Restrictions on menstrual products in resistance-controlled areas demonstrate how Myanmar’s polycrisis amplifies everyday vulnerabilities.

Key Takeaways

• Menstrual insecurity interacts with healthcare collapse, displacement, inflation, and gender inequality to create multidimensional social consequences.

• The impacts extend beyond hygiene, contributing to deteriorating health outcomes, economic hardship, reduced mobility, and social exclusion.

• Addressing menstrual health should be viewed as part of humanitarian resilience and social recovery rather than solely as a women’s health issue.

Myanmar’s ongoing conflict has led to a complex polycrisis in which political instability, armed violence, economic decline, humanitarian displacement, and institutional collapse reinforce one another. While much attention has focused on military operations, displacement, and humanitarian needs, less visible disruptions to everyday life are also producing significant social consequences.

One such example is the reported restriction on menstrual hygiene products in resistance-controlled areas. According to reports by The Guardian, Myanmar’s military authorities have increasingly restricted the transportation and distribution of menstrual products in conflict-affected regions, particularly in areas under resistance influence. Authorities have reportedly justified these restrictions by claiming that sanitary pads are being diverted to support resistance medical operations. Activists and humanitarian workers suggest that the measures form part of the broader “four cuts” strategy, which seeks to deprive resistance groups of supplies and support networks.

Although presented as a security measure, the reported restrictions have consequences that extend far beyond resistance actors. Limiting access to essential menstrual hygiene products disproportionately affects civilian women and girls, raising concerns regarding the protection of civilians and adherence to humanitarian principles. The policy also highlights how military decision-making can overlook gender-specific humanitarian needs. Despite the military’s public portrayal of itself as a modern professional force that includes women, senior command positions remain overwhelmingly occupied by men. This limited representation of women in senior leadership may contribute to the marginalisation of women’s health considerations in military planning, allowing policies to be implemented with insufficient attention to their gender-specific humanitarian consequences. More broadly, the reported restrictions illustrate how menstrual hygiene products, ordinarily recognised as essential health commodities, become reclassified as strategic resources during armed conflict, with disproportionate consequences for civilian women and girls.

Since August, the transportation of menstrual products has reportedly been blocked along certain routes connecting Sagaing Region and Mandalay. Although the military government has issued no official announcement, activists argue that the restrictions may be more widespread than publicly recognised due to the social stigma surrounding menstruation and the limited public discussion of menstrual health needs.

At first glance, the issue may appear to be a simple shortage of hygiene products. However, in a country already experiencing healthcare collapse, economic hardship, mass displacement, and weakened social protection systems, menstrual insecurity becomes much more than a supply problem. This article argues that menstrual product restrictions illustrate how Myanmar’s polycrisis amplifies existing vulnerabilities for women. By interacting with healthcare breakdown, inflation, displacement, and social stigma, menstrual insecurity becomes a multiplier of health risks, economic exclusion, reduced mobility, and social marginalisation for women and girls. Beyond its health and economic consequences, menstrual insecurity undermines the dignity of women and girls by depriving them of the privacy, safety, and confidence required to participate fully in everyday life.

Menstrual Insecurity and Healthcare Collapse

The first consequence emerges through the interaction between menstrual insecurity and Myanmar’s deteriorating healthcare system.

In many conflict-affected areas, healthcare infrastructure has been severely disrupted by armed conflict, displacement, and shortages of medical supplies. Clinics have been destroyed or abandoned, healthcare workers displaced, and access to medicine remains limited. Under these conditions, restrictions on menstrual products create risks that extend beyond discomfort. Women and girls who cannot access sanitary pads are often forced to rely on unsafe alternatives such as reused cloths, improvised materials, or prolonged use of disposable products. These coping strategies increase the likelihood of urinary tract infections (UTIs), reproductive tract infections, skin irritation, and other preventable health complications.

Under normal circumstances, many of these conditions are easily treatable. However, in areas where antibiotics, medical personnel, and healthcare facilities are scarce, minor infections can develop into chronic health problems. The resulting public health burden is therefore not caused by menstruation itself but by the interaction between material scarcity and healthcare collapse. This illustrates a defining characteristic of polycrisis: multiple vulnerabilities combine to produce outcomes more severe than any single crisis.

Menstrual Insecurity and Economic Hardship

The second pathway operates through Myanmar’s worsening economic crisis. Years of conflict, inflation, currency depreciation, and market disruption have significantly reduced household purchasing power. Within this environment, restrictions on menstrual products have contributed to supply shortages and increased dependence on informal markets.

Reports indicate that the price of sanitary pads has tripled from approximately 3,000 kyat to 9,000 kyat per packet. This exceeds Myanmar’s minimum daily wage of 7,800 kyat. For households already struggling to afford food, transportation, and basic necessities, menstrual products become increasingly inaccessible. As a result, many households in conflict-affected areas are forced to make impossible choices between purchasing menstrual hygiene products and meeting other essential needs, such as food. This dilemma highlights how the crisis compels families to choose between fundamental rights, including the right to adequate food and the right to health, dignity, and menstrual hygiene.

At the same time, Myanmar’s prolonged economic crisis has placed growing pressure on women to contribute financially through paid work alongside their male counterparts. Yet unlike many household expenses, menstrual health is both recurring and unavoidable. Women and girls cannot simply postpone the need for menstrual products during times of economic hardship. Consequently, families often resort to unsafe alternatives or divert scarce resources from other essential needs. For women who rely on paid employment to support their households, inadequate access to menstrual products may also affect their ability to work safely and consistently. What begins as a supply restriction therefore becomes a form of gendered economic exclusion, deepening existing inequalities while undermining household resilience during a period of economic crisis.

Menstrual Insecurity and Humanitarian Displacement

A third dimension of Myanmar’s polycrisis emerges through mass displacement. Since the 2021 military coup, millions of people have been internally displaced, many living in temporary shelters, monasteries, schools, or forest encampments with limited access to clean water, sanitation facilities, healthcare, and privacy. In these settings, menstrual hygiene management becomes not only a health issue but also a humanitarian and protection challenge.

Displacement disrupts the infrastructure needed for safe menstrual hygiene. Women and girls often lack private spaces to change menstrual products, wash reusable materials, or dispose of used pads safely. Many displaced women report waiting until nighttime to change menstrual products to avoid being seen, while others carry used pads with them because there is no safe place for disposal. Access to water is equally constrained, with some displaced communities prioritising drinking water over bathing or washing clothes. Although reusable menstrual products, such as menstrual cups and reusable cloth pads, are often promoted as sustainable alternatives during humanitarian crises, their use in Myanmar is constrained by both practical and sociocultural barriers. Limited access to clean water and private washing facilities makes it difficult to use and maintain reusable products safely, while persistent menstrual stigma, limited familiarity with menstrual cups, and cultural concerns surrounding their insertion reduce their acceptability among many women and girls. As a result, the loss of access to disposable menstrual products cannot be readily offset by switching to reusable alternatives.

These challenges are further intensified by conflict. Ongoing military operations, road blockages, and restrictions on humanitarian access make it difficult for aid organisations to deliver menstrual products to displaced communities. At the same time, insecurity limits women’s ability to travel to local markets even when products are available.

As a result, menstrual insecurity is intensified by the conditions of displacement. The interaction between forced displacement, inadequate sanitation, and restricted humanitarian access transforms what is ordinarily a manageable aspect of daily life into a multidimensional humanitarian challenge. This demonstrates how Myanmar’s displacement crisis magnifies the social consequences of menstrual product restrictions and further erodes the dignity, health, and well-being of women and girls.

Menstrual Insecurity, Social Exclusion, and the Invisibility of Crisis

The cumulative effects of healthcare collapse, economic hardship, and displacement ultimately extend beyond women’s physical well-being to shape their participation in social and civic life. Menstrual insecurity affects not only how women manage their health but also their ability to remain active within their communities. Many women report feeling embarrassed or lacking confidence to attend school, work, displacement camps, or community spaces because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate protection.

This reduction in mobility can limit participation in education, livelihood activities, community meetings, and political engagement. In resistance-controlled areas, where communities increasingly depend on collective action and mutual support to sustain basic services, women’s reduced participation weakens both individual agency and community resilience. This includes not only civilian participation in everyday governance and social support systems, but also the involvement of women engaged in political organizing and resistance activities, where sustained presence and mobility are essential. What begins as a shortage of menstrual products therefore evolves into a broader form of social exclusion.

Beyond its physical consequences, menstrual insecurity also imposes a significant psychological burden on women and girls living in conflict-affected areas. The constant uncertainty over whether menstrual products will be available each month, combined with the inability to manage menstruation safely and privately, can generate persistent stress and anxiety. Many women experience shame, fear of humiliation, and a loss of dignity when they are unable to manage menstruation according to accepted social norms. For women already coping with armed conflict, displacement, economic hardship, and the trauma of violence, menstrual insecurity becomes another source of emotional distress that compounds existing psychological pressures. Rather than being a temporary inconvenience, it contributes to a chronic state of insecurity in which women must continually worry about meeting a basic bodily need while navigating an increasingly precarious environment.

These challenges are further reinforced by persistent menstrual stigma. In many parts of Myanmar, menstruation remains a sensitive topic that is rarely discussed openly. Women often hesitate to request menstrual products from humanitarian volunteers because aid distribution is frequently managed by men, while camp managers may overlook menstrual needs altogether (see here). This cultural silence discourages women from seeking support, contributes to underreporting, and limits public recognition of menstrual insecurity as a humanitarian concern.

Menstrual Insecurity, Social Exclusion, and the Invisibility of Crisis

The cumulative effects of healthcare collapse, economic hardship, and displacement extend beyond women’s physical well-being to shape their participation in social, economic, and civic life. Menstrual insecurity affects not only how women manage their health but also their ability to remain active within their communities. Many women report feeling embarrassed or lacking confidence to attend school, work, displacement camps, or community spaces because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate menstrual protection.

Beyond its physical consequences, menstrual insecurity also imposes a significant psychological burden on women and girls living in conflict-affected areas. The constant uncertainty over whether menstrual products will be available each month, combined with the inability to manage menstruation safely and privately, can generate persistent stress and anxiety. Many women experience shame, fear of humiliation, and a loss of dignity when they are unable to manage menstruation according to accepted social norms. For women already coping with armed conflict, displacement, economic hardship, and the trauma of violence, menstrual insecurity becomes another source of emotional distress that compounds existing psychological pressures. Rather than being a temporary inconvenience, it contributes to a chronic state of insecurity in which women must continually worry about meeting a basic bodily need while navigating an increasingly precarious environment.

These psychological pressures often translate into behavioural changes that reduce women’s participation in everyday life. Women may avoid attending school, work, community meetings, displacement camp activities, or humanitarian distributions because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate protection. Such absences can limit participation in education, livelihood activities, community decision-making, and political engagement. In resistance-controlled areas, where communities increasingly depend on collective action and mutual support to sustain basic services, women’s reduced participation weakens both individual agency and community resilience. This includes not only civilian participation in local governance and social support networks but also the involvement of women engaged in political organising and resistance activities, where sustained mobility and physical presence are essential. For women participating in resistance movements, inadequate access to menstrual products may affect their ability to remain deployed, undertake physically demanding tasks, or participate consistently in political and military activities. What begins as a shortage of menstrual products therefore evolves into a broader form of social exclusion that limits women’s participation in both civilian and resistance contexts.

These challenges are further reinforced by persistent menstrual stigma. In many parts of Myanmar, menstruation remains a sensitive topic that is rarely discussed openly. Women often hesitate to request menstrual products from humanitarian volunteers because aid distribution is frequently managed by men, while camp managers may overlook menstrual needs altogether. This cultural silence not only discourages women from seeking assistance but also reinforces feelings of embarrassment and isolation, causing many women to internalise menstrual insecurity as a private problem rather than a humanitarian concern. As a result, menstrual needs remain underreported and frequently overlooked in humanitarian planning and response.

Within Myanmar’s polycrisis, stigma functions as a force multiplier. By obscuring the physical, psychological, and social consequences of menstrual insecurity, it allows armed conflict, displacement, healthcare collapse, and economic hardship to reinforce one another while limiting effective humanitarian intervention. Menstrual insecurity is therefore not simply a hidden health issue but a multidimensional humanitarian concern that undermines health, dignity, psychological well-being, and social participation. It illustrates how everyday forms of gendered vulnerability become embedded within broader patterns of conflict and social fragility.

Conclusion

The reported restriction of menstrual products in Myanmar’s resistance-controlled areas offers an important illustration of how polycrisis functions in practice. The issue is not merely a shortage of hygiene products. Rather, it reveals how multiple crises interact and reinforce one another.

Healthcare collapse transforms preventable infections into long-term health risks. Economic decline makes essential products unaffordable. Displacement intensifies difficulties in managing menstrual health safely. Social stigma keeps the resulting harms largely invisible. Together, these overlapping pressures create consequences that extend far beyond the original restriction.

Understanding menstrual insecurity through the lens of polycrisis highlights the importance of examining how everyday needs intersect with broader structural challenges. As Myanmar continues to navigate conflict, displacement, and economic instability, ensuring access to basic menstrual products should be recognised not only as a health concern but also as an essential component of social resilience, human dignity, and long-term recovery.

Policy Recommendations

Expand Community-Based Menstrual Health Support in Conflict Areas

Local civil society organisations, women’s groups, and humanitarian actors should strengthen the distribution of menstrual hygiene kits through community-based networks, particularly in displacement camps and conflict-affected areas. Where disposable products remain inaccessible, support should include reusable menstrual products alongside menstrual health education, soap, and sanitation materials to reduce health risks.

Strengthen International Advocacy And Cross-border Aid

The United Nations, ASEAN, and international partners should press Myanmar’s military to end inhumane restrictions on menstrual hygiene products and expand cross-border humanitarian assistance to ensure women and girls in conflict-affected areas have access to essential menstrual health supplies.

Integrate Menstrual Health into Humanitarian and Public Health Responses

Humanitarian agencies should treat menstrual health as an essential component of health and protection programming rather than a secondary hygiene concern. Menstrual products, antibiotics for common infections, and reproductive health services should be incorporated into emergency healthcare responses, especially in areas experiencing displacement and limited medical access.

Reduce Menstrual Stigma Through Community Awareness and Education

Local organisations, educators, and community leaders should promote menstrual health awareness to challenge stigma and improve access to information. Greater public discussion can help ensure that menstrual insecurity is recognised as a legitimate humanitarian and public health issue rather than a private concern that remains invisible in policy discussions.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Key Takeaways:

• Deforestation in Myanmar is closely connected to political transition, militarised governance, and extractive economic policies. Myanmar lost about 12,000 km² of forest cover nationwide between 1990 and 2000, the worst period of forest loss under the military regime. Forest destruction increased in 2008 and accelerated after 2017, coinciding with rare-earth exports to China.

• Resource extraction and conflict economies continue to be a major cause of environmental degradation. Rare-earth mining, jade extraction, logging, agribusiness expansion, and hydropower projects expanded through networks of military actors, ethnic armed organisations, border militias, domestic cronies, and foreign investors, particularly in Shan, Kachin, and Tanintharyi.

• The impacts are severe and multidimensional: loss of biodiversity, carbon emissions, river contamination, soil erosion, and the displacement of Indigenous and forest-dependent communities, threatening Myanmar’s long-term environmental and human security.

Introduction

Myanmar possesses one of Southeast Asia’s most ecologically significant forest systems, including tropical rainforests, montane forests, mangroves, and biodiverse river basins. However, decades of authoritarian governance, armed conflict, weak environmental regulation, and extractive economic development have transformed Myanmar into one of the region’s most alarming deforestation hotspots. This article will discuss the causes and effects of Myanmar’s deforestation in the prominent political cycle.

Historical Triggers of Military Rule (1990–2008)

The decade of greatest deforestation in Myanmar was from 1990 to 2000, under the military regimes of the SLORC and SPDC. FAO said the country lost 12,000 km² of forest cover nationwide in this decade alone. Forests became an important source of income for the military government, which relied on timber exports, especially teak, to fund military campaigns, state expansion, and patronage networks.

Military-linked companies and politically connected elites frequently received logging concessions with minimal environmental oversight. In ethnic border zones like Kachin, Shan, and Karan States, the forest became linked with conflict and military control. Poor governance, corruption, and militarised extraction have accelerated forest loss and opened up pristine forest areas to commercial exploitation.

Military-Backed Economic Reforms and Agribusiness Expansion (2008–2015)

Deforestation increased again after 2008 as Myanmar opened its economy and pursued market-oriented reforms. Under President Thein Sein and the military-backed USDP government, large-scale land concessions were granted to domestic groups, foreign investors, and crony companies for agricultural business, mineral mining, hydropower, and infrastructure development.

Commercial agriculture became one of the major drivers of forest conversion. In Tanintharyi Region, large rainforest areas were cleared for large-scale oil palm concessions, including the controversial Myanmar Stark Prestige Plantation (MSPP), which has been linked to forest clearance as well as land and labour rights concerns affecting Karen communities. Roads, special economic zones, and infrastructure corridors also expanded into previously forested areas. At the same time, major infrastructure projects such as the Dawei Special Economic Zone (DSEZ), the Dawei Deep-Sea Port, and the Dawei–Thailand Road Corridor expanded into previously forested areas. Although these projects were promoted as part of economic modernization, many lacked proper environmental assessments and displaced local communities without adequate compensation.

Commercial agriculture became one of the major drivers of forest conversion. In Tanintharyi Region, large rainforest areas were cleared for large-scale oil palm concessions, including the controversial Myanmar Stark Prestige Plantation (MSPP), which has been linked to forest clearance as well as land and labour rights concerns affecting Karen communities. Roads, special economic zones, and infrastructure corridors also expanded into previously forested areas. At the same time, major infrastructure projects such as the Dawei Special Economic Zone (DSEZ), the Dawei Deep-Sea Port, and the Dawei–Thailand Road Corridor expanded into previously forested areas. While environmental and social impact assessment processes were undertaken or proposed for some of these projects, civil society organizations and environmental groups raised concerns regarding the adequacy, transparency, and public accessibility of these assessments, as well as the extent of meaningful community consultation and compensation for affected populations.

The NLD Government: Reform Efforts and Structural Challenges (2015–2021)

When the National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power in 2016, the government introduced stronger environmental policies. A nationwide logging ban was implemented between 2016 and 2017, timber extraction quotas were reduced, and gemstone mining licenses in Hpakant were suspended to reassess environmental impacts.

Despite these reforms, the government faced major structural limitations. Myanmar’s economy remained dependent on natural resource exports such as jade, natural gas, timber, and agricultural products. At the same time, economic cooperation with China continued through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

Large infrastructure projects and mining operations accelerated forest loss by extracting sites, roads, and waste disposal areas, while also contaminating rivers and degrading ecosystems through chemical runoff, erosion, and sedimentation. For example, rare-earth mining activities in Kachin State have been associated with forest clearance, toxic waste generation, and water contamination linked to extraction processes. The expansion of rare-earth mining during the late NLD period laid the foundation for a dramatic increase in production after the 2021 military coup. By the mid-2020s, Myanmar had emerged as one of the world’s largest suppliers of rare-earth elements, second only to China and the United States in some production estimates. Most of these minerals were exported to China for processing, while many mining sites operated in contested areas of Kachin State where environmental regulation and government oversight remained weak. Numerous reports have documented the involvement of Chinese-backed operators and highlighted concerns regarding inadequate environmental safeguards, toxic chemical use, deforestation, and water pollution associated with rare-earth extraction.

The NLD government also lacked full control over conflict-affected border regions. In states such as Kachin and Shan, ethnic armed organizations, militias, border guard forces, and military actors operated independently of the central government. Following the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015, some regions experienced a temporary reduction in armed clashes, creating expectations that environmental governance and resource management might improve. However, evidence suggests that many extractive activities continued during this period. As a result, illegal logging, jade mining, and other forms of resource exploitation persisted despite the relative decline in violence in certain areas

Rare-Earth Mining and Deforestation in Border Regions (2017–Present)

Rare-earth mining has emerged as one of the most destructive environmental issues in Myanmar since 2017. As global demand for rare-earth minerals increased, Myanmar became an important supplier to China. According to the Institute for Strategy and Policy - Myanmar (ISP- Myanmar), the country exported approximately USD 3.6 billion worth of rare-earth minerals to China since 2017, including nearly USD 4 billion after the 2021 military coup.

Most mining activities are concentrated in Kachin State and northern Shan State near the Chinese border. The rapid expansion of rare-earth extraction has caused severe deforestation due to road construction, land clearing, excavation, and tree cutting for fuelwood used in mineral processing. Satellite images and environmental monitoring reports indicate clear areas of forest loss around the mining zones. There has been significant expansion in the mining area from 2018 onwards, from about 26,000 hectares in April 2018 to 46,700 hectares in April 2024. By the end of 2024, they had identified nearly 400 sites for rare earth mining in Kachin State.

Ecological and Social Consequences of Deforestation

Deforestation in Myanmar has produced serious environmental and social consequences. Biodiversity loss is one of the most immediate concerns, as Myanmar’s forests contain many endangered species and ecologically sensitive habitats. Forest destruction fragments ecosystems, disrupts food chains, and threatens wildlife survival.

Deforestation also contributes to climate change. Forests act as important carbon sinks by absorbing and storing carbon dioxide. Large-scale forest clearance releases this stored carbon back into the atmosphere, worsening greenhouse gas emissions and reducing regional climate resilience.

At the same time, arsenic levels in some areas of the Salween River were found to be at 0.55 mg/l, which is 55 times the safe limit. Likewise, the river, which starts east of Mong Hsat township, Shan state, and flows into Thailand as the Kok River, was also found to be highly contaminated with arsenic due to rare-earth and gold mining. Due to the rivers’ flow across national boundaries, the downstream communities in the northern parts of Thailand have been impacted by contamination, which has become a growing concern for water quality, public health, agriculture, and fisheries.

This reflects that the environmental consequences of unsustainable resource extraction activities in Myanmar have become a regional matter and need to be addressed through more cooperation and environmental governance between Myanmar and neighboring countries such as Thailand and China. Forest loss also increases soil erosion, land degradation, and vulnerability to landslides, especially in mountainous conflict zones. Declining soil quality threatens agricultural productivity and food security for already vulnerable rural populations.

The 2021 Coup and the Expansion of Conflict Economies

The 2021 military coup accelerated environmental destruction across Myanmar. According to Global Forest Watch (GFW), more than $1.45 billion in official forest product imports from Myanmar have been reported since the coup, with China accounting for 64%. The collapse of governance systems, intensified armed conflict, and weakened environmental enforcement created conditions for widespread illegal logging and unregulated mining. Natural resources increasingly became part of Myanmar’s conflict economy. Armed groups, elites, and military authorities relied on timber, minerals, and land concessions to finance operations and maintain territorial control.

Among the major hotspots of deforestation, Global Forest Watch (GFW) recorded from 2002 to 2025 that Myanmar lost 830 kha (kilo-hectares) of humid primary forest. Deforestation there has been driven by mining, infrastructure projects, and commercial agriculture. Tanintharyi experienced large-scale forest clearance linked to oil palm and rubber plantations, while Kachin became heavily affected by jade extraction, rare-earth mining, and illicit logging.

Conclusion

Overall, Myanmar’s deforestation crisis is broadly a reflection of weak governance, conflict economies, geopolitical competition and resource dependence. Without greater political stability, stronger institutions and more accountable resource governance, there is little chance of achieving environmental protection. All stakeholders including the National Unity Government (NUG), should operate within their capacities to reduce dependency on unsustainable resource extraction and ensure that environmental sustainability becomes an integral part of Myanmar’s long-term recovery and development efforts to prevent environmental destruction in the long term.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Strengthen environmental governance, including the Central government, EAOs, and NGOs, through independent monitoring systems, satellite tracking, and stronger enforcement against illegal logging and mining activities.

2. Improve regulation of rare-earth mining and cross-border mineral trade, particularly through greater transparency and environmental accountability in Myanmar-China supply chains.

3. Regional organisations such as ASEAN should play a more active role in addressing the Myanmar crisis and its environmental consequences through supporting mechanisms,

4. Recognise and protect Indigenous land rights by involving local communities in forest management and resource governance processes.

5. Promote sustainable livelihoods such as community forestry, sustainable agriculture, and renewable energy while linking environmental protection with broader political stability and governance reforms.

   ---

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

In many cities across Myanmar, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find accessible public green spaces where people can relax, exercise, or escape from crowded urban environments.

Key Takeaways:

• Rapid urbanization and population growth are increasing pressure on public spaces in Myanmar’s cities.

• Unequal access to green spaces affects social well-being, public health, and urban resilience.

• Green spaces should be recognized as essential urban infrastructure rather than optional amenities.

Parks, playgrounds, and community recreational spaces remain limited, while commercial buildings and housing developments continue to expand. During the last few years, major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay have experienced rapid population growth due to economic, social, and political pressures. According to the census data, Yangon’s population increased from 2.7 million in 1983 to around 5 million in 2024. Despite growing urban density, green spaces are still often treated as optional amenities rather than essential public infrastructure.

Factors behind Populated Cities

Migration to urban areas in Myanmar is driven by several economic, social, and political factors. One of the main reasons is that employment opportunities, education, and public services are concentrated in major cities such as Yangon. Migration from other states and regions to Yangon in search of economic and social opportunities has significantly contributed to the city’s high population density.

Rural-to-urban migration has accelerated since 2010, especially in Yangon, where internal migration represented a more significant trend than international migration. However, political instability following the 2021 military coup, combined with economic decline, inflation, and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, further added pressure to economic hardship and displacement pressures across the country. As a result, cities are facing growing demands for housing, transportation, and public infrastructure, while overcrowding and pressure on public spaces continue to increase.

Social Life in Myanmar

Myanmar society has traditionally been community-oriented, with strong social practices centred around religious events, cultural festivals, tea shops, markets, and neighbourhood spaces. These informal gathering places have long played an important role in building social cohesion and a sense of belonging. Social participation and community bonding are essential parts of social sustainability and urban resilience, particularly during periods of crisis and uncertainty. Communities with stronger social ties are often better able to support one another during disasters, economic hardship, and other social stresses.

Despite rapid urbanization, social trust and neighbourhood relationships remained relatively strong in Myanmar’s cities before the crises. However, urban density, privatization, and changing lifestyles are reducing communal interaction spaces. Housing limitations in Yangon, particularly in small apartments and informal rental accommodation, can reduce opportunities for community interaction and shared social life. Moreover, there are limited accessible public spaces where people can gather and socialize without needing to spend money.

Accessible public green spaces can therefore play an important role in strengthening community engagement, social inclusion, and mental well-being. Well-maintained public spaces with social and cultural activities can encourage interaction between diverse communities while reducing social isolation.

Urban Planning Failure and Its Impacts

Rapid urbanization in Yangon has taken place without systematic and long-term urban planning. Since 2021, many people have moved in search of safety and livelihood opportunities due to conflict, insecurity, and displacement . This could also have added pressure to Yangon’s housing, infrastructure, public services, and public spaces. As the population increased, traditional low-rise housing was gradually replaced by high-density apartments to accommodate growing urban populations. Moreover, this transition has also reduced open spaces and social infrastructure within the city.

Urban expansion has increasingly prioritized commercial and residential development over public welfare and environmental sustainability. In some cases, governance challenges and corruption have undermined the protection of public spaces, allowing commercial interests to take precedence over community and environmental needs. Urbanization in Yangon has expanded into agricultural land and open spaces, contributing to the gradual decline of public green areas. Public open spaces have also been privatized through real estate and commercial projects over the past two decades. For example, 10 acres of Kanthaya Park in North Okkalapa Township, Yangon, were replaced by a supermarket development.

At the same time, many low-income residents, migrants, and industrial workers are moving into suburban areas with limited infrastructure and public amenities. Residents living in dense apartment communities can experience stress related to the lack of recreational and social spaces, negatively affecting quality of life and community resilience. As green spaces continue to decline, cities face growing environmental challenges such as urban heat, flooding, air pollution, and overcrowding, while social cohesion and overall urban well-being are increasingly weakened.

The Need for Green Spaces

Green spaces are important not only for environmental purposes but also for social well-being, public health, and community resilience. In the context of urban sustainability, access to open spaces, local amenities, and green areas is considered important tangible elements that support quality of life, while social cohesion, inclusion, and a sense of belonging are equally important intangible aspects of social sustainability. In rapidly urbanizing cities like Yangon, the lack of green spaces and community facilities can weaken social participation and reduce opportunities for traditional and social activities.

As urban populations continue to grow, the need for accessible public spaces is becoming increasingly urgent. Yangon’s population is projected to continue rising significantly in the coming decades, increasing pressure on already limited public spaces. Without proactive efforts to preserve and develop green areas, the scarcity of communal spaces is likely to increase further.

Green spaces also provide multiple health benefits. Research has shown that access to nature and urban greenery can reduce stress, improve mental well-being, encourage physical activity, and strengthen social cohesion. Exposure to natural environments has been associated with lower stress levels and reduced symptoms of anxiety and depression. Parks and walkable green areas can also encourage recreational activities such as walking, jogging, and community exercise, which contribute to healthier lifestyles.

In addition, green spaces can help improve air quality, reduce urban heat, buffer noise pollution, and mitigate flooding risks. Well-maintained public spaces can also encourage community interaction and reduce social isolation, particularly among children, elderly people, and low-income residents. In this sense, green spaces should be viewed not as luxury amenities, but as essential urban infrastructure that supports healthier, more inclusive, and more resilient cities.

Current Gaps and Inequalities

Despite the growing importance of public green spaces, access to them remains highly limited and unequal, especially in Yangon. Yangon currently has far less green space per person than the minimum standard recommended by the World Health Organization. According to an official statement by the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC) in 2016, Yangon’s parks covered a total of 211.25 hectares, providing only 1.74 square meters of green space per person. Several townships still have no public parks at all, while many existing parks are concentrated in the Central Business District and Inner Urban City Zone. As a result, access to green spaces often depends on where people live and their socioeconomic conditions.

In densely populated areas, the shortage of public recreational facilities can further limit opportunities for social interaction and leisure. Some public parks and recreational spaces are also perceived as unsafe or poorly maintained, particularly for women and vulnerable groups. In addition, certain green areas such as private golf courses and open areas are located within exclusive zones or semi-private developments with limited public accessibility.

Although Yangon was once known as the “Garden of the East,” rapid urbanization since 2012 has intensified pressure on public spaces while urban planning has struggled to keep pace with population growth. Real estate development and commercial expansion continue to reduce accessible green areas, while clear standards for creating new parks and public spaces remain limited. At the same time, the unequal distribution of green spaces reflects broader social and spatial inequalities within the city.

Nevertheless, some local organizations and urban initiatives have started advocating for the preservation and revitalization of public spaces in Yangon, including heritage restoration and community-focused urban regeneration projects.

Recommendations

Addressing the shortage of green spaces in Myanmar’s cities requires stronger urban planning, long-term policy commitment and enforcement, and community participation. Public awareness campaigns can also play an important role in changing perceptions of green spaces from optional amenities to essential urban infrastructure. At the same time, stronger advocacy and collaboration with relevant government departments are needed to ensure that green space preservation and development become priorities in urban planning and decision-making. Existing public and urban greenery should be protected from commercial conversion, while future urban development plans should include accessible parks, community spaces, and pedestrian-friendly environments. This requires stronger governance, transparent and corruption-free permitting processes, and effective enforcement to prevent the loss of public spaces to unsustainable development. Neglected and underutilized urban spaces could also be transformed into community green spaces that encourage recreation, social interaction, and creative activities. One example is the Yangon Alley Garden Project led by Doh Eain, which revitalized previously neglected alleyways into community spaces with gardens, playgrounds, seating areas, and street art. At the same time, regularly evaluating existing projects can help identify challenges, learn from past experiences , and inform the design of future green space initiatives.

Moreover, public spaces should be safe, inclusive, and accessible to different groups, including women, children, elderly people, and low-income communities. Maintaining public parks and organizing social and cultural activities can also strengthen community engagement and social cohesion.

Conclusion

As Myanmar’s cities continue to grow under economic, political, and social pressures, the need for accessible public green spaces is becoming increasingly urgent and essential. Rapid urbanization, population growth, and unplanned development have reduced many communal and recreational spaces, particularly in densely populated urban areas. At the same time, growing urban stress, overcrowding, and environmental challenges have highlighted the importance of healthier and more inclusive urban environments.

Green spaces should not be viewed as luxury amenities available only to certain communities. They are essential urban infrastructure that supports social cohesion, mental and physical well-being, environmental sustainability, and community resilience. Accessible public spaces can create opportunities for social interaction, relaxation, and community engagement, especially during periods of uncertainty and crisis.

Building more sustainable and livable cities in Myanmar will require recognizing that green spaces are not optional additions to urban development, but an essential part of urban life and public well-being.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

The global transition toward renewable energy and electric vehicles has accelerated demand for rare earth minerals, placing Myanmar’s conflict-affected borderlands at the center of emerging critical mineral supply chains. As rare earth extraction expands in Kachin State following the 2021 coup, environmental degradation, weak regulation, and fragmented governance structures have increasingly shaped the country’s role in the global green economy.

Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar has become the world’s third-largest producer of rare earth elements, after the US and China, for advanced renewable energy technologies, as China increasingly shifts environmentally destructive extraction beyond its borders into Myanmar’s weakly regulated frontier regions.

• The rapid expansion of rare earth mining in Kachin State after the 2021 coup reflects fragmented governance systems involving militias, armed actors, informal taxation networks, and opaque cross-border business arrangements operating with limited environmental oversight or accountability.

• Myanmar’s rare earth frontier exposes a deeper contradiction within the global green transition: while wealthier societies pursue cleaner energy and “greener” cities, the environmental and human costs of extracting critical minerals are increasingly displaced onto conflict-affected and politically fragile regions, creating zones of ecological sacrifice that remain largely invisible within global climate narratives.

Introduction

Rapidly reducing dependence on fossil fuels and accelerating the transition toward renewable energy have become central to global climate strategies and the pursuit of a net-zero future. Electric vehicles, wind turbines, batteries, and other low-carbon technologies are increasingly viewed as essential tools for addressing climate change and advancing sustainable development goals. Yet the technologies driving this transition depend heavily on critical minerals, particularly rare earth elements essential for renewable energy systems and advanced manufacturing industries.

As global demand for critical minerals intensifies, governments and industries face growing challenges surrounding supply chain security, environmental sustainability, and geopolitical competition. While the expanding critical mineral economy presents economic opportunities for resource-rich developing countries, it also risks reproducing patterns of environmental degradation, corruption, conflict, and unequal resource governance commonly associated with the “resource curse.”

Myanmar has emerged as an increasingly important supplier within regional rare earth supply chains linked to China’s processing industries. According to Global Witness, Myanmar’s exports of rare earth minerals to China increased dramatically from approximately US$1.5 million in 2014 to nearly US$780 million by 2021. Much of this extraction has concentrated in Kachin State along Myanmar’s northern borderlands, where long-standing conflict dynamics and contested territorial authority continue to shape local governance systems.

As extraction rapidly expands, Myanmar’s rare earth frontier increasingly reveals a deeper contradiction at the heart of the global green transition: while renewable energy technologies are promoted as environmentally sustainable solutions, the environmental and governance costs associated with critical mineral extraction are increasingly displaced onto fragile border regions affected by conflict and weak regulation.

Myanmar’s Rare Earth Boom and China’s Supply Chain Shift

Rare earth minerals have become strategically important because of their essential role in renewable energy technologies and advanced manufacturing industries. Heavy rare earth elements such as dysprosium and neodymium are particularly valuable because they are used in permanent magnets essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, batteries, smartphones, and high-performance electronics. As governments accelerate climate goals and low-carbon industrial strategies, global demand for these minerals has surged dramatically.

China has dominated the global rare earth industry since the 1980s and continues to control much of the world’s processing and refining capacity. However, the environmental consequences of rare earth extraction within China became increasingly severe over the past decade. Illegal mining, toxic waste, poisoned waterways, and long-term ecological degradation generated mounting environmental concerns, particularly in Jiangxi Province, often referred to as China’s “rare earth kingdom.”

In response, Chinese authorities intensified environmental enforcement measures after 2016 and shut down many domestic heavy rare earth mining operations. Yet while China reduced environmentally destructive extraction within its own territory, global demand for rare earth minerals continued to rise rapidly. Rather than reducing extraction overall, mining activities increasingly shifted across the border into Myanmar’s weakly regulated frontier regions. While China argues for a non-interference policy in the Myanmar crisis for Western powers, they are exploiting the Myanmar Civil War as a tool to increase China’s influence in Myanmar by dealing with both the military-led government and the ethnic military. China’s cooperation with KIA for rare earth minerals from Kachin state is evidence of China’s double standard in its own foreign policy towards Myanmar.

A six-month investigation by Global Witness documented how this highly polluting industry expanded rapidly into Myanmar’s Kachin Special Region 1, a semi-autonomous territory controlled by militia groups affiliated with Myanmar’s military establishment. Within just a few years, the region became one of the world’s largest suppliers of heavy rare earth minerals.

Reports indicate that thousands of Chinese workers and technicians crossed into Myanmar between 2016 and 2019 to establish and operate mining sites using the same in-situ leaching methods previously employed in Jiangxi. The mines continue to supply Chinese state-owned processing companies that dominate the global rare-earth refining industry. Commodity research firm Roskill noted in 2021 that nearly all major Chinese state-owned enterprises involved in heavy rare earth processing had become dependent on Myanmar as a source of raw materials.

The expansion of extraction into Myanmar demonstrates how stricter environmental governance in one country can displace ecological harm into weaker regulatory environments elsewhere. As one industry expert cited by Global Witness observed, “the environmental challenges that come with this type of mining in China have spread to a neighbouring nation.”

Fragmented Governance After the Coup

The rapid expansion of rare earth extraction in Myanmar cannot be understood solely through global market demand. It is also deeply connected to fragmented governance systems that intensified following the 2021 military coup.

Rather than producing a simple absence of governance, the post-coup crisis generated overlapping systems of competing authority involving military actors, militias, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), border business networks, and informal economic actors. In many extraction zones across northern Myanmar, governance operates through negotiated control, informal taxation systems, and localized power arrangements rather than centralized state regulation.

In Kachin Special Region 1, mining operations reportedly function through opaque agreements involving militia-controlled authorities and cross-border commercial actors. Although foreign investment in small- and medium-scale mineral extraction is technically illegal under Myanmar law, enforcement remains limited in conflict-affected borderlands where competing systems of authority overlap.

The Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar (ISP) reported that militia leaders and affiliated business networks have become central brokers in the rare-earth economy, facilitating mining operations, granting access to extraction sites, collecting informal taxes, and controlling cross-border trade routes into China. In many cases, Myanmar-registered companies reportedly function as fronts for Chinese investment operating through informal and opaque commercial arrangements.

The post-coup political environment has further weakened environmental oversight and institutional accountability. Under fragmented governance conditions, extraction activities continue with limited regulatory monitoring, while armed actors and border business networks benefit economically from the rapid expansion of rare earth mining.

Myanmar’s rare earth sector, therefore, illustrates how conflict-affected borderlands can become integrated into global supply chains through systems of shadow governance and informal extraction economies operating beyond effective environmental regulation.

Environmental Consequences in Kachin State and Beyond

The environmental consequences of rare earth extraction in Myanmar increasingly mirror the ecological devastation previously witnessed in China’s Jiangxi Province, where decades of poorly regulated mining contaminated waterways, destroyed forests, and generated massive long-term cleanup costs. China’s “Take profit without responsibility” policy in neighbouring countries for Rare-earth mining clearly downgrades China’s role as a global normative actor.

Mining operations in Kachin State commonly use in-situ leaching methods that inject chemical solutions such as ammonium sulfate directly into mountainsides to extract rare earth minerals. While highly profitable and relatively inexpensive, this process leaves behind toxic wastewater, contaminated soil, deforested landscapes, and unstable terrain vulnerable to erosion and landslides.

Global Witness documented how mining sites across Kachin State have expanded rapidly across mountainous terrain, with thousands of chemical collection pools identified near river systems and forest areas. Local communities have reported worsening access to clean water, dying fish populations, contaminated farmland, and the disappearance of wildlife from nearby forests. Residents also described growing fears about surrounding toxic exposure, respiratory illnesses, and long-term environmental destruction linked to chemical leaching processes.

The environmental consequences are no longer confined to isolated mining zones. Recent environmental monitoring in Thailand detected alarming levels of arsenic contamination in transboundary river systems linked to mining activities upstream in Myanmar, including areas associated with rare earth extraction. Investigations reported by Mongabay found growing concerns along the Salween River basin, where communities increasingly fear the impacts of toxic contamination on fisheries, agriculture, drinking water systems, and local livelihoods.

These developments highlight how environmental harm generated within Myanmar’s conflict-affected borderlands increasingly carries regional ecological and human security consequences. The contamination of shared river systems demonstrates that the environmental costs of weak extraction governance do not stop at national borders.

The long-term implications may prove severe. In China’s Jiangxi Province, authorities estimated that environmental cleanup costs linked to rare earth mining could exceed US$5.5 billion, with ecological recovery potentially taking up to a century. Myanmar currently lacks both the institutional capacity and regulatory mechanisms necessary to manage environmental remediation on a comparable scale.

The Hidden Contradiction of Global Green Transition

Myanmar’s rare earth frontier reveals a critical contradiction at the heart of the global green transition. Renewable energy technologies are frequently presented as environmentally sustainable solutions to climate change. Yet, the extraction systems that support these industries often impose severe environmental and social costs in politically fragile regions.

The environmental burdens associated with critical mineral extraction are not distributed equally. Instead, they are increasingly externalized onto vulnerable borderland communities where governance systems remain weak, fragmented, and conflict-affected. A green transition that ignores the social and environmental impacts on local communities is not truly green; it is simply greenwashing under the language of sustainability. While industries and consumers elsewhere benefit from electric vehicles, renewable energy infrastructure, and advanced technologies, the ecological and political consequences of extraction are concentrated in frontier regions such as northern Myanmar.

This dynamic raises broader questions about environmental governance, supply chain accountability, and the political economy of climate transition policies. Efforts to accelerate renewable energy adoption without addressing extraction governance risk reproduce new forms of environmental injustice and conflict-linked resource exploitation.

Myanmar’s rare earth frontier ultimately reveals a critical paradox at the heart of the global green transition: technologies designed to secure a sustainable future increasingly depend upon extraction systems rooted in environmental destruction, fragmented governance, and conflict-affected borderlands. Without stronger environmental accountability and conflict-sensitive supply chain governance, the pursuit of clean energy risks reproducing new forms of ecological injustice under the banner of sustainability.

Policy Recommendations

Addressing the environmental and governance challenges of rare earth extraction in Myanmar requires stronger international cooperation, conflict-sensitive environmental governance, and improved supply chain accountability.

Key priorities include:

• Strengthening environmental monitoring in conflict-affected extraction areas and tightening regulations on rare earth trade linked to environmentally harmful practices, particularly within Chinese-linked supply chains.

• Improving transparency and traceability in critical mineral supply chains, including the potential use of blockchain technologies to reduce illicit trade and improve accountability.

• Expanding responsible sourcing standards for companies and governments reliant on rare earth minerals for renewable energy, electric vehicles, and advanced manufacturing.

• Enhancing regional cooperation to address transboundary environmental impacts such as river pollution and ecological degradation. Local actors, including the NUG and EAOs, should also consider long-term environmental consequences in governance decisions.

• Encouraging ASEAN to take a more active role in addressing regional environmental risks stemming from Myanmar’s extractive and ecological crises.

  ---

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Myanmar is a resource-rich country with abundant deposits of jade, gold, and rare earth minerals, yet it faces increasing environmental degradation and social harm.

Key Takeaways:

1. Weak governance, not resource scarcity, is the main driver of environmental degradation and social harm in Myanmar’s mining sector.

2. The benefits of mining are concentrated among powerful actors, while local communities bear the environmental, health, and livelihood costs.

3. Unregulated extraction is linked to conflict economies and cross-border impacts, making mining a regional governance and sustainability issue.

Introduction

Mining activities often fail to comply with laws and Environmental Impact Assessment procedures, leading to land loss, water scarcity, and severe pollution that directly affect local communities. This pattern reflects a long history of extractive waves driven by global demand. Since the 2021 military coup, governance breakdown has accelerated unregulated mining, intensifying these impacts. Mining in Myanmar is therefore not only an environmental issue, but also a broader social and governance crisis.

Background: Mining and Governance Context

Myanmar’s mining sector has long been central to its economy, supported by abundant deposits of minerals such as tin, tungsten, copper, jade, and gemstones, and shaped by successive political regimes from independence to military rule and partial democratisation. Across these periods, mining has expanded under different governance systems, but weak enforcement of environmental laws and fragmented control among the government, military, ethnic armed groups, and foreign actors have limited effective oversight.

During the post-independence period (1948–1962), the government sought to develop the mining sector through national planning and partnerships with foreign companies, but progress was constrained by internal conflict and limited institutional capacity. Under military rule (1962–2010), mining governance became increasingly centralised yet opaque, with the expansion of state control and military-linked enterprises alongside widespread illegal and artisanal mining, leading to growing environmental degradation and social impacts. Many laws and governance structures during this period were still based on outdated colonial-era legal frameworks. The democratic transition period (2011–2021) introduced legal reforms and opened the sector to foreign investment, but governance remained weak, as the Permanent Secretaries of every ministry were appointed by the previous administration, which created a barrier for the NLD-appointed ministers to plan for the reform.

Since the 2021 military coup, these challenges have intensified as the rule of law deteriorated and illegal mining activities surged, contributing to widespread deforestation and environmental damage. International sanctions reduced foreign investment, pushing the military regime to rely more heavily on natural resources to finance its operations. This has accelerated the expansion of rare earth mining, particularly in border regions controlled by armed groups and foreign-linked actors. On the other hand, after the 2021 coup, environmental and climate-related initiatives were disrupted as international funding withdrew, and many civil society organisations reduced or redirected their activities due to political instability and security concerns. As a result, Myanmar’s mining sector increasingly reflects an “open-access” system, where overlapping authorities and weak governance enable uncontrolled extraction and concentration of benefits among powerful actors.

Governance Framework and Its Gaps

Myanmar has established a formal governance framework to regulate its mining sector, including the Myanmar Mines Law (2015), Mining Rules (2018), and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures, which require companies to minimize environmental damage and comply with environmental standards. These frameworks are supported by institutional oversight from the Environmental Conservation Department (ECD), and in principle align with international practices by incorporating environmental management plans and compliance requirements. However, while regulatory systems exist, their implementation remains weak. Even before 2021, only a small proportion of EIA-related reports were approved due to limited institutional capacity and poor-quality submissions, highlighting long-standing weaknesses in enforcement that have likely worsened under current governance conditions. Monitoring is also inadequate, as compliance inspections are often conducted only in response to complaints rather than through regular enforcement mechanisms.

Significant governance gaps persist across the sector. Transparency and accountability are limited, with local communities often lacking access to information about mining projects and decision-making processes. The post-coup crisis also weakened local civil society participation, as many organisations reduced environmental activities and some community leaders were arrested or unable to engage due to security risks. Overlapping authorities and unclear jurisdiction further complicate governance, while enforcement of regulations remains weak during project implementation. In many cases, consultation processes are superficial and can be influenced by economic incentives or pressure, undermining genuine community participation. As a result, governance in Myanmar’s mining sector exists formally through laws and regulations, but fails functionally in practice.

Governance Breakdown in Practice

In practice, governance of Myanmar’s mining sector is highly fragmented, with control divided among military-linked actors, ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), and foreign stakeholders, particularly in border regions. These actors operate with limited coordination, and local communities are largely excluded from decision-making processes despite being directly affected by mining activities. Rather than approaching natural resources from a sustainable development perspective, many military actors and armed groups increasingly treat mining as a source of revenue to strengthen their financial and political position during the ongoing conflict. In many areas, extractive projects are closely tied to political and economic interests, where access to resources provides both financial benefits and strategic power for armed groups and elites.

Mining is deeply embedded in Myanmar’s conflict economy. Revenues generated from resource extraction often fund armed actors, reinforcing cycles of conflict and instability. In regions such as Kachin State, ethnic armed organisations have taken on governance-like roles, controlling mining activities and taxation systems linked to cross-border trade. At the same time, China acts as a double-edged sword by engaging with both the military and ethnic armed groups, while exploiting Myanmar’s weak rule of law to sustain continued extraction and secure access to rare earth minerals for global markets.

Since the 2021 military coup, these dynamics have intensified. The breakdown of law and order has led to a surge in illegal and informal mining, especially in remote areas. The number of rare earth mining sites has increased rapidly, reflecting a broader expansion of unregulated extraction. As governance weakens, mining activities continue to grow without effective oversight, prioritising short-term gains over environmental sustainability and social protection.

Environmental Costs

Mining activities in Myanmar have caused severe environmental damage, particularly to water resources. The use of toxic chemicals such as mercury, cyanide, and acids contaminates rivers and groundwater, making water unsafe for drinking, agriculture, and aquatic life. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining along the Ayeyarwady River has long served as an important livelihood strategy for local communities with limited economic alternatives. In some mining areas, water samples have been found to pose substantial risks to ecosystems and are entirely unsuitable for human use. These impacts are intensified by the expansion of large-scale and mechanized mining, which increases pressure on water resources and contributes to widespread pollution. Evidence from border areas shows that toxic discharge from mining has entered tributaries linked to the Thanlwin (Salween) system, contaminating downstream water sources and affecting agriculture and fisheries in nearby communities.

Deforestation and land degradation are also major consequences of mining. Forest clearing for extraction has led to significant forest loss, estimated at around 46,000 hectares, particularly in resource-rich regions such as Kachin and Sagaing. Mining activities accelerate soil erosion, reduce agricultural productivity, and damage local ecosystems. Biodiversity loss follows as habitats are destroyed and ecosystems collapse, affecting both terrestrial and aquatic species.

Environmental disasters, including landslides and flooding, are increasingly common in mining areas, causing long-term ecological damage and risks to human life. These impacts are not accidental but are directly linked to weak governance systems. Historically, Myanmar’s governance system has prioritized state revenue collection, including taxes on the extraction of state-owned resources. Without effective regulation and accountability, mining continues to operate unsustainably, while the exclusion of local communities from decision-making further limits environmental protection.

Social Costs of Mining

Mining in Myanmar also imposes high social costs, particularly on communities living near extraction sites. Livelihoods are increasingly undermined as agricultural land is lost to mining activities and access to forests and clean water is reduced, contributing to long-term economic insecurity. In many cases, mining operations have damaged homes, farmland, and community spaces without compensation, leaving local populations with limited means of recovery.

Public health risks are also severe. Exposure to contaminated water and toxic chemicals has led to respiratory illnesses, skin diseases, and other chronic health conditions among both workers and nearby communities. A health survey conducted in an artisanal and small-scale gold mining community in Mandalay Region found that 9 out of 18 miners showed warning levels of mercury contamination, while 3 out of 18 miners displayed neurological signs and symptoms associated with chronic mercury intoxication. Workers face especially dangerous conditions, including frequent landslides and accidents in mining areas. For example, deadly jade mine collapses in Kachin State have killed hundreds of miners in recent years, highlighting the extreme risks associated with poorly regulated extraction. Many workers receive little or no medical support or compensation, even in cases of injury or death.

The risks and benefits are unequally distributed, while local communities have little opportunity to raise concerns under the military regime. Profits are concentrated among powerful actors such as military-linked groups and foreign stakeholders, while local communities bear the environmental and social burdens. Mining revenues also contribute to conflict, reinforcing instability in resource-rich regions. Weak governance enables this imbalance, shifting the costs of extraction onto vulnerable populations while concentrating gains among those with power.

Why This Is a Governance Issue

The environmental and social impacts of mining in Myanmar should not be understood as isolated outcomes of extractive activities, but as symptoms of deeper governance failures. At its core, the issue is not the existence of mining itself, but the conditions under which it operates. Sustainability means maintaining the equilibrium among social, economic, and environmental well-being through effective governance. After the coup weakened governance, the entire system came under stress, showing that this is fundamentally a governance issue. In the case of Mogok’s ruby mines, control over the area has shifted between the junta and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), with reports indicating that the TNLA returned the area following China-mediated negotiations and diplomatic pressure. These challenges are further worsened by political instability, forming part of a broader polycrisis in which conflict, economic pressures, and environmental degradation reinforce one another. In this context, mining reflects deep-rooted dynamics of power, control, and conflict.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Myanmar’s mining crisis is not only environmental, but also deeply social and rooted in governance failures. Its impacts extend beyond national borders, as pollution from mining contaminates rivers and ecosystems in neighboring countries such as Thailand, while broader environmental decline contributes to regional instability and displacement. Addressing these challenges requires stronger enforcement, improved transparency and accountability, and conflict-sensitive resource governance. Similarly, local communities must be meaningfully included in decision-making processes. Looking ahead to 2026, ongoing political uncertainty and parallel governance structures will continue to shape the sector. Myanmar is going to face more and more climate-related disasters, and this could increase the vulnerability of local communities. Without governance reform, resource wealth will continue to drive environmental degradation and social inequality rather than sustainable development.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Extreme heat is becoming a serious and growing risk to public health in Myanmar’s cities.

Key Takeaways

• Extreme heat in Myanmar is increasing rapidly, with record-breaking temperatures and rising heat-related deaths showing it is already a serious public health risk.

• Urban conditions, such as dense infrastructure, limited green space, unreliable electricity, and ongoing conflict, are intensifying heat exposure, especially for vulnerable groups.

• Despite growing impacts, heat stress remains under-recognised and under-addressed, requiring urgent, coordinated action at both national and urban levels.

1. Importance of addressing the problem

Across Southeast Asia, heatwaves are becoming more frequent, longer, and more intense due to global warming. Recent years have seen record-breaking heat causing deaths, hospitalisations, school closures, and economic losses. Scientists warn that this trend will continue, with each year becoming hotter than the last.

Myanmar is part of this regional pattern and is highly vulnerable to climate change. Temperatures have already increased over recent decades, and extreme weather events, including heatwaves, are becoming more frequent and intense. Limited capacity to respond further increases the country’s risk.

Heat stress is driven mainly by climate change, which increases temperatures and leads to more frequent and intense heatwaves. Natural factors like El Niño can worsen extreme heat, while human activities, such as deforestation, land-use change, and rapid urbanisation, reduce natural cooling and make cities hotter.

Despite these risks, extreme heat is still not widely recognised as a major public health issue, with gaps in data, research, and policy attention. As a so-called “silent killer,” heatwaves are likely causing more deaths than reported, especially in urban areas where exposure is highest.

2. Evidence of Extreme Heat Stress in Myanmar

Evidence shows that extreme heat in Myanmar is increasing in both frequency and intensity. Temperature data indicate a clear warming trend. Myanmar’s mean annual temperature has risen by about 0.82°C over the past 50 years and is projected to increase by up to 2.07°C by 2060. Long-term projections also suggest that both minimum and maximum temperatures could rise by up to 2.7°C by the end of the century. In recent years, temperatures during the hot season have regularly exceeded 40°C, with some areas experiencing temperatures above 44°C. This reflects a broader global pattern, as the past decade has been the warmest on record.

Historical records show that extreme heat events have occurred before, but are becoming more severe. For example, a heatwave in 2010 recorded temperatures as high as 47°C in Mandalay.

More recently, new records have been set. In April 2024, Myanmar recorded its highest-ever April temperature of 48.2°C in Chauk, while Yangon exceeded 40°C and Mandalay reached 44°C. According to Eldorado Weather, four cities from Myanmar have been listed among the world’s 15 hottest cities in March 2026. At the same time, projections indicate that sea levels could rise by 20–41 cm by the 2050s (up to 83 cm by the 2080s), potentially submerging 30% of the Ayeyarwady Delta and leading to 43% land loss .

These data confirm that climate risks in Myanmar are increasing rapidly year by year.

3. Urban Heat Stress & its Contributing Factors

Urban areas in Myanmar face higher heat stress due to a combination of environmental and socio-economic factors.

Changes in land use, including the loss of vegetation, reduce the ability of the environment to regulate heat. One key driver is the urban heat island effect. Dense buildings, concrete, and asphalt surfaces absorb and retain heat, making cities significantly hotter than surrounding areas. Rapid urbanisation, combined with limited green spaces, reduces natural cooling and prevents temperatures from dropping, especially at night. Rapid urbanisation is worsened by corruption and weak land-use regulation in Myanmar, leading to the conversion of green spaces into built-up areas. In cities like Yangon, high humidity combined with trapped heat in crowded living environments makes it even harder for residents to cope with extreme temperatures. As urban populations grow, these challenges are expected to worsen.

Beyond environmental factors, broader sustainability challenges also increase vulnerability. Ongoing conflict has displaced many people into temporary or poorly ventilated shelters, where protection from extreme heat is limited. At the same time, the conflict has forced people to move from rural areas to cities like Yangon, placing additional pressure on already overstretched urban centers like Yangon.

Limited access to electricity further worsens the situation. Many households experience unstable and insufficient power supply, making it difficult to use fans or air conditioning during extreme heat. Electricity has increasingly become a luxury rather than a basic service for the public, due to structural challenges, resource shortages, and political instability. In many areas, power is available for only around eight hours per day, often at unpredictable times due to supply shortages. Although there are other alternative energy sources, such as solar power, access to them remains limited, as high installation costs make them affordable only for wealthier households.

These factors together make urban populations in Myanmar particularly exposed to heat stress.

4. Heat Stress Impacts in Myanmar: Evidence and Trends

The rise in extreme heat is already having serious impacts on human health in Myanmar.

Heatwaves are prolonged periods of unusually high temperatures that can harm both human health and ecosystems. Health risks are especially high in urban areas, where dense infrastructure and limited cooling increase exposure.

Recent events show the scale of these impacts. During the 2024 heatwave, at least 1,473 people reportedly died from heat-related causes in a single month. This represents a significant increase compared to 2010, when 260 heat-related deaths were recorded during the summer. Such figures suggest that heat-related mortality is rising rapidly alongside increasing temperatures.

While people in Myanmar are accustomed to high temperatures, increasingly deadly heat extremes are being recorded. This can create a false sense of safety, as some may believe they are prepared for the heat. However, those who do not seek information on heat-related risks may face higher exposure during heatwaves. As a result, heat stress is emerging as a significant but often overlooked public health risk in Myanmar.

5. Public Health Risks

Extreme heat poses serious and wide-ranging public health risks in Myanmar, particularly for vulnerable populations.

Exposure to high temperatures can lead to a range of health problems, including heat exhaustion, heatstroke, dehydration, and worsening of cardiovascular and respiratory conditions. Evidence from Myanmar also shows that people experience symptoms such as fatigue, headaches, skin problems, and difficulty concentrating during heatwaves. In many cases, these effects can last beyond the heatwave period and increase the risk of mortality.

The impacts are not evenly distributed. Older people are particularly vulnerable, as their bodies are less able to cope with extreme heat, and most excess deaths during heatwaves occur among the elderly. Children are also at higher risk, as heat can affect their physical and cognitive development. Outdoor workers, such as construction workers and street vendors, face prolonged exposure and a higher risk of heat-related illness.

Social and economic inequalities further increase vulnerability. Low-income communities and those living in informal settlements often lack proper housing, ventilation, and access to cooling, increasing their exposure to heat. Women, especially those who are pregnant or postpartum, also face additional health risks, as exposure to extreme heat has been linked to higher risks of preterm birth, low birth weight, stillbirth, congenital abnormalities, and neonatal mortality, yet gender-sensitive responses remain limited.

Current conditions in Myanmar can further worsen these risks. Fuel shortages have led to long queues at petrol stations, with people waiting for hours under extreme heat. Some reports on social media and certain sources suggest that individuals have fainted or even died while queuing in these conditions.

These patterns show that heat stress is not only a health issue, but also a question of social inequality in Myanmar’s context.

6. Recommendations to mitigate and adapt to the risks

Addressing heat stress in Myanmar requires both immediate responses and long-term planning.

In Myanmar, some initiatives are already being implemented, although they remain limited. The Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) has been supporting communities through early warning messages, awareness campaigns, first aid services, and the creation of shaded spaces during heatwaves. However, these efforts face constraints due to limited resources and ongoing political challenges, which restrict wider implementation. Since the 2021 military coup, reductions in international funding, the withdrawal of aid programmes, and increasing restrictions on NGO operations have significantly weakened the capacity of civil society organisations to deliver services and support vulnerable communities. In addition, Myanmar still lacks advanced heat monitoring systems, such as standardised heat stress measurement tools, which limits effective early warning and response.

At the regional level, neighbouring countries are adopting more structured approaches. For example, Bangkok has introduced cooling centres and public cooling spaces, along with a heat warning system to guide public behaviour during extreme heat. Other Countries in Southeast Asia are also using data and technology to improve responses. Singapore applies climate modelling and urban monitoring systems to inform heat-resilient urban planning, while cities like Malacca use low-cost sensors and nature-based solutions to reduce urban heat.

In the short term, expanding green spaces, improving access to water, strengthening public education and awareness on the risks of extreme heat, and ensuring access to electricity for cooling are critical to reduce immediate risks. In the long term, improving urban design, strengthening early warning systems, and addressing energy supply issues are essential to build resilience against rising temperatures.

Heat stress in Myanmar is a silent and growing crisis, caused by both climate change and ongoing structural challenges. Without greater recognition and integration into policy and response systems, it will continue to increase risks, especially for the most vulnerable.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Myanmar’s disaster response is weak due to poor systems, political issues, and lack of coordination, affecting people, the economy, and the environment. At the same time, non-state and international groups bring both challenges and opportunities to improve disaster management.

Key Takeaways:

• Disaster impacts are driven not only by hazards but by governance failures.

• Non-state actors are essential but face major constraints.

• Inclusive and effective governance is critical for improving disaster response.

The common classification of disasters as natural or man-made is misleading. The United Nations emphasises that a hazard becomes a disaster only when it affects vulnerable populations lacking protection due to poverty, exclusion, or social disadvantage.

Myanmar is highly exposed to disaster risks and is the most climate hazard–prone globally due to its geographical location and diverse topography. The country is also highly vulnerable, with weak coping capacity and limited ability to support long-term recovery.

Governance plays a key role in reducing disaster impacts. Evidence shows that higher government effectiveness is linked to lower disaster mortality. Understanding governance gaps is therefore essential to explain failures in disaster management and reduce future risks.

State-Driven Disaster Governance Gaps

1. Restrictions on Humanitarian Aid Delivery

The military regime imposes strict controls on humanitarian aid, especially in conflict-affected areas where needs are greatest. It restricts and monitors aid, limiting access for local and international actors and worsening conditions. After the 2025 Sagaing earthquake, rescue teams were denied immediate entry and required official approval despite urgent needs. Aid was confiscated, preventing delivery to areas most in need, particularly those controlled by the NUG and ethnic resistance groups. Curfews further delayed operations.

Restrictions also affect international organisations. The 2022 Registration Law requires disclosure of staff, funding, and operations, restricts engagement with local actors, and imposes penalties for non-compliance. Since the 2021 coup, hundreds have reportedly been arrested under these rules, while travel authorisations are frequently delayed or denied.

Information control further limits response. Internet shutdowns, media restrictions, and bans on digital platforms reduce public awareness. Similar patterns were observed during Cyclone Nargis (2008) and Cyclone Mocha (2023), where aid delivery was delayed and restricted.

2. State Negligence and Abuse During Disasters

The military regime has failed to fulfil its obligation to protect affected populations. During the 2025 earthquake, military involvement in relief was minimal, with limited troop deployment and reports of looting by soldiers. Support prioritised government and military groups, particularly in Naypyitaw, while vulnerable populations such as IDPs were neglected.

Despite announcing ceasefires, the military continued airstrikes in affected areas, causing civilian casualties and damaging shelters, including religious buildings. In one case, a monastery hosting medical teams was targeted. These actions have been widely criticised as inhumane and indicative of disregard for human rights. Similar patterns occurred during Typhoon Yagi and Cyclone Mocha. Rescue support was limited, evacuation efforts were inadequate, and aid was redirected to military-aligned areas. Entire communities, especially Rohingya and resistance-aligned groups, lacked food and shelter.

Overall, humanitarian aid has been politicised, used to reward loyalty and restrict opposition rather than to save lives.

3. Weak Disaster Preparedness

Despite high exposure to hazards, preparedness remains weak due to limited infrastructure and coordination. Disasters therefore cause greater damage and casualties than in comparable countries. This is evident in Typhoon Yagi (2024). Countries like Vietnam implemented early warnings, evacuations, and large-scale mobilisation, while Myanmar’s response was limited. Although affected only by storm remnants, Myanmar recorded a comparable death toll, highlighting governance failures.

Existing disaster frameworks are undermined by poor implementation, weak coordination, and limited community engagement. Although Myanmar has a formal disaster management structure, gaps persist due to centralised control, weak institutional capacity, and inadequate local resources. State priorities often focus on military operations rather than disaster response, increasing risks to civilians.

4. Fiscal Prioritisation and Underinvestment

Financial allocation remains a major challenge. Military spending far exceeds disaster investment, with defence expenditure nearly 200 times higher. The government relies on limited reserve funds covering less than 1% of disaster damage, while the National Natural Disaster Management Fund provides minimal support. Budget rigidity limits flexibility during emergencies. These issues have worsened. In 2022, disaster funds were diverted to economic support, reducing resources for emergency response. During the 2025 earthquake, shortages of equipment and support highlighted severe underinvestment.

5. Limited Manpower In Disaster Response

Myanmar faces significant human resource constraints. There is a shortage of trained rescue personnel, and state responders are often absent, with some reports of misconduct. Response efforts, therefore, rely heavily on local communities and volunteers.

The workforce has further declined due to arrests, killings, forced conscription, and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Unlike past disasters with large-scale mobilisation, recent responses involve small, less coordinated volunteer groups. The healthcare workforce is also critically insufficient. Even before the crisis, workforce numbers have dropped below WHO standards, worsened by arrests and killings of health workers. During the 2025 earthquake, limited facilities were overwhelmed, particularly in Mandalay.

Weak institutional capacity and coordination further limit effective emergency response, increasing dependence on local networks.

Role of Political Opposition and International Actors

1. National Unity Government (NUG)

The NUG has emerged as a parallel governance actor since 2021. It provides humanitarian aid in areas under its influence, often working with EAOs, and coordinates through its Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, with local communities, CSOs, and international partners.

A key strength of the NUG is its ability to deliver structured and transparent responses despite limited resources. During Cyclone Mocha, it established coordination mechanisms, issued early warnings, supported evacuations, and allocated funds for relief and recovery. Engagement with international actors has also increased since 2024, with actors such as the United States, the European Union, and some UN agencies.

However, its reach is restricted by the SAC restrictions on access, as well as resource constraints, relying on domestic fundraising and diaspora support with limited international funding. Institutional challenges, including limited human resources, technical capacity, and administrative systems, further affect its ability to coordinate large-scale responses and deliver aid consistently.

2. Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs)

EAOs have become key service providers in many regions. Their strengths include local access, territorial control, and strong community trust. Organizations such as the Karen National Union (KNU), with established governance structures, have developed dedicated administrative systems to deliver social services and coordinate emergency response for local populations. During Cyclone Mocha, groups such as the Arakan Army conducted early warning, needs assessments, and relief operations. Their efforts are often supported by strong community trust and collaboration with CSOs and NGOs.

However, they face key limitations. Resource constraints limit large-scale response, while fragmentation and lack of recognition hinder coordination and engagement with international actors. Ongoing conflict further restricts operations, and some groups face concerns related to human rights and environmental practices, affecting credibility.

3. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and International Actors

CSOs, CBOs, NGOs, and international actors are primary humanitarian providers, especially in hard-to-reach areas. Local actors deliver frontline responses, while international actors provide funding and technical support.

However, effectiveness is constrained by access restrictions, funding limitations, and capacity gaps. Tensions between local priorities and international neutrality requirements also affect cooperation. Many INGOs are reluctant to partner with informal actors due to legal and donor constraints, and top-down funding systems reinforce unequal power dynamics and slow delivery. Finally, humanitarian funding has declined due to competing global crises and donor caution, compounded by military restrictions on banking transactions, which disrupt fund transfers and limit operational capacity.

Impacts of Disaster Governance Gaps

1. Social Impacts

Cyclone Nargis (2008) caused over 77,000 deaths. In 2024, Typhoon Yagi affected around 887,000 people, while the 2025 earthquake resulted in about 9,000 deaths and injuries. Health conditions worsen due to damaged water systems, leading to disease outbreaks. Displacement into temporary shelters increases risks of infection, while repeated shocks, conflict, and displacement create psychological trauma, especially for children. Disasters often cause shortages of food, clean water, shelter, medicine, and electricity. Education is also disrupted, with thousands of schools affected, and temporary learning spaces remain insufficient. Disasters have caused widespread destruction of homes, roads, bridges, and communication systems. Essential facilities as well as cultural heritage sites have been damaged. Human rights are often compromised due to restricted aid, delayed response, and attacks on civilian areas. Some communities lack adequate food, shelter, or evacuation support, increasing risks. Restrictions on information further limit access to life-saving assistance. Displacement remains severe, with millions internally displaced and increased migration.

2. Economic Impacts

Livelihoods are heavily affected, with damage to agriculture and fisheries reducing income. For example, Typhoon Yagi (2024) flooded farmland during a key planting season. The 2025 earthquake affected over 3.5 million workers, with losses up to US$36.8 million per day. Infrastructure damage disrupts economic activity and supply chains, increasing poverty rates. Recovery often exceeds initial damage estimates, placing long-term pressure on public finances.

3. Environmental Impacts

Disasters damage water systems, causing contamination and scarcity. Disasters contribute to soil degradation and land loss. Riverbank erosion is a major issue in regions such as Ayeyarwady. Floods and extreme weather damage crops, irrigation, and storage, reducing agricultural output. Disasters harm ecosystems and severely damage mangrove forests and surrounding ecosystems. Disasters alter landscapes through landfall, landslides, and ground fractures, as seen during Cyclone Nargis and the 2025 earthquake.

4. Governance Impacts

Repeated failures reduce public trust, weakening cooperation and policy implementation. Disasters strain already fragile public systems, limiting their ability to respond effectively. All the above impacts are intensified by limited preparedness, weak coordination, and constraints in response and recovery capacity.

Recommendations

Disasters cannot be prevented, but their impacts can be reduced through effective governance. Given Myanmar’s limited institutional capacity and reliance on external support, responsibility extends to the international community. As structural challenges are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the following recommendations focus on strengthening non-state and international actors.

Disaster governance should be decentralised, inclusive, and effectively implemented at all levels, especially locally. Strong coordination among CSOs, EAOs, NUG, and NGOs/INGOs is key, with a focus on conflict sensitivity and vulnerable groups. Invest in resilient infrastructure, essential supplies, and community preparedness. Strengthen human capacity through training and support, improve early warning systems, and ensure flexible, well-prioritised disaster funding. Support local actors as primary responders and simplify funding access. Strengthen partnerships between local and international organisations to improve coordination and aid effectiveness.

Conclusion

Disaster governance in Myanmar is weak due to poor planning, limited resources, and restricted aid. Non-state actors try to help, but face political, financial, and coordination challenges. As a result, disasters have severe impacts. Improving this requires more inclusive, locally led efforts with stronger international support.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Water insecurity in Myanmar is a multifaceted crisis driven by environmental change, weak governance, economic decline, and social inequality, requiring coordinated infrastructure, community, and policy solutions to ensure sustainable access to safe water.

Key Takeaways

• Water insecurity in Myanmar is driven by environmental factors, governance failures, economic decline, and social inequalities.

• Limited access to safe water impacts on health, education, livelihoods, ecosystems, and institutional capacity.

• Addressing the crisis requires integrated solutions combining infrastructure investment, community capacity building, and stronger governance coordination.

Introduction

Although water covers 70% of the planet, only about 3% is freshwater that we can drink or use to irrigate our farm fields. In Myanmar, access to safely managed drinking water has improved over the past two decades, rising from 27.11% in 2000 to 58.83% in 2020, yet water insecurity remains a critical challenge. Water insecurity happens when water is insufficient for human daily needs. More than 60% of households still lack safely managed drinking water services, and over 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) require WASH assistance.

Drivers of Water Insecurity

1. Environmental Factors

According to meteorologist U Tun Lwin, rising temperatures and deforestation are two key environmental causes of water scarcity, with impacts further intensified by disasters. Climate change has contributed to increasingly erratic rainfall, shifting monsoon cycles, and prolonged dry seasons. In addition, over the past three decades, the Central Dry Zone has experienced an approximate 2.4°C increase in baseline temperature, contributing to prolonged dry seasons and more frequent droughts. These climatic shifts have reduced the reliability of surface water sources. For example, in Rakhine State, ponds and small lakes are drying up, limiting water available for drinking and cooking. Similarly, in Htoke Kaw Koe Village in Karen State, wells that traditionally sustained local communities now fail during peak dry months. Consequently, households have to rely on shallow, unprotected, and often contaminated water sources. Extreme weather events further intensify these vulnerabilities. For example, Cyclone Mocha in May 2023 caused storm surges that contaminated unprotected community ponds with saline water. Moreover, earthquakes can disrupt groundwater systems, causing fluctuations in groundwater levels and damage to wells. Following the 2025 Sagaing earthquake in Myanmar, many tubes and dug wells were displaced or damaged.

2. Governance Failures

Weak policy implementation, limited regulatory enforcement, and insufficient investment in water infrastructure have undermined water management systems and disaster preparedness. In some areas, poor oversight has contributed to declining water quality, including arsenic contamination in some areas. Institutional weaknesses also limit effective disaster response. Limited preparedness and coordination can delay recovery efforts, leaving affected communities without reliable access to safe water following disasters. For example, in April 2025, approximately 1.6 million people in Myanmar lost access to clean water following disaster-related disruptions.

Governance failures are further compounded by weak intersectoral coordination and restrictions on humanitarian assistance. Since the 2021 military takeover, access limitations have hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly for IDPs. Conflict has also damaged critical water infrastructure. Reports indicate that wells, water tanks, and supply routes have been destroyed in some areas during armed confrontations. Such actions disrupt water supply systems and affect civilian populations who depend on these sources for daily survival.

Mass displacement represents another governance-linked driver of water insecurity. Ongoing political instability has displaced nearly 3.5 million people nationwide. Many displaced populations live in overcrowded camps where water supply systems are limited. In such environments, residents frequently rely on unsafe sources such as collected rainwater stored in temporary containers, highlighting the link between governance failures and water insecurity.

3. Economic Decline

Since the 2021 political crisis, the national economy has contracted while inflation has surged to approximately 28.6%, pushing the poverty rate to 32.1%, reducing both government capacity to invest in water infrastructure and household ability to secure safe water. At the structural level, economic decline limits public spending on water infrastructure, maintenance, and service delivery. Water utilities face shrinking operational budgets, constraining system expansion and repair. Economic shocks, including natural disasters, such as the, 2025 earthquake, have further damaged water systems and intensified supply disruptions. At the household level, declining incomes reduce the ability of families to afford safe water. Many low-income households have to depend on private water vendors. Although wholesale mineral water prices range between US$0.42 and US$1.64 per kilogram (minimum wage US$1.9 per day), these costs represent a significant burden for low-income families. As a result, 16.3% of households lack sufficient water for daily needs.

4. Social Inequalities

Rural–urban disparities remain significant. Urban populations benefit more frequently from piped water systems and municipal treatment facilities, while rural communities often rely on natural sources such as ponds, rivers, and shallow wells. With roughly two-thirds of Myanmar’s population living in rural areas, uneven infrastructure development creates structural disparities in water access.

Education and awareness also influence water practices. Limited knowledge of safe water storage and sanitation practices contributes to the use of untreated water and poor hygiene behaviours. Social marginalisation further intensifies vulnerability. Communities located in border regions, mountainous areas, and conflict-affected zones often face infrastructure neglect and barriers to humanitarian assistance. Government restrictions on aid delivery, together with regulatory pressures and operational risks, have constrained humanitarian operations and led many international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to scale down or relocate their activities. As a result, communities that previously depended on externally supported WASH services face reduced assistance, while many displaced communities rely on temporary camps and aid-dependent water systems with limited storage capacity.

Impacts of Water Insecurity

1. Economic Impacts

At the household level, families often spend additional income purchasing water from vendors. Health risks associated with unsafe water can also increase medical expenses and reduce working time due to illness. In water-scarce areas, households may spend several hours per day collecting water, reducing opportunities for income-generating activities. At the national level, widespread water insecurity can affect workforce productivity and place additional pressure on healthcare systems. Reduced agricultural productivity and labor capacity can slow economic growth and lower overall economic performance.

2. Social Impacts

Unsafe water increases the spread of waterborne diseases. In late 2025, approximately 300 people were affected by a cholera outbreak in Myanmar, with several confirmed deaths. Displacement camps have reported widespread cases of diarrhea and other illnesses associated with contaminated water sources. These risks have been further exacerbated by the reduction of international humanitarian support following the withdrawal or relocation of many INGOs, which has disrupted WASH service provision and weakened disease prevention and response capacity in vulnerable communities. Children face particularly high vulnerability. In fragile contexts, children under five are significantly more likely to die from diarrheal diseases linked to unsafe water. Long-term exposure to contaminated groundwater also poses serious health threats, including arsenic contamination in regions such as the Ayeyarwady Delta. Beyond disease, the physical burden of carrying water over long distances contributes to musculoskeletal pain. Education outcomes are also affected. School attendance is closely linked to proximity to water sources, where collection requires long hours, and absenteeism and dropout rates increase. Water collection responsibilities also reinforce gender inequality. Women and girls are typically responsible for collecting water and may travel long distances to reach water sources. In conflict-affected areas, these journeys expose them to risks of harassment, assault, and violence.

3. Environmental Impacts

Reduced water availability disrupts plant physiological processes, limiting nutrient uptake, slowing photosynthesis, and restricting plant growth. Declining soil moisture reduces crop yields and agricultural productivity. Prolonged drought conditions can also degrade soil health by reducing microbial activity and weakening soil structure. Groundwater over-extraction can further accelerate environmental degradation. Excessive pumping lowers water tables and reduces groundwater discharge to connected rivers and streams, diminishing water availability in surrounding ecosystems. These pressures are evident in urban areas such as Yangon, where population growth and post-2021 displacement have increased water demand. More than half of the city’s population relies on groundwater, with widespread extraction through private wells. Studies indicate that actual groundwater abstraction far exceeds official estimates, placing severe stress on aquifer systems. Excessive extraction has been linked to declining groundwater levels, increased risk of land subsidence, saltwater intrusion, and broader environmental degradation.

4. Governance Impacts

Waterborne diseases, sanitation-related illnesses, and outbreaks linked to unsafe water significantly increase patient loads, stretching already limited medical resources. Water insecurity can place additional strain on existing water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) systems. Furthermore, inadequate water infrastructure in rural and displacement settings makes consistent service delivery difficult. These pressures extend beyond the health sector. Reduced productivity due to illness and time spent collecting water can influence economic performance and public sector functioning.

Recommendations

1. Infrastructure and Technical Solutions

Strengthening physical water infrastructure is essential to ensure a reliable and climate-resilient water supply in Myanmar. At the national and municipal levels, governments should invest in dual-purpose water infrastructure systems that provide reliable water services while enhancing resilience to natural hazards. This includes the protection and management of raw water sources, as well as investment in water treatment plants, storage facilities, pumping stations, and distribution networks, supported by robust monitoring, control, and maintenance systems.

In rural and drought-prone regions, decentralized technical solutions, often implemented through community initiatives or by NGOs, can play a key role. Solar-powered water systems are particularly suitable in these areas, where solar panels can power groundwater pumps while reducing dependence on fuel. Rehabilitation of dug wells, including roofing, aprons, and proper drainage, can improve water quality and reduce contamination risks. In upland areas, gravity-flow systems that channel water from higher elevation streams into village storage tanks offer a low-cost and low-maintenance solution.

At the community and household levels, smaller-scale interventions can further enhance water security. These include rainwater harvesting systems, basic water treatment technologies such as chlorination, pond rehabilitation, restoration of wells and boreholes, salinity barriers in coastal areas, emergency water tankering, and improved household water storage facilities.

2. Institutional and Community Capacity

Infrastructure alone is insufficient without institutional and community capacity. At the community level, WASH education programs should be implemented in villages and schools to improve hygiene practices and safe water storage. Training residents in the operation and maintenance of water systems can strengthen local ownership and ensure long-term sustainability. At the governance level, decentralized water management should be strengthened at village and township levels through the establishment or reinforcement of local water management committees with clear responsibilities and accountability mechanisms. Restoring damaged public water systems is particularly critical in conflict-affected areas. Integrating water management planning into broader climate adaptation and environmental policies will further enhance resilience.

In addition, the governance bodies have to facilitate humanitarian access to ensure emergency WASH assistance reaches internally displaced and vulnerable populations. At the same time, INGOs should maintain engagement in Myanmar by adopting more adaptive and locally grounded approaches despite ongoing regulatory constraints and security risks. In particular, they should strengthen collaboration with civil society organisations, which have access and contextual knowledge to reach hard-to-reach and conflict-affected areas. INGOs should also support and accelerate the 2023 UN-led localization strategy by expanding consultation and support for locally led aid operations, thereby improving the effectiveness and reach of humanitarian assistance.

3. Financial Support

The national government should prioritise budget allocation for water infrastructure development, system maintenance, and rural water supply programs. Targeted subsidies can help vulnerable households overcome affordability barriers to safe water access. Public–private partnerships may mobilize additional resources to support water system expansion and service delivery. At the same time, international financial assistance should be adapted to the current operational context in Myanmar. Given existing governance and access constraints, reliance on traditional delivery channels alone may limit the effectiveness of aid distribution. Thus, donors should expand direct and flexible funding to civil society organisations, such as increased risk-sharing, simplified compliance requirements, and the use of pooled funding mechanisms to ensure that financial resources reach vulnerable populations more efficiently.

Conclusion

​​Water insecurity in Myanmar is a complex problem caused by environmental changes, social inequalities, and weak institutional systems. Climate change, groundwater depletion, and disasters have made water sources less reliable, while unequal infrastructure and conflict have made access more difficult. The withdrawal or reduced presence of international actors and ongoing access restrictions have also limited the delivery of WASH services, especially for vulnerable communities.

To address this crisis, practical and coordinated actions are needed. Improving climate-resilient infrastructure, promoting community-based water systems, and supporting civil society organisations can help improve access to safe water. At the same time, more flexible and localised funding approaches are important to ensure that assistance reaches those most in need. Without sustained efforts, water insecurity will continue to affect human well-being and future development in Myanmar.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Strengthening community-based recycling and integrating the informal sector is key to improving waste management and advancing a circular economy in Myanmar.

Myanmar has been facing the challenge of solid waste management, especially plastic, which is flowing into landfills, waterways, and informal channels at a concerning pace. At the same time, in the current context of economic decline, political instability, and polycrisis, the practice of “repair, reuse, recycle” is familiar to many Myanmar households and communities.

These everyday practices, such as repairing old appliances, reusing containers, or selling recyclables to small junk shops, reflect long-standing cultural habits shaped by necessity. Because of weak national infrastructure and governance, community-level recycling systems can be a viable route for waste governance and circular economy growth. However, with limited infrastructure, heavy reliance on the informal sector, and a fragile institutional environment, building strong community recycling systems in Myanmar is urgent and necessary for sustainable development.

Current State of Community Recycling in Myanmar

Municipal waste collection in Myanmar remains inconsistent, particularly outside major cities, and many wastes end up in unmanaged dumps or open landfills. Recycling is mostly driven by the informal sector, and waste-pickers, scrap collectors, and small buyers dominate the system. For example, according to a survey in 2017 in Yangon, approximately 86 tonnes of recyclable materials were recovered daily from landfill sites, and 57% was glass, 15% paper/cardboard, 13% cardboard/paper, 7% plastic and 7% tin cans (Premakumara et al., 2017).

Neighbourhood drop-off points and small junk shops are common community-level practices, but there is no standardised recycling system applied across townships. Data on recycling volumes and source-segregation are scarce, making strategic planning difficult (Premakumara et al., 2017; Prevent Plastics Myanmar, 2021). Public awareness of waste sorting is low overall, although many households recognise high-value materials (such as aluminium cans, plastic bottles, cardboard) because they can be sold to informal collectors. This awareness of “value in waste” offers a foundation for community engagement.

Key Challenges

Weak infrastructure: Myanmar has very few dedicated materials-recovery facilities (MRFs) and limited municipal recycling services. Collection schedules are often unreliable, and transport vehicles and equipment are insufficient
Policy and enforcement gaps: Although some bans (for example, on thin plastic bags) exist in city areas, enforcement is weak, and incentives for households or communities are unclear. For example, the recycling value chain remains informal with little official policy integration (ECD & MONREC, 2018; Premakumara et al., 2017).

Informal sector vulnerabilities: While the informal waste-picker network is fundamental and contributes significantly to recycling, workers often face unsafe working conditions, unstable prices for recyclables, and a lack of social protections. A recent mapping in Yangon and Hpa-An found that waste-picker livelihoods depend heavily on fluctuating scrap values and minimal regulation (Win et al., 2024).

Social and behavioural barriers: Cultural habits such as dumping, burning or littering remain widespread in many communities. Convenience-driven disposal practices (throwing all waste into one bin) persist, and source separation is rarely practised. These habits hinder effective recycling at the community level.
Economic barriers: Community-led recycling projects receive limited financial support, and many recycling markets in Myanmar are low-profit, especially for plastic types with little resale value. For example, research notes that even though Myanmar’s informal sector achieves high rates of recovery for “valuable” materials, single-use plastics with low resale value often escape collection (Jeske, 2023).

Opportunities for Strengthening Community Systems

Integrate and recognise the informal sector: Recognising the role of informal actors is key. Policymakers should provide protective equipment, training programs, and partnerships between municipal authorities and waste-picker groups. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) highlights that recognising informal waste workers improves efficiency and inclusion of recycling systems (Chen, 2023).
Community-based collection models: Neighbourhood sorting centres, school or monastery-led recycling hubs, and incentive-based systems (points, rebates for recyclables) can encourage recycling locally. Because many households already resell high-value materials, a more formal collection network can build on this behaviour.
Improving public awareness: Campaigns targeted at the household and quarter level, and youth-led initiatives, can tap into Myanmar’s culture of reuse and repair (for example, repair shops for umbrellas or electronic appliances) and increase recycling habits. Since many communities already engage in reuse due to resource scarcity, this is an ideal environment for behaviour change.

Policy recommendations:
• Introduce local-level bylaws mandating separation at source, tailored to township realities.
• Offer financial incentives or subsidies to recycling SMEs to make community recycling viable.
• Provide subsidies for purchasing materials with recycled content, stimulating demand for recyclables and closing the loop.

Conclusion

Community-level recycling systems offer a strong entry point for Myanmar’s transition toward a circular economy and stronger waste governance in the current context of Myanmar. By establishing collection, sorting, and education in neighbourhoods and by integrating the informal sector into formal systems, Myanmar can build resilience despite its governance and infrastructure constraints. Strengthening these local systems also helps communities take ownership of environmental challenges at a time when national-level attention to waste management remains limited. Moreover, as economic pressures continue to shape household behaviour, community recycling can build on existing cultural practices of reuse and repair, making sustainability both practical and accessible. With inclusive policies, targeted investments, and local innovation, community recycling can scale up, offering a hopeful path forward for both people and the environment, even amid Myanmar’s ongoing uncertainties.

References:

Chen, S. (2023, December 28). Unsung Heroes: Four Things Policymakers Can Do to Empower Informal Waste Workers. UNDP. https://www.undp.org/blog/unsung-heroes-four-things-policymakers-can-do-empower-informal-waste-workers

ECD, & MONREC. (2018). National Waste Management Strategy and Master Plan for Myanmar (2018-2030). https://optoce.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Myanmar-National-Waste-Management-Strategy_Mar-2018.pdf

Jeske, F. (2023, March 10). Plastic Waste in Myanmar: How Poverty (Paradoxically) Can Drive Circularity. Regional Knowledge Centre for Marine Plastic Debris. https://rkcmpd-eria.org/zero-in-on-plastic/plastic-waste-in-myanmar-how-poverty-paradoxically-can-drive-circularity

Premakumara, D. G. J., Hengesbaugh, M., Onogawa, K., & Horizono, S. (2017). Waste Management in Myanmar: Current Status, Key Challenges and Recommendations for National and City Waste Management Strategies. United Nations Environment Programme.

Prevent Plastics Myanmar. (2021). Best Practices: Waste Management Systems in Myanmar. Prevent Plastic. https://preventplastics.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Waste-management-best-practices.Eng-.pdf

Win, N. N., Thu, Y., Yee, H. L., & Jeske, F. (2024). Waste Picker mapping in Myanmar. Thant Myanmar.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

This article explores Bangkok’s PM2.5 crisis, emphasising sustainable policies, clean transport, and community action to protect public health and urban resilience.

Background
The worldwide increase in urbanisation and industrial activity has made air pollution a major sustainability problem, endangering both environmental health and human health. The danger of PM2.5 arises because its tiny particles can penetrate deep into the lungs and bloodstream, causing severe respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. Bangkok illustrates this problem through its ongoing violation of international PM2.5 safety limits due to rising vehicle traffic, industrial activity, and rapid urban growth. The high pollution levels in the city threaten human health while damaging its long-term sustainability. Sustainable urban development depends on PM2.5 pollution control through unified policy efforts, technological advancements, and public participation. The city of Bangkok can build a sustainable future with improved health and environmental quality by successfully reducing PM2.5 pollution.

Why Air Quality Matters
A sustainable city needs to maintain clean air because it serves as the base for residents to live, work and breathe safely. The health of public populations depends on clean air, while urban communities need it to build sustainable economic and social systems. The presence of poor air pollution reveals multiple problems in transportation systems, urban planning and environmental justice systems, which create disproportionate harm to vulnerable communities. The protection of air quality enables sustainable cities to reach their climate action targets through the promotion of clean transportation systems and efficient urban development. The protection of clean air serves as a sustainability duty because it guarantees future generations will receive a habitable world instead of dealing with rising health expenses and environmental deterioration from present-day pollution.

Analysis of Current Approaches
Bangkok demonstrates recognition of air pollution problems through its management efforts, yet these initiatives have not produced substantial decreases in PM2.5 concentrations. The main source of Bangkok's pollution stems from vehicle emissions, which generate 60% of the total pollution. The city has established Euro V/VI engine upgrade programs and expanded emission checkpoint networks and low-emission zones, but these initiatives have not produced substantial results. The process of implementing higher emission standards has encountered multiple delays because of insufficient personnel, excessive vehicle numbers, and non-compliant drivers. The majority of polluting vehicles operate without facing any enforcement actions.
The construction and industrial sectors have established rules to manage dust and emissions, but their monitoring systems are unreliable, and new environmentally friendly technologies have not gained widespread acceptance. The combination of construction activities and factory operations produces major PM2.5 pollution events throughout the year, but these events become more severe during dry months because of reduced atmospheric dispersion.
The city of Bangkok works to establish permanent solutions through its electric vehicle promotion program and public transportation system improvements. The current lack of sufficient charging stations and insufficient mass transit coverage in various city areas hinders electric vehicle adoption. The growing public interest in sustainable transportation faces a major obstacle because people lack access to practical alternative transportation options.

The success of Bangkok's air quality policies depends on better enforcement, more defined rules, additional infrastructure funding, and public participation instead of depending on regulations alone.

Solutions
The solution to Bangkok's air quality problems needs transportation solutions, urban planning solutions, and community participation to achieve lasting improvements. The city needs to transform its transportation system because this approach will deliver the most significant results. The combination of financial benefits with defined rules and a complete electric vehicle charging system will help Bangkok residents switch from fossil fuel-based transportation to electric vehicles. The public transportation system needs enhancement through better connectivity for underserved areas and the adoption of electric buses and motorcycles to reduce private vehicle usage. The combination of safer cycling lanes with pedestrian-friendly infrastructure will promote low-emission travel while improving public health.

Sustainable urban planning stands as an essential factor for success. The implementation of expanded low-emission zones together with enhanced pollution controls in areas with high air pollution levels will help control the movement of vehicles that produce significant emissions. The implementation of stronger buffer zones between industrial facilities and residential areas protects residential areas from particulate pollution exposure. The implementation of these measures throughout Bangkok's urban development plan will maintain air quality protection as a fundamental element of the city's growth path.

Conclusion
The success of long-term sustainability depends on active involvement from both the public and essential stakeholders. The combination of environmental NGO partnerships with health impact education and awareness programs will help people understand the benefits of using cleaner transportation methods. The combination of vehicle scrapping rebates and technology adoption subsidies for households and businesses creates positive behavioural change. The combination of these coordinated efforts will enhance Bangkok's ability to create a sustainable urban space that promotes environmental health and community wellness.

This article is based on my public policy and planning analysis titled ‘Better Policies, Cleaner Air: Strengthening Bangkok Metropolitan Area’s Pollution Control’ (2025).

Dr Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

This article highlights the Yangon childhood, revealing how environmental hazards and structural inequalities create environmental injustice among local communities.

Growing up in Yangon, I witnessed firsthand how environmental harm is unequally experienced across communities. In my community, environmental issues were a constant part of my daily life: scarce water shortages during the hot season, frequent flooding in the rainy months, and ongoing air pollution and poor waste management in the neighbourhood. All of this was caused by nearby small manufacturing businesses such as garment printing, welding workshops, aluminium pots factories and shoe production, many of which discharged untreated waste directly into the surrounding environment. This small business began to develop more in my neighbourhood after 1988.

From early childhood until around the age of nine or ten, I was regularly exposed to air pollution and chemical fumes from the garment workshop next door to my home. They disposed of all their waste directly into a nearby ditch, where it accumulated due to poor water flow. At the same time, our entire neighbourhood relied on water drawn from driven and drilled wells, without awareness of potential contamination. These living conditions were part of a broader pattern of structural inequalities, in which communities striving to develop, such as the one where I live, faced ongoing harm due to weak environmental oversight, inadequate public infrastructure and limited access to safe and healthy environments.

Environmental justice refers to the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, or income, in environmental decision-making, law enforcement, regulation, policies and protection from environmental harm. Environmental justice holds that no community should carry an unequal share of environmental degradation or be excluded from the benefits of a healthy environment. Originating from grassroots movements in the United States, the concept has since gained global relevance, drawing attention to the reality that marginalised communities often endure higher levels of pollution and ecological risks while lacking both political voice and legal protection.

Environmental Justice also emphasises equitable access to environmental benefits, including clean air, safe drinking water, and healthy ecosystems. This approach offers a useful perspective that allows me to examine the intersection of my personal experiences related to international human rights standards on health and water.

Environmental conditions in Yangon

Yangon is the most populous city in Myanmar, with a population of more than 5 million. It struggles with rapid urbanisation, inadequate infrastructure, and weak environmental regulations. There is ongoing exposure to environmental risks in many low-income neighbourhoods and suburbs due to the close integration of industrial and residential areas. While I was growing up in such an environment, I witnessed firsthand how poor urban design and inadequate safeguards resulted directly in health risks.

Air quality was a persistent worry, especially due to the nearby small-scale industries like garment printing workshop, welding stations and shoe manufacturing. Many operated informally, frequently avoiding environmental checks through payments to local administrators or connections with military officials. This business discharged fumes, particulates and chemical byproducts directly into the surrounding environment without any filtration. The garment printing workshop next to my home releases strong chemical odours that probably came from solvents, dyes and inks that permeated into our living space. According to the WHO, long-term exposure to these pollutants can cause respiratory problems, skin irritation, and other long-term health problems.

Access to water was another issue, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s. Most households relied on driven or drilled wells, particularly in the summer. These unregulated water sources were exposed to contamination from industrial wastewater, household waste, and septic leaks. During the rainy season, poor drainage and frequent flooding combined sewage with groundwater, while standing floodwater promoted mosquito breeding and the spread of diseases carried by vectors.

Before 2015, solid waste management was almost absent. Although the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC) provided waste collection services, coverage was irregular in informal neighbourhoods (not residential areas under YCDC law) and the outskirts of the city, leaving many people without reliable support. Consequently, people often disposed of waste in vacant lots, open pits, drainage channels and burned it directly in some places until now. This practice not only blocked drainage systems and worsening flood but also produced foul odours, leachate contamination of nearby water, rodent infestation and increased infectious diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea.

Multiple environmental threats, polluted air, unsafe drinking water, unmanaged waste and frequent floods created an accumulated burden on public health and well-being. Such conditions were not coincidental; they resulted from structural inequalities, weak enforcement of regulation, and the exclusion of low-income suburban communities from environmental decision-making. As environmental justice theory highlights, marginalised communities with limited political and economic resources are disproportionately affected.

The combined effects of environmental degradation and entrenched socioeconomic inequalities in Yangon create serious risks for the protection of fundamental human rights for local communities, particularly threatening necessities such as access to clean and safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, and essential health services, while disproportionately impacting vulnerable and marginalised populations who have limited resources and political voice.

Khin Kyi Thar is a master’s student in the MA program in Human Rights, Peace, and Democratisation, an online program jointly offered by Yangon Cosmopolitan University and Mahidol University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Severe air pollution in Yangon, driven by traffic, coal power, and weak regulation, has become a major public-health and social-justice crisis, threatening lives, livelihoods, and Myanmar’s sustainable development.

In the bustling streets of Yangon, the city’s skyline is often hazy and filled with fog. It can be recognised as dangerously polluted air in the city. Therefore, breathing clean air has become a daily challenge for the residents. It is not just an environmental issue but also a public‑health and social‑justice concern, deeply connected with Myanmar’s path toward sustainable development.

It is observed that Yangon’s air quality often reaches levels categorised as “unhealthy”. Burmese News International (BNI) (2025) recorded the city as one of the most polluted cities globally, with an Air Quality Index (AQI) of 165, on 27 January 2025. In addition, another report noted that AQI values in Yangon vary between 50 and 200, with levels around 200 considered harmful to health1.

The main reasons that contribute to the rise in air pollution in Yangon are increasing vehicle traffic, industrial emissions, trash burning, reliance on diesel generators (especially during power outages), and coal‑based energy generation, together with urbanisation and a weak regulatory framework¹. According to the Greenpeace report (2019)2, six out of 14 monitored towns in Myanmar exceeded the World Health Organisation guideline for annual average PM₁₀ levels, and none met the standard.

Air pollution imposes tangible burdens on people’s lives. With air pollution, fine particulate matter (PM₂.₅) and other airborne toxins seep into lungs, bloodstream and can trigger chronic diseases and complications. The 2019 Greenpeace report estimated that coal‑derived emissions alone could cause about 7,100 premature deaths per year in Myanmar if planned coal‑fired power plants go ahead. Furthermore, a report3 by Ohnmar from the University of Medicine 1, Yangon have found that exposure to dust, soot, lead and other pollutants reduces lung function, raises the prevalence of chronic bronchitis, and impairs cognitive or developmental health. Meanwhile, doctors in Yangon suggest that vulnerable groups, such as children, the elderly, and those with predisposed lung or heart conditions, stay indoors during high pollution periods and use masks when outdoors4.

Air pollution in Myanmar has impacts on the environmental, economic and social sectors. Firstly, polluted air degrades ecosystems, soils and water resources, especially when particulate matter settles, or when emissions come from coal‑plants that also affect nearby farmland and water supplies. Secondly, health impacts will result in lost productivity, higher healthcare costs and lower quality of life. Communities near polluting installations may lose livelihoods (e.g., farmers whose animals fall ill). Finally, pollution disproportionately affects the vulnerable group, those living in poorer districts or working in dusty jobs, deepening inequalities, as people with fewer resources have less ability to protect themselves (e.g., cannot avoid exposure or access care). Thus, addressing air pollution is not only about achieving cleaner air but also enabling healthier, fairer development.

Despite the urgency of the situation, Myanmar faces several significant obstacles, including a lack of regulatory standards for many coal‑fired power plants, making control of SO₂, NOₓ and multiple pollution sources. Because of resource constraints and infrastructure, investment for clean energy alternatives, improved waste management, air monitoring networks and health services are needed. To reduce the data gaps, reliable long‑term air quality data (especially PM₂.₅) and health‑impact studies, which are currently scarce in Myanmar, should be supported by the government and international networks, to make tracking progress and targeting interventions harder. As well as that, public awareness and behavioural change should be promoted in the community.

For Myanmar, the fight against air pollution is a critical chapter in sustainable development. It is not just an environmental challenge but a matter of public health, social justice and the future prosperity of cities like Yangon and beyond. By combining better data, stronger policy, cleaner energy, smarter transport, and active communities, Myanmar can move toward cleaner air, healthier people, stronger economies and more resilient societies.

Footnotes:

Myanmar is increasingly dealing with environmental challenges as a result of urbanisation, a poorly functioning government, and an inadequate waste management system. However, an informal community of garbage collectors and junk shop operators offers minimal support for Myanmar’s recycling sector. In this context, the article takes a look at informal garbage collectors in Myanmar in terms of the circular economy concepts they have already adopted, the obstacles they confront, and how they may be integrated into a country’s sustainability strategy. This is a call for an inclusive circular economy that balances sustainability and social equality.

Key Takeawys:

1. Myanmar faces a significant waste and plastic pollution crisis in metropolitan areas due to insufficient municipal capacity, poor infrastructure, and regulatory gaps.

2. Informal workers (collected, scrap dealers, junk shops) play a crucial role in recycling and material recovery, reducing landfill use, pollution, and poverty. However, they are not recognised or protected under official CE regulations.

3. An efficient circular economy in Myanmar requires social inclusion through recognition, formal integration, and targeted support for informal workers. Towards environmental sustainability, good employment, equity, and resilience, “A just transition approach” can lead to ecologically sustainable growth and development.

Introduction: Circular Economy in the Myanmar Context

A Circular Economy (CE) can be defined as a high-tech, advanced economy that is common in industrialised countries. In simple terms, it is about using resources efficiently, which includes reducing waste, recycling, and reusing materials so that nothing gets wasted unnecessarily. In a transitory nation like Myanmar, the Circular Economy takes on a whole different form.

Myanmar does not follow a ‘take, make, dispose’ model. In fact, they have to deal with informal structures. The country produces about 0.44 kg of garbage per person each day, which is lower than the global average. However, there is a major issue with managing their waste. A serious waste management issue develops in major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay, where traditional trash management systems are overworked, and dump sites are already full.

In developing countries, CE ideals are well-suited to local culture and informal work. In the Chatham House Briefing, Preston & Lehne argue that CE can help reduce the requirement for landfills, creating green jobs, particularly for low-income people, improving resource security if local production capability is restricted, and strengthening climate resilience through waste reduction and recycling.

According to international sources such as UNEP research on the circular economy in Asia and the Pacific, informal trash industries are a significant driver of recycling markets in low- and middle-income nations.

Myanmar’s waste management network has significant obstacles. There are major gaps in waste collection, with city authorities unable to provide waste management services properly. As a result, solid trash is left in streets and canals or burned, affecting both air and water quality. Plastic solid trash is becoming increasingly prevalent, accounting for 13% of total solid garbage. Plastic garbage in coastal areas accounts for up to 87% of sea waste. Because of a lack of proper recycling stations, most processed materials are exported or supplied to local small companies.

How Informal Workers Contribute to Circularity

A highly effective recycling network is formed by informal waste workers, such as street collectors, travelling buyers, scrap dealers, and junk shop owners. They gather, sort, and market recyclables like glass, paper, metals, and plastics in both domestic and international recycling markets.

Informal collectors keep garbage out of disposal sites by reusing goods that would otherwise end up there. Although this promotes material reuse and recycling, lowering demand for new materials and thus reducing garbage generation, it can also be perceived negatively because it leads to littering and pollution in areas where informal collectors dispose of waste. Informal recycling reduces greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the need for new resources. In a fragile economy, informal recycling provides a source of income for those living in poverty.

Problems and Exclusion Experienced by Informal Wasteworkers

Although they perform an effective job, informal garbage collectors are occasionally ignored. Two significant challenges are:

1. Lack of Recognition and Policy Support.

They go unreported in formal waste policies and are viewed as a problem rather than a benefit. They cannot access waste streams or profit from national CE plans unless legally recognised.

2. Poor Working Conditions and Social Stigma.

Working circumstances for informal recycler groups are frequently unsafe, exposing them to potentially harmful substances without protective equipment and leaving them subject to exploitation. Criticised communities with waste-related jobs are less likely to get communal social services.

Social Inclusion: The Missing Link in Circularity

A circular economy will require social inclusion, with a focus on countries like Myanmar. When it comes to informal players like rubbish pickers who help keep cities clean, a significant issue in the present rules is disregarded. To achieve a just and sustainable conclusion, Myanmar can implement a “Just Transition” strategy, including the following elements:

1. Recognition: Waste pickers play an important role in city cleaning and recycling. As a result, individuals will be empowered rather than excluded and will play an essential role in trash management.

2. Integration: Provide a means for informal sector employees to be integrated into official waste management systems. It may involve reaching an agreement with cooperatives to employ rubbish pickers in a fair and controlled manner in a formal environment. It will increase employment certainty and make waste management a collective responsibility, leading to more favorable environmental outcomes.

3. Support: Providing specific assistance to ensure integration success. This consists of providing safety equipment, health insurance, and assistance in establishing equitable markets for recycled products. This will improve the quality of life for trash workers. With these approaches, Myanmar can start to shift to a more inclusive and sustainable circular economy in which all waste sector workers’ contributions are valued.

Barriers to Implementation

In Myanmar, several hurdles to an inclusive circular economy include legislative flaws, financial limits, and a lack of information. The existing regulation fails to handle the informal sector, which contributes significantly to the management of waste. The installation of infrastructure for processing hazardous waste is expensive, which serves as a constraint. Finally, information about waste and the informal sector is inaccurate, making it difficult to handle effectively.

Conclusion

Workers in Myanmar’s informal economy have intimate contact with the circular economy. The circular economy exists, but it faces numerous challenges. To enable this economic transition into the future, sustainability must be linked to social inclusion through measures such as formalising the informal economy, raising safety standards, and investing in community projects. Such approaches can help to maximise resource utilisation and recognise the vital role of waste pickers in building a sustainable future.

Pyae Phyoe Mon is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and an M.A. Candidate in Social Sciences at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

Myanmar, particularly more than half of the population dependent on the livestock and agriculture sector, is now struggling with the prolonged polycrisis: the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing political conflict, severe economic downturn, severe human rights violations, and environmental degradation.

Key Takeaways:

1. The lack of technical and financial assistance from the government is a major challenge for rural livestock and agricultural farmers.

2. Circular feeding could be a significant agrarian change in the husbandry sector and help to improve sustainable development.

3. The ongoing civil war continues to hinder agricultural sector development, limiting market access and livelihood opportunities.

Already developed agricultural countries depend largely on machines and technology. However, least-developing and fragile countries like Myanmar rely heavily on conventional agriculture and traditional animal husbandry. According to the data from 2021, waste and by-products from the agriculture sectors around the world contribute approximately 11.7% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Since agriculture, including livestock farming, is the second largest source of GHG emissions worldwide, it is crucial to promote sustainable livestock farming practices that support long-term environmental sustainability and development.

Furthermore, agricultural practices in Myanmar are a major driver of climate change. An estimated 83 to 90% of the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions come from the agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) sector. That is significantly higher than the global average, where AFOLU contributes roughly one-quarter of total emissions.

The Impact of Varieties of Disasters on Farmers in Myanmar

Climate change is one of the challenges in achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) across the globe. Even small changes in temperature, as well as extreme weather conditions, have severe impacts on crop growth and the yields. In addition, resilient crop varieties and sustainable farming practices are one of the adaptation strategies for farmers to cope with climate change.

In Myanmar, disasters driven by climate change, such as floods, storms and earthquakes, have already affected crop and livestock production severely. In addition, the consequences of the 2021 military coup caused socio-economic disaster, especially in disadvantaged rural areas. Many villages were displaced, leading to the loss of farmland and the unsustainable expansion of new farmland in another area. At the same time, farmers are experiencing biological threats such as Apple snail infestations, which have destroyed several acres of paddy fields. In some cases, farmers are unable to re-cultivate paddy after the fields have been damaged. Moreover, pesticides are often ineffective, as the snails have adapted and developed resistance to commonly used chemicals.

On top of that, during the ongoing civil war, farmers have no access to receive any technical assistance from the government in a politically unstable country like Myanmar. And internationally funded projects can only be found in relatively stable regions. However, most of these projects prioritise humanitarian aid and disaster response rather than long-term sustainable livelihood development. Following the recent Mandalay earthquake in March 2025, even the livelihood-focused organisations such as LIFT also shifted their attention to post-earthquake relief efforts. Additionally, many project areas now overlap because NGOs are unable to reach conflict-affected regions due to restrictions from the Myanmar military government.

Current Agricultural and Livestock Farming Practice

Most farmers in Myanmar continue to rely on traditional (conventional) agricultural methods and outdated post-harvest technologies. Livestock production is also extensive and traditional, with nearly all rural households raising animals, particularly poultry and swine, for home consumption or supplementary income. Practices such as burning crop residues, overusing chemical fertilisers, disposing of animal manure improperly, and over-relying on commercial feed contribute significantly to environmental degradation. Waste and by-products from farms release methane, ammonia and nitrous oxide, all potent greenhouse gases which intensify climate change and global warming.

More than 60% of Myanmar’s labour force is employed in the agriculture and livestock sectors. Livestock farmers heavily rely on commercial feed, which is often expensive. Farmers prepare their feed with no knowledge of the quality of feed formulation and nutritional value. They particularly use carbohydrate-rich broken rice, rice bran, paddy seeds and groundnut cake.

Additionally, feeding costs have become a major challenge for farmers due to severe inflation. As of March 2025, Myanmar’s inflation rate has reached 28.67%, a significant increase from 0.75% in December 2020, two months before the military coup. From then on, the country’s socio-economic situation has further deteriorated since the 2021 military coup. During this period, the prices of livestock feed, chemical fertilisers, and other essential farm inputs have skyrocketed, causing a financial burden on farmers. In contrast, the farm-gate prices of paddy have not increased properly, resulting in leaving farmers with very low profits. Hence, farmers depend more on livestock farming for supplementary income. However, many smallholders struggle to afford commercial feed, ultimately threatening both their livelihoods and the long-term sustainability of the husbandry sector. This widening gap between production costs and income threatens farmers’ livelihoods and undermines the long-term sustainability and resilience of Myanmar’s agriculture and livestock sectors.

On top of that, nearly 300 agricultural students graduate annually from Yezin Agricultural University, making the imbalance ratio of agricultural professionals to the 7 million farmers. It further hinders the development of the agricultural sector.

Feasible Solutions for Agrarian Change

Since approximately 70% of the population in Myanmar resides in rural areas, livelihoods heavily depend on livestock and agriculture. These subsectors provide both income opportunities and access to nutrient-rich food. However, they also contribute to resource depletion, overuse of biomass, and over-rely on commercial feed, chemical fertilisers, and pesticides, resulting in greenhouse gas emissions and environmental degradation.

There are many potential solutions for sustainability in livestock farming, but one of the most effective approaches is circular feeding practice. Circular feeding not only reduces feeding costs but also contributes to SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), SDG 8 (Economic Growth), SDG 12 (Sustainable Consumption and Production), and SDG 13 (Climate Action). Commercial feed can be partially replaced with high-protein, farm-made alternatives, such as banana or hyacinth silage, fodder plants like duckweed, azolla and wolffia, and protein-rich insects like mealworm and BSF larvae. Additionally, by-products from livestock farming, such as animal manure, can be composted, used to produce biogas, or fed to Black Soldier Fly (BSF) larvae as protein conversion. To implement this effectively, farmers need both financial assistance and technical assistance.

The main nutrients required for poultry and swine are protein, minerals, vitamins, and carbohydrates. High protein can be obtained from insects and from fodder plants such as azolla, duckweed, and Wolffia, which also provide minerals. Banana and water hyacinth silage supply not only protein but also fibre, while carbohydrates can be sourced from farm by-products such as rice bran, broken rice, and maize bran.

Black Soldier Fly (BSF) larvae are highly protein-rich insects, containing 30–35% crude protein. Fodder plants such as azolla and Wolffia provide at least 20% protein and 20-30% of other minerals and vitamins. The advantage of it is that it can be cultivated in small spaces, even in the household farmyard. In addition, water hyacinth and banana silage, very easy to find in our surroundings and simple to process, have a higher crude protein content and fibre content than the fresh. During fermentation, water and carbohydrates decrease, concentration of the crude protein and fibre increases.

In addition, feed, in the livestock sector, accounts for around 83 % of total energy consumption through raw material sourcing, feed production, packaging and transport. By reducing reliance on commercial feed and replacing it with circular feed, farmers can lower greenhouse gas emissions from production and transport, reduce farm waste, and improve the feed conversion ratio (FCR) and increase income, ultimately enhancing both environmental sustainability and farm efficiency.

Another feasible and sustainable approach for both livestock and agriculture is the practice of polycultural agriculture, such as rice-duck farming and rice-fish farming, which are suitable for Myanmar’s agro-climatic context. Both farming systems are environmentally friendly as they reduce the need for chemical fertilisers and pesticides, thereby improving natural pest control, enhancing overall productivity and providing farmers with an additional source of income. Additional benefits include enhanced food security for smallholder households during the crisis and, over the long term, a reduction in methane emissions. Therefore, these farming methods in lowland rice production are recommended as an effective climate adaptation and mitigation strategy and supporting economic resilience.

Conclusion

To conclude, the lack of agricultural and livestock technicians is also a significant challenge in Myanmar. Ongoing civil conflicts have further hindered the development of sustainable agricultural practices, as foreign-funded NGO projects often cannot reach the least developed and conflict-affected areas. Promoting sustainable changes in animal husbandry, such as circular feeding, offers a viable solution to reduce environmental degradation while enhancing economic resilience. By adopting these practices, farmers can achieve a balance between environmental responsibility and economic stability, strengthening their capacity to withstand socio-economic shocks during periods of crisis.

Hnin Eaindra Khine is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also currently interning at RecyGlo Myanmar, where she supports various environmental sustainability projects.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

Myanmar is facing a growing waste-management crisis as rising urbanisation, increased consumption, and ongoing conflict strain a system already weakened by decades of neglect.

Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar had seen rapid booming in urbanisation, population, and consumption, which brought along waste management issues.

• The country is still using decade-old handling methods for its waste, although the previous elected government had tried to improve the system.

• Following the 2021 polycrisis, the system deteriorated, threatening the quality of life and demanding a solution; if not, the issues would become a chronic problem.

Combined with increased consumption, population growth in Myanmar has led to a gradual increase in waste generation across its major cities and rural areas, except in the major war-torn regions, where scarcity drives down consumption. But the country’s waste management is still heavily dependent on landfills, and even the transportation system of waste to the designated landfill area has collapsed after the coup.

Countries in the Southeast Asia region have adopted their own waste management policies, practices, and expertise to address their waste issues, while Myanmar is tackling its own problem, unable to care for the management of throw away. Even so, the waste problem is still vulnerable to being cleared up, as it may impact society, the economy, and the environment in the long run.

The status of waste in Myanmar

According to the 2017 data, Myanmar’s waste generation is 0.44 kg/capita/day, significantly below the global average of 0.74 kg/capita/day. But even before the 2021 crisis, the population of the country was roughly divided into 30% of urban residents and 70% residing in rural regions. The urban population is growing after many people fled to major cities due to the instabilities in their region. Thus, the waste generation in cities is soaring while the waste management is in a struggle.

The major city, Yangon, the economic capital of Myanmar, with a population of 5.8 million, has 6 landfill sites with a combined capacity of 2064 tons/day, and all of them are open dumping conditions. Upon domestic use, the importation of plastic waste is also considerable, unless the country totally bans the importation of plastic waste by all means. The second largest city, Mandalay, disposes of its waste in two active landfill sites with a combined capacity of 750 tons/day, and also has open dumping conditions. The majority of municipal solid waste is mainly composed of organic waste, roughly 60-70 % of municipal waste. This makes it challenging in waste management as the organic waste generates leachate, which may pollute the water resources, soil, and also demand complex waste treatment plants and facilities.

Background history of the waste problem

Myanmar had urbanised without a proper urban development plan, and waste management was neglected. The biggest city, Yangon, had been occupying nearby neighbourhoods to accommodate its growing population, but the sharp expansion had occurred after the political movement towards democratisation, when the country’s economy was on rise, establishing the industrial zones and property development plan, but without a suitable, standardised urban development plan, as the governing system was still operating on the military-shadowed bureaucracy. The population of the city also rose upon economic opportunity, but also added up from migrants from the cyclone ‘Nargis’ affected region. Even before democratisation, past governors failed to manage the simple transportation issue of waste in major cities, while the rural areas were totally neglected. The result of this led to a wastewater canal clogged with solid waste, with trash piling up, and waste being disposed of into a major waterway. During the past decades, Myanmar’s waste problem has gone round in circles with this problem.

During the 2016-2020 government, the country’s waste sector was improved through policies, technological investment, and economic means. The National Waste Management Strategy & Master Plan 2018-2030 was set in 2018 with 6 main goals, and most of them are set to start their mid-term phase in 2021. Much research, baseline data, and recommendations of the Myanmar solid waste sector were done through international organisations and individual researchers during these years. Also, an innovative approach, a waste-to-energy plant was established in Thanlyin Special Economic Zone(SEZ), which not only generates electricity from combustion of municipal solid waste but also reduces CO2 emission, planned to reduce 5820 tons of CO2 emission in 2025. The city authority of Yangon had tried to replace the incinerator with small open dump landfill sites, and plans to set up landfill gas-to-energy recovery systems in major landfill sites. The open dump landfill system had tried to improve with an engineered landfill in Mandalay through the Mandalay City Development Committee (MCDC). Additionally, pilot-scale organic waste composting was conducted in Mandalay to be applied in rural areas. The capital, Nay Pyi Taw, had no designated landfill site, with only six recent open dump sites as of 2016 data. The rural area of the country mainly practices open dump landfill or uncontrolled open-air incineration, with little to no access to proper waste disposal and treatment systems.

Drawbacks and weak points of the waste management effort

But since that time, Myanmar’s waste management sector has had many weak points and requirements. Although the master plan was set in 2018, aiming to standardise tools and plans for each waste type, there was no update or improvement of the existing laws; some were enacted in the colonial era, like the City of Yangon Municipal Act (1922). The different major cities were managed by different sets of laws and regulations on waste management demand. The 6 goals set by the master plan exclude how to reduce the landfill problem, but do mention how to improve waste collection and eliminate uncontrolled disposal. The economy of waste was not adequately mentioned, even though it includes improving the circular economy in the mission statement. It plans to utilise Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) as a regulatory tool, but does not mention a specific time to implement.

The waste management in Myanmar is facing challenges in the technological and economic sectors. The lack of skilled labour and ongoing open dump styles retard the effort to handle waste properly. And the initial investments in waste treatment facilities, and return-on-investment(ROI) are also considerable factors. Also, the inability to invite the private sector into waste treatment.

Current Situation

During the country’s polycrisis after 2021, the collapse of civil services caused the waste management system to be unusable, and even the collection of waste became unreliable, and some parts of cities lost access to the municipal waste collection system. An unstable waste management system led to inaccessibility to waste treatment facilities. The treatment facilities are still running on past civilian government projects. In a war-torn area, waste management is undermined, and hard to focus on these types of issues. But MNDAA (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army) announced the waste collection tax in Lashio during their administration, but this was just following the municipal laws just a fee for collection service. In the NUG(National Unity Government) controlled area, where millions of internally displaced people and at risk of war, the waste management is unimaginable in those areas; the waste management and circular economy are not a priority in the Myanmar transition stage. In major cities, after the INGOs left due to the country’s system unreliability, imposition of strict rules to track and monitor practices, local NGOs tried to educate about waste management, but their activities are monitored and remotely controlled by the military government, unable to run publicly for mass participation due to the military government’s political unwillingness, limiting their effort.

As the majority of people are struggling with their livelihoods and are unable to think about their waste, the military government also ignores the issue. But the lack of systematic waste management in the country may lead to severe consequences like water pollution and resource depletion, degradation of life quality, and a threat to public health. Considering the above-mentioned issues, the waste problem is taken into account in shaping the future sustainable Myanmar. Although the country is in crisis, the issues should be highlighted through civic engagement activities and raising awareness about them, to prevent future man-made disasters and pollution.

Conclusion

Myanmar had long been practising the 20^th-century concept of waste management, while the booming, unsystematic urbanisation and population demand effective waste management, due to military dictatorship, poverty, and isolation. Although there was an effort in waste management during the previous elected government, the implementation was hindered due to many factors, and those efforts vanished after 2021. However, the issue is still going on and threatening the quality of life in Myanmar.

Thuta Aung is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc), holds a B.Sc. in Geology, and is currently pursuing Environmental Science at Chiang Mai University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

The article exposes the harsh realities faced by Myanmar’s migrant fishermen, whose exploited labor sustains Southeast Asia’s thriving seafood industry.

Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar migrant fishermen play an important role in Southeast Asia’s seafood industry but face relentless exploitation through debt, abuse, and weak legal protection.

• Policies and conventions exist, yet poor enforcement, costly documentation, and flawed grievance systems deny them fair pay and safety.

• True reform demands shared accountability among governments, employers, and corporations to ensure ethical recruitment and humane conditions at sea.

Beneath the surface of Southeast Asia’s booming USD 50-billion fishing industry lies an ocean of exploitation and hardship. Thousands of Myanmar migrant fishermen sustain the region’s seafood supply chains under brutal conditions marked by debt bondage, withheld wages, and violence at sea. Drawn by desperation and trapped by systemic neglect, their labor fuels a global market that thrives on the very invisibility of those who make it possible.

1. The Fishing Industry Landscape in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia’s fishing industry is responsible for supplying around 20% of the world’s fish, contributing nearly one-fifth of the region’s GDP, with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar leading production. Supporting over nine million workers, fisheries sustain coastal livelihoods and serve as a vital protein source for millions. Yet beneath this thriving economy lies a dependency on migrant labor, particularly from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, who take on the industry’s most grueling “3D jobs”: difficult, dirty, and dangerous.

2. Myanmar’s Migrant Fishermen: A Workforce Across Borders

Within Myanmar, fisheries employ over 3.2 million people, accounting for roughly 6% of the population. Many are internal migrants from regions like the Central Dry Zone, Rakhine, and Ayeyarwady, who move to coastal areas in search of better wages. However, the lack of formal registration leaves many unprotected and vulnerable to exploitation. Across borders, Myanmar migrants form the backbone of Southeast Asia’s seafood supply chain, particularly in Thailand, where they comprise nearly 70% of the fishing workforce. In Ranong province alone, Burmese migrants make up more than 90% of the labor force. While official records listed 13,500 registered Myanmar fishers in 2022, the real figure is likely far higher.

3. Who Are These Fishermen, and Why Do They Work There?

Most migrant fishers are young men from rural villages, often with limited education and job prospects. Poverty, debt, and a lack of opportunity drive them abroad. Many are lured by brokers offering advance salaries to pay debts or support families, only to find themselves trapped in debt bondage once aboard. Others choose the work for the free food and accommodation it offers. However, the “choice” is stolen from some, as the recruiters promise factory jobs but deliver workers into forced labor on distant fishing vessels. The blurred line between migration and trafficking continues to define this hidden workforce.

4. The Challenges Beneath the Waves

a. Legal Recognition and Documentation

Legal status is both essential and burdensome for migrant fishers. To work legally, they must obtain pink cards, work permits, sea books, passports, and health insurance, costing between 10,000 and 30,000 baht (USD 300–800). The process is complex and expensive, pushing many into informal recruitment channels controlled by brokers who exploit loopholes. Even those who enter through formal MOU systems face long processing delays. Once at sea, employers often confiscated documents, creating “document bondage” that traps workers in jobs they cannot leave. Without papers, they risk arrest or deportation and are deterred from reporting abuse.

b. Wages and Debt Bondage

Despite legal wage protections, many fishers earn far below minimum standards, sometimes as little as USD 30 to 150 per month. Employers frequently manipulate payroll systems, controlling workers’ ATM cards to simulate compliance. Some migrants wait months or even years for payment, while others lose wages for sick days or port work. Debt bondage remains at the heart of this exploitation. Many migrants borrow heavily to pay recruitment fees or travel costs, up to USD 800, which are inflated with hidden charges. Employers then withhold documents until debts are “repaid,” trapping workers in a cycle of dependency and coercion.

c. Working Hours and Conditions

At sea, exhaustion is the norm. One in four fishers reports working 17–24 hours a day, with nearly half having no fixed schedule. Many endure days without rest or overtime pay. This relentless fatigue, combined with hazardous conditions and poor safety gear, not only violates labor laws but also signals forced labor.

Vessels often lack toilets, clean bedding, and adequate food or water. Some fishers survive on rice and dried fish, even boiled seawater. Long-haul voyages can confine crews for months or years, with little contact with the outside world.

d. Human Rights Violations

The 2021 Myanmar military coup triggered a surge of out-migration to Thailand, and it expanded the pool of Burmese migrants entering the fishing sector, where forced labor, trafficking, and physical abuse remain widespread. One in five migrant fishers reports being unable to leave their job without punishment. Violence is routine: some are beaten with iron rods or wooden blocks; others are threatened, “sold” to other vessels, or even thrown overboard for falling ill. Psychological coercion and racial discrimination deepen their fear and silence. Weak legal protection and retaliation risks make justice elusive, allowing impunity to persist across fleets.

e. Social Factors: Life Beyond the Boat

Migrant fishers live in overcrowded and unsafe quarters, often without proper sanitation, healthcare, or social protection. Injuries at sea frequently go untreated, and families left behind face economic instability. With limited access to education and welfare systems, migrants remain marginalised even onshore. This social neglect reinforces their dependence on exploitative employers and brokers.

5. The Role of Corporations and Industry Owners

Corporate and vessel owners sit at the centre of this crisis. Many withhold ID cards or wages, perpetuating debt and dependency, despite such acts being illegal. Some refuse to compensate for injuries or deaths at sea, denying accountability. Brokers exploit “travel first, pay later” schemes, often in collusion with employers, that deepen workers’ debts.

Corporate buyers and processors in global seafood markets wield significant power to change this system. Yet, many prioritise profit over ethics, failing to demand fair labor practices across their supply chains. Without market pressure, abuses at sea remain hidden behind layers of subcontracting.

6. Policies, Interventions, and Support Networks

Reforms have emerged at national and regional levels. The ILO’s Work in Fishing Convention (C188) sets global standards for safety, living conditions, and labor rights at sea, and Thailand is the first and only Southeast Asian country to ratify C188 in 2019. The move followed the EU’s “yellow card” warning against illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, prompting the Labour Protection in Fishing Work Act 2019.

At the ASEAN level, the 2023 Declaration and 2024 Guidelines on the Protection of Migrant Fishers introduced a rights-based framework emphasising ethical recruitment and access to justice. In Thailand, 32 Port-in-Port-out (PIPO) centres and the reorganisation of maritime enforcement (Thai-MECC) oversee compliance, while welfare committees provide grievance channels.

As a region deeply dependent on fisheries and aquaculture, ASEAN must move beyond declarations and guidelines to take decisive, region-wide action against labor exploitation and human trafficking. Protecting migrant fishermen’s rights cannot rest solely with labor ministries. It demands coordinated efforts across law enforcement, immigration, and workers’ associations.

Amplifying the voices of civil society organisations (CSOs) and migrant-led groups is crucial for meaningful progress in protecting migrant fishers’ rights. ASEAN must urge national governments to recognise and support workers’ freedom to organise. Only by empowering these associations can ASEAN expose the real challenges, strengthen advocacy, and drive sustainable, rights-based reforms within Southeast Asia’s fishing industry.

International agencies like the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, the Fishers’ Rights Network, and Migrant Workers Network, continue to build capacity, offer legal aid, and advocate for reform, forming a web of support amid fragmented enforcement.

7. The UNHCR Forum: Voices from the Deep

On September 16, 2025, the UNHCR convened a forum in Bangkok spotlighting migrant fishers’ human rights. The discussions exposed ongoing abuses, long hours, withheld pay, debt bondage, and discrimination, despite policy advances. Speakers underscored that progress has been driven more by unions and NGOs than by governments. Nearly half of the surveyed fishers still do not know where to seek help. Participants called for stronger corporate accountability, democratic grievance systems, and regional cooperation to make ASEAN’s declarations truly actionable.

8. Gaps, Challenges, and the Road Ahead

Despite multiple initiatives, major gaps remain. Inspections often focus on paperwork rather than worker welfare, with little confidentiality, leaving migrants afraid to report violations. Barriers such as high documentation fees, restrictions on union formation, and loopholes in labor agreements perpetuate exploitation.

Justice remains out of reach for most fishers since the legal processes are slow, evidence is scarce, and trust in institutions is low. To bridge these gaps, stakeholders recommend eliminating recruitment fees, simplifying documentation, ensuring confidential reporting, and sanctioning violators. Vessel certification and stronger oversight by Thai-MECC could enhance transparency.
Cross-border cooperation between Thailand and Myanmar, including digital data sharing and harmonised welfare systems, could help ensure compensation and social protection for migrant fishers.

Conclusion

Consequently, the plight of Myanmar’s migrant fishermen reveals the dark underside of Southeast Asia’s ocean wealth, highlighting prosperity built on invisible suffering. Though regional frameworks and international conventions promise reform, genuine progress demands accountability from governments, vessel owners, and corporate buyers. ASEAN must go beyond policy rhetoric by empowering and collaborating with civil society organisations (CSOs) that represent migrant fishers’ voices and drive real on-the-ground change. Until fair wages, safe work, and dignity are ensured, the region’s fishing triumph will remain shadowed by injustice and silent endurance.

Dr. Htet Khaing Min, a medical doctor, is a Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). He recently led Remote Health Projects, focusing on Community Health Worker programs in the border regions of Naga and Karen States.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

Nationalism can inspire conservation through eco-nationalism, but it often weakens international cooperation needed to tackle ecological decline.

Key Takeaways:

• The ecosystem has been degrading rapidly in recent years, posing threats to sustainable development, and multilateralism is required to address these issues.

• The development is defined by the society that politics has shaped, while nationalism is on the rise, which prioritises national sovereignty over global cooperation, and can hinder multilateral efforts to preserve the ecosystem.

• Nationalism has led to mixed approaches, such as “eco-nationalism” to promote conservation as national pride, while others exploit resources for political and economic power.

The downgrade of the ecosystem and its services can be seen as a whole, which is evidence of the universal process of state failure. Our ecosystem has been degraded since the very first society. It has lost a significant amount of forest area, nonhuman lives, driven into the sixth mass extinction, sea level is rising, acidification is occurring, wetlands are shrinking, and there is an increase in natural disasters, global warming, and CO2 emissions. These crises cause severe impacts on ecosystem balance and challenge the vision of sustainable development. However, the term ”development” has been understood mistakenly, focusing only on economic growth. This understanding promotes resource extraction, utilisation, optimisation, and advancement, and sees the ecosystem as an asset.

Additionally, development is also influenced by the political system, which thus significantly impacts the ecosystem. Viewing the ecosystem through the lens of politics shapes our concept, missions, and vision of the ecosystem. At the same time, the attitude toward the ecosystem is in multilateral cooperation, not limited to one nation or one political ideology, under sustainability diplomacy.

The term ecology became popular in the 19th century and brought a movement to consider the ecosystem in mainstream development. But the consideration of the ecosystem is still bound by the body politic, which is the government bodies responsible for a specific geographical area. Still, the body politics approach the ecosystem in an anthropocentric way. Rawl, a liberal politician, defines “The environment as a territorial asset that the institution of property must protect from deterioration only because of its capacity to support them in perpetuity.”

In politics, right-wing populism has become popular worldwide, and there are strong reasons behind it. After the 2016 U.S election, the republican Party won against liberal Democrats, followed by the elected right-wing parties and the emergence of nationalists around the world from diverse countries, reflecting the global trend of right-wing populism. The situation became bold after the 2020 COVID pandemic, as many European countries see the pandemic as the result of globalisation and immigration. The supply chain was disrupted during the global outbreak, and demand for self-sufficiency for national security was disrupted. Moreover, nationalism can convince the public about poverty, job losses, and resource management in a much simpler way than others, as they prioritise only the nation, and each identity is subsumed within the state.

Nationalism is highly considered a right-oriented political ideology, which is, in most cases, generally interpreted as the opposite of environmental protection. Most of the green ideology is brought by left-wing groups, and they support coordination rather than isolation to hold sovereignty. But in the 21st-century trend of right-wing populism, when the global ecosystem and services are in crisis, nationalists show some bargaining in interpreting or handling environmental issues. At some point, nationalism does not stick to the right-wing in green concepts but can adopt some left-wing ecological ideas. Indeed, nationalism contains an embedded environmental spirit, considering the ecosystem as the nation’s pride, resources, and symbol of sovereignty.

And nationalism brings new approaches to the current ecosystem situation. At this point, their approach to the ecosystem is “eco-nationalism”. This approach ensures resource availability for future generations, maintaining the ecosystem as a national asset. However, the nationalist approach to the environment is not that simple; it tries to manipulate and shape the ecosystem to align with its mission and vision of superiority. Some named them as eco-fascism for their usage of environmentalism as a tool to exclude marginalised people, threatening the three foundational pillars: social, environmental, and economic of sustainable development. Nationalism emphasises sovereignty and admires self-sufficiency; in that case, its ground would be opposite to environmentalism. Still, in some cases, they hold environmental conservation as an oppressive tool to show off their ecosystem as a source of pride. In contrast, there is no clear ground for the environment held by nationalism.

Although nationalism is on the rise, there are many differences in background depending on the nation’s development status, and it affects the ecosystem differently. The nationalists from developed nations emphasise self-sufficiency, technology-driven economic development, and keeping a distance from global ecosystem issues relief efforts. In contrast, developing countries focus on the right to use resources and freedom from international adjudication. The common ground between the two types is that they consider the environment within their boundary to be separate from others and would like to gain complete control over it.

As society developed and nations race for resources, resource security became part of nation-building. Resource nationalism resides in a country with many critical mineral reserves. The host country tries to manipulate the market and build superiority within the state. Thus, resource nationalism is driven by “politico-economic” interaction, and prioritising conservation or sustainability is sent to the back. As nationalism is the selling point of populism, they try to convince the public about folk medicine related to the development. At some points, they may lead to severe degradation of the environment. Moreover, the most obvious threat to nationalism is its nation-centric approach, whereas the ecosystem must be considered as a whole; the dismissal of this perspective is the primary threat to nationalism from the environment. For example, the Trump administration’s installation of the wall on the Mexico border significantly impacts the ecosystem, prohibiting wildlife from crossing by 86%. Nationalism’s isolation from the international community is also a considerable factor. The nationalist groups view climate change and ecosystem problem efforts as a threat to their sovereignty, because of international intervention and guidance of countries’ development plans. In a demanding environment, coordination is vital, and thus, regardless of the political landscape, sustainable development diplomacy is essential to foster cooperation between nations. This nationalist narrative on the international effort has led to a hindrance to meeting the goal. The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Climate Agreement will increase the chance of global warming escalating. China, the most significant greenhouse gas emitter, participates in international agreements like COP26. Still, its Belt & Road project is the largest financier of fossil fuel infrastructure, reflecting the complex nature of the nation-first concept on the environment.

Handling environmental issues within the territory, nationalist acts differ; they see the environment as the nation's pride, something to protect along with their culture and identity. They also try to stand out in environmental pros like energy security, green transition, and pride. And thus, they are less opposed to energy transition policies than climate change policies, but the intention is for the national interest, not the ecosystem. China set its own goals, and it is gradually meeting them. Green nationalists attempt to bring environmental development along with national security and the economy, and they still consider international agreements beneficial if they can help the country’s development. The fact is that these environmental values are emphasised based on a nation-first policy, while the global ecosystem degradation demands a fully committed global effort.

In contrast, the perspective of development is primarily influenced by the political ideology of that time, and it affects the ecosystem. The rise of right-wing populism greatly impacted the ongoing global ecosystem crisis. Their highly right-oriented, populist ideology threatens the continuing international effort to relieve the ecosystem. Whatever the political system is, understanding the global ecosystem problem has no borders and demands cooperation to address it, which is becoming vital for the upcoming society.

Thuta Aung is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc), holds a B.Sc. in Geology, and is currently pursuing Environmental Science at Chiang Mai University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support to The Sabai Times

Mangroves play a crucial role as a guardian angel of coastal towns, for many communities, but the need to secure food is more important than saving the guardian.

Key Takeaways:

1. Mangroves provide environmental and community benefits, while also serving as one of the most effective natural systems for carbon sequestration in combating climate change.

2. In the Tanintharyi Region, charcoal production has accelerated mangrove deforestation, especially without effective governance and legal control following the 2021 military coup.

3. Although the SAC tries to meet the targets of the Forestry Master Plan (2001–2030), its efforts seem to be symbolic conservation designed for international recognition rather than genuine protection.

Mangrove: The Guardian Angel of Coastal Towns

Mangroves are one of the richest sources of blue carbon, offering environmental and community benefits. They act as natural barriers, protecting coastal villages from cyclones, storm surges, tsunamis, and erosion. At the same time, they provide vital habitats for marine biodiversity and shelter for birds, reptiles, and other wildlife. Their intricate root systems trap sediments and filter pollutants, improving water quality. Most importantly, mangroves absorb around 12.3 kg of CO₂ annually, 2 - 4 times more than most other tropical forests, and are crucial in mitigating climate change.

Mangroves support fisheries, tourism, aquaculture, and agriculture for community benefits. Many coastal communities depend on fish, prawns, and crabs that thrive within mangrove ecosystems. The leaf litter and nutrients mangroves release enrich coastal soils and waters, sustaining nearby agriculture and aquaculture. In addition, healthy mangrove forests attract ecotourism, creating opportunities to boost local livelihoods and strengthen community income.

Although mangroves comprise only about 1% of Myanmar’s total forest cover (42.92%), they play a crucial role in the country’s ecological and community well-being. Myanmar’s mangrove forests are the 3rd largest in Southeast Asia. In Myanmar, mangroves are found in Tanintharyi, Ayeyarwady, Yangon, Bago, Rakhine, and Mon States.

Killing the Guardian Angel for A living

Most people in Myanmar continue to rely heavily on nonrenewable fuels, particularly charcoal, as their primary source of cooking fuel. It is estimated that 90% of charcoal production in the country comes from coastal mangrove forests. Among the coastal regions where mangroves are found, Tanintharyi is the center of charcoal production, providing domestic markets and supplying cross-border trade with Thailand.

Even before the 2021 military coup, communities in the Tanintharyi Region had relied on cutting mangroves and trading charcoal illegally to Thailand as a source of livelihood. Villages in Myeik, Kyunsu, Boatpyin, and Kawthaung townships have already engaged in mass charcoal production since Thailand’s charcoal ban in the late 1990s. However, in the economic downturn following the coup, mangrove deforestation only intensified as more people turned to mangrove cutting and charcoal burning for their living. In particular, charcoal kilns have rapidly expanded in villages across Kyunsu and Boat Pyin townships.

Mrs. Htway Naing, a local villager who made a living from making charcoal, shared her experiences and insights into the culture of charcoal production. Mrs. Htway Naing and her husband did mangrove burning in Shwe Ge Nyo Village from Kyun Su Township, their main livelihood for nearly a decade. She said, “Nearly all households in those villages are involved in mangrove cutting. In Shwe Ge Nyo Village, where we once lived, there were two main charcoal producers, each owning about 12 large kilns and over a hundred small-scale burners across the village.”

She continued, “The owners hire men to cut mangroves using chainsaws. On average, they harvest 10 - 15 Pone San per day.” A Pone San is a local unit of measurement for firewood, referring to a stack of wood measuring approximately 5 feet in length by 6 feet in height. Each unit is valued at around 8 to 9 USD in the market.

“Some villagers cut and sell mangroves per trunk. During tidal days, they cut daily, filling boats with nearly 100 or 200 trees based on the size of the boats. Once the tide recedes, they focus on the charcoal-making process,” explained Mrs. Htway Naing. The charcoal kilns vary in size. A 7×7 ft kiln takes about 10 days to bake, a 12×12 ft kiln lasts around a month and a half, and a 16×16 ft kiln can take more than two months to produce charcoal.

There are over a hundred household-level charcoal-burning camps in larger villages such as Yay Aye and Shwe Ge Nyo. Following the economic downturn and rising inflation, grassroots communities have struggled to sustain their livelihoods from agriculture, fisheries, and rubber plantations. As a result, charcoal production has become one of the few remaining income sources; however, it also brings the added burden of unofficial payments to local administrators and SAC officials.

Community-led Conservation in Kaw Thaung Township, Tanintharyi Region

Even before the coup, community-led conservation efforts had taken root in Kawthaung Townships. In Kawthaung, Mr. Shwe Fun, a local environmental enthusiast, founded the Pakchan River Conservation Group in 2016, bringing together five villages from the upper part of the Pakchan River. “ Since 2017, some active villagers and I have been actively planting trees and raising awareness among local villagers about the importance of mangrove protection and community forests. Through these collective efforts, we have grown more than a hundred thousand trees together,” said Mr. Shwe Fun.

The Pakchan River, also known as the Kraburi River, forms the natural boundary between Myanmar and Thailand. Rising in the Tenasserim Hills flows into the Andaman Sea near Kawthaung (Myanmar) and Ranong (Thailand). It provides a wide range of benefits to both people and nature. Its extensive mangrove forests serve as critical habitats for marine life. Villages along the river from both sides rely on its resources daily.

Mangrove conservation in the southern coastal area is crucial since Irrawaddy dolphins can be found in the Myeik to Kawthaung coastal line. The Irrawaddy dolphin, Orcaella brevirostris, one of the endangered species, is found in both freshwater and coastal environments in South and Southeast Asia, mainly in three rivers: the Ayeyarwady (Myanmar), the Mahakam (Indonesian Borneo), and the Mekong in Southeast Asia.

Hence, mangrove forests in Tanintharyi Region are important for Irrawaddy dolphins because they are crucial habitats that provide food, shelter, and nursery grounds for the dolphins and their prey. These coastal ecosystems support rich biodiversity, including various fish and invertebrates that form the dolphins' diet, and their interconnected waterways serve as vital areas for dolphin movement and survival in the Ayeyarwady's estuaries.

SAC’s Showpiece Conservation and Efforts

The Forestry Master Plan (2001–2030) sets targets: to increase reserved and protected public forests to 30% of the country’s land area, to establish 10% as protected areas, and to create 2.27 million acres (919,000 ha) of Community Forests. Under this framework, the State Administration Council (SAC), a council founded by the military junta following the February 2021 coup d'état, has designated more than 660,000 acres of reserved and protected public forests and 610,000 acres of protected areas during its tenure. However, no new community forests have been established.

According to the Community Forest Instruction (2019), community forest user groups have rights to be granted for at least 30 years for the first time, allowing them to benefit from and self-manage these forests. As of November 2021, there were 7,010 user groups with nearly 180,000 members, collectively managing 965,600 acres (390,761 ha) of community forests nationwide. Yet, since the SAC’s takeover, no additional community forests have been developed, only focusing on the reserved and protected public forests, which are meant to be under the state’s complete control and managed primarily to extract forest products.

In July 2025, the SAC designated 54,000 acres of six mangrove forests as protected public forests in Kyun Su Township, Tanintharyi Region, including two forests established in 2024. However, no additional conservation or monitoring measures have been implemented. Since before the 2010 political transition, and even under the civilian government (2015 - 2020), forestry inspectors regularly visited villages, and patrol boats monitored activities around coastal areas. But after the 2021 military coup, there were clashes between the Kyun Su People’s Defense Force (PDF) and SAC troops in coastal villages in late 2023. Following the ambushes and clashes with the Kyun Su PDF, patrol officials do not dare to patrol around, leaving these areas largely unmonitored. Despite this, SAC has kept designating two mangrove forests as protected public forests in 2024 and four in 2025 in Kyun Su Township, Tanintharyi Region. On the other hand, small-scale charcoal burners continue making charcoal by paying unofficial payments to village administrators and SAC forestry officials.

To conclude, while the SAC has declared new reserved forests and protected public forests nationwide, it is clear that it cannot effectively monitor or control them. Since the 2021 military coup, local people's defense forces have emerged across the country, and the SAC has lost control of roughly 42% of Myanmar’s territory, leaving vast forest areas beyond its reach. Hence, these designations seem aimed at gaining international recognition or projecting the image that the military regime can manage all sectors, including environmental sustainability, despite the ongoing civil war. In reality, such measures are for show, intended to make the country appear stable in international news, even as the SAC struggles to govern nearly half the nation.

Hnin Eaindra Khine is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also currently interning at RecyGlo Myanmar, where she supports various environmental sustainability projects.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

Transboundary air pollution in Southeast Asia has become a serious issue for each country in the region, and the current efforts still cannot bring an obvious result to the area, threatening its goodwill.

Key Takeaways:

1. Transboundary air pollution became a major topic among the Southeast Asian countries, affecting the region's well-being.

2. Each nation has its source of air pollution while acting as both the contributor and the recipient of the transboundary haze.

3. Although the international conventions were done since the mid-90s, ASEAN adopted its own in the late 90s, but it still has a conflict of interest.

Air pollution has recently become an eye-catching topic in world news, especially among developing nations in Southeast Asia. Although the countries are divided geographically, the atmosphere has no boundary. Starting the transboundary haze problem in ASEAN almost 50 years ago, the peatland fire problems in Malaysia and Indonesia began. Thus, the pollutants from each country threaten the well-being of the people in the region, regardless of their nationality.

Air pollution, especially PM_2.5(Particulate Matter with a diameter of less than or equal to 2.5 μm in ambient air) pollution, has been linked to several million deaths yearly, along with other pollutants, like black carbon, that threaten different regions seasonally. Additionally, contaminants such as SOx, NOx, and VOCs can contribute to climate change and exacerbate ocean acidification, eutrophication, and ozone depletion.

As each nation in the region had expanded agricultural practice, both in quantity and quality, and industrialization to boost the economy, especially in a cost-effective way, along with intense climate phenomena like El Niño and increased bushfires, it brought the inevitable environmental issues, not only limited to each nation, but also threatened the region. Among them, air pollution became a challenging topic in most ASEAN countries.

Thailand

Thailand is one of the most heavily affected by air pollution in Southeast Asian countries. The Bangkok area and northern Thailand were the most affected during the summer months. Particulate matter during these months was mainly composed of biomass burning. Hitting the world's top-most polluted cities annually. In Bangkok, the primary cause of air pollution was transportation, as the ratio of car ownership increased, and the public transportation gap widened.

However, there is another story in northern Thailand: the reason for most pollution is biomass burning. In the summer of 2024, 6,897 hotspots were found in Thailand, while 14,828 hotspots were detected in Myanmar. The transboundary haze came to the country’s northern part, where the capital of Thailand north is located. Impacting the city's social and economic. The combined haze is caused by crop burning, especially the maize, used in the livestock industry. Additionally, cash crops like corn, sugarcane, and rice cultivation need seasonal burning, producing pollutants that cloud almost all of Thailand during the summer.

Myanmar

Myanmar also suffered from air pollution in its economic capital city, Yangon, which worsens during the summer. Also, in Shan state, it triggers transboundary air pollution in its neighbouring countries, especially Thailand. But on the other hand, after the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) in 2003, foreign investments, especially from the CP group, the largest livestock feed producer, based in Thailand, came into the region to farm hectares of land to grow the maize under a contract farming style, to fulfill the growing demand for livestock food from China.

Indonesia

According to its geographical location, Indonesia contributes air pollutants to its neighboring countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and occasionally Thailand from its forest fires and agricultural biomass burning. But vice versa, it is also the recipient of pollutants. Indonesia’s diverse landscape and activities reflect its complex air pollution nature. In urban areas like Jakarta, the contaminants are from transportation and industry, while in regions like Sumatra and Kalimantan, the forest and agricultural fires generate pollutants. Anthropogenic fires are fueled by climate change, like El Niño or the Indian Ocean Dipole, which worsens the situation.

Vietnam

Vietnam is calm primarily from the transboundary pollution. However, it suffered from air pollutants, especially PM2.5, during 2013 and 2015. In the case of the first event, the pollutants came from East Asia anthropogenic sources, revealed by satellite imagery. In contrast, the second one was generated from the forest fire of Indonesia, and the contaminants were fed by the westward propagating stored wind resulting from the El Niño event. As climate change has reached an alarming point, the potential of the El Niño events is at high risk. The possibility of pollutants traveling transboundary will become frequent and threaten the country.

Malaysia

A southeast asian country, with haze issues mainly due to its power plant, accounting for up to 85% of pollutants, contributes to peatland fire that emits pollutants, and receives pollutants from other countries, with several air pollution episodes originating from Indonesia. And now the El Niño events exacerbate the issues, as the Malaysian geography is in the middle of the main pathway of the Southeast Asian pollution outflow.

Singapore

Singapore is one of the countries that has suffered a lot from its neighbor's transboundary pollutants. Especially during the monsoon months, ranging from August to October. The intense peatland and forest fire from Indonesia during October 2015, brought by the nocturnal low-level jet, significantly impacted the country's social and economic factors.

Current effort and issues

The transboundary haze problem has been affecting Southeast Asia since 1960. In Europe, scientists investigated the root causes of rain acidification, which disrupts the ecosystem in the northern hemisphere, and found the primary source was from thousands of miles away. To address this, the pan-European countries signed the “1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution’’ to prevent this issue. The convention shows distinct results, such as reducing 80% of harmful gas emissions. Apart from international efforts, regional development has been on its track since the 90s, like the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET).

However, ASEAN hasn’t adopted its dedicated convention or agreement, although the region has experienced it since the 1970s. As the region has suffered haze problems since 1990, citing 1991, 1994, and 1994 haze problems across the countries in the region, ASEAN ministers of environment agreed to co-operation on the transboundary haze problem in 1995. They adopted the 1997 REGIONAL HAZE ACTION PLAN in Singapore. But, in 5 years, after much effort, ASEAN's first legal agreement on the issues was in 2002 when it signed the “ASEAN AGREEMENT ON TRANSBOUNDARY HAZE POLLUTION-AAHTP”.

Although many efforts were made at the national and international levels, the transboundary problem and the region’s rising economic trend are still ongoing. And still, the AATHP is the only agreement on transboundary air pollution, without penalties.

Apart from the convention, each nation develops its law or acts as a voice to address its specific regional issues with relevant spatial countries. The most recent one is Thailand's lead joint plan, ‘CLEAN Sky strategy,' bringing Myanmar and Lao PDR to the table to address the mainland SEA air pollution issue. At the national level, Singapore is the first country in the region to adopt the ‘Transboundary Haze Pollution Act-2014', which adds extraterritorial liabilities for those who have caused the activity that creates haze pollution in Singapore. Rather than Singapore, other countries in the region haven’t seen distinct progress in addressing domestic law to prevent transboundary haze due to their internal affairs.

Still, the nations’ interests pose obstacles to addressing the issue. Even though Thailand faces severe pollution from transboundary haze, it still has unclear boundaries between the government and the private sector, making them gently avoid discussing during ministerial meetings in ASEAN. In Myanmar, the internal conflict is getting more intense and complex, and addressing the air pollution at the international level can be tricky. Some hotspots that generate haze in Thailand from Myanmar are controlled by EAOs(Ethnic Armed Organizations), pushing Thailand to work with responsible EAOs from Myanmar, highlighting Thailand’s unrealistic government-to-government approach in addressing the haze problem.

Although the countries accused Indonesia of its transboundary haze in maritime Southeast Asia, Indonesia has still firmly refused to allow any pollutants to pass through its territory. From another point of view, Singapore-based businesses are involved in those pollutant-generating agricultural businesses in Indonesia, making the affected countries a pull factor in handling the problem.

Conclusion

Transboundary air pollution had increased since 1970 and gradually grew at an alarming rate in the region as the nations improved their economy. Each country has witnessed the effect of transboundary haze pollution and has tried to address the issue since the 90s. However, the nation's interest is a pull factor in these efforts and still demands complete solidarity on this issue. Controlling factors like conventions with penalties and region-specific treaties would be a possible solution. And if not adequately addressed, the air pollution problem would remain and threaten the quality of life and the ecosystem in the region, regardless of the border.

Thuta Aung is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc), holds a B.Sc. in Geology, and is currently pursuing Environmental Science at Chiang Mai University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

What role can Black Soldier Fly farming play in addressing organic waste challenges in a least developed country (LDC) like Myanmar?

Key Takeaways:

1. Solid waste management remains a significant challenge in heavily populated urban areas in developed and developing countries.

2. The decomposition of organic waste in landfills releases methane, a potent greenhouse gas that accelerates global warming.

3. An EU-funded Sein Lan project can lead to a sustainable waste solution, BSF farming in Myanmar.

As urban areas grow more congested, the solid waste crisis grows more severe. Developed and underdeveloped countries strive to tackle the solid waste problem and its consequences in their own ways. Do you know the severe consequences of the waste problem? When biodegradable organic and non-biodegradable waste are dumped in landfills, organic waste such as food scraps, garden trimmings, paper, manure, and other natural materials decompose anaerobically (without oxygen).

As a result, they produce methane (CH₄), a greenhouse gas 28 times more potent than CO₂ that contributes to global warming, and food waste accounts for 8 to 10% of global greenhouse gas emissions. These gases trap heat in the atmosphere, contributing to climate change. Approximately 50% of landfill mass in many countries is organic waste. Organic waste seems natural, but it can be dangerous if not appropriately managed, and its consequences can be severe. Several countries have enacted laws and regulations to reduce organic waste, particularly food and kitchen waste, at the national level.

Law Enforcement on Food Waste Management

After the EU set ‘Fit For 55’, a set of laws to reduce 55% of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, EU countries adopted new legislation to meet the goal. For example, Spain recently legislated its first law on preventing food loss and waste in March 2025. This law forces the entire supply chain to make food waste prevention plans and to sell the imperfect or misshapen food in supermarkets. On top of that, it forced mandatory food donations by large retailers to social organisations. Moreover, restaurants must offer takeaway containers for leftovers without charging.

The UK also enforced mandatory food waste segregation regulations in March 2025, targeting the retail, hospitality, healthcare, and education sectors, and aims to minimise waste generation. All businesses must separate food waste into designated bins for composting or anaerobic digestion, with mandatory weekly collections. Businesses will also cover recycling fees, promote accountability, and encourage more sustainable waste management practices.

In many developing and underdeveloped countries, implementing new legislation on organic waste management seems unfeasible. Despite this, these countries are finding innovative, localized solutions to address the issue. There are many ways of capturing methane from biodegradable organic waste and converting it into valuable resources such as biogas, electricity, and organic fertilizer. One particular promising solution is Black Soldier Fly (BSF) farming. BSF farming is well-suited for least developed countries due to its cost-effectiveness and multiple benefits for poultry farming and organic agriculture.

Black Soldier Fly Farming Global Pictures

The BSF, Hermetia illucens, does not resemble the common housefly and is, in fact, a completely different species with a unique ecological role. The BSF has a complex life cycle which includes five primary stages over 39–47 days: egg, larval, pre-pupal, pupal, and finally adult fly. Furthermore, Black Soldier Fly is a highly beneficial species to our ecosystem. They are rich in protein and thrive on organic waste, making them valuable for sustainable animal feed production and waste reduction.

Notably, Africa is leading in adopting BSF farming, and Southeast Asia comes second. Many African countries also have flexible regulations that allow various types of organic waste to feed BSF larvae. These larvae are then used to feed livestock, fish, and pets, and their by-products (known as frass) are used as organic fertilizer, contributing to a circular and resilient local economy.

In Southeast Asia, Black Soldier Fly (BSF) farming has already been introduced and scaled up to industrial levels through investments from international and local companies. One of the region’s largest insect protein producers is Entobel, a Singapore-based company that established operations in Vietnam in 2015. Other leading BSF companies in Southeast Asia include Nutrition Technologies from Malaysia, Biocycle from Indonesia, and FlyLab from Thailand. These companies are vital in transforming organic waste into sustainable protein, animal feed, and fertilizer.

Black Soldier Fly Farming: A Budding Innovation in Myanmar

Myanmar once experienced a massive landfill fire that broke out at the largest landfill site of Yangon in April 2018. During the heated summer, the fire, fueled by the methane gas, spread quickly and consumed more than half of the disposal site area. Smoke and a burning smell from the fire blanketed the surrounding area and affected nearly 150,000 people. Dozens of people, including children and the elderly, were hospitalized with respiratory problems at that time.

In Myanmar, organic fertilizer businesses could be pivotal in reducing organic waste since we do not have a sound waste management system. Nowadays, some environmental enthusiasts and forward-thinking animal farm owners have begun to innovate by establishing small-scale, household-level BSF farms. However, the number can be counted on one hand. While BSF farming is still in its early stages of innovation, momentum is growing. Additionally, I have observed that some individuals independently do their own small-scale BSF initiatives. For example, I visited Pioneer Agrobiz Natural Farm in Hmawbi Township, where they are breeding BSF as part of their commitment to sustainable agriculture.

A 65-year-old former medical doctor innovated a small household-scale Black Soldier Fly farm in his Pioneer Agrobiz Natural Farm. Today, he actively promotes post-harvest technology and modern sustainable farming practices, educating local farmers and encouraging them to adopt more resilient and sustainable methods to minimize harvesting losses and damages.

By 2050, the global population is projected to reach around 10 billion, significantly increasing the demand for sustainable sources of nutrition. Hence, Dr. Myo Aung Kyaw, a founder of Pioneer Natural Agrobiz Farm, shared his opinion. “Insects, particularly the Black Soldier Fly, are a solution to meet nutritional needs because BSF larvae are rich in protein, containing approximately 40–50%, making them a highly nutritious alternative. This makes BSF a cost-effective and environmentally sustainable protein source for the future,” said Dr. Kyaw.

His BSF farm is only 10 by 12 feet wide. However, this small-scale setup successfully stops approximately 15 visses of organic waste from ending up in landfills daily. “We feed the larvae 10 viss of food waste by mixing with five viss of higher quality waste byproducts such as rice bran and peanut or chickpea meal every day to ensure they receive enough protein and carbohydrate for larval growth," said Dr. Kyaw. While Black Soldier Fly larvae typically consume kitchen waste, food scraps, and animal manure, some farmers enhance their diet by combining lower-quality organic waste with nutrient-rich byproducts like rice bran and peanut meal.

He explained, “An adult female Black Soldier Fly can lay between 400 and 500 eggs before dying shortly afterward. To facilitate egg-laying, bundles of 2*8 inches wide wooden flats are placed inside the ‘love cage’ breeding nets where the flies can mate and lay their eggs. These eggs normally hatch within 3 to 5 days. Remarkably, just 1 gram of eggs can produce up to 5 kilograms of larvae. In the market, 1 kilogram of larvae is valued at approximately 20,000 MMK”.

During the pupal stage, from 14 to 18 days, larvae turn from white to brown or black. At this stage, they become inactive and instinctively burrow into dry and dark areas as they prepare to transform into adulthood. The optimal time to harvest and use the larvae as feed is during the prepupal stage, typically when they are 12 to 14 days old.

On top of that, frass, a byproduct of Black Soldier Fly (BSF) larvae rearing, is composed of larval excrement and leftover feed. This nutrient-rich material serves as an excellent organic fertilizer. He uses BSF frass in his organic farming and feeds the larvae to support his poultry farm of nearly 100 chickens. Since he has only started the farm almost 10 months ago, it remains at a household scale, producing for his chickens rather than for commercial sale.

Another initiative for BSF farming is the ‘Sein Lan’ BSF farming project. With the EU funding, in January 2025, Mercy Corps Myanmar launched a four-year project called the ‘Sein Lan’ project, collaborating with RecyGlo Myanmar and Village Link, to promote BSF farming and technologies in Myanmar. This initiative aims to reduce environmental degradation caused by Myanmar’s animal feed sector while improving economic outcomes through a more sustainable and resilient value chain.

To conclude, after introducing the ‘Sein Lan’ project to local livestock farmers, I wonder whether it will successfully attract local MSMEs and foreign investors to grasp potential business opportunities in BSF farming in Myanmar. While the four-year project emphasizes successful implementation, I wonder if providing access to modern technologies will strengthen and support household-scale BSF farms like Pioneer and other livestock farm owners across Myanmar. By doing so, could this project be a significant starting point and a revolutionary change for Myanmar's future organic waste recycling solution, Black Soldier fly farming?

Hnin Eaindra Khine is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also currently interning at RecyGlo Myanmar, where she supports various environmental sustainability projects.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Special Request for the Sustainability Literacy Survey in Myanmar

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times