For more than a million displaced people, learning has become fragile, erratic, and uncertain. Although education in refugee settings is often discussed as a humanitarian issue, it is fundamentally a sustainability concern. Without access to high-quality, continuous education, entire generations risk being excluded from sustainable development, deepening inequality and instability far beyond the camps.

Education directly supports the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 4 (Quality Education) and Sustainable Development Goal 10 (Reduced Inequalities). However, budget cuts, structural disparities in learning levels, and policy restrictions continue to limit Rohingya children’s access to education. These barriers not only deprive children of their rights but also weaken the long-term resilience of displaced communities.

Two primary education systems are operating in the camps. The first consists of community-based schools run informally by Rohingya teachers during early morning and evening hours. These classes are often led by instructors who either developed their skills within the camps or previously taught in Myanmar. Families typically pay nominal fees. Although these schools are unlicensed, underfunded, and lack official certification, they sometimes offer instruction using the Myanmar curriculum up to Grades 10 or even 12.

Alongside them are learning centres supported by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and funded by local partners and international donors such as UNICEF. Some centres follow in-house programs focused on foundational literacy and life skills, while others use the Myanmar curriculum. These facilities are more structured, yet they generally provide education only up to lower secondary levels. Notably, there are no government-run schools, colleges, or universities operating within the camps. For most students who reach Grade 10, the educational pathway effectively ends.

This educational dead end significantly affects children’s motivation. Many begin school with aspirations of becoming doctors, engineers, teachers, or computer scientists. Over time, however, they realise that the system cannot support their ambitions. When education is not linked to viable opportunities, attendance declines, child labour increases, and early marriage, particularly among girls, becomes more common. Education shifts from being a pathway out of poverty to merely a temporary refuge from hardship.

Teacher recruitment and training further complicate the situation. In NGO-supported centres, teachers are hired by implementing organisations and paid through donor funding. Training is provided after recruitment, but it is often brief and inconsistent. Experienced educators are sometimes overlooked in favour of less qualified candidates due to administrative or regulatory constraints. As a result, teaching quality varies widely, and effective pedagogical methods, especially in science, mathematics, and digital skills, are not consistently applied.

From a sustainability perspective, this model is short-sighted. An education system that ends at basic literacy does not prepare young people for climate adaptation, sustainable livelihoods, or civic participation. Many young refugees express a strong interest in digital literacy, computer skills, vocational training, and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. These ambitions are not abstract; they reflect a genuine desire to contribute meaningfully to society if given the opportunity.

Investing in refugee education, therefore, is not charity; it is prevention. Education reduces dependency, mitigates social risks, and equips displaced populations to contribute to host communities and future reconstruction efforts. Reports from international organisations, including the United Nations and the World Bank, consistently demonstrate that education strengthens social cohesion and economic resilience, particularly in crisis-affected contexts.

To advance sustainability, education in refugee camps must evolve from an emergency response model to a long-term development strategy. This includes expanding secondary and post-secondary pathways, standardising teacher recruitment and training, integrating digital and vocational education, and recognising refugee-led initiatives as partners rather than temporary stopgaps. Donors and policymakers must align educational support with sustainability goals to ensure continuity rather than repeated cycles of disruption.

If sustainability means meeting present needs without compromising future generations, then denying refugee children access to quality education is inherently unsustainable. At its core, the Rohingya crisis is not only about displacement, but it is also about whether the global community is willing to invest in human potential where it has been most disrupted. Education is not a luxury reserved for stable societies; it is the foundation of stability itself.

Ata Ullah is a Rohingya refugee researcher, writer, and education advocate based in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. He is the founder of the NextGen Rohingya Network, focusing on refugee education, sustainability, and youth advocacy.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Amid Myanmar’s ongoing political turmoil, the absence of comprehensive sex education is fueling health risks and social vulnerability among youth, highlighting an urgent need for informed, inclusive, and sustainable educational reforms.

Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has experienced profound social, political, and economic disruptions. Among the less visible yet deeply urgent consequences is the increase in unprotected sexual activity and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) among young adults. According to the World Health Organisation (2023), Myanmar has reported a growing number of HIV infections among people aged 15 to 24, reflecting weakened access to reproductive services and public health outreach. Schools remain unstable, and social taboos surrounding sexuality remain. The lack of comprehensive sex education (CSE) in Myanmar shows that it is not only a public health failure but a broader governance crisis. In the context of sustainability, this issue underscores how fragile institutions undermine social resilience. Sustainable development, as outlined by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), depends on inclusive education (SDG 4), gender equality (SDG 5), good health (SDG 3), and effective governance (SDG 16). The absence of CSE in Myanmar’s education system highlights how governance breakdowns can directly threaten social sustainability.

Before the coup, Myanmar’s sex education curriculum was limited and inconsistent. Lessons focused narrowly on reproductive biology and largely avoided topics such as contraception, consent, gender identity, and sexual rights (UNESCO, 2018). These gaps were compounded by social conservatism and religious sensitivity, which made open discussions about sexuality taboo in many schools and at home. After 2021, the education sector worsened further. Many teachers and students joined the Civil Disobedience Movement, while thousands of schools were closed, damaged, or militarised. Meanwhile, international and local NGOs such as Marie Stopes Myanmar and Population Services International, which once provided youth-friendly reproductive health services, were restricted or shut down (UNFPA, 2025). Young people increasingly turned to peers or social media for sexual health information, often encountering misinformation. Community health groups have noted a rise in sexually transmitted infections and unplanned pregnancies since 2022, particularly among displaced and urban youth (Save the Children, 2023). With health infrastructure weakened and reproductive services reduced, the absence of institutional sex education has translated directly into higher social and health risks.

Beyond public health data, social dynamics further reveal how the absence of structured sex education is being filled by unregulated digital content. A recent editorial video report by The Irrawaddy (2025) featured interviews with secondary school teachers who admitted that platforms like TikTok and Facebook play a major role in shaping students' views on sexuality. Teachers reported that sexual themes and online trends have normalised early sexual activity without awareness of protection or consequences. In the absence of formal, comprehensive sex education, social media effectively becomes the “teacher,” accelerating misinformation and unsafe behaviour among Myanmar’s youth.

Recent empirical research has highlighted the severity of knowledge gaps among Myanmar’s youth. An analysis of data from the Myanmar Demographic and Health Survey found that nearly half of sexually active young people had their first sexual encounter before the age of 18, and only around half reported using contraception. Educational attainment and regional factors were significant predictors of safe-sex practices, suggesting that both access to information and social context shape sexual behaviour. These findings highlight how the absence of comprehensive sex education contributes directly to risky behaviours and underscore the urgent need for policy intervention. Moreover, misinformation about sexuality contributes to discrimination against LGBTQ+ communities, undermining social inclusion and cohesion. True sustainability requires that all individuals, regardless of gender or identity, be able to make informed, autonomous choices about their bodies and relationships.

Comprehensive sex education is not merely an educational issue but a governance responsibility. Effective governance provides citizens with the knowledge and autonomy to make informed decisions. In Myanmar, the lack of CSE reflects deeper governance failures: the politicisation of morality, the silencing of civil society, and the neglect of youth rights. Teachers are often discouraged or penalised for addressing sexual health topics, as education policy remains centrally controlled and highly conservative. This suppression undermines young people’s access to information that could protect their well-being. Moreover, post-coup censorship and reduced NGO activity have restricted community-based initiatives, leaving few trusted channels for accurate education. The governance crisis following the 2021 coup has had devastating ripple effects on Myanmar’s education and health sectors, including widespread school closures, teacher arrests, and rising sexual and gender-based violence (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

From a sustainability perspective, this governance vacuum weakens three key pillars: social resilience, as youth become more vulnerable to preventable health risks; gender equality, as young women face disproportionate consequences from early pregnancies and unsafe sex; and institutional trust, which is compromised when schools and government systems fail to provide relevant, protective education. Neglecting sex education carries lasting social and economic costs. Rising rates of HIV, STIs, and teenage pregnancies place additional strain on an already fragile health system. In 2023, Myanmar recorded an estimated 11,000 new HIV infections, with a growing proportion among youth populations (UNAIDS, 2023). Many young women who become pregnant early face stigma, school dropout, and economic exclusion, reinforcing cycles of poverty and gender inequality.

Building sustainable reform in Myanmar demands a multi-layered strategy that recognises sex education as a governance and human rights issue. Comprehensive sex education should be integrated into the national curriculum based on UNESCO’s International Technical Guidance on Sexuality Education, which emphasises scientific accuracy, age-appropriateness, and inclusivity (UNESCO, 2018). Despite systemic challenges, small but meaningful initiatives have emerged to advance inclusive sexual education in Myanmar. According to UNFPA (2025), recent training programs have introduced comprehensive sexuality education modules that engage young people, including those with disabilities and LGBTQ+ identities. These programs emphasise diversity, consent, and human rights, reflecting an effort to align Myanmar’s youth education with global sustainability principles. Such inclusive approaches demonstrate how governance partnerships with civil society can still function as micro-level models of resilience, even within broader institutional collapse.

Teacher training must be prioritised, as many educators lack both the confidence and the pedagogical tools to teach sensitive topics effectively. Community-based and digital education platforms could supplement formal schooling, particularly in conflict-affected or remote areas. Collaboration among local bodies, international partners, and local NGOs is essential to destigmatise and mainstream sex education. Public campaigns that frame CSE as a health and sustainability issue rather than a moral or cultural one can gradually shift public perception. Governance reform must protect and empower civil society organisations that work on youth health and rights, as these actors play a crucial role in sustaining education and awareness when state systems fail.

To conclude, the crisis of sexual health among Myanmar’s youth is not simply a private or moral matter but a reflection of systemic governance failure. Sustainable development cannot be achieved while young people remain uninformed, unprotected, and stigmatised. Comprehensive sex education, when effectively implemented, strengthens social resilience, gender equality, and institutional trust, which are essential pillars of sustainability. Rebuilding Myanmar’s social fabric requires acknowledging that health and education are intertwined with governance and justice. Teaching young people about their bodies, rights, and responsibilities is not a threat to culture but a foundation for a sustainable future. In a country where so much has been silenced, empowering youth with knowledge can be the most sustainable act of all.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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This article examines the ethical challenges posed by artificial intelligence and argues that a multi-stakeholder, value-based approach, integrating legal regulation, technical expertise, and international ethical frameworks, is essential for governing AI in a way that protects human rights, privacy, and social values.

AI and the Role of Algorithms

Along with the development of AI, the role of algorithms has become increasingly important, particularly in different types of machine learning within the AI field. Algorithms set up by computer scientists and engineers can be controlled by specific management systems for particular tasks; however, machine learning algorithms that result from the data we provide to AI systems are not fully controllable by computer scientists, especially when they cause harm by violating data privacy. Since people hope to benefit from these algorithms for business or other economic or social purposes, violations of personal data privacy and social values caused by these algorithms must also be brought to public attention. If algorithms cause harm to humans and their lives, they should indeed be regulated through proper regulatory frameworks within each country or society.

However, regulation is not the only or necessarily the best solution to control AI. An alternative approach is to design better algorithms or to grant technicians greater access to explore technical solutions independently. Nevertheless, technicians are not the only ones who understand every aspect of protecting human rights, such as regulators, police officers, or judges, and they are not the primary actors responsible for addressing violations of privacy or fairness. Therefore, legal scholars have focused on traditional solutions that attempt to regulate algorithms, data, and machine learning. Even though there are several debates and many unanswered questions related to ethical AI principles, there is a general belief in the importance of regulating AI or establishing ethical AI guidelines as an essential step toward benefiting society.

Ethical Challenges Posed by AI and EU Efforts to Regulate AI

Several challenges arise in AI technology, and some of the most common include discrimination and bias, privacy concerns, transparency, accountability, justice, and fairness. These challenges demonstrate the need to justify AI systems and to design effective AI ethics guidelines. The EU AI Act 2024 adopts a risk-based regulatory approach and classifies AI risks into different categories, such as unacceptable risk, high risk, transparency risk, and minimal risk. Firstly, unacceptable risks are strictly prohibited under Article 5 of the Act, as they violate fundamental EU rights and values.

Secondly, high-risk AI systems include those that impact health, safety, or fundamental rights, such as systems subject to conformity assessments or post-market monitoring, and these are identified under explicit criteria in Article 6 of the Act. Thirdly, risks related to impersonation, manipulation, or deception—such as chatbots, deepfakes, or AI-generated content—are categorised as transparency risks, and state parties are obligated to comply with information and transparency requirements. Finally, minimal-risk AI systems, such as spam filters or recommender systems, are not subject to specific regulatory obligations. However, the EU AI Act mainly focuses on a regulatory framework, and its ethical guidelines for AI remain unclear. Although the 2019 EU Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI encourage AI systems to be lawful, ethical, and robust, they do not contain clear or explicit ethical sections or principles. To effectively regulate AI ethics, core ethical principles should be clearly articulated within the EU legal framework.

Defining AI Ethics by Key Stakeholders

Regulating technology is one of the most important duties of government, and it is not an easy task to perform perfectly in practice. Regardless of the outcome, governments must strive to protect public interests by providing legal frameworks to regulate AI. For example, the EU enacted the AI Act in 2024, introducing strict regulations and requirements for the benefit of the EU community. However, a value-oriented approach to defining AI ethics may be more effective than a purely regulatory legal framework, and governments should collaborate with technical experts to develop effective AI guidelines. While legal experts may lack sufficient technical knowledge of AI, technical experts and industries are at the forefront of AI advancement. Their involvement is beneficial because they possess the resources, expertise, and practical experience related to AI technologies. For instance, Google published its AI Principles in 2018 to address AI-related challenges, and Microsoft implemented the Responsible AI Standard based on six principles: fairness; reliability and safety; privacy and security; inclusiveness; transparency; and accountability.

In addition, academic researchers and legal scholars from both theoretical and practical domains of AI development should contribute to defining AI ethics. Inviting civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) can further encourage the creation of ethical frameworks that respect human rights, equality, and equity through an inclusive approach. For example, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism introduced measures for due diligence and impact assessments on AI technologies used by private and corporate sectors.

Furthermore, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights have demonstrated that Meta’s algorithms directly contributed to harm by amplifying anti-Rohingya content, including advocacy of hatred against the Rohingya, during the conflict between the Myanmar military and the Rohingya people. Additionally, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted the first intergovernmental AI principles in 2019 and updated them in 2024, comprising five value-based principles and five practical recommendations aimed at promoting trustworthy AI. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) also adopted the first global instrument on AI norms and ethics for its member states through consultations with international experts and organisations. Therefore, a multi-stakeholder approach to defining AI ethics, bringing together governments, companies, legal scholars, technical experts, and international bodies, is necessary to promote shared responsibility and transparency in AI ethical principles.

Accordingly, this article recommends implementing a multi-stakeholder approach to defining AI ethics in each country, using existing guidelines as references to develop well-designed, ethics-based frameworks.

REFERENCES
1. Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, “Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach”, 3rd Edition,2021
2. Ben Goertzel, Cassio Pennachin (Eds.), “Artificial General Intelligence” 2007
3. Michael Kearns and Aaron Roth, “The Ethical Algorithm: The Science of Socially Aware Algorithm Design”, Oxford University Press, 2020
4. Nathalie A. Smuha “The Cambridge Handbook of the Laws, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence”, KU Leuven Faculty of Law and Criminology,2025.
5. EU AI Act,2024.
6. https://ai.google/principles/
7. Microsoft Responsible AI Standard, v2, June 2022.
8. Brent Daniel Mittelstadt , Patrick Allo , Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra Wachter and Luciano Floridi, “The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the debate”, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 2 Alan Turing Institute, British Library, London, UK, 2016.
9. UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, 31st March,2024.
10. BBC, “Rohingya sue Facebook for $150 bn over Myanmar hate speech”, 8th December 2021.
11. UNESCO, “Recommendations on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence” 26th September 2024.

Lwin Nyein Chan Thu holds an LL.M. in Business Law from Thammasat University, Thailand, and is currently working as a researcher and lawyer providing free legal services to youth detainees during the military coup in Myanmar.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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The article argues that global sustainability narratives remain “lost in translation” by privileging Western perspectives over local knowledge

Introduction

Orientalism was invented by European people who perceived the Eastern people as “the Orient” and as exotic and mysterious (Said, 1979, p. 1). And this Said’s Orientalism is still echoing in the current age, while it is believed that the world is moving towards sustainable development altogether. Lost in translation, as a contemporary artwork, illustrates this concept of Orientalism through artistic and narrative styles that are based on the Western perception. This essay will discuss some of these styles, including media dynamics, cultural binaries, misrepresentation, and incomprehension between Western and non-Western characters of the film, and connect these patterns with those of global discourse and movement towards sustainable development.

Media Dynamics

To describe orientalist media dynamics, it is the first to analyse current global media culture that emphasises the West’s imagination of ‘the East’ being exotic and mysterious (Said, 1979, p. 1). Lost in Translation serves as a contemporary artwork that subconsciously manifests Orientalism. There are controversial discussions surrounding Western loneliness and Eastern exoticism in this film. The film first tends to portray the unfamiliarity of American protagonists with Japanese culture with “dazzled humility” (King,2005, p.46). However, the film continues to portray Japanese characters as stereotypical Orient with the visuals including neon signs, bowing, strange customs, making them look unfamiliar and exotic, ultimately leading to “ bemused condescension” (King,2005, p.46). These visual settings and discriminatory scripts have spoken for Japanese culture from Western perceptions instead of the actual culture (King,2005, p.46). Said (1979) mentions that this cultural narrative is “ the corporate institution” in which the West controls the narrative and declares the statements about the Orient (p.3).

The pattern of orientalist media portrayal can be found in ingrained sustainable development discourse and agreement of the present and the past. Alagoz (2024) mentions in his “ Sustainable Orientalism” article that the notions of sustainable development and mutual benefits were visualised with the semi-naked African woman and the dressed European man: man exchanging finished goods and woman exchanging raw materials (p.139). These visuals aimed to promote “a gigantic colonial fantasy” of Europe and its territorial occupation of Africa and the Middle East for their economic sustainability, Alagoz (2024) further clarified (p.138). In the name of mutual benefits, the motives of the picture have manifested Orientalism by dominating the European features of a fine-dressed man and quality products in exchange for low-cost raw materials. This depiction influenced the narratives of geopolitical dynamics of post-colonisation, which are still mirroring cultural representation today. Said (1979) also mentioned this dynamic that “Orientalism is not just academic but a 'distribution of geopolitical awareness' through media, literature, art” (p.12).

Cultural Binaries

The intuitive argument countered from the West could be Occidentalism, which is the opposite of Orientalism. This term means Eastern people perceiving the West as rational: both of which are “man-made” (Said, 1979, p.5). This perception is depicted in the scenes of Lost in Translation, where Japanese characters look strange and confused by what the two Western protagonists are talking and where the male character is the tallest one in the elevator. However, most of these portrayals, such as East being the short and mysterious workers, and not subtitling the Japanese language, are mainly from the American characters that the images of “the cityscapes and curving off-ramps” are rendered like a tv screen to depict the western protagonists’ confusion and lost in translation of the signs (King,2005, p.48). Furthermore, this cultural domination is described by Said (1979) as Orientalism, separating the world into two: the Orient and Occident (p. 2). And, he further states that Europe found its cultural identity and strength in differentiating itself from the Orient (Said, 1979, p.3).

The similar cultural dichotomies between Western and Eastern states found in sustainable development, but in a different direction, are called Green Orientalism and Brown Occidentalism according to Heurtebise (2023, p.121). That means the West is in charge of all the environmental issues, climate change, and ecological disruption, such as global warming and loss of biodiversity (Heurtebise, 2023, p.125). Since the effects are not green, it is referred to as “brown,” leading to Brown Occidentalism (Heurtebise, 2023, p.125). On the contrary, Green Orientalism, being a self-identified term by Asians, is regarded as “holistic harmony” and “environmental wisdom,” unlike the European dualistic nature and capitalist (Heurtebise, 2023, p.125). The article continues to label this distinction as ‘Culturalization of Anthropocene" in Chinese Ecological Civilization that puts ecological crises as cultural binaries rather than augmenting these two (Heurtebise, 2023, p.126). However, what Alagoz (2024) defines as these cultural binaries is that the dividing lines between West and non-West show high and low cultural strength for developing economic and territorial highlighting the Western cultural domination (p.140).

Misrepresentation and Incomprehension

As the last part of assessing Lost in Translation in parallel to current sustainable discourse, the focus lies on the lack of cultural comprehension between Western people and non-Westerners. There is a hospital scene in the film where the Western protagonist has imitated and mimicked the question of a Japanese grandma since he did not understand it (King,2005, p.46). The highlight of what turned the tables is Western people imitating the Japanese language. However, it is rebutted with the fact that there was a lack of understanding or translation of the Japanese language, and this incomprehension in film ultimately leads to linguistic insignificance and undermining local power and knowledge (King,2005, p.48). This proves Said’s assertion that “ the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination…. hegemony” (Said, 1979, p.5). This point has been mirrored in Sustainable Orientalism, which is assessed by “ the circulation of thoughts” in the Western sustainability metrics (Alagoz, 2024, p.149). The imagination of sustainability is still ingrained as achieving the lifestyles of the First World without mere consideration of local culture and knowledge of non-Western (Alagoz, 2024, p.149). Thus, there is a need to address this cultural domination and binaries and work on representing the truth of both Eastern and Western cultures. And, it is claimed by Heurtebise (2023) that transcultural environmentalism as a solution means “transcending cultural specificities and linguistic barriers” (p.142).

Conclusion

In conclusion, Lost in Translation, in its attempt to portray loneliness and isolation of the Western protagonists surrounding the Eastern people, manifests Orientalism by dominating media portrayal, misrepresenting culture, and lacking linguistic comprehension. These ingrained trends mirror the discourse and agreement surrounding global sustainability, and this needs to be addressed by augmenting cultural binaries and breaking linguistic incomprehension to shape the actual sustainable development of the world.

References
Alagöz, G. (2024). Sustainable Orientalism: Hegemonic discourses for environmental sustainability and their transmission to non-Western habitats.
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7ww6h030
Heurtebise, J.-Y. (2023). Green orientalism, brown occidentalism, and Chinese ecological civilisation. Asian Studies, 21(1), 63–86.
https://journals.uni-lj.si/as/article/view/11669/11985
King, H. (2005). Lost in translation. Film Quarterly, 59(1), 12–21.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/fq.2005.59.1.45
Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. Vintage Books.

Khine Yin Thaw is a Bachelor of Arts student at Parami University, United States.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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As thousands of Myanmar workers seek opportunities in Malaysia, this article examines their motivations, struggles, and broader social implications.

Introduction

Migration from Myanmar to Malaysia has become one of the most significant labour movements in Southeast Asia. Malaysia’s expanding industrial base and continuous demand for affordable labour have made it a primary destination for Myanmar migrants. Among the estimated 800,000 Myanmar workers living in Malaysia, many view migration as a means to escape economic hardship and political instability in their home country.
Despite their significant role in Malaysia’s economy, these workers often remain marginalised and underrepresented in public discourse. In early 2024, Frontier Myanmar reported that the Malaysian government introduced a voluntary repatriation program starting on 1 March 2024. The policy encouraged undocumented migrants to surrender to the authorities and return home without prosecution by paying a fine of 300–500 ringgit per immigration offence. This move signalled Malaysia’s increasingly strict approach toward undocumented labour, even though the country continues to rely heavily on migrant workers to sustain its industries.

Reasons for Migration

The migration of Myanmar citizens to Malaysia can be explained through both push and pull factors. Push factors stem from conditions within Myanmar. Persistent economic instability, unemployment, and political uncertainty have forced many citizens to seek opportunities abroad. The 2021 military coup further intensified the economic crisis, leading to inflation, rising poverty, and limited access to stable employment. For many rural families, labour migration has become one of the few viable strategies for survival and income generation.
Conversely, pull factors are linked to Malaysia’s expanding economy, which offers higher wages, greater job security, and improved living standards compared to Myanmar. The most common employment sectors include manufacturing, construction, agriculture, plantation work, and domestic service. Social networks also play a vital role in facilitating migration, as friends and relatives who have already migrated assist newcomers in finding jobs and navigating legal procedures. Over time, these social connections have established a strong and continuous migration corridor between Myanmar and Malaysia.

Theoretical View of the Intended Migration

The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) provides a useful framework for understanding the intentions of Myanmar workers to migrate. The theory suggests that human behaviour is influenced by three components: attitude toward the behaviour, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control.
For many Myanmar migrants, the attitude toward migration is highly positive. Young individuals, in particular, view working abroad as a means to achieve financial independence, support their families, and enhance their quality of life. Migration is perceived as a symbol of progress, ambition, and empowerment.
Subjective norms, or social expectations, also shape migration decisions. Within many Myanmar communities, migration to Malaysia is considered a mark of success. Families and neighbours often respect and admire those who send remittances home, which reinforces the idea that working abroad is both honourable and beneficial.

Finally, perceived behavioural control refers to an individual’s belief in their ability to migrate successfully and adapt to life in a new country. Despite knowing the challenges of working in so-called 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous, and difficult), many believe the opportunity to earn a higher income outweighs the associated risks.
According to UNDP (2024), approximately 40 per cent of Myanmar youth expressed a desire to migrate abroad if given the chance. This indicates that migration is not merely an economic decision, but also a social and psychological phenomenon deeply rooted in both community influence and personal ambition.

Issues and Challenges

Although Malaysia benefits from the labour of Myanmar migrants, these workers continue to face numerous legal, economic, and social challenges. Legal documentation remains one of the most pressing concerns. The Irrawaddy (2024) reported that around 500,000 Myanmar workers are officially registered, while the remaining 300,000 live and work without valid documentation. Undocumented migrants face the constant threat of arrest, detention, and deportation under Malaysia’s immigration laws. Although the 2024 repatriation initiative provided temporary relief, the requirement to pay fines ranging from 300 to 500 ringgit (USD 70–120) was financially burdensome for many low-income workers.
Exploitation and labour abuse are also widespread. Numerous human rights organisations have reported cases involving recruitment fraud, unpaid wages, passport confiscation, and unsafe working environments. Many migrants endure long working hours, minimal rest, and poor occupational safety. Furthermore, Myanmar migrants often encounter social discrimination and cultural exclusion. They are frequently viewed as temporary or low-status residents and are excluded from welfare programs. Language barriers, unclear legal rights, and frequent policy shifts further increase their vulnerability and insecurity.

Benefits to Myanmar’s Economy

Despite these hardships, the contribution of Myanmar migrant workers remains vital to the country’s economic development. According to the World Bank (2023), Myanmar migrants abroad remitted approximately USD 1.5 billion, representing around 2 per cent of the nation’s GDP. These remittances serve as a crucial lifeline for families, enabling access to education, healthcare, and improved living conditions while stimulating local business growth.

Conclusion

The situation of Myanmar migrant workers in Malaysia highlights the complex nature of labour migration, which is a process that provides opportunities for personal growth while exposing workers to structural inequalities and risks. Addressing these challenges aligns closely with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth, which emphasises fair labour practices, safe working conditions, and equal opportunities for all workers. For migration to become a truly sustainable and empowering process, both governments must strengthen labour governance, ensure fair recruitment, and expand legal migration pathways. Providing skill-development programs, digital training, and entrepreneurship opportunities such as SME and start-up support can also help migrants build long-term financial independence. Ultimately, when human dignity is respected and economic opportunities are shared equitably, migration can evolve from a necessity into a vehicle for inclusive growth and regional prosperity.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Education plays a transformative role in post-conflict recovery, serving not only to rebuild schools but also to foster reconciliation, social cohesion, and sustainable peace.

Key Takeaways:

1. Education reform must go beyond reconstruction to promote trust, identity, and peace-building in divided societies.

2. Inclusive and multilingual education policies, as seen in Nepal and Timor-Leste, are essential for social equity and national cohesion.

3. International partnerships and flexible learning pathways can strengthen resilience, reconciliation, and long-term stability in post-conflict Myanmar.

Conflict and Education

Education is one of the most critical foundations for rebuilding societies after violent conflict. Before rebuilding schooling, education plays a transformative role in fostering reconciliation, social cohesion, and stable peace. Conflict-affected countries face destroyed infrastructure, fractured governance systems, traumatised communities, and politicised curricula. Education recovery is not simply restoring infrastructure but building trust, identity, and inclusive nation-building.

For Myanmar, with over seven decades of ethnic conflict with a fractured education system, the experience of Nepal and Timor-Leste can give instructive lessons for education recovery. The education recovery method in these countries can outline how Myanmar might rebuild an inclusive, harmonised education that supports federal, inclusive, and peaceful societies for future generations.

Nepal’s education reform

Nepal has been through multiple political transitions: from monarchy to republic, from unitary to federal state. These transitions shaped education reforms and were both targeted by the policy and became a site of contention. The Nepal education sector played a vital role in peace-building and violent prevention by fostering mutual understanding and tolerance during conflict and post-conflict settings. During the Maoist Insurgency from 1996-2006, both the government and the Maoists viewed schools as key sites for propaganda campaigns, which resulted in high dropout rates.

After ending the decade-long conflict in 2006 through the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), Nepal took the initiative in its education sector, especially in the primary education sector. In 2009, Nepal adopted the School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP) for 2009-2015 as part of a peace dividend with the help of Development Partners. In the SSRP, Nepal ensured equity and social cohesion for disadvantaged groups, including conflict-affected people, by allocating seats for teachers and management positions. As a result, the historically excluded people (Dalits) and indigenous people (Adivasi) got a chance to participate in the education reform sector.

Afterwards, Nepal launched the most transformative policy initiative, the School Sector Development Plan (SSDP) in 2016. The School Sector Development Plan (SSDP) leverages the Nepal education system by increasing enrollment rate, enhancing teacher competency, and strengthening school accountability systems. SSDP also offers scholarships for Dalits and martyrs’ children, and mother-language published textbooks (21 languages), enabling mutual understanding among different ethnic groups and creating harmony among diverse societies. As a result, the literacy rate climbed from a meagre 25% in 1981 to 67% in 2021 due to its educational reforms and initiatives.

Despite several successes, Nepal is facing challenges in constructing a federal education bill for future implementation. In 2023, Nepal’s parliament registered the School Education Bill to replace the outdated Education Act of 1971 transitions Nepal into a federal education system. This bill aims to empower local educational autonomy and reconstruct school education with federalism and inclusive education, leading Nepal to commit to its constitutional federal state vision. There are several attempts with multiple introductions and long parliamentary reviews, but they failed to stall due to major stakeholder backlash. Teachers’ unions and federations repeatedly protested, resulting in the closure of public schools in 2023 and again mobilised in 2024-2025.

Timor-Leste’s recovering education

Following the UN-sponsored referendum in 1999, Timor-Leste gained full independence in 2002. Home to 1.4 million people, Timor-Leste was occupied by Indonesia for 24 years and lived under 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule. In 1999, following Timor-Leste’s vote for independence, pro-Indonesian militias destroyed about 90% of schools and educational infrastructure, causing a near-total collapse of the education system. Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste, resulting in a significant loss of 90% of schools and the educational workforce. The post-conflict impacts, including the destruction of infrastructure, large-scale displacement, and interrupted schooling, left the education sector in an extremely fragile state.

Due to the violence unleashed by the Indonesian invasion, a fifth of the population was prevented from finishing basic education. After decades of conflict and instability disruptions, Timor-Leste has implemented structured education policies to foster an inclusive education system that empowers citizens for nation-building and peace and stability. Another challenge in educational reform lies in the insufficient growth rate of the teaching workforce, as teachers are overburdened due to limited resources and increasing classroom sizes.

Timor’s curriculum has developed over time into an indigenous curriculum that focuses on the country’s culture, history, and environment to strengthen Timorese national identity for Timorese. In 2010, the Timorese government, with the help of international organisations, implemented the “Equivalency Education Program”, offering young people and adults the opportunity to pursue education through a condensed curriculum of primary and secondary education. During 2010-2017, the World Bank also funded the Second Chance Education Project, which aimed to help adults complete their basic education, and 197 students had graduated by 2017. These initiatives allow the conflict-affected Timorese population to pursue an accredited education system through a systematic approach.

Language reform is another key component for education reform in Timor-Leste. The Indonesian invasion in 1999 introduced the Indonesian curriculum into Timor to “Indonesianize” the people, and more than 90% of all secondary teachers were Indonesian at that time. After gaining independence, Timor-Leste adopted Tetum as the main language of instruction in the early primary years, gradually incorporating more Portuguese over time. The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS) conducted Curriculum reform in 2013 for basic education, improving teaching quality and student learning outcomes.

Timor became a full ASEAN member in November 2025 despite its painful history with Indonesia. Timor Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão states that ASEAN can learn “Maybe in peace, and reconciliation dialogue,” from Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste also joined the Southeast Asia Primary Learning Metrics (SEA-PLM) as part of its educational reform. Joining the ASEAN and SEA-PLM can enhance Timor’s strategic educational reforms in adaptations in local languages, Tetum and Portuguese. Education became a key site for national identity, reconciliation, and social cohesion for Timor-Leste, although it is still fragile and in the rebuilding stage.

Peace and reconciliation models stand as a pillar for Timor-Leste’s emerging education policy. Many peace education programs are being implemented with the help of international organisations, including Heavenly Culture, World Peace, Restoration of Light(HPWPL), and UNESCO. HPWL implementation aims to lead Timor Leste’s schools to become a violence-free and peace-promoting environment while UNICEF conducts training for sustaining Peace through transformative education. These programs demonstrate how education can rebuild human capital and promote social cohesion in post-conflict societies.

Recommendations for Myanmar

A future peaceful Myanmar requires an education system that teaches not only literacy and skills, but also dignity and coexistence for all societies. The classroom can become a place where trauma is transformed into resilience with the right strategic implementations.

Lessons from Nepal and Timor-Leste can be used to rebuild the fractured education system due to political instability and conflict-affected settings. Key recommendations for future implementation include:

1. Adopt a federal and inclusive framework: development of federal education law will empower local authorities and democratic education while maintaining national standards, ensuring marginalised people have access and representation in policymaking.

2. Integrate Peace and Reconciliation in Education: Schools should foster social cohesion through peace education, inter-ethnic dialogue, and conflict-resolution programs.

3. Implement a Multilingual and culturally sensitive curriculum: Incorporate local languages alongside Burmese to improve inclusion and learning outcomes.

4. Provide Flexible Learning Pathways: offer equivalency and second-chance programs for CDM students, displaced children and adults, addressing gaps of conflict and prolonged disruptions.

5. Leverage International Support: Collaborate with international initiatives for technical, financial, and consultative support to adapt reforms strategically.

In this way, Myanmar can transform education into a tool for reconciliation, social cohesion, and human capital development. The new education system will ensure inclusive and peaceful nation-building for future generations and support the country’s long-term vision of federalism and equity for all.

Aung Thet Paing Hmue is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) with over two years of experience in the humanitarian sector. Currently residing in Thailand, he navigates cross-border challenges while building his professional future.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Ethnocentric education curriculum strengthens Burmanisation, leading to the failure of social cohesion and peace building.

Key Takeaways:

1. Myanmar is a culturally rich and diverse country, experiencing social ethnic conflicts for over 60 years.

2. Ethnocentric education and majority-centred curriculum designs are detrimental to the country’s peace-building efforts.

3. Decentralised and localised education, including mandatory civic education, might be a solution to save a fragile country like Myanmar.

Myanmar is a diverse and multicultural country with 144 ethnic groups, according to the 1973 census, residing within its borders. The dominant group is the Bamar, which comprises two-thirds of the country’s population. Since gaining independence from the British colony in 1948, the country has faced a prolonged civil war. Shortly after independence, Myanmar experienced ethnic insurgencies, including the Bamar Communist Party. Following the first military coup in 1962, the coup led to the formation of many ethnic armed organisations.

The Myanmar military has used its power to manipulate and restrict the rights of ethnic minorities. Ethnic groups were marginalised and persecuted since before the 1962 coup, but it got worse under the military rule after the 1962 coup. The military regime only promoted Buddhism, the religion practised by the majority of the Bamar, and prioritised culture, tradition, and language of the Bamar majority, leading to Burmanisation, which has weakened social cohesion and obstructed peace-building efforts.

Several factors have contributed to the breakdown of social cohesion and peace-building in Myanmar. The key causes are the centralised Burmanisation policies of the military government, the exploitation of resources from ethnic areas with little or no benefit for local communities, the cultural dominance of the Bamar majority, and the exclusive educational design, including the medium of instruction and curriculum design. In this article, I will focus particularly on how the design of the history curriculum plays a pivotal role in shaping social cohesion and building peace with ethnic minorities.

Background of Myanmar in the Secondary Curriculum

Myanmar’s origins are often traced to the ancient Pyu cities. Still, it rose to prominence as a kingdom during the reign of King Anawrahta in the early 11th century, during the Bagan era. In the basic education history curriculum, students begin learning early Myanmar history from Grade 6 under the new education system (or Grade 5 under the old system). In the first year of middle school, the history curriculum focuses on the Bagan dynasty, highlighting its cultural development and connections with the Mon kingdoms during the reign of King Anawrahta. In the early 11th century, King Anawrahta conquered Thaton, the capital of the Mon kingdom. He introduced Theravada Buddhism from the Mon kingdom to the Bagan dynasty, along with Mon culture, art, and tradition, which significantly accelerated the development of Bagan’s civilisation.

In the history of Myanmar, the Mon and Arakan (Rakhine) can be assumed to be the earliest civilisations in terms of culture, religion, and literature, rather than the Bamar. The Mon kingdom of Thaton is said to have emerged as early as the 6th century BCE. And the Arakanese kingdom of Dhanyawaddy developed in the mid-4th century CE. The Arakan kingdom benefited from the expansion of maritime trade routes from Asia to the Mediterranean, and the Mahamuni Buddha Statute was also constructed during this era. During this time, Bagan was still a small village and had not yet become a centre of civilisation. It was only in the 11th century, under King Anawrahta, that Bagan rose to prosperity and became a significant cultural and political power1.

In the secondary-level history curricula, the focus is primarily on the Bamar dynasties such as Bagan, Ava, Taungoo, Nyaungyan, and Konbaung. By contrast, the earliest civilizations, such as Suvannabhumi, the Mon kingdom, and the parallel Mon kingdoms of Hanthawaddy2, the Arakanese kingdoms of Dhanyawaddy and Vesali, and the Maw Shan polities3 that became powerful at the fall of the Bagan dynasty, are not highlighted.

Mrauk-U in Arakan was a parallel kingdom alongside the Konbaung Bamar Kingdom. The Bamar kingdom conquered it during the reign of King Bodawpaya4. About forty years later, the Bamar king ceded Arakan and Tanintharyi to the British during the First Anglo-Burmese War, as per the Treaty of Yandabo. Before its conquest, Arakan was an independent kingdom, and even after the conquest, it maintained only around forty years of direct connection with the Bamar before being handed over to British rule till the time of independence.

The history curriculum is centred on the Bamar majority despite ethnic groups possessing their own rich and longstanding histories.

Ugly Incidents of Barmanisation

During the era of parliamentary democracy following Burma’s independence from the British colony, Arakan and Mon did not receive recognition as separate states. Rakhine was incorporated as a division within the Union of Burma, rather than as an independent state, and Mon was included as part of the Tanintharyi Division, rather than having its own localised administration. From the Bagan dynasty through the post-independence period, the history curriculum primarily focused on Bamar kings, heroes, and revolutionary leaders, such as General Aung San. This neglect of ethnic heroes, cultures, and histories contributed to the Burmanization.

The impact of Burmanisation is evident in the NLD government's attempt to name the Chaung Sone Bridge in 2017 after General Aung San, a Burmese politician and the father of modern Burma. The bridge is located in Chaung Sone township, Mon State, and its naming caused resentment among the local Mon people. The local Mon community protested, preferring names such as Chaung Sone Bridge, or honouring notable Mon figures like Queen Shin Saw Pu, King Yarzardirit, or Mon Hero Ae Mon Tra. Eventually, the dispute was brought to the Pyithu Hluttaw, the lower house, and decided by a voting system. The motion to name General Aung San was approved with a majority vote from Bamar Hluttaw representatives.

In 2019, a similar issue arose in Loikaw, Kayah (Karenni) State. At Gandar Hay Won Park, the NLD government installed a bronze statue of General Aung San as an honorific monument. Honorific statues symbolise the identity, history, and values of a nation or an ethnic group. The Karenni people considered it disrespectful to the Karenni state, as it had never been under direct British colonial rule. Hence, they protested against the General Aung San Statute. However, despite their opposition, the statue was initially installed, though it was later relocated after widespread demonstrations by the Karenni community. However, six young activists who led the protest were prosecuted for causing political unrest and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment with hard labour by the Loikaw court, which was under the control of the NLD-led state government. Both the Chaung Sone Bridge confrontation and the Karenni Bogyoke incident highlighted the failure of many Bamar people to stand in solidarity with ethnic minorities facing marginalisation and racial bullying.

Moreover, in the Student Councils of secondary schools, there are five teams named after Bamar kings, such as Anawrahta, Bayint Naung, Kyansittha, Alaungpaya, and Commander Maha Bandula. Throughout Burmese history, from the Bagan period to the post-independence era, national recognition has primarily been limited to the Bamar kings, such as Anawrahta, Bayinnaung, and Alaungpaya, as well as independence heroes like General Aung San. Obviously, monarchs like Razadirit or heroes such as La Gon Eain and Banyar Dala are omitted. Furthermore, other fallen martyrs, together with General Aung San, for independence, who sacrificed their lives, such as Burmese Muslim cabinet minister U Razak, Karen minister Man Ba Khine, and Shan minister Sao San Tun, have not been similarly acknowledged as national heroes. This selective recognition, rooted in ignorance of the whole history, is a significant cause of Burmanisation.

Civic Education in the Post-Civil War Context

The federal education system allows ethnic states and regions to design parts of their own curriculum that reflect their local histories, cultures, and heroes, which could be a solution. Otherwise, to increase reconciliation among all ethnic groups, including both Bamar and non-Bamar, implementing civic education is also required. Following the education system reform in the 2017-2018 academic year under the NLD government, updates and reforms have been implemented for the civic education curriculum. In the traditional education system, the civic education curriculum primarily emphasised moral values. But in the new system, the civic education curriculum includes morality, human rights, citizenship responsibilities, and peace-building. Nevertheless, civic education should not remain just in the textbook. Its values must be deeply understood and practiced by every citizen, and taught from the basic education level.

In teaching civic education, it is crucial to involve ethnic intellectuals and social and political activists in designing the curriculum to address their challenges. As Matthew D. Nelsen, the author of ‘The Color of Civics,’ advised, “ Civic learning should include critical categories of knowledge that highlight how marginalised groups have challenged the dominant sociopolitical system and should enable young people to explore the deep historical roots of local and national political challenges. To do this, civic learning must be meaningfully embedded in the local context and connected to the lives and experiences of students,” in his book.

To conclude, as educational policy makers and social scientists play a critical role, educators and teachers should also have a deep understanding of civic education. The role of teachers in promoting civic knowledge is pivotal, as their attitudes and lived experiences directly influence the implementation of more empowering civic learning environments. In the future of Myanmar, a non-ethnocentric curriculum that embraces decentralisation and avoids an ethnocentric approach may foster sustaining peace and social cohesion between all ethnicities, including Bamar and non-Bamar communities, on an equal basis.

Footnotes

In Myanmar’s polycrisis, Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) provide crucial education for millions. However, their focus on the dominant ethnic group’s identity risks creating new forms of exclusion for minority groups living within the EAO-controlled territories.

Key Takeaways:

• The post-coup expansion of Ethnic Basic Education Providers (EBEPs) is remarkable, but it mainly prioritizes and serves the dominant ethnic group

• Language and curriculum policies in EAO-controlled areas create new barriers for “minorities within minorities”.

• Interim education systems must prioritise inclusivity and equitable representation of all communities to build a truly federal and democratic Myanmar.

Historical Role of Education in EAO-controlled areas

Throughout history, the Myanmar education system was centralised and used as a tool for national assimilation. This process is often referred to as “Burmanisation“. This policy prioritised Burmese language and culture in the state schools, and marginalised the country’s diverse ethnic minority groups. This was seen as a cultural and identity threat to non-Bamar communities, fuelling decades of civil conflicts. This schooling strategy aims to promote a single national identity and is a core element of state-building, but has instead fuelled the ethnic tensions it sought to suppress.

The ethnic education system in Myanmar stands as a vital mechanism for cultural preservation, resistance, and the assertion of a right to self-determination by marginalised ethnic groups in the face of a persistent state-led “Burmanisation” project. Ethnic Basic Education Providers (EBEPs) were founded to respond to the state-enforced Burmanisation as a critical alternative. Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), and community groups developed independent education programs, particularly in ethnic regions, to counter the junta’s monopoly on education.

Following the 2011 democratic transition, the semi-democratic government made a symbolic transformation to reform and include ethnic languages in the curriculum by the “Mother tongue-based and multi-lingual education; MTB-MLE“. By 2020, 64 minority languages had been introduced as subjects in government schools. Despite these efforts, EBEPs and EAOs continued to operate their own parallel systems, highlighting the lack of trust and reliance on a territorial-based administration system.

Role of EBEPs in post-2021 military coup
After the 2021 military coup, many students and teachers nationwide joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and boycotted the formal education system. By late 2024, approximately 7 million, or 53%, of Myanmar’s school-age children will be missing out on basic education. Therefore, the EBEPs’ functions became essential in many EAO-controlled territories. EBEPs have established functional and resilient mother tongue-based school systems. EBEPs have seen a surge in enrolment, ensuring the children can still access education amid the ongoing crisis in many places.

The growth of EBEPs since the military coup is a powerful testament to the resilience of communities in a polycrisis setting in Myanmar. The Karen National Union (KNU)’s education system supports over 145,000 students through 1,660 schools, while the Ta’ang National Education Committee (TNEC) serves over 10,000 students in 500 schools. There were only 215 schools in the 2023-2024 academic year in the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) controlled area. The number rose to 448 schools in total during the 2023-2025 academic year, indicating the improvement of the KIO education system in the region.

Minorities within Minorities challenges
However, the rapidly expanding EBEP system has introduced new complexities. The primary goal of providing the necessary education to the marginalized people also creates significant challenges for the minority groups in the EAO-controlled territories.

The creation of parallel education systems by EAOs has been a powerful act of resistance, but the specific peace and conflict dynamics of each ethnic group often shaped these systems. The education regimes developed by the EAOs tend to be more separatist in character when conflict is rife and less separatist when ceasefires are in place.

After the 1027 operation, the prior territories of the EAOs have changed significantly, forming a power and administrative vacuum in particular places. For example, the Palang State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) has established a new governance body, the Ta’ang Land Council (TLC), in its newly acquired territory, which overlaps with KIO-controlled areas. Moreover, the TLC’s effort to make the Ta’ang language an official language causes ethnic tension with the Kachin, Shan, and Bamar populations.

Beyond territorial disputes, the issue of “minorities within minorities” is also evident in linguistic and political situations. Many ethnic education systems are designed to promote a specific ethnic identity and language by relying on a single, dominant dialect. For instance, the Karen Education and Culture Department (KECD) places a heavy emphasis on the S’gaw language. This creates an internal hierarchy among even the same ethnic group. Moreover, the Karen conflict is not monolithic, with splinter groups such as the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and KNU-Peace Council (KNU-PC). Each group has its own education system with distinct curricula that reflect their ideological separation.

In Rakhine state, minority groups such as the Rohingya, Mro, Khumi, and Maramagyi face significant barriers. For the 2025-2026 academic year, the United League of Arakan (ULA) is hiring teachers to reopen schools in AA-controlled areas of 15 townships, including Paletwa township in Chin State. However, the Rohingya teachers have been barred from teaching, and local school committees are being pressured to hire Rakhine teachers. The ULA aims to revitalise Rakhine education, but there is no clear information on how they will provide education for the Chin ethnicity in Paletwa township. These exclusions could damage the reconciliation between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities for the future of Arakan.

Recommendations

To ensure that the interim education system serves as a foundation for the future democratic state and nation-building process, the following factors should be considered by all stakeholders.

1. Decentralised education system: the EAOs should incorporate the micro-minorities with fairer representation, collaboration, and diverse leadership. In this way, the interim education system will be transparent and become an inclusive decision-making process for all people.

2. Cross-ethnic cooperation: to foster mutual understanding and avoid linguistic marginalisation in the controlled areas, the EAOs should coordinate policies to recognise each other.

3. Teacher diversity: The recruitment policies should prioritize inclusivity by ensuring the representation of teachers from underrepresented minority groups.

4. Expand Inclusive Education for all: To bridge the educational gap, all stakeholders should expand education at all levels by supporting necessary training and infrastructure to accompany the innovations to ensure no one is left behind.

Conclusion

The rise of EBEPs in post-coup Myanmar represents an act of extraordinary resilience and a vital community-driven alternative for millions of children facing an acute schooling crisis. Yet, this crucial provision operates as a double-edged sword: the prioritisation of the dominant ethnic group’s identities within EAO-controlled areas risks reproducing the exclusionary mechanisms of the state (such as past Burmanisation policies). This trajectory not only creates “minorities within minorities” but also fundamentally undermines the foundation for a truly federal and democratic building process of Myanmar. For education to contribute to a shared and just future, it must move beyond cultural preservation for dominant groups and embrace principles of inclusivity, equity, and shared governance for all ethnic minority groups within these territories.

Aung Thet Paing Hmue is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) with over two years of experience in the humanitarian sector. Currently residing in Thailand, he navigates cross-border challenges while building his professional future.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Myanmar's education system has been severely affected since 2020 by the consequences of both COVID-19 and the military coup. Amid various oppressions, many CDM educators and students developed initiatives to uphold the right and ensure continuous learning despite the uncertainty.

Key takeaways:

1. Despite the collapse of Myanmar's formal education system, many initiatives are emerging as both a right to education and an act of resistance against the junta.

2. The interim education system remains fragile and fragmented with current efforts. All stakeholders should consider and fill the gaps collaboratively.

3. Sustainable progress is still required to expand inclusive education for all affected students and holistic support for students and teachers.

Background History

Before the 2021 military coup, Myanmar students faced a temporary pause in education as schools, colleges, and universities were closed to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. To ensure the continuous learning of young people, NLD's Ministry of Education developed the National Response and Recovery Plan for the Education Sector with the support of UN agencies. This plan aimed to reopen and restore education once the global crisis subsided.

After the coup d'état, tens of thousands of civil servants immediately went on strike and joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) to show opposition against the military junta. In some states and regions, 50 to 65 percent of teaching staff joined the movement in 2021, and the junta pressured them to rejoin the service. The CDM movement pushed teachers and students into an uncertain future, with many arrested, and some choosing to flee for safety. The junta regime issued arrest warrants, detained, and sacked striking civil servants as it tries to pressure them back to work. But most still refuse to work under military rule, and nearly 30% of the national educational workforce was terminated by the junta. Only the economically privileged households could afford non-state schools as an alternative.

Following the military conscription law in 2024, many young people, including the CDM students and teachers, fled the country to escape forced service. The students are struggling with educational setbacks, career uncertainty, and severe trauma. Former students often live with no income and are struggling with depression and fear.

Innovations amid repression

Amid Myanmar’s ongoing repression, many CDM-aligned educators and students have taken proactive steps to create alternative higher education pathways by creating Interim University Councils (IUCs). The NUG also established the Basic Education Completion Assessment System (BECA) for the Basic Education Sector while recognising the IUCs as a sign of democratic higher educational institutions. Currently, 31 interim university councils and networks were approved by the NUG, which were aimed to fill the void left by junta-controlled institutions.

Some councils have received significant backing from international partners, while many cannot withstand challenges due to human resource shortages and security issues after four years of military coup. In 2024, the United States launched the Diversity and Inclusion Scholarship Program (DISP). This program aimed to offer full scholarships to marginalised and vulnerable CDM students across Southeast Asian Universities and via online programs through the University of Arizona. In September 2024, the University of Yangon Interim Council announced its Capstone project for transferring credits aimed at students with one semester left to graduate. USAID financially supports this project.

Meanwhile, the EU Mobility Programme for Myanmar (EMPM) has been running since January 2023. It continues to support CDM students to access education through virtual learning and short-term transfers to universities in ASEAN and Europe.

International experts and the Burmese diaspora helped establish the online learning distance education system through various implementations, especially in the higher education sector. National University of the Union of Myanmar (NUUM) and Spring University Myanmar(SUM), founded after the military coup, were accredited by the NUG's Ministry of Education. These universities offer scholarships and non-degree credit transferable certificate programs, which can significantly support the CDM students. Moreover, the Spring University Myanmar (SUM) supports on-ground implementation for the diaspora and CDM students. These initiatives greatly support the conflict-affected CDM and refugee people.

The Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs), on the other hand, have prior experience in filling the educational gap within the context of armed conflict. The Kachin State Comprehensive University, Ta'ang National Education Committee, and Karen Medical College are examples of the EAO efforts to fill critical higher education gaps. Payap University in Thailand also partnered with Mon National College to offer a joint bachelor's degree, which can be seen as a success for the ethnic centered education.

These initiatives are essential for filling the urgent education gap in Myanmar through diverse approaches. They provide reliable and accredited educational options during political turmoil, while maintaining academic continuity and supporting future leaders in exile.

Challenges

Even though interim education systems provide alternatives for CDM students to continue their education, there are still significant challenges. There are questions regarding the accreditation and recognition of the Interim University Councils. For example, Chulalongkorn University contacted the Myanmar Junta-controlled Medical University (Mandalay) in November 2024. As a result, Myanmar’s military junta labeled the documents illegal and fake. The two students received arrest warrants, and those who helped to notarize and translate their application have been arrested.

US President Donald Trump's decision to make sweeping cuts to foreign aid in his second administration led to the termination of more than US$70 million in funding for education programmes in Myanmar. This decision also affected Myanmar's emerging interim education system. The Diversity and Inclusion Scholarship Program (DISP) and the Capstone Project of the University of Yangon were also terminated, leading to uncertainty for the scholarship-awarded students. The University of Yangon Interim Council stated that they would work their best to resume the Capstone Project.
For many students and teachers who seek to flee and continue their studies abroad, applying for a passport or obtaining a notarised version of their official documents has become dangerous. In one case, the junta arrested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials for aiding a junior CDM doctor. Furthermore, the criminal clearance record is still required for most countries, resulting in a deadly trap for the CDM teachers and students.

On the ground, schools run by the NUG and EROs have been repeatedly targeted in attacks. At least 174 schools and universities in Myanmar have been damaged by the airstrikes, shelling, and ground fighting between the military and anti-coup armed forces. This destruction of schools harms a generation during the conflict, without access to education.

Recommendations

1. Build and Strengthen Accreditation: The stakeholders should consider building the current institutions into more transparent recognition frameworks for IUCs, NUG-approved institutions, and ERO-affiliated schools with the help of global networks and international donors.

2. Expand Inclusive Education for all: To bridge the educational gap, all stakeholders should expand education at all levels by supporting necessary training and infrastructure to accompany the innovations to ensure no one is left behind.

3. Provide Holistic Support for CDM students and teachers: the international community should support and protect CDM students and teachers with a holistic approach, not only with physical help but also with a combination of psychosocial and livelihood assistance.
4. Adapt alternative documentation requirements: Hose countries, and universities should consider the alternative verification methods from NUG or third-party attestations instead of requiring certifications from the military junta.

Conclusion

Amid the ruins of Myanmar's former education system, numerous innovations demonstrate the extraordinary resilience of Myanmar's educators and students. The community continues to reclaim education under the NUG and ERO leadership as an act of Defiance against despair without certainty of credibility and accreditation.

However, resilience ‌alone cannot erase the uncertain future of the CDM students. The future of Myanmar depends on inclusive, decentralised, and recognised education. All stakeholders should determine the difficulties and challenges, and how to transform into a reliable and empowered organisation for the future.

Aung Thet Paing Hmue is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) with over two years of experience in the humanitarian sector. Currently residing in Thailand, he navigates cross-border challenges while building his professional future.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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While climate action and green innovation dominate the sustainability agenda, actual progress demands equal attention to the human dimension, social sustainability.

Key Takeaways:

1. Social sustainability is essential for long-term resilience, focusing on equity, inclusion, community well-being, and environmental goals.

2. Core components- social cohesion, inclusion, resilience, and process legitimacy- are foundational to building just and stable societies.

3. Grassroots initiatives like the Edu4SD project demonstrate how civic education and sustainability literacy can drive meaningful social transformation even in fragile contexts.

In today's global discussions about sustainability, the focus often centres on renewable energy, climate change, and green technology. These environmental and economic components are undeniably important, but another vital pillar of sustainability that usually doesn't receive the same attention is social sustainability. Without addressing the human element of sustainability, even the most sophisticated climate policies and green initiatives risk falling short. Social sustainability emphasizes living, working, interacting, and building communities. It's about ensuring fairness, inclusion, and equity in the social fabric, which is critical for a sustainable future.

The Essence of Social Sustainability

At its core, social sustainability focuses on creating communities where people's needs are met equitably and with dignity. It ensures everyone can access the opportunities and resources needed for a healthy, fulfilling life. Social sustainability isn't just a nice-to-have; it's essential to creating a resilient, inclusive society capable of enduring the long term.

Social sustainability aligns directly with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 4: Quality Education, SDG 5: Gender Equality, SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities, and SDG 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities. These goals emphasize the need for inclusivity, equal opportunities, and a sense of belonging for all individuals, regardless of their background, gender, or socio-economic status.

Four Key Components of Social Sustainability

Social sustainability includes several components that contribute to its overall success. These are

1. Social Cohesion

Social cohesion is the glue that holds a community together. A cohesive society is one where people share common values, trust one another, and are committed to collective well-being. When socially cohesive, communities can weather crises more effectively and bounce back stronger. Cohesion fosters mutual understanding, collective action, and a sense of shared purpose. Communities built on trust are likelier to engage in conflict resolution, public health initiatives, and governance that benefits everyone.

2. Inclusion

Inclusion is a fundamental aspect of social sustainability. It ensures that everyone, regardless of race, gender, income, or background, can access the resources, services, and opportunities they need. Inclusive development goes beyond basic access; it ensures that marginalized communities are not left behind in pursuing progress. Inclusivity also means allowing everyone to participate in decision-making processes that affect their lives. This principle directly aligns with SDG 5: Gender Equality and SDG 4: Quality Education, which stresses the importance of providing equal opportunities and empowering all individuals, particularly those historically excluded.

3. Resilience

Resilience is the ability of individuals and communities to adapt, recover, and thrive in the face of adversity. In our increasingly unpredictable world, resilience has become a cornerstone of social sustainability. From natural disasters to political instability, socially sustainable communities are better equipped to handle and recover from shocks. They not only survive crises but grow stronger from them. Building resilient communities involves creating safety nets, fostering social networks, and ensuring everyone has the resources and support needed to rebuild and adapt.

4. Process Legitimacy

For a society to be socially sustainable, its processes must be transparent, fair, and inclusive. When decisions are made through legitimate processes, communities are more likely to trust institutions and participate in governance. This is where democracy and public trust come into play. Process legitimacy involves ensuring that all voices are heard, especially those from marginalized or vulnerable groups, and that decisions are made accountable and transparent.

Myanmar's Path to Social Sustainability

While social sustainability is a global concern, its importance is particularly evident in countries like Myanmar, where socio-political challenges often impede long-term progress. Despite these challenges, efforts to promote social sustainability are growing.

One example is the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc), which has been instrumental in promoting social sustainability through its Edu4SD campaign. This initiative focuses on educating and empowering communities in Myanmar to understand and engage with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Through webinars, publications, and community outreach, SRIc bridges the gap between sustainability theory and local practice, ensuring that Myanmar's citizens have the tools to create a more sustainable and equitable future.

The work done by organizations like SRIc demonstrates that education is a powerful tool in promoting social sustainability. Even in the face of political instability, educating people about social cohesion, inclusion, and resilience can foster long-term change. In a recent article on LinkedIn, SRIc emphasized the importance of civic dialogue and local engagement, showing how a collective understanding of sustainability concepts can empower people to drive social change from the ground up. This emphasis on education gives hope that change is possible, even in challenging circumstances.

Why Social Sustainability Matters Now

Social sustainability is not just a concept, but a necessity in today's world. As we grapple with widening inequality and face global challenges like climate change, political instability, and economic disparities, the role of social sustainability becomes even more pronounced. The World Bank's recent report underscores that social sustainability remains underprioritized, a fact that is crucial for long-term development. Without social sustainability, even the most advanced technological and economic solutions will fail to address the needs of the people they serve.

A sustainable future cannot be built solely through technology or finance; it requires a human-centred approach. This approach places the well-being of people at its heart, ensuring that no one is left behind in the pursuit of sustainability. By stressing the human-centred approach, we underscore the importance of prioritizing people's well-being in all sustainability efforts, making the audience feel the significance of this perspective.

Conclusion: Building a Sustainable Future Together

Sustainability is often viewed through the lens of science and technology, but it is a human issue at its core. A truly sustainable world is one where communities are inclusive, resilient, and united in their collective goals. Social sustainability fosters the human connections that enable societies to thrive. By investing in social cohesion, inclusion, resilience, and legitimacy, we support the SDGs and build a future where everyone can flourish. As we continue to confront the challenges of the 21st century, it's clear that the key to a sustainable future lies in our ability to care for one another.

Min Thant is an experienced educator pursuing a Bachelor of Education at SEGi University in Malaysia. With over nine years of teaching experience, he is committed to advancing education in Myanmar through innovative curriculum development and integrating blended learning methodologies.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

The opinions expressed in this article do not represent the official stance of SRIc - Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre. The Sabai Times is committed to publishing a range of perspectives that may not align with editorial policy.

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Peace education offers a powerful, long-term solution for fostering empathy, resilience, and nonviolence among children, especially in conflict-affected regions like Myanmar.

Key Takeaways:

1. Peace education creates a safe, inclusive environment for children to learn academics, empathy, tolerance, and nonviolent communication.

2. Implementing peace-based curricula and teacher training is essential, especially in regions affected by conflict or displacement.

3. Peace education is not an emergency tool but a transformative process for long-term healing and rebuilding of society.

What Is Peace Education?

Peace education goes beyond teaching children to avoid violence. It cultivates a mindset of respect, empathy, community awareness, and constructive conflict resolution. It prepares students to live as thoughtful citizens in diverse, often divided, societies.

In conflict-affected countries like Myanmar, where children are frequently exposed to displacement, discrimination, and violence, peace education is not a luxury—it is a necessity. Peace education empowers young people to become part of the solution in healing fractured communities through nonviolent communication, emotional awareness, and inclusive teaching strategies.

According to Researcher Carolyn B. Pryor, as peace education has evolved, many American educators have revisited their goals, particularly in states like Florida, Georgia, and Michigan, where new immigrant children, often uprooted by violence, are identified as ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) students. In Michigan, for instance, ESOL high school students successfully petitioned to integrate a peace education course into their curriculum. And those programs were successful.

Peace-Based Learning in Myanmar: The Kalyana Metta Model

Established in 2008, the Kalyana Metta Development Foundation is a local nonprofit based in Myanmar, firmly committed to promoting peace, justice, and environmental awareness. Through its partnerships with Sagaing University of Education and Yangon University of Education, it integrates peace-based learning modules into teacher education and public school curricula.

In 2018, the foundation ran a three-week intensive peace education training in Pyin Oo Lwin, targeting teacher trainees from education universities. Later, they arranged weekend courses and intensive programs in other regions. The results were transformative—not only in classroom practices but in the teachers’ personal lives.

"While attending the course, my expectations have been fulfilled. I appreciate the content you’re teaching. There hasn't been a single day I haven’t reflected on myself."

"I was so excited to join the Intensive Course. The content is all about things I hadn’t thought of or considered before. Throughout the course period, I was filled with self-confidence and joy."

"In the past, whenever a problem arose, I would blame others first. But now, I’ve become more thoughtful and reflective. My students used to be very afraid of me. I used to shout a lot… as soon as I saw a mistake, I immediately yelled at them. But now, my students are amazed by the change in their teacher."

"The topics we discussed and shared were truly excellent. Now that we’re becoming teachers, we’ll plant these seeds of peace together with the children."

Four Core Components of Peace Education in Elementary Schools

1. Empathy Development

• Children are taught to name, understand, and respect their feelings and those of others.

• Classroom activities: Story reflections, emotion cards, and daily “feeling check-ins.”

2. Celebrating Diversity

• Students explore and appreciate different cultures, religions, languages, and abilities.

• Example: Flower diversity games, cultural dress days, and class discussions on fairness.

3. Community Awareness

• Peace education also fosters social responsibility and environmental stewardship.

• Projects: Recycled art from plastic waste, “dream town” drawings, and community service mini-projects.

4. Conflict Resolution Skills

Children learn how to respond to problems using peaceful strategies.

Three-step method:

1. Cool down

2. Talk about it

3. Solve together

These are reinforced through songs, puppetry, and collaborative role play.

Why Peace Education Matters Now More Than Ever

In Myanmar, children face severe challenges due to ongoing conflict, leading to learning loss and trauma from violence and airstrikes. While access to education is crucial, it is equally important that education addresses the emotional needs of these children. Peace education is vital in helping them heal, build resilience, and break the cycle of violence.

Peace education is a long-term investment in the fabric of society. It nurtures the future generation with the essential values of humanism, diversity, and rights. Instilling those values through stories, videos, and real-life examples can help them understand more and, in the long run, can build a peaceful society that all people crave.

Call to Action

Peace education should be embedded into national education policy, teacher training programs, and community initiatives. NGOs, education ministries, and international partners must collaborate to ensure their reach, especially in rural, marginalized, and conflict-affected areas.

As Myanmar continues to face internal conflict and displacement, let us not forget the quiet work of building peace in the hearts of children. Every school can become a safe space. Every teacher can be a peacebuilder.

May Thazin Kyaw is a Bachelor of Elementary Teacher Education student at President University in Indonesia. She has volunteered with various educational academies and movements in Myanmar.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

The opinions expressed in this article do not represent the official stance of SRIc - Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre. The Sabai Times is committed to publishing a range of perspectives that may not align with editorial policy.

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Religious institutions in Myanmar have increasingly filled the educational void, especially since the 2021 coup, by sustaining learning, community support, and leadership development amid conflict and state collapse.

Key Takeaways:

1. Armed conflict from the Spring Revolution, in response to the military regime, has severely weakened—if not collapsed—the formal education system, especially in war-affected areas.

2. University registration declined by more than 68% from 2022 to 2024 compared to the 2019-2020 academic year.

3. The role of religious institutions' contribution to Education has considerably changed post-2021 coup in Myanmar.

Introduction

The suspicion of teachers' involvement in protections against the military in the wake of Myanmar’s 2021 coup, and to disperse the educated youth, the State Administrative Council (SAC) targeted schools and universities. Incidents of armed conflicts, including attacks, destruction, and airstrikes on school compounds, have been widespread in many war-affected areas such as Sagaing, Chin, and Kayah (Kareni). Consequently, the closure of schools and universities is widespread. Students have been arrested, sometimes even killed. Some became members of local PDFs or EAOs. In addition to these, poverty, violence, and limited access to education have severely lessened youth aspirations for further education. After the emergence of conscription law, most university students have continuously boycotted education under military rule by leaving their countries as migrant workers or asylum seekers to resist imprisonment or recruitment. The quality and reliability of education are less guaranteed and getting worse. Hence, the formal educational system has been ruined either wholly or partially. University registration declined by more than 68% from 2022 to 2024 compared to the 2019-2020 academic year.

As formal education is inaccessible in conflict areas, religious institutions took a crucial role in filling the educational void. Not only did monastic and faith-based schooling provide indoctrination and theological education, but they also offered broader academic and leadership training. They historically served as more than places of worship, congregations, and sacred places. They have been centers of learning, community development, social inclusion, and the birth of next-generation leaders. After the 2021 coup, Christian seminaries, Buddhist universities, and Islamic madrasahs have maintained educational programs by offering religious and secular learning amid political turmoil.

Pre-colonial Religious Institutions’ Contribution to Education

Monastic education was one of the best educational systems. At 3 or 4, children, especially boys, were sent to the nearest monastery to learn basic literacy skills in Burmese and Pali, the importance of Buddha teachings, and astrology. It was targeted at the Theravada Buddhist population, especially the major Burmese people. Shah (2019) argues that it was also used to civilize non-Buddhist ethnic groups and to assimilate people into the lowland polities. Moreover, cultural standardization and social norms were transmitted from the monasteries.

As monks ran monastic schools, girls were not admitted to education. The Rights to education and gender equality were not recognized. Traditional conceptions embodied Burmese culture and living standards. Rarely did some girls from elite or royal families receive education, and even then, it was not prioritized.
Furthermore, the education itself did not intend to accommodate diverse ethnic groups within a nation, and it aimed to reinforce a respect for tradition, hierarchy, and Burmanization. A study from the University of Auckland on the Role of Education in Myanmar found that the Myanmar Education system allowed the de facto authority to control its curriculum. Unfortunately, no rulers or Burmese Kings attempted to educate minority ethnic groups, such as Mon, Shan, and Rakhine. Oral tradition was mainly used amongst ethnic people.

The Rise of Western Education/ Church-based Education in British Colonial

Similar to monastic education, church-based education also played a role in manipulating civil control, regulating social movements, and serving as de facto agents of colonial power. All kinds of Christian missionaries, including Baptists, Catholics, and Anglicans, used the Bible as an integral part of the curriculum; however, there were slight alterations to the adopted education system based on the particular religious practices, traditions, cultures, inhabitants, and geographical landscape.

Unlike the education in monasteries amongst Burmese groups, Christian missionaries endeavoured to address the essentials of education to excluded girls and marginalized groups from rural and mountainous regions, for instance, Kachin, Chin, and Karen. However, the homosexuals had not been counted yet. No matter what, Church-led education was a good initiative for ethnic minorities, which could bring the Western governance system, education, a literacy movement, a sense of community, Christian identity, and social mobility from animism. At the end of colonization, those educated in missionary schools became active leaders in their communities, insightful human resources like interpreters, teachers, nurses, and administrators, by challenging societal norms, traditional perceptions, and adapting to political changes in Myanmar.

Religious Institutions’ Contribution to Education in Post-2021 Coup

Not only for education, but religious institutions also contribute to community hubs and development, where social stability, moral, and ethical values are prioritized during the period of national unrest. Students have been nurtured with hope and resilience by promoting compassion, community services, and social justice. What is more, leadership development, youth empowerment, and vocational training are initiated to foster the role of young people in the community with the purpose of national reconstitution during and after the revolution. For example, Islamic madrasahs serve as the sole avenue for Myanmar Muslims to receive Islamic moral and ethical principles, as the national education system excludes religious instruction for all faiths except Buddhism.

Despite the oppressive political environment, violence, and conscription law, the following religious institutions play a vital role in their respective area. Some may not be included in the map because of the limited information.

Conclusion

To sum up, religious institutions in Myanmar have played a crucial role in promoting sustainable education, not just in the wake of the 2021 coup but also throughout history. Despite the political instability, their contributions to education and community development are undeniably significant. By adapting their programs to meet broader community needs, regardless of race, religion, and geographical location, as an example of the admission requirements of the Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT), they will become invaluable assets, particularly for those students in conflict or war-affected areas, in the nation’s struggle to preserve educational opportunities amid ongoing political unrest.

Aung Ko Ko is a second-year social studies student at the Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT). He has experience teaching at a migrant centre and studying how political unrest affects youth aspirations in higher education.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

The opinions expressed in these articles do not represent the official stance of SRIc - Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre. The Sabai Times is committed to publishing a range of perspectives that may not align with editorial policy.

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