This article analyses the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as a high-stakes geopolitical bypass, where Beijing’s pursuit of energy security through a fragmented Myanmar risks permanent regional instability.

Key Takeaways

• The Strategic Bypass: The Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and the Muse-Mandalay railway provide China with a critical “back door” to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the naval vulnerabilities of the Straits of Malacca.

• Institutional Dependency: Myanmar increasingly functions as a “sub-contractor” state, with the junta setting up special committees to expedite Chinese projects like the Muse-Mandalay railway despite a complete lack of territorial control.

• Local Marginalisation: Large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Kyaukphyu SEZ threaten the livelihoods of over 5,000 fishing households and risk the relocation of 20,000 people, fuelling deep-seated local resentment.

The Strategic Imperative: Bypassing the Straits

For Beijing, Myanmar represents not merely a neighbouring state but a critical geographic solution to a persistent strategic vulnerability. China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma”, its dependence on energy imports transiting the narrow and potentially contested Strait of Malacca, has compelled policymakers to conceptualize the Bay of Bengal as an alternative strategic corridor. Within this framework, the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port in Rakhine State functions as a central node.

The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is designed to operate as a dedicated conduit for China’s economic and energy security. By linking the Rakhine coastline directly to Yunnan Province through operational oil and gas pipelines (established in 2013 and 2017, respectively) and the proposed Muse–Mandalay railway, China can circumvent contested maritime zones, particularly those in the South China Sea. This infrastructure significantly reduces geopolitical exposure while enhancing logistical efficiency.

The Role of the Junta: A Centralised Partner in a Fragmented State

Recent reporting indicates that Myanmar’s military government is actively attempting to demonstrate its strategic relevance to Beijing. The junta has established a dedicated administrative body to expedite the Muse–Mandalay railway project, which is intended to connect the Chinese border with central Myanmar. This initiative reflects a broader pattern in which military leadership emphasises the continuity of Chinese-backed infrastructure projects despite ongoing internal conflict.

However, China’s engagement in Myanmar is becoming increasingly fragmented. While Beijing traditionally favours a centralised, top-down governance model, the authority of the military government is progressively eroding. Of Myanmar’s total foreign investment stock of approximately $43 billion, China accounts for roughly 32% (approximately $14 billion). A transition toward a decentralized or federal political system could compel China to renegotiate existing agreements with multiple subnational actors, thereby increasing political and contractual complexity.

The “Subcontractor” Model and Labor Enclaves

The governance structure of major infrastructure projects in Myanmar reveals a pronounced asymmetry in power relations. Within the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), the China-based CITIC Consortium retains dominant decision-making authority. In contrast, the Myanmar state assumes a more limited role, functioning effectively as a “subcontractor” responsible for land acquisition and regulatory facilitation. At the same time, China provides capital investment, technological expertise, and, in many cases, labor.

This model has generated significant local contention, particularly because it relied on imported Chinese labor. By circumventing domestic labor markets, such practices restrict employment opportunities for local populations, thereby limiting the distribution of economic benefits. At the same time, local communities remain disproportionately exposed to environmental degradation and social disruption.

The Myitsone Dam project further exemplifies these dynamics. Situated at the headwaters of the Irrawaddy River, the country’s “spinal cord” was structured to export 90% of its electricity to China, fuelling concerns of resource extraction without domestic benefit. According to International Rivers, the venture was a lopsided partnership: the China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) was to retain 70% of the profits, leaving only 20% for the Myanmar government and 10% for the local firm Asia World as a service fee. This lopsided profit-sharing highlights Myanmar’s role as a junior partner in its own strategic development.

Community Concerns and Territorial Control

Residents in Kyaukphyu express deep dejection as the deep-sea port project, a 4,200-acre cornerstone of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” moves forward with little community transparency. Despite the port providing Beijing a critical strategic bypass to the Bay of Bengal for oil imports, the joint venture remains heavily asymmetric, with China controlling 70% of the project compared to Myanmar’s 30%. As the two governments prepare to begin construction on a 600-acre site this year, villagers face widespread job losses and remain marginalised from the decision-making process.

It is estimated that over 5,000 households may lose access to fishing grounds, while the International Commission of Jurists warns that up to 20,000 individuals could face displacement. These developments have contributed to rising local discontent.

The Conflict and Governance Focus

The current landscape of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is defined by a profound disconnect between official administrative authority and de facto territorial control. While the State Administration Council (SAC) in Naypyidaw acts as the formal gatekeeper, signing high-level addendums to revive the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and forming committees to expedite the Muse-Mandalay Railway, its actual power is increasingly confined to isolated urban centers. In a strategic shift to win local compliance in Myitkyina, the junta is now promising that the majority of the electricity generated will remain in Myanmar for domestic and residential use from the Myitsone Dam mega-project, which was suspended in 2011 over environmental and humanitarian concerns. By projecting a narrative of “business as usual,” the junta attempts to maintain the image of a stable investment partner despite losing significant ground to resistance forces.

In contrast, the physical security of these corridors is now dictated by Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government (NUG). In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) has achieved what the Institute for Strategy and Policy- Myanmar describes as full or partial control over the majority of Chinese projects, effectively encircling the Kyaukphyu SEZ. Similarly, the Three Brotherhood Alliance maintains a stranglehold on the Northern Shan State transit routes due to China’s intervention in 2025. In total, the regime has reclaimed about 11.3% of the territory it lost in Northern Shan State, securing control over 44.4% of the Mandalay–Muse trade route. Meanwhile, the NUG challenges the SAC’s legal legitimacy by warning Beijing that agreements signed with an illegal junta may not be honoured by a future democratic government. Through its “10-Point Policy,” the NUG offers a tactical alternative, promising to safeguard legitimate Chinese investments while firmly rejecting “lifeblood“ sacrifices like the Myitsone Dam. This creates a fragmented reality where China must balance its long-term infrastructure goals against the shifting frontlines of a nation in revolt.

Historical Continuity: From 1988 to the Lancang–Mekong Fund

China’s relationship with Myanmar’s military establishment can be traced to the post-1988 period, during which Beijing emerged as a principal economic and political partner for a regime isolated by Western sanctions. Over time, this relationship has evolved into a multilayered framework encompassing both large-scale infrastructure investments and smaller development initiatives.

Between 2017 and 2025, Myanmar received 132 projects valued at approximately $38.6 million through the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Special Fund, with over 100 projects implemented. This funding mechanism enables China to extend its influence at the local level while simultaneously supporting the military government’s broader strategic infrastructure agenda.

Implications and Recommendations

1. The Risk of the “Stability Trap.”

China’s current approach reflects a strategic gamble predicated on the assumption that the military government can eventually restore stability and secure key economic corridors. However, continued support for the junta risks entrenching conflict dynamics by positioning Chinese investments as targets for resistance groups. Failure to address local grievances, particularly those related to environmental degradation and socioeconomic exclusion, may result in long-term instability that undermines the viability of these projects.

2. Navigating the “Civilian” Pivot

The anticipated shift to an “elected” government, likely generals in civilian attire, will mirror the Thein Sein era, where project suspensions are used as tactical “reform” signals to lift Western sanctions. To mitigate this, China must move beyond fragile military-to-military deals toward a legalised investment framework ratified by parliament. By insisting on multi-stakeholder oversight, Beijing can gain “political insurance,” ensuring projects aren’t used as bargaining chips by a pseudo-civilian regime desperate to prove its independence or legitimacy.

3. Engagement with Territorial Stakeholders

China should broaden its diplomatic engagement to include EAOs and the National Unity Government (NUG). Agreements concluded solely with a central authority lacking territorial control are inherently fragile, both legally and operationally.

4. Reform of the Labor Model

To reduce local opposition, the current subcontractor model should be restructured. Future project phases, including the Muse–Mandalay railway and Kyaukphyu SEZ, should incorporate mandatory local employment quotas alongside investments in vocational training to enhance workforce capacity.

5. Environmental Accountability

All major infrastructure initiatives should be subject to transparent and independent Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs). These assessments must include enforceable provisions capable of halting projects if significant risks to ecosystems, such as mangrove forests or local water systems, are identified.

Sevil Khikmatova is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and a Policy Analyst at STEAR with a focus on climate governance and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability. Support The Sabai

Myanmar’s disaster response is weak due to poor systems, political issues, and lack of coordination, affecting people, the economy, and the environment. At the same time, non-state and international groups bring both challenges and opportunities to improve disaster management.

Key Takeaways

• Disaster impacts are driven not only by hazards but by governance failures.

• Non-state actors are essential but face major constraints.

• Inclusive and effective governance is critical for improving disaster response.

The common classification of disasters as natural or man-made is misleading. The United Nations emphasises that a hazard becomes a disaster only when it affects vulnerable populations lacking protection due to poverty, exclusion, or social disadvantage.

Myanmar is highly exposed to disaster risks and is the most climate hazard–prone globally due to its geographical location and diverse topography. The country is also highly vulnerable, with weak coping capacity and limited ability to support long-term recovery.

Governance plays a key role in reducing disaster impacts. Evidence shows that higher government effectiveness is linked to lower disaster mortality. Understanding governance gaps is therefore essential to explain failures in disaster management and reduce future risks.

State-Driven Disaster Governance Gaps

1. Restrictions on Humanitarian Aid Delivery

The military regime imposes strict controls on humanitarian aid, especially in conflict-affected areas where needs are greatest. It restricts and monitors aid, limiting access for local and international actors and worsening conditions. After the 2025 Sagaing earthquake, rescue teams were denied immediate entry and required official approval despite urgent needs. Aid was confiscated, preventing delivery to areas most in need, particularly those controlled by the NUG and ethnic resistance groups. Curfews further delayed operations.

Restrictions also affect international organisations. The 2022 Registration Law requires disclosure of staff, funding, and operations, restricts engagement with local actors, and imposes penalties for non-compliance. Since the 2021 coup, hundreds have reportedly been arrested under these rules, while travel authorisations are frequently delayed or denied.

Information control further limits response. Internet shutdowns, media restrictions, and bans on digital platforms reduce public awareness. Similar patterns were observed during Cyclone Nargis (2008) and Cyclone Mocha (2023), where aid delivery was delayed and restricted.

2. State Negligence and Abuse During Disasters

The military regime has failed to fulfil its obligation to protect affected populations. During the 2025 earthquake, military involvement in relief was minimal, with limited troop deployment and reports of looting by soldiers. Support prioritised government and military groups, particularly in Naypyitaw, while vulnerable populations such as IDPs were neglected.

Despite announcing ceasefires, the military continued airstrikes in affected areas, causing civilian casualties and damaging shelters, including religious buildings. In one case, a monastery hosting medical teams was targeted. These actions have been widely criticised as inhumane and indicative of disregard for human rights. Similar patterns occurred during Typhoon Yagi and Cyclone Mocha. Rescue support was limited, evacuation efforts were inadequate, and aid was redirected to military-aligned areas. Entire communities, especially Rohingya and resistance-aligned groups, lacked food and shelter.

Overall, humanitarian aid has been politicised, used to reward loyalty and restrict opposition rather than to save lives.

3. Weak Disaster Preparedness

Despite high exposure to hazards, preparedness remains weak due to limited infrastructure and coordination. Disasters therefore cause greater damage and casualties than in comparable countries. This is evident in Typhoon Yagi (2024). Countries like Vietnam implemented early warnings, evacuations, and large-scale mobilisation, while Myanmar’s response was limited. Although affected only by storm remnants, Myanmar recorded a comparable death toll, highlighting governance failures.

Existing disaster frameworks are undermined by poor implementation, weak coordination, and limited community engagement. Although Myanmar has a formal disaster management structure, gaps persist due to centralised control, weak institutional capacity, and inadequate local resources. State priorities often focus on military operations rather than disaster response, increasing risks to civilians.

4. Fiscal Prioritisation and Underinvestment

Financial allocation remains a major challenge. Military spending far exceeds disaster investment, with defence expenditure nearly 200 times higher. The government relies on limited reserve funds covering less than 1% of disaster damage, while the National Natural Disaster Management Fund provides minimal support. Budget rigidity limits flexibility during emergencies. These issues have worsened. In 2022, disaster funds were diverted to economic support, reducing resources for emergency response. During the 2025 earthquake, shortages of equipment and support highlighted severe underinvestment.

5. Limited Manpower In Disaster Response

Myanmar faces significant human resource constraints. There is a shortage of trained rescue personnel, and state responders are often absent, with some reports of misconduct. Response efforts, therefore, rely heavily on local communities and volunteers.

The workforce has further declined due to arrests, killings, forced conscription, and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Unlike past disasters with large-scale mobilisation, recent responses involve small, less coordinated volunteer groups. The healthcare workforce is also critically insufficient. Even before the crisis, workforce numbers have dropped below WHO standards, worsened by arrests and killings of health workers. During the 2025 earthquake, limited facilities were overwhelmed, particularly in Mandalay.

Weak institutional capacity and coordination further limit effective emergency response, increasing dependence on local networks.

Role of Political Opposition and International Actors

1. National Unity Government (NUG)

The NUG has emerged as a parallel governance actor since 2021. It provides humanitarian aid in areas under its influence, often working with EAOs, and coordinates through its Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, with local communities, CSOs, and international partners.

A key strength of the NUG is its ability to deliver structured and transparent responses despite limited resources. During Cyclone Mocha, it established coordination mechanisms, issued early warnings, supported evacuations, and allocated funds for relief and recovery. Engagement with international actors has also increased since 2024, with actors such as the United States, the European Union, and some UN agencies.

However, its reach is restricted by the SAC restrictions on access, as well as resource constraints, relying on domestic fundraising and diaspora support with limited international funding. Institutional challenges, including limited human resources, technical capacity, and administrative systems, further affect its ability to coordinate large-scale responses and deliver aid consistently.

2. Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs)

EAOs have become key service providers in many regions. Their strengths include local access, territorial control, and strong community trust. Organizations such as the Karen National Union (KNU), with established governance structures, have developed dedicated administrative systems to deliver social services and coordinate emergency response for local populations. During Cyclone Mocha, groups such as the Arakan Army conducted early warning, needs assessments, and relief operations. Their efforts are often supported by strong community trust and collaboration with CSOs and NGOs.

However, they face key limitations. Resource constraints limit large-scale response, while fragmentation and lack of recognition hinder coordination and engagement with international actors. Ongoing conflict further restricts operations, and some groups face concerns related to human rights and environmental practices, affecting credibility.

3. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and International Actors

CSOs, CBOs, NGOs, and international actors are primary humanitarian providers, especially in hard-to-reach areas. Local actors deliver frontline responses, while international actors provide funding and technical support.

However, effectiveness is constrained by access restrictions, funding limitations, and capacity gaps. Tensions between local priorities and international neutrality requirements also affect cooperation. Many INGOs are reluctant to partner with informal actors due to legal and donor constraints, and top-down funding systems reinforce unequal power dynamics and slow delivery. Finally, humanitarian funding has declined due to competing global crises and donor caution, compounded by military restrictions on banking transactions, which disrupt fund transfers and limit operational capacity.

Impacts of Disaster Governance Gaps

1. Social Impacts

Cyclone Nargis (2008) caused over 77,000 deaths. In 2024, Typhoon Yagi affected around 887,000 people, while the 2025 earthquake resulted in about 9,000 deaths and injuries. Health conditions worsen due to damaged water systems, leading to disease outbreaks. Displacement into temporary shelters increases risks of infection, while repeated shocks, conflict, and displacement create psychological trauma, especially for children. Disasters often cause shortages of food, clean water, shelter, medicine, and electricity. Education is also disrupted, with thousands of schools affected, and temporary learning spaces remain insufficient. Disasters have caused widespread destruction of homes, roads, bridges, and communication systems. Essential facilities as well as cultural heritage sites have been damaged. Human rights are often compromised due to restricted aid, delayed response, and attacks on civilian areas. Some communities lack adequate food, shelter, or evacuation support, increasing risks. Restrictions on information further limit access to life-saving assistance. Displacement remains severe, with millions internally displaced and increased migration.

2. Economic Impacts

Livelihoods are heavily affected, with damage to agriculture and fisheries reducing income. For example, Typhoon Yagi (2024) flooded farmland during a key planting season. The 2025 earthquake affected over 3.5 million workers, with losses up to US$36.8 million per day. Infrastructure damage disrupts economic activity and supply chains, increasing poverty rates. Recovery often exceeds initial damage estimates, placing long-term pressure on public finances.

3. Environmental Impacts

Disasters damage water systems, causing contamination and scarcity. Disasters contribute to soil degradation and land loss. Riverbank erosion is a major issue in regions such as Ayeyarwady. Floods and extreme weather damage crops, irrigation, and storage, reducing agricultural output. Disasters harm ecosystems and severely damage mangrove forests and surrounding ecosystems. Disasters alter landscapes through landfall, landslides, and ground fractures, as seen during Cyclone Nargis and the 2025 earthquake.

4. Governance Impacts

Repeated failures reduce public trust, weakening cooperation and policy implementation. Disasters strain already fragile public systems, limiting their ability to respond effectively. All the above impacts are intensified by limited preparedness, weak coordination, and constraints in response and recovery capacity.

Recommendations

Disasters cannot be prevented, but their impacts can be reduced through effective governance. Given Myanmar’s limited institutional capacity and reliance on external support, responsibility extends to the international community. As structural challenges are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the following recommendations focus on strengthening non-state and international actors.

Disaster governance should be decentralised, inclusive, and effectively implemented at all levels, especially locally. Strong coordination among CSOs, EAOs, NUG, and NGOs/INGOs is key, with a focus on conflict sensitivity and vulnerable groups. Invest in resilient infrastructure, essential supplies, and community preparedness. Strengthen human capacity through training and support, improve early warning systems, and ensure flexible, well-prioritised disaster funding. Support local actors as primary responders and simplify funding access. Strengthen partnerships between local and international organisations to improve coordination and aid effectiveness.

Conclusion

Disaster governance in Myanmar is weak due to poor planning, limited resources, and restricted aid. Non-state actors try to help, but face political, financial, and coordination challenges. As a result, disasters have severe impacts. Improving this requires more inclusive, locally led efforts with stronger international support.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Around one million Rohingya refugees have been living in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district since the large-scale persecution by Myanmar’s armed forces in Rakhine State in 2017. However, the camps are facing significant reductions in international humanitarian aid, increasing Bangladesh’s burden to sustain the livelihoods and security of the refugee population. This article examines the policy challenges surrounding Rohingya repatriation and explores options for the long-term and sustainable management of the refugee camps.

Key Takeaways

• The 2026 hearings at the International Court of Justice increase international accountability for the persecution of the Rohingya. Still, they do not address the current long-term humanitarian conditions faced by Rohingya refugees living in camps in Cox’s Bazar.

• Rohingya refugee camps are experiencing significant reductions in international humanitarian aid, creating growing challenges for both the refugees and the host country, Bangladesh.

• Bangladesh continues to advocate for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State, but any sustainable solution will require strong international coordination and guarantees of safety and rights for returnees.

The Rohingya: the background

The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority who are primarily located in the Rakhine State (formerly Arakan State) in western Myanmar, particularly in the northern townships bordering Bangladesh. Despite their long presence in the country, they have been denied citizenship under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, which excludes them from the list of officially recognised ethnic groups. As a result, the Rohingya have been rendered effectively stateless and have faced decades of discrimination, restrictions on movement, and periodic violence by the Tatmadaw, the armed forces.

Most Rohingya lived in Rakhine State, a coastal region bordering Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal. The situation escalated dramatically in August 2017 when the Myanmar military launched large-scale “clearance operations.” These operations resulted in mass killings, sexual violence, and the destruction of villages. Estimates suggest that at least 6,700 people were killed in the first month alone, while more than 730,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.

According to the United Nations, the Rohingya are widely described as the “most persecuted minority in the world.” Today, the Cox’s Bazar region hosts the largest refugee settlement globally, with more than one million Rohingya living in camps. Meanwhile, approximately 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, where they continue to face severe restrictions on movement, access to healthcare, and economic opportunities.

Refugees in Bangladesh also experience significant challenges, including restrictions on employment, limited access to education, growing security concerns, and increasing exposure to climate-related disasters. As international humanitarian funding declines partly due to shifting global priorities and evolving donor policies, particularly under the second administration of Donald Trump, which has emphasised reduced foreign aid commitments and an “America First” approach, Bangladesh faces mounting pressure regarding the long-term hosting of Rohingya refugees. Consequently, a key policy debate has emerged: whether Bangladesh should pursue the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar or continue hosting them while seeking alternative, durable solutions.

International Legal Context: The ICJ Case

The year 2026 marked an important moment for the Rohingya community as proceedings continued before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The case, The Gambia v. Myanmar, concerns alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The case was filed by The Gambia, which argues that Myanmar committed acts of genocide against the Rohingya population during the military operations of 2016 and 2017. During hearings, Gambian representatives presented witness testimony describing widespread violence, including killings, sexual assault, and the burning of villages.

Myanmar, however, rejects these allegations. Its representatives argue that the military operations were legitimate counter-terrorism measures carried out in response to attacks by armed groups in northern Rakhine State. Myanmar also disputes the reliability of evidence presented by international investigators and maintains that questions related to citizenship and identity are unrelated to genocide claims.

The NUG claims to represent the democratic will of the Myanmar people and has distanced itself from the military’s policies toward the Rohingya. It generally supports accountability for crimes committed during the military operations. It has expressed concern that allowing the junta to represent Myanmar in international courts could undermine the principles of the United Nations and the rule of law.

Domestic attitudes toward the Rohingya in Myanmar

Another complication in the case concerns who legitimately represents Myanmar before international institutions. Following the 2021 Myanmar military coup, a parallel government known as the National Unity Government (NUG) was formed by elected lawmakers and activists.

Domestic public opinion in Myanmar has also played a significant role in shaping attitudes toward the Rohingya and the genocide case. Among many within the Buddhist majority, perceptions of the Rohingya are strongly influenced by religious nationalism and Islamophobia. These concerns have been amplified by nationalist movements such as the 969 Movement and organisations like Ma Ba Tha.

In addition, the Rohingya are widely portrayed as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, often referred to as “Bengalis,” rather than as an indigenous ethnic group. Influential monks, including Ashin Wirathu, have helped spread anti-Muslim narratives through sermons and social media campaigns. These narratives have contributed to the denial or justification of violence against the Rohingya, with military operations often framed domestically as necessary counter-terrorism measures.

Camps in Bangladesh: humanitarian, environmental, and security concerns

Despite increasing international legal attention to the Rohingya crisis, legal proceedings do little to address the immediate humanitarian conditions faced by refugees in Bangladesh. The camps in Cox’s Bazar remain extremely overcrowded and are highly dependent on international humanitarian aid.

Refugees face severe restrictions on employment and education, while access to healthcare and formal schooling remains limited. At the same time, Bangladesh faces growing financial and security pressures related to the long-term hosting of such a large displaced population.

Environmental risks further complicate the situation. Both Bangladesh and Myanmar rank among the countries most vulnerable to extreme weather events. Cox’s Bazar is particularly prone to cyclones, floods, and landslides. The Cyclone Mocha damaged thousands of shelters and affected millions of people across the region.

Another relocation site, Bhasan Char, currently hosts around 32,574 Rohingya refugees but lies only about two meters above sea level, making it highly vulnerable to storm surges and sea-level rise.

These environmental risks contribute to secondary displacement and have pushed some Rohingya to undertake dangerous maritime journeys. In 2023 alone, around 4,500 Rohingya attempted irregular sea crossings, with more than 569 reported missing or dead. According to UNHCR, the number of Rohingya fleeing by boat increased to 9,195 in 2024, which is more than double the number recorded the previous year.

In addition to humanitarian and environmental challenges, the prolonged presence of a large refugee population has generated growing security concerns both for the refugees and for Bangladesh. The camps in Cox’s Bazar creatе conditions that increase vulnerability to crime, trafficking, and the activities of armed groups. One group that has drawn particular attention is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed organisation that originally emerged in Rakhine State. Although the majority of Rohingya refugees are civilians with no involvement in militant activities, the presence of armed factions and criminal groups has contributed to instability within the camps and raised national security concerns, urging Bangladesh to start the repatriation.

Bangladesh’s leadership has increasingly framed the protracted refugee situation as a long-term security and governance challenge. During discussions with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus reiterated the government’s position that “the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar remains the only sustainable solution to the crisis.” Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which means that it is not legally bound by the international framework that defines refugee rights and state obligations, thus hosting the Rohingya primarily on humanitarian grounds.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Prioritise safe and voluntary repatriation with international guarantees.

Bangladesh should continue advocating for safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar. However, the repatriation should occur only under internationally monitored conditions, guaranteeing security, citizenship rights, and freedom of movement or a safe zone for refugees.

2. Increase international responsibility sharing

The Rohingya crisis should not be solely Bangladesh’s burden. Donor states and international organisations must increase financial humanitarian contributions to Cox Bazar’s camps and support long-term assistance programs that target disaster risk prevention and access to livelihood opportunities.

3. Strengthen security governance in camps

Bangladesh should strengthen security governance in camps to address criminal networks, human trafficking, and armed group activity. However, security policies should not go against the human rights of refugees.

4. Reassess engagement with Myanmar’s evolving political landscape

Recent political developments in Myanmar, including a military-organised election led by Min Aung Hlaing following the 2021 Myanmar coup, may signal a shift from direct military rule to a nominally civilian government. While this transition could be presented internationally as a step toward legitimacy, in practice, the leadership and power structures are likely to remain unchanged, particularly regarding Rohingya rights.

Bangladesh and the international community should therefore approach engagement cautiously, ensuring that any negotiations or repatriation initiatives are based on verifiable improvements on the ground rather than formal political changes alone.

Sevil Khikmatova is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and a Policy Analyst at STEAR with a focus on climate governance and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability. Support The Sabai

Water insecurity in Myanmar is a multifaceted crisis driven by environmental change, weak governance, economic decline, and social inequality, requiring coordinated infrastructure, community, and policy solutions to ensure sustainable access to safe water.

Key Takeaways

• Water insecurity in Myanmar is driven by environmental factors, governance failures, economic decline, and social inequalities.

• Limited access to safe water impacts on health, education, livelihoods, ecosystems, and institutional capacity.

• Addressing the crisis requires integrated solutions combining infrastructure investment, community capacity building, and stronger governance coordination.

Introduction

Although water covers 70% of the planet, only about 3% is freshwater that we can drink or use to irrigate our farm fields. In Myanmar, access to safely managed drinking water has improved over the past two decades, rising from 27.11% in 2000 to 58.83% in 2020, yet water insecurity remains a critical challenge. Water insecurity happens when water is insufficient for human daily needs. More than 60% of households still lack safely managed drinking water services, and over 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) require WASH assistance.

Drivers of Water Insecurity

1. Environmental Factors

According to meteorologist U Tun Lwin, rising temperatures and deforestation are two key environmental causes of water scarcity, with impacts further intensified by disasters. Climate change has contributed to increasingly erratic rainfall, shifting monsoon cycles, and prolonged dry seasons. In addition, over the past three decades, the Central Dry Zone has experienced an approximate 2.4°C increase in baseline temperature, contributing to prolonged dry seasons and more frequent droughts. These climatic shifts have reduced the reliability of surface water sources. For example, in Rakhine State, ponds and small lakes are drying up, limiting water available for drinking and cooking. Similarly, in Htoke Kaw Koe Village in Karen State, wells that traditionally sustained local communities now fail during peak dry months. Consequently, households have to rely on shallow, unprotected, and often contaminated water sources. Extreme weather events further intensify these vulnerabilities. For example, Cyclone Mocha in May 2023 caused storm surges that contaminated unprotected community ponds with saline water. Moreover, earthquakes can disrupt groundwater systems, causing fluctuations in groundwater levels and damage to wells. Following the 2025 Sagaing earthquake in Myanmar, many tubes and dug wells were displaced or damaged.

2. Governance Failures

Weak policy implementation, limited regulatory enforcement, and insufficient investment in water infrastructure have undermined water management systems and disaster preparedness. In some areas, poor oversight has contributed to declining water quality, including arsenic contamination in some areas. Institutional weaknesses also limit effective disaster response. Limited preparedness and coordination can delay recovery efforts, leaving affected communities without reliable access to safe water following disasters. For example, in April 2025, approximately 1.6 million people in Myanmar lost access to clean water following disaster-related disruptions.

Governance failures are further compounded by weak intersectoral coordination and restrictions on humanitarian assistance. Since the 2021 military takeover, access limitations have hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly for IDPs. Conflict has also damaged critical water infrastructure. Reports indicate that wells, water tanks, and supply routes have been destroyed in some areas during armed confrontations. Such actions disrupt water supply systems and affect civilian populations who depend on these sources for daily survival.

Mass displacement represents another governance-linked driver of water insecurity. Ongoing political instability has displaced nearly 3.5 million people nationwide. Many displaced populations live in overcrowded camps where water supply systems are limited. In such environments, residents frequently rely on unsafe sources such as collected rainwater stored in temporary containers, highlighting the link between governance failures and water insecurity.

3. Economic Decline

Since the 2021 political crisis, the national economy has contracted while inflation has surged to approximately 28.6%, pushing the poverty rate to 32.1%, reducing both government capacity to invest in water infrastructure and household ability to secure safe water. At the structural level, economic decline limits public spending on water infrastructure, maintenance, and service delivery. Water utilities face shrinking operational budgets, constraining system expansion and repair. Economic shocks, including natural disasters, such as the, 2025 earthquake, have further damaged water systems and intensified supply disruptions. At the household level, declining incomes reduce the ability of families to afford safe water. Many low-income households have to depend on private water vendors. Although wholesale mineral water prices range between US$0.42 and US$1.64 per kilogram (minimum wage US$1.9 per day), these costs represent a significant burden for low-income families. As a result, 16.3% of households lack sufficient water for daily needs.

4. Social Inequalities

Rural–urban disparities remain significant. Urban populations benefit more frequently from piped water systems and municipal treatment facilities, while rural communities often rely on natural sources such as ponds, rivers, and shallow wells. With roughly two-thirds of Myanmar’s population living in rural areas, uneven infrastructure development creates structural disparities in water access.

Education and awareness also influence water practices. Limited knowledge of safe water storage and sanitation practices contributes to the use of untreated water and poor hygiene behaviours. Social marginalisation further intensifies vulnerability. Communities located in border regions, mountainous areas, and conflict-affected zones often face infrastructure neglect and barriers to humanitarian assistance. Government restrictions on aid delivery, together with regulatory pressures and operational risks, have constrained humanitarian operations and led many international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to scale down or relocate their activities. As a result, communities that previously depended on externally supported WASH services face reduced assistance, while many displaced communities rely on temporary camps and aid-dependent water systems with limited storage capacity.

Impacts of Water Insecurity

1. Economic Impacts

At the household level, families often spend additional income purchasing water from vendors. Health risks associated with unsafe water can also increase medical expenses and reduce working time due to illness. In water-scarce areas, households may spend several hours per day collecting water, reducing opportunities for income-generating activities. At the national level, widespread water insecurity can affect workforce productivity and place additional pressure on healthcare systems. Reduced agricultural productivity and labor capacity can slow economic growth and lower overall economic performance.

2. Social Impacts

Unsafe water increases the spread of waterborne diseases. In late 2025, approximately 300 people were affected by a cholera outbreak in Myanmar, with several confirmed deaths. Displacement camps have reported widespread cases of diarrhea and other illnesses associated with contaminated water sources. These risks have been further exacerbated by the reduction of international humanitarian support following the withdrawal or relocation of many INGOs, which has disrupted WASH service provision and weakened disease prevention and response capacity in vulnerable communities. Children face particularly high vulnerability. In fragile contexts, children under five are significantly more likely to die from diarrheal diseases linked to unsafe water. Long-term exposure to contaminated groundwater also poses serious health threats, including arsenic contamination in regions such as the Ayeyarwady Delta. Beyond disease, the physical burden of carrying water over long distances contributes to musculoskeletal pain. Education outcomes are also affected. School attendance is closely linked to proximity to water sources, where collection requires long hours, and absenteeism and dropout rates increase. Water collection responsibilities also reinforce gender inequality. Women and girls are typically responsible for collecting water and may travel long distances to reach water sources. In conflict-affected areas, these journeys expose them to risks of harassment, assault, and violence.

3. Environmental Impacts

Reduced water availability disrupts plant physiological processes, limiting nutrient uptake, slowing photosynthesis, and restricting plant growth. Declining soil moisture reduces crop yields and agricultural productivity. Prolonged drought conditions can also degrade soil health by reducing microbial activity and weakening soil structure. Groundwater over-extraction can further accelerate environmental degradation. Excessive pumping lowers water tables and reduces groundwater discharge to connected rivers and streams, diminishing water availability in surrounding ecosystems. These pressures are evident in urban areas such as Yangon, where population growth and post-2021 displacement have increased water demand. More than half of the city’s population relies on groundwater, with widespread extraction through private wells. Studies indicate that actual groundwater abstraction far exceeds official estimates, placing severe stress on aquifer systems. Excessive extraction has been linked to declining groundwater levels, increased risk of land subsidence, saltwater intrusion, and broader environmental degradation.

4. Governance Impacts

Waterborne diseases, sanitation-related illnesses, and outbreaks linked to unsafe water significantly increase patient loads, stretching already limited medical resources. Water insecurity can place additional strain on existing water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) systems. Furthermore, inadequate water infrastructure in rural and displacement settings makes consistent service delivery difficult. These pressures extend beyond the health sector. Reduced productivity due to illness and time spent collecting water can influence economic performance and public sector functioning.

Recommendations

1. Infrastructure and Technical Solutions

Strengthening physical water infrastructure is essential to ensure a reliable and climate-resilient water supply in Myanmar. At the national and municipal levels, governments should invest in dual-purpose water infrastructure systems that provide reliable water services while enhancing resilience to natural hazards. This includes the protection and management of raw water sources, as well as investment in water treatment plants, storage facilities, pumping stations, and distribution networks, supported by robust monitoring, control, and maintenance systems.

In rural and drought-prone regions, decentralized technical solutions, often implemented through community initiatives or by NGOs, can play a key role. Solar-powered water systems are particularly suitable in these areas, where solar panels can power groundwater pumps while reducing dependence on fuel. Rehabilitation of dug wells, including roofing, aprons, and proper drainage, can improve water quality and reduce contamination risks. In upland areas, gravity-flow systems that channel water from higher elevation streams into village storage tanks offer a low-cost and low-maintenance solution.

At the community and household levels, smaller-scale interventions can further enhance water security. These include rainwater harvesting systems, basic water treatment technologies such as chlorination, pond rehabilitation, restoration of wells and boreholes, salinity barriers in coastal areas, emergency water tankering, and improved household water storage facilities.

2. Institutional and Community Capacity

Infrastructure alone is insufficient without institutional and community capacity. At the community level, WASH education programs should be implemented in villages and schools to improve hygiene practices and safe water storage. Training residents in the operation and maintenance of water systems can strengthen local ownership and ensure long-term sustainability. At the governance level, decentralized water management should be strengthened at village and township levels through the establishment or reinforcement of local water management committees with clear responsibilities and accountability mechanisms. Restoring damaged public water systems is particularly critical in conflict-affected areas. Integrating water management planning into broader climate adaptation and environmental policies will further enhance resilience.

In addition, the governance bodies have to facilitate humanitarian access to ensure emergency WASH assistance reaches internally displaced and vulnerable populations. At the same time, INGOs should maintain engagement in Myanmar by adopting more adaptive and locally grounded approaches despite ongoing regulatory constraints and security risks. In particular, they should strengthen collaboration with civil society organisations, which have access and contextual knowledge to reach hard-to-reach and conflict-affected areas. INGOs should also support and accelerate the 2023 UN-led localization strategy by expanding consultation and support for locally led aid operations, thereby improving the effectiveness and reach of humanitarian assistance.

3. Financial Support

The national government should prioritise budget allocation for water infrastructure development, system maintenance, and rural water supply programs. Targeted subsidies can help vulnerable households overcome affordability barriers to safe water access. Public–private partnerships may mobilize additional resources to support water system expansion and service delivery. At the same time, international financial assistance should be adapted to the current operational context in Myanmar. Given existing governance and access constraints, reliance on traditional delivery channels alone may limit the effectiveness of aid distribution. Thus, donors should expand direct and flexible funding to civil society organisations, such as increased risk-sharing, simplified compliance requirements, and the use of pooled funding mechanisms to ensure that financial resources reach vulnerable populations more efficiently.

Conclusion

​​Water insecurity in Myanmar is a complex problem caused by environmental changes, social inequalities, and weak institutional systems. Climate change, groundwater depletion, and disasters have made water sources less reliable, while unequal infrastructure and conflict have made access more difficult. The withdrawal or reduced presence of international actors and ongoing access restrictions have also limited the delivery of WASH services, especially for vulnerable communities.

To address this crisis, practical and coordinated actions are needed. Improving climate-resilient infrastructure, promoting community-based water systems, and supporting civil society organisations can help improve access to safe water. At the same time, more flexible and localised funding approaches are important to ensure that assistance reaches those most in need. Without sustained efforts, water insecurity will continue to affect human well-being and future development in Myanmar.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

When Myanmar’s military seized power on 1 February 2021, the immediate consequences were political: mass protests, violent repression, and the collapse of a fragile democratic transition. Five years later, the deeper consequences are institutional. Myanmar is now experiencing a prolonged polycrisis, armed conflict, economic contraction, displacement, and humanitarian emergency, but at its core lies a crisis of governance.

Key Takeaways

• After five years of the military coup, Myanmar’s healthcare system has shifted from a fragile public service to a fragmented and increasingly privatised survival mechanism.

• Service disruption, funding instability, and institutional fragmentation have weakened Myanmar’s healthcare system.

• Workforce depletion, declining immunisation coverage, and rising out-of-pocket spending demonstrate a reversal in progress toward Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3).

Healthcare provides one of the clearest indicators of governance failure. Before the coup, Myanmar’s health system was fragile but was gradually improving. Public spending remained limited, yet vaccination coverage was rising, HIV and tuberculosis (TB) programs were expanding, and international partnerships were strengthening service delivery. The trajectory was uneven, but it was forward. Since 2021, that trajectory has reversed.

Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3) commits states to universal health coverage, financial risk protection, and epidemic preparedness. These are governance obligations requiring institutional capacity, fiscal prioritisation, territorial coordination, and professional autonomy. Myanmar’s post-coup experience demonstrates how quickly these foundations can erode.

This regression can be understood through three interrelated governance failures:

(1) collapse of access to healthcare;

(2) disruption of financing and financial risk protection; and

(3) institutional and territorial fragmentation driven by Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) participation and mass displacement.

1. Collapse of Access: Institutional Erosion and Service Breakdown

The most visible consequence of post-coup governance failure is declining access to healthcare. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), escalating conflict, displacement, and economic collapse have created a severe humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, with 19.9 million people requiring humanitarian assistance, including 12.9 million in need of humanitarian health services (WHO, 2025). Conflict-affected areas, including Sagaing, Rakhine, Kachin, Kayah, and northern Shan, face repeated disruptions to clinics, referral systems, and outreach services. Since 2021, approximately 433 attacks on healthcare facilities have been reported, according to WHO surveillance data (WHO, 2024).

Workforce depletion has critically weakened service capacity. Before the coup, Myanmar’s health workforce density stood at 17.8 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 population (WHO, 2024), already below the WHO benchmark of 22.8 required for SDG-compatible service coverage. By 2022-2023, reported figures fell to roughly 1.01 doctors and 1.96 nurses per 10,000 population (WHO, 2024). Nursing availability declined by an estimated 73 percent between 2019 and 2022 (WHO, 2024). These figures indicate systemic incapacity rather than temporary disruption.

Preventive services have similarly regressed. WHO and UNICEF WUENIC estimates show DTP3 coverage declining to around 48 percent in 2021 before partially recovering to 76 percent in 2023 (WHO, 2024). WHO estimates that around 1.2 million children in Myanmar are zero-dose or under-immunised, reflecting major disruptions to routine immunisation services following the political crisis (WHO, 2023). The WHO Global TB Reports (2024) document declines in TB case detection following the coup compared to pre-2021 notification levels. HIV testing and treatment continuity were also disrupted in conflict-affected regions (WHO, 2024f). Treatment interruptions increase risks of transmission and drug resistance, undermining previous gains.

Analyses in global health journals similarly highlight how conflict, health worker participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement, and infrastructure disruptions have collectively weakened routine healthcare delivery (BMJ Global Health, 2026; The Lancet, 2024).

2. Funding Disruption and the Re-Privatisation of Health Risk

Healthcare sustainability depends on financial protection as much as service availability. The 2023 Myanmar National Health Accounts show that 71 percent of total health expenditure was out-of-pocket (WHO, 2024g), among the highest in Southeast Asia. While public spending remained limited, international funding played a stabilising role in HIV, TB, malaria, and immunisation programs.

Several international humanitarian programmes have also been disrupted or suspended since the coup. Before 2021, international NGOs played a central role in supporting Myanmar’s health sector, particularly in HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria control, and maternal and child health services. However, political instability, operational restrictions, and new registration requirements have forced many organisations to scale back or suspend activities. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that Myanmar’s national HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis programmes effectively “shut down” after the coup as the public health system collapsed and partnerships with the Ministry of Health were disrupted (The New Humanitarian, 2021). Although other funding did not disappear entirely, coordination weakened, and long-term system strengthening stalled.

Simultaneously, domestic fiscal priorities shifted toward security expenditures amid economic contraction and declining tax revenues (WHO, 2024).Investigative reporting by Athan News has highlighted how public hospitals increasingly require patients to purchase medicines and supplies externally. The economic crisis has sharply increased household vulnerability. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study warned that the combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 military coup could push up to 25 million people, nearly half of Myanmar’s population, below the national poverty line, reversing over a decade of poverty reduction (UNDP, 2021). When 76 percent of health expenditure was already out-of-pocket prior to the coup, further fiscal retrenchment deepens financial vulnerability and shifts health risk directly onto households (WHO, 2024g). Financial risk protection, central to SDG 3, has eroded, widening inequality.

3. CDM Participation, Displacement, and Territorial Fragmentation

Institutional fragmentation represents the third structural driver of health system unsustainability. Following the coup, an estimated half of the public-sector health workforce participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), withdrawing from state institutions in protest against military rule (Amnesty International, 2021). The mass walkout of doctors, nurses, teachers, and other civil servants significantly disrupted public service delivery, including healthcare, education, and social welfare systems.

While the CDM has been a central component of resistance to military rule, the withdrawal of large numbers of public-sector professionals created additional pressures on already fragile service systems. These disruptions occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and amid escalating conflict, further constraining the health sector’s ability to maintain routine services and emergency response capacity. At the same time, conflict-related displacement has fragmented service delivery across regions, weakening referral systems and continuity of care.

Moreover, procurement systems and medical supply chains have deteriorated due to import licensing delays, transport insecurity, and currency instability. Restrictions on transporting medicines and medical equipment to conflict-affected and opposition-controlled areas have further complicated humanitarian delivery, particularly in territories outside military control. These constraints have contributed to shortages of essential medicines, including tuberculosis drugs and other life-saving treatments.

Conflict escalation has displaced millions. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 19.9 million people were estimated to require humanitarian assistance in 2025, including approximately 4 million internally displaced persons and 1.5 million refugees (OCHA, 2024). Displacement disrupts vaccination records, HIV and TB treatment adherence, maternal health services, and chronic disease management. Health systems depend on territorial coherence, stable populations, referral networks, and administrative coordination. In Myanmar, territorial control is increasingly fragmented, and service provision varies significantly by region.

Long-established ethnic health systems in areas administered by organisations such as the Kachin Independence Organization and the Karen National Union have historically maintained parallel healthcare governance structures and community-based service networks. These systems have helped sustain basic services in some conflict-affected regions. However, newly contested territories under resistance forces such as the Sagaing Region aligned with the National Unity Government often lack comparable institutional infrastructure (BMJ Global Health, 2026). In such areas, healthcare provision frequently relies on mobile clinics, community volunteers, or humanitarian actors, resulting in uneven coverage and limited continuity of care (BMJ Global Health, 2026; WHO, 2024). Prolonged fragmentation risks institutionalising geographic inequalities in access to healthcare.

Implications and Recommendations

Myanmar’s health crisis demonstrates that humanitarian assistance cannot substitute for governance recovery. Sustainable progress toward SDG 3 requires restoring institutional functionality alongside emergency support.

Protection of health workers and facilities must be prioritised to safeguard service continuity and professional autonomy. Financial risk protection mechanisms require stabilisation through accountable pooled financing that supports essential medicines and primary care, particularly for displaced and low-income populations. Strengthening transparency and oversight in health financing and procurement is also critical. Even before the coup, Myanmar’s health system faced governance challenges, including weak regulatory oversight and risks of corruption in procurement and pharmaceutical supply chains. Since 2021, institutional collapse and severe staff shortages have further weakened accountability, with reports indicating that patients in some public hospitals have been forced to pay informal fees or bribes to access treatment and basic services (Frontier Myanmar, 2023). Finally, adaptive coordination among state, ethnic, and community-based providers is necessary to mitigate fragmentation and expand equitable coverage.

Health outcomes will remain the clearest indicator of whether governance recovery is taking place. Without institutional resilience, fiscal prioritisation of social sectors, and territorial coordination, healthcare will continue shifting from a public good to a private burden borne disproportionately by the poor and displaced.

References

Amnesty International Thailand. (2021). After coup, Myanmar military puts chokehold on people’s basic needs.

BMJ Global Health. (2026). Health system disruption and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.

Frontier Myanmar. (2024). Myanmar’s public hospitals are failing their patients.

Human Rights Watch. (2025). Myanmar: Junta assault on health care hinders quake response.

Insecurity Insight. (2022). Myanmar: Attacks on health care in 2021 – Factsheet.

The Lancet. (2024). Health and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup.

The New Humanitarian. (2025). Myanmar healthcare and disease prevention are neglected casualties of war.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2021). COVID-19, coup d’état and poverty: Compounding negative shocks and their impact on human development in Myanmar.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2024). Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2023). Decreasing zero-dose children threefold amidst pandemic and political unrest in Myanmar.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024a). Myanmar External Public Health Situation Analysis.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024b). Global tuberculosis report 2024. Geneva: WHO.

Frontier Myanmar. (2023). “No remedy”: A broken public health system fosters neglect and corruption.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024c). Global Health Expenditure Database: National Health Accounts country profile.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Myanmar’s ongoing polycrisis has accelerated inflation and poverty, placing growing pressure on households and increasing the urgent need for inclusive recovery and social protection measures.

Key Takeaways

1. Myanmar’s post-2021 polycrisis has driven persistently high inflation, weakening household incomes and purchasing power.

2. Inflation reflects structural problems in fiscal management, currency policy, trade systems, and political instability. At the same time, rising living costs have forced households to rely on harmful coping strategies that weaken their long-term economic resilience.

3. Without coordinated reforms and stronger social investment, Myanmar risks long-term poverty and inequality.

Nature of the Polycrisis (Post-2021 Context)

Since 2021, Myanmar has been experiencing a complex “polycrisis” driven by overlapping political, economic, social, and environmental shocks. Political instability and armed conflict have weakened public institutions and disrupted markets. The COVID-19 pandemic further strained already fragile health and education systems. At the same time, forced conscription, insecurity, and limited job opportunities have encouraged young and skilled workers to migrate, leading to serious human capital loss.

By 2024–2025, around half of the population was living below the poverty line, with another one-third close to it. Electricity access fell below 50 percent, while agricultural productivity declined due to rising input costs and restricted market access. Environmental degradation also increased climate risks. As incomes fell, households increasingly relied on selling assets and reducing consumption. These coping strategies have become long-term survival mechanisms rather than temporary responses, indicating deep fragility as a system.

Inflation in Myanmar

Inflation has been one of the defining features of Myanmar’s economic crisis. In 2023 and 2024, inflation remained extremely high, reaching nearly 30 percent year-on-year. By October 2024, end-period inflation stood at 29.7 percent. From April 2025, inflation began to ease as the kyat strengthened and food supply conditions improved. By October 2025, year-on-year inflation had declined to 19.8 percent, while average inflation fell from 27.9 percent in 2024 to 23.1 percent in 2025. This decline was driven mainly by slower food inflation, supported by humanitarian assistance and tighter price controls. At the same time, continued economic cooperation with China, including project financing and alternative financial arrangements after the 2021 coup, has provided the military government with an additional source of external funding despite Western sanctions. However, non-food inflation remained high, especially in energy, health, and transport, reflecting ongoing import restrictions and conflict-related disruptions. Overall, inflation has moderated from its peak but remains structurally elevated.

Several structural factors explain this pattern. First, monetary financing has fueled inflation. In 2023, two-thirds of the budget deficit was financed by the Central Bank of Myanmar, with the deficit reaching 5.6 percent of GDP. This expanded the money supply without corresponding growth in production. Second, supply constraints reduced the availability of goods. Import restrictions, conflict-related transport disruptions, and energy shortages limited both domestic and external supplies. Third, policy responses were largely ineffective. Price controls failed to manage inflation and instead created shortages, while the issuance of high-denomination notes in 2023 weakened public confidence in monetary management. Finally, depreciation of the kyat increased import costs, transmitting currency instability into higher domestic prices.

Together, these factors show that inflation in Myanmar reflects a combination of fiscal weakness, supply disruptions, and policy distortions rather than short-term market fluctuations.

Effects on Households

Inflation has severely affected household welfare, mainly because incomes have not kept pace with rising prices. In 2023, 57 percent of households reported no income growth, and 30 percent reported declines. Real household income fell by 15 percent between 2022 and 2023, while median incomes remained close to survival levels. Job losses, business decline, and farm disruptions were key causes. Informal employment increased, and job quality deteriorated, reversing earlier economic progress. The minimum wage has remained unchanged since 2018.

At the same time, prices of basic goods rose sharply. Food inflation reached 39 percent in late 2024. Non-food inflation was also high, especially in health, transport, and energy. Conflict-affected regions faced higher inflation due to transport disruptions and market fragmentation.

Urban households faced heavy cost burdens. Rent rose by 24.6 percent, petrol prices increased by 44 percent between Q4 of 2023 and 2024, and city inflation ranged between 21 and 26 percent. In cities, prices increased more rapidly than in rural areas because businesses faced higher transport and operating costs, while the arrival of displaced people also raised demand for housing, food, and services. Urban consumption fell by nearly 20 percent between 2017 and 2023. In March 2026, the military government introduced an even-odd” licensing scheme driving rule for private vehicles to conserve fuel amid global supply disruptions linked to conflict in the Middle East. This policy suggests limited fuel reserves and could further increase transport costs and inflationary pressure in Myanmar.

Rural households were affected by declining agricultural viability. Agricultural employment fell from 43 percent to 34 percent, while rising input costs reduced farm incomes. Rural consumption declined by 6 percent.

Marginalised communities experienced frequent shortages, displacement, and restricted market access. Low-income households across all areas lacked savings and secondary incomes. Overall, inflation has deepened inequality and weakened household resilience.

Coping Strategies

As economic pressure increased, households relied more on negative coping strategies. Many reduced their food intake and cut spending on health and education. Among the poorest households, 42 percent reported eating less. These practices weakened nutrition and human capital development.

Savings were rapidly depleted. By late 2024, only 20 percent of households had any savings or bank deposits. Informal borrowing became widespread. About 64 percent of loans came from relatives and friends, while 22 percent came from moneylenders who usually charge high rates. Most loans were used for food and health expenses, indicating distress borrowing. Many households sold productive assets such as land, bicycles, and tools, reducing their future earning capacity.

As financial pressure increased, some households turned to risky income-generating activities, with about 5 percent reporting engagement in such strategies nationwide. Economic stress has also been linked to rising drug and alcohol use, domestic and gender-based violence, and increased vulnerability among adolescents and young people, who face greater risks of harmful behaviours due to disrupted education and limited job opportunities.

Migration became one of the most important coping mechanisms. Around 10 percent of households sent migrants in 2024, and about 3.7 million Myanmar migrants lived in Thailand. Migrants to Thailand and Malaysia earned two to three times domestic wages, while those in Japan and Korea earned much more. The introduction of compulsory military service in 2024 has also accelerated outward migration, as many young people left the country to avoid conscription. Remittances supported about 7.5 percent of households and improved nutrition. However, forced currency conversion and taxation reduced net benefits and encouraged informal transfers.

Overall, while these coping strategies help households survive immediate shocks, they are largely unsustainable and weaken long-term resilience.

Consequences

The combined effects of inflation and conflict have severely damaged health, nutrition, and education. Many households reduced meals, relied on cheaper food, or borrowed food. Around 25 percent of households experienced acute food insecurity in early 2024. Adult diet quality deteriorated, and more than 20 percent of children had inadequate diets. Unmet healthcare needs reached 8.1 percent nationally and over 14 percent in conflict-affected regions. Limited access to medicines and medical services further increased health risks.

Education has also been deeply affected. In 2023/24, 21 percent of children were out of school. Low-income households spent only 2 percent of their budgets on education, compared with 4 percent among wealthier households. Financial pressure forced many families to withdraw children from school.

As household incomes declined, some families relied on child labour and early marriage to cope with financial stress. The introduction of the conscription law has further intensified these pressures, as some families arrange early or forced marriages for young women to avoid military service obligations. Informal and community-based education systems struggled with limited resources and security risks. These trends have reduced learning outcomes and skill development.

Together, deteriorating health and education outcomes threaten Myanmar’s future productivity and social mobility. Loss of human capital increases long-term vulnerability and limits the country’s capacity to recover from a crisis.

Poverty Trap

Myanmar’s poverty levels have risen sharply over the past decade due to overlapping political and economic crises. By the end of 2023, 49.7 percent of the population lived below the national poverty line, while another 25 percent remained just above it, meaning around 42 million people were living at or near subsistence levels. This marks a dramatic increase from 24.8 percent in 2017. Child poverty has also worsened, with 53 percent of children, about 8.9 million, living in poverty by 2022.

At the same time, the poverty gap has widened, showing that poor households are becoming more vulnerable. Reduced spending on health, education, and nutrition is reinforcing long-term disadvantage, while the middle class continues to shrink. Without the post-2021 crisis, poverty would likely have been close to 11 percent in 2023, with around eight million fewer poor people (WB04). These trends indicate that Myanmar is entering a self-reinforcing poverty trap.

Conclusion

Between 2021 and 2026, Myanmar’s economy has been shaped by structural inflation, currency instability, and prolonged trade disruptions. These pressures have weakened household resilience and accelerated the erosion of human capital. As incomes stagnated and prices surged, families increasingly relied on negative coping strategies that undermine long-term well-being. The combined effects of poor governance, policy distortions, and conflict have reinforced poverty and inequality, pushing many households into a cycle of vulnerability.

These trends not only deepen domestic hardship but also highlight major challenges in achieving SDG2 (Zero Hunger), SDG3 (Health), SDG4 (Education), and SDG8 (Decent Work). Without political stabilisation and institutional reforms, as well as improvements in monetary governance, exchange rate management, trade facilitation, social protection, and sustained investment in health and education, Myanmar will face prolonged stagnation and intergenerational poverty.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Education in rural Myanmar remains a critical challenge shaped by limited resources, language barriers, economic hardship, and unequal access to qualified teachers, yet it also presents an important opportunity for youth-led initiatives to drive inclusive and sustainable development.

Quality education has long been a central challenge in rural Myanmar due to limited access to schools, a shortage of qualified teachers, and socioeconomic barriers. Myanmar has been struggling with political instability and educational disparities between rural and urban areas. Achieving quality education is fundamental to long-term development and inclusive growth. There are many reasons why students in rural areas cannot access quality education.

Firstly, quality education is strongly reliant on teachers’ competence and the effective allocation of resources. The Myanmar Ministry of Education reports that over 20% of rural teachers are unqualified and often lack formal teacher training or university degrees. Most rural teachers are local people who finished only secondary education. They only use the rote learning method rather than a critical one.

According to administrators from ethnic education departments, language barriers affect the quality of education. Burmese is the only language used in the national curriculum. As a result, ethnic students find it difficult to learn lessons, lag behind peers, and lose interest in learning.

Another one is the economic barrier in rural areas. Economic barriers deeply influence access to quality education in rural areas. Even though learning at a government school is officially free, families struggle with indirect expenses such as uniforms and school supplies. And also, parents with a low education level focus more on immediate survival ahead of long-term education.

Infrastructure shortage is another critical barrier to providing quality education. Many rural schools lack basic facilities such as teaching aids, electricity, clean water, sanitary facilities and safe classrooms. According to the World Bank’s report, more than 70% of rural people lack electricity, which makes it impossible for teachers to use contemporary teaching resources, and for students, it can limit their study time and academic advancement.

Quality education aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 4 and youth participation in local communities are an important part of solving these problems. Young people can be leaders, mentors and innovators who can change educational disparities. Youth-led initiatives use critical methods and localised curriculum textbooks and make education more relevant. Youth can create a robust education system that supports social empowerment and quality education by making investments in youth-led initiatives.

There are 3 ways to strengthen quality education by focusing on sustainable strategies for youth-led initiatives. These are (1) Developing youth leadership and capacities, (2) Encouraging volunteerism and community- based learning, (3) Incorporating youth voices into national education.

Strengthening youth leadership through training in digital literacy and sustainable development would equip them to contribute more effectively. Capacity-building programs offer leadership, educational innovation and social awareness. Expanding youth-led digital literacy initiatives can accelerate community-based learning solutions. Linking youth-led education to livelihood opportunities can increase family support for schooling and reduce the number of students who drop out because of economic barriers.

Volunteer networks, community-based training facilities, and youth-led non-governmental organisations are essential for long-term educational growth. These organisations have successfully reached out-of-school children. However, their long-term impact is still limited by their lack of government recognition. In order to formalise their contributions, non-formal education programs, civil society, and government agencies should work together more closely through certification frameworks, resource support, and policy integration.

To ensure equitable and culturally relevant education in rural Myanmar, it is crucial to invest in young educators, especially those from ethnic minority backgrounds. Both the demand for instruction that respects language and cultural diversity and the lack of trained teachers can be addressed by funding teacher training programs for these young people. Schools that prioritise mother-tongue-based multilingual education (MTB-MLE) and participatory teaching methods tend to achieve higher student engagement. Myanmar may foster a cycle of long-term local leadership and educational resilience by allowing young educators to serve in their own communities.

By establishing Youth Advisory Councils within the Ministry of Education, composed of representatives from diverse regions and ethnic groups, it would help a lot for educational disparities. These councils would offer suggestions for policy implementation, teacher preparation, and curriculum development. Youth representatives could be part of local village education committees that serve as a contact between local government, parents, and schools. This participative approach guarantees the lived reality of youth in rural and conflict-affected areas.

Empowering youth in rural areas is an investment for the country’s long-term stability. Youth engagement offers a potential way for advancing quality education and achieving the broader vision of an inclusive, resilient, and sustainably governed society.

Thiri San Min holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from East Yangon University. She is currently researching the Belt and Road Initiative and its impacts on Myanmar.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

In the Rohingya refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, education remains trapped between emergency relief and long-term sustainability, leaving an entire generation uncertain about its future.

Only a limited amount of education is available in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. For more than a million displaced people, learning has become fragile, erratic, and uncertain. Although education in refugee settings is often discussed as a humanitarian issue, it is fundamentally a sustainability concern. Without access to high-quality, continuous education, entire generations risk being excluded from sustainable development, deepening inequality and instability far beyond the camps.

Education directly supports the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 4 (Quality Education) and Sustainable Development Goal 10 (Reduced Inequalities). However, budget cuts, structural disparities in learning levels, and policy restrictions continue to limit Rohingya children’s access to education. These barriers not only deprive children of their rights but also weaken the long-term resilience of displaced communities.

Two primary education systems are operating in the camps. The first consists of community-based schools run informally by Rohingya teachers during early morning and evening hours. These classes are often led by instructors who either developed their skills within the camps or previously taught in Myanmar. Families typically pay nominal fees. Although these schools are unlicensed, underfunded, and lack official certification, they sometimes offer instruction using the Myanmar curriculum up to Grades 10 or even 12.

Alongside them are learning centres supported by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and funded by local partners and international donors such as UNICEF. Some centres follow in-house programs focused on foundational literacy and life skills, while others use the Myanmar curriculum. These facilities are more structured, yet they generally provide education only up to lower secondary levels. Notably, there are no government-run schools, colleges, or universities operating within the camps. For most students who reach Grade 10, the educational pathway effectively ends.

This educational dead end significantly affects children’s motivation. Many begin school with aspirations of becoming doctors, engineers, teachers, or computer scientists. Over time, however, they realise that the system cannot support their ambitions. When education is not linked to viable opportunities, attendance declines, child labour increases, and early marriage, particularly among girls, becomes more common. Education shifts from being a pathway out of poverty to merely a temporary refuge from hardship.

Teacher recruitment and training further complicate the situation. In NGO-supported centres, teachers are hired by implementing organisations and paid through donor funding. Training is provided after recruitment, but it is often brief and inconsistent. Experienced educators are sometimes overlooked in favour of less qualified candidates due to administrative or regulatory constraints. As a result, teaching quality varies widely, and effective pedagogical methods, especially in science, mathematics, and digital skills, are not consistently applied.

From a sustainability perspective, this model is short-sighted. An education system that ends at basic literacy does not prepare young people for climate adaptation, sustainable livelihoods, or civic participation. Many young refugees express a strong interest in digital literacy, computer skills, vocational training, and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. These ambitions are not abstract; they reflect a genuine desire to contribute meaningfully to society if given the opportunity.

Investing in refugee education, therefore, is not charity; it is prevention. Education reduces dependency, mitigates social risks, and equips displaced populations to contribute to host communities and future reconstruction efforts. Reports from international organisations, including the United Nations and the World Bank, consistently demonstrate that education strengthens social cohesion and economic resilience, particularly in crisis-affected contexts.

To advance sustainability, education in refugee camps must evolve from an emergency response model to a long-term development strategy. This includes expanding secondary and post-secondary pathways, standardising teacher recruitment and training, integrating digital and vocational education, and recognising refugee-led initiatives as partners rather than temporary stopgaps. Donors and policymakers must align educational support with sustainability goals to ensure continuity rather than repeated cycles of disruption.

If sustainability means meeting present needs without compromising future generations, then denying refugee children access to quality education is inherently unsustainable. At its core, the Rohingya crisis is not only about displacement, but it is also about whether the global community is willing to invest in human potential where it has been most disrupted. Education is not a luxury reserved for stable societies; it is the foundation of stability itself.

Ata Ullah is a Rohingya refugee researcher, writer, and education advocate based in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. He is the founder of the NextGen Rohingya Network, focusing on refugee education, sustainability, and youth advocacy.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Strengthening community-based recycling and integrating the informal sector is key to improving waste management and advancing a circular economy in Myanmar.

Myanmar has been facing the challenge of solid waste management, especially plastic, which is flowing into landfills, waterways, and informal channels at a concerning pace. At the same time, in the current context of economic decline, political instability, and polycrisis, the practice of “repair, reuse, recycle” is familiar to many Myanmar households and communities.

These everyday practices, such as repairing old appliances, reusing containers, or selling recyclables to small junk shops, reflect long-standing cultural habits shaped by necessity. Because of weak national infrastructure and governance, community-level recycling systems can be a viable route for waste governance and circular economy growth. However, with limited infrastructure, heavy reliance on the informal sector, and a fragile institutional environment, building strong community recycling systems in Myanmar is urgent and necessary for sustainable development.

Current State of Community Recycling in Myanmar

Municipal waste collection in Myanmar remains inconsistent, particularly outside major cities, and many wastes end up in unmanaged dumps or open landfills. Recycling is mostly driven by the informal sector, and waste-pickers, scrap collectors, and small buyers dominate the system. For example, according to a survey in 2017 in Yangon, approximately 86 tonnes of recyclable materials were recovered daily from landfill sites, and 57% was glass, 15% paper/cardboard, 13% cardboard/paper, 7% plastic and 7% tin cans (Premakumara et al., 2017).

Neighbourhood drop-off points and small junk shops are common community-level practices, but there is no standardised recycling system applied across townships. Data on recycling volumes and source-segregation are scarce, making strategic planning difficult (Premakumara et al., 2017; Prevent Plastics Myanmar, 2021). Public awareness of waste sorting is low overall, although many households recognise high-value materials (such as aluminium cans, plastic bottles, cardboard) because they can be sold to informal collectors. This awareness of “value in waste” offers a foundation for community engagement.

Key Challenges

Weak infrastructure: Myanmar has very few dedicated materials-recovery facilities (MRFs) and limited municipal recycling services. Collection schedules are often unreliable, and transport vehicles and equipment are insufficient
Policy and enforcement gaps: Although some bans (for example, on thin plastic bags) exist in city areas, enforcement is weak, and incentives for households or communities are unclear. For example, the recycling value chain remains informal with little official policy integration (ECD & MONREC, 2018; Premakumara et al., 2017).

Informal sector vulnerabilities: While the informal waste-picker network is fundamental and contributes significantly to recycling, workers often face unsafe working conditions, unstable prices for recyclables, and a lack of social protections. A recent mapping in Yangon and Hpa-An found that waste-picker livelihoods depend heavily on fluctuating scrap values and minimal regulation (Win et al., 2024).

Social and behavioural barriers: Cultural habits such as dumping, burning or littering remain widespread in many communities. Convenience-driven disposal practices (throwing all waste into one bin) persist, and source separation is rarely practised. These habits hinder effective recycling at the community level.
Economic barriers: Community-led recycling projects receive limited financial support, and many recycling markets in Myanmar are low-profit, especially for plastic types with little resale value. For example, research notes that even though Myanmar’s informal sector achieves high rates of recovery for “valuable” materials, single-use plastics with low resale value often escape collection (Jeske, 2023).

Opportunities for Strengthening Community Systems

Integrate and recognise the informal sector: Recognising the role of informal actors is key. Policymakers should provide protective equipment, training programs, and partnerships between municipal authorities and waste-picker groups. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) highlights that recognising informal waste workers improves efficiency and inclusion of recycling systems (Chen, 2023).
Community-based collection models: Neighbourhood sorting centres, school or monastery-led recycling hubs, and incentive-based systems (points, rebates for recyclables) can encourage recycling locally. Because many households already resell high-value materials, a more formal collection network can build on this behaviour.
Improving public awareness: Campaigns targeted at the household and quarter level, and youth-led initiatives, can tap into Myanmar’s culture of reuse and repair (for example, repair shops for umbrellas or electronic appliances) and increase recycling habits. Since many communities already engage in reuse due to resource scarcity, this is an ideal environment for behaviour change.

Policy recommendations:
• Introduce local-level bylaws mandating separation at source, tailored to township realities.
• Offer financial incentives or subsidies to recycling SMEs to make community recycling viable.
• Provide subsidies for purchasing materials with recycled content, stimulating demand for recyclables and closing the loop.

Conclusion

Community-level recycling systems offer a strong entry point for Myanmar’s transition toward a circular economy and stronger waste governance in the current context of Myanmar. By establishing collection, sorting, and education in neighbourhoods and by integrating the informal sector into formal systems, Myanmar can build resilience despite its governance and infrastructure constraints. Strengthening these local systems also helps communities take ownership of environmental challenges at a time when national-level attention to waste management remains limited. Moreover, as economic pressures continue to shape household behaviour, community recycling can build on existing cultural practices of reuse and repair, making sustainability both practical and accessible. With inclusive policies, targeted investments, and local innovation, community recycling can scale up, offering a hopeful path forward for both people and the environment, even amid Myanmar’s ongoing uncertainties.

References:

Chen, S. (2023, December 28). Unsung Heroes: Four Things Policymakers Can Do to Empower Informal Waste Workers. UNDP. https://www.undp.org/blog/unsung-heroes-four-things-policymakers-can-do-empower-informal-waste-workers

ECD, & MONREC. (2018). National Waste Management Strategy and Master Plan for Myanmar (2018-2030). https://optoce.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Myanmar-National-Waste-Management-Strategy_Mar-2018.pdf

Jeske, F. (2023, March 10). Plastic Waste in Myanmar: How Poverty (Paradoxically) Can Drive Circularity. Regional Knowledge Centre for Marine Plastic Debris. https://rkcmpd-eria.org/zero-in-on-plastic/plastic-waste-in-myanmar-how-poverty-paradoxically-can-drive-circularity

Premakumara, D. G. J., Hengesbaugh, M., Onogawa, K., & Horizono, S. (2017). Waste Management in Myanmar: Current Status, Key Challenges and Recommendations for National and City Waste Management Strategies. United Nations Environment Programme.

Prevent Plastics Myanmar. (2021). Best Practices: Waste Management Systems in Myanmar. Prevent Plastic. https://preventplastics.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Waste-management-best-practices.Eng-.pdf

Win, N. N., Thu, Y., Yee, H. L., & Jeske, F. (2024). Waste Picker mapping in Myanmar. Thant Myanmar.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

This article explores Bangkok’s PM2.5 crisis, emphasising sustainable policies, clean transport, and community action to protect public health and urban resilience.

Background
The worldwide increase in urbanisation and industrial activity has made air pollution a major sustainability problem, endangering both environmental health and human health. The danger of PM2.5 arises because its tiny particles can penetrate deep into the lungs and bloodstream, causing severe respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. Bangkok illustrates this problem through its ongoing violation of international PM2.5 safety limits due to rising vehicle traffic, industrial activity, and rapid urban growth. The high pollution levels in the city threaten human health while damaging its long-term sustainability. Sustainable urban development depends on PM2.5 pollution control through unified policy efforts, technological advancements, and public participation. The city of Bangkok can build a sustainable future with improved health and environmental quality by successfully reducing PM2.5 pollution.

Why Air Quality Matters
A sustainable city needs to maintain clean air because it serves as the base for residents to live, work and breathe safely. The health of public populations depends on clean air, while urban communities need it to build sustainable economic and social systems. The presence of poor air pollution reveals multiple problems in transportation systems, urban planning and environmental justice systems, which create disproportionate harm to vulnerable communities. The protection of air quality enables sustainable cities to reach their climate action targets through the promotion of clean transportation systems and efficient urban development. The protection of clean air serves as a sustainability duty because it guarantees future generations will receive a habitable world instead of dealing with rising health expenses and environmental deterioration from present-day pollution.

Analysis of Current Approaches
Bangkok demonstrates recognition of air pollution problems through its management efforts, yet these initiatives have not produced substantial decreases in PM2.5 concentrations. The main source of Bangkok's pollution stems from vehicle emissions, which generate 60% of the total pollution. The city has established Euro V/VI engine upgrade programs and expanded emission checkpoint networks and low-emission zones, but these initiatives have not produced substantial results. The process of implementing higher emission standards has encountered multiple delays because of insufficient personnel, excessive vehicle numbers, and non-compliant drivers. The majority of polluting vehicles operate without facing any enforcement actions.
The construction and industrial sectors have established rules to manage dust and emissions, but their monitoring systems are unreliable, and new environmentally friendly technologies have not gained widespread acceptance. The combination of construction activities and factory operations produces major PM2.5 pollution events throughout the year, but these events become more severe during dry months because of reduced atmospheric dispersion.
The city of Bangkok works to establish permanent solutions through its electric vehicle promotion program and public transportation system improvements. The current lack of sufficient charging stations and insufficient mass transit coverage in various city areas hinders electric vehicle adoption. The growing public interest in sustainable transportation faces a major obstacle because people lack access to practical alternative transportation options.

The success of Bangkok's air quality policies depends on better enforcement, more defined rules, additional infrastructure funding, and public participation instead of depending on regulations alone.

Solutions
The solution to Bangkok's air quality problems needs transportation solutions, urban planning solutions, and community participation to achieve lasting improvements. The city needs to transform its transportation system because this approach will deliver the most significant results. The combination of financial benefits with defined rules and a complete electric vehicle charging system will help Bangkok residents switch from fossil fuel-based transportation to electric vehicles. The public transportation system needs enhancement through better connectivity for underserved areas and the adoption of electric buses and motorcycles to reduce private vehicle usage. The combination of safer cycling lanes with pedestrian-friendly infrastructure will promote low-emission travel while improving public health.

Sustainable urban planning stands as an essential factor for success. The implementation of expanded low-emission zones together with enhanced pollution controls in areas with high air pollution levels will help control the movement of vehicles that produce significant emissions. The implementation of stronger buffer zones between industrial facilities and residential areas protects residential areas from particulate pollution exposure. The implementation of these measures throughout Bangkok's urban development plan will maintain air quality protection as a fundamental element of the city's growth path.

Conclusion
The success of long-term sustainability depends on active involvement from both the public and essential stakeholders. The combination of environmental NGO partnerships with health impact education and awareness programs will help people understand the benefits of using cleaner transportation methods. The combination of vehicle scrapping rebates and technology adoption subsidies for households and businesses creates positive behavioural change. The combination of these coordinated efforts will enhance Bangkok's ability to create a sustainable urban space that promotes environmental health and community wellness.

This article is based on my public policy and planning analysis titled ‘Better Policies, Cleaner Air: Strengthening Bangkok Metropolitan Area’s Pollution Control’ (2025).

Dr Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

Amid Myanmar’s ongoing political turmoil, the absence of comprehensive sex education is fueling health risks and social vulnerability among youth, highlighting an urgent need for informed, inclusive, and sustainable educational reforms.

Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has experienced profound social, political, and economic disruptions. Among the less visible yet deeply urgent consequences is the increase in unprotected sexual activity and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) among young adults. According to the World Health Organisation (2023), Myanmar has reported a growing number of HIV infections among people aged 15 to 24, reflecting weakened access to reproductive services and public health outreach. Schools remain unstable, and social taboos surrounding sexuality remain. The lack of comprehensive sex education (CSE) in Myanmar shows that it is not only a public health failure but a broader governance crisis. In the context of sustainability, this issue underscores how fragile institutions undermine social resilience. Sustainable development, as outlined by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), depends on inclusive education (SDG 4), gender equality (SDG 5), good health (SDG 3), and effective governance (SDG 16). The absence of CSE in Myanmar’s education system highlights how governance breakdowns can directly threaten social sustainability.

Before the coup, Myanmar’s sex education curriculum was limited and inconsistent. Lessons focused narrowly on reproductive biology and largely avoided topics such as contraception, consent, gender identity, and sexual rights (UNESCO, 2018). These gaps were compounded by social conservatism and religious sensitivity, which made open discussions about sexuality taboo in many schools and at home. After 2021, the education sector worsened further. Many teachers and students joined the Civil Disobedience Movement, while thousands of schools were closed, damaged, or militarised. Meanwhile, international and local NGOs such as Marie Stopes Myanmar and Population Services International, which once provided youth-friendly reproductive health services, were restricted or shut down (UNFPA, 2025). Young people increasingly turned to peers or social media for sexual health information, often encountering misinformation. Community health groups have noted a rise in sexually transmitted infections and unplanned pregnancies since 2022, particularly among displaced and urban youth (Save the Children, 2023). With health infrastructure weakened and reproductive services reduced, the absence of institutional sex education has translated directly into higher social and health risks.

Beyond public health data, social dynamics further reveal how the absence of structured sex education is being filled by unregulated digital content. A recent editorial video report by The Irrawaddy (2025) featured interviews with secondary school teachers who admitted that platforms like TikTok and Facebook play a major role in shaping students' views on sexuality. Teachers reported that sexual themes and online trends have normalised early sexual activity without awareness of protection or consequences. In the absence of formal, comprehensive sex education, social media effectively becomes the “teacher,” accelerating misinformation and unsafe behaviour among Myanmar’s youth.

Recent empirical research has highlighted the severity of knowledge gaps among Myanmar’s youth. An analysis of data from the Myanmar Demographic and Health Survey found that nearly half of sexually active young people had their first sexual encounter before the age of 18, and only around half reported using contraception. Educational attainment and regional factors were significant predictors of safe-sex practices, suggesting that both access to information and social context shape sexual behaviour. These findings highlight how the absence of comprehensive sex education contributes directly to risky behaviours and underscore the urgent need for policy intervention. Moreover, misinformation about sexuality contributes to discrimination against LGBTQ+ communities, undermining social inclusion and cohesion. True sustainability requires that all individuals, regardless of gender or identity, be able to make informed, autonomous choices about their bodies and relationships.

Comprehensive sex education is not merely an educational issue but a governance responsibility. Effective governance provides citizens with the knowledge and autonomy to make informed decisions. In Myanmar, the lack of CSE reflects deeper governance failures: the politicisation of morality, the silencing of civil society, and the neglect of youth rights. Teachers are often discouraged or penalised for addressing sexual health topics, as education policy remains centrally controlled and highly conservative. This suppression undermines young people’s access to information that could protect their well-being. Moreover, post-coup censorship and reduced NGO activity have restricted community-based initiatives, leaving few trusted channels for accurate education. The governance crisis following the 2021 coup has had devastating ripple effects on Myanmar’s education and health sectors, including widespread school closures, teacher arrests, and rising sexual and gender-based violence (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

From a sustainability perspective, this governance vacuum weakens three key pillars: social resilience, as youth become more vulnerable to preventable health risks; gender equality, as young women face disproportionate consequences from early pregnancies and unsafe sex; and institutional trust, which is compromised when schools and government systems fail to provide relevant, protective education. Neglecting sex education carries lasting social and economic costs. Rising rates of HIV, STIs, and teenage pregnancies place additional strain on an already fragile health system. In 2023, Myanmar recorded an estimated 11,000 new HIV infections, with a growing proportion among youth populations (UNAIDS, 2023). Many young women who become pregnant early face stigma, school dropout, and economic exclusion, reinforcing cycles of poverty and gender inequality.

Building sustainable reform in Myanmar demands a multi-layered strategy that recognises sex education as a governance and human rights issue. Comprehensive sex education should be integrated into the national curriculum based on UNESCO’s International Technical Guidance on Sexuality Education, which emphasises scientific accuracy, age-appropriateness, and inclusivity (UNESCO, 2018). Despite systemic challenges, small but meaningful initiatives have emerged to advance inclusive sexual education in Myanmar. According to UNFPA (2025), recent training programs have introduced comprehensive sexuality education modules that engage young people, including those with disabilities and LGBTQ+ identities. These programs emphasise diversity, consent, and human rights, reflecting an effort to align Myanmar’s youth education with global sustainability principles. Such inclusive approaches demonstrate how governance partnerships with civil society can still function as micro-level models of resilience, even within broader institutional collapse.

Teacher training must be prioritised, as many educators lack both the confidence and the pedagogical tools to teach sensitive topics effectively. Community-based and digital education platforms could supplement formal schooling, particularly in conflict-affected or remote areas. Collaboration among local bodies, international partners, and local NGOs is essential to destigmatise and mainstream sex education. Public campaigns that frame CSE as a health and sustainability issue rather than a moral or cultural one can gradually shift public perception. Governance reform must protect and empower civil society organisations that work on youth health and rights, as these actors play a crucial role in sustaining education and awareness when state systems fail.

To conclude, the crisis of sexual health among Myanmar’s youth is not simply a private or moral matter but a reflection of systemic governance failure. Sustainable development cannot be achieved while young people remain uninformed, unprotected, and stigmatised. Comprehensive sex education, when effectively implemented, strengthens social resilience, gender equality, and institutional trust, which are essential pillars of sustainability. Rebuilding Myanmar’s social fabric requires acknowledging that health and education are intertwined with governance and justice. Teaching young people about their bodies, rights, and responsibilities is not a threat to culture but a foundation for a sustainable future. In a country where so much has been silenced, empowering youth with knowledge can be the most sustainable act of all.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

This article highlights the Yangon childhood, revealing how environmental hazards and structural inequalities create environmental injustice among local communities.

Growing up in Yangon, I witnessed firsthand how environmental harm is unequally experienced across communities. In my community, environmental issues were a constant part of my daily life: scarce water shortages during the hot season, frequent flooding in the rainy months, and ongoing air pollution and poor waste management in the neighbourhood. All of this was caused by nearby small manufacturing businesses such as garment printing, welding workshops, aluminium pots factories and shoe production, many of which discharged untreated waste directly into the surrounding environment. This small business began to develop more in my neighbourhood after 1988.

From early childhood until around the age of nine or ten, I was regularly exposed to air pollution and chemical fumes from the garment workshop next door to my home. They disposed of all their waste directly into a nearby ditch, where it accumulated due to poor water flow. At the same time, our entire neighbourhood relied on water drawn from driven and drilled wells, without awareness of potential contamination. These living conditions were part of a broader pattern of structural inequalities, in which communities striving to develop, such as the one where I live, faced ongoing harm due to weak environmental oversight, inadequate public infrastructure and limited access to safe and healthy environments.

Environmental justice refers to the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, or income, in environmental decision-making, law enforcement, regulation, policies and protection from environmental harm. Environmental justice holds that no community should carry an unequal share of environmental degradation or be excluded from the benefits of a healthy environment. Originating from grassroots movements in the United States, the concept has since gained global relevance, drawing attention to the reality that marginalised communities often endure higher levels of pollution and ecological risks while lacking both political voice and legal protection.

Environmental Justice also emphasises equitable access to environmental benefits, including clean air, safe drinking water, and healthy ecosystems. This approach offers a useful perspective that allows me to examine the intersection of my personal experiences related to international human rights standards on health and water.

Environmental conditions in Yangon

Yangon is the most populous city in Myanmar, with a population of more than 5 million. It struggles with rapid urbanisation, inadequate infrastructure, and weak environmental regulations. There is ongoing exposure to environmental risks in many low-income neighbourhoods and suburbs due to the close integration of industrial and residential areas. While I was growing up in such an environment, I witnessed firsthand how poor urban design and inadequate safeguards resulted directly in health risks.

Air quality was a persistent worry, especially due to the nearby small-scale industries like garment printing workshop, welding stations and shoe manufacturing. Many operated informally, frequently avoiding environmental checks through payments to local administrators or connections with military officials. This business discharged fumes, particulates and chemical byproducts directly into the surrounding environment without any filtration. The garment printing workshop next to my home releases strong chemical odours that probably came from solvents, dyes and inks that permeated into our living space. According to the WHO, long-term exposure to these pollutants can cause respiratory problems, skin irritation, and other long-term health problems.

Access to water was another issue, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s. Most households relied on driven or drilled wells, particularly in the summer. These unregulated water sources were exposed to contamination from industrial wastewater, household waste, and septic leaks. During the rainy season, poor drainage and frequent flooding combined sewage with groundwater, while standing floodwater promoted mosquito breeding and the spread of diseases carried by vectors.

Before 2015, solid waste management was almost absent. Although the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC) provided waste collection services, coverage was irregular in informal neighbourhoods (not residential areas under YCDC law) and the outskirts of the city, leaving many people without reliable support. Consequently, people often disposed of waste in vacant lots, open pits, drainage channels and burned it directly in some places until now. This practice not only blocked drainage systems and worsening flood but also produced foul odours, leachate contamination of nearby water, rodent infestation and increased infectious diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea.

Multiple environmental threats, polluted air, unsafe drinking water, unmanaged waste and frequent floods created an accumulated burden on public health and well-being. Such conditions were not coincidental; they resulted from structural inequalities, weak enforcement of regulation, and the exclusion of low-income suburban communities from environmental decision-making. As environmental justice theory highlights, marginalised communities with limited political and economic resources are disproportionately affected.

The combined effects of environmental degradation and entrenched socioeconomic inequalities in Yangon create serious risks for the protection of fundamental human rights for local communities, particularly threatening necessities such as access to clean and safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, and essential health services, while disproportionately impacting vulnerable and marginalised populations who have limited resources and political voice.

Khin Kyi Thar is a master’s student in the MA program in Human Rights, Peace, and Democratisation, an online program jointly offered by Yangon Cosmopolitan University and Mahidol University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainability Support The Sabai

This article examines the ethical challenges posed by artificial intelligence and argues that a multi-stakeholder, value-based approach, integrating legal regulation, technical expertise, and international ethical frameworks, is essential for governing AI in a way that protects human rights, privacy, and social values.

AI and the Role of Algorithms

Along with the development of AI, the role of algorithms has become increasingly important, particularly in different types of machine learning within the AI field. Algorithms set up by computer scientists and engineers can be controlled by specific management systems for particular tasks; however, machine learning algorithms that result from the data we provide to AI systems are not fully controllable by computer scientists, especially when they cause harm by violating data privacy. Since people hope to benefit from these algorithms for business or other economic or social purposes, violations of personal data privacy and social values caused by these algorithms must also be brought to public attention. If algorithms cause harm to humans and their lives, they should indeed be regulated through proper regulatory frameworks within each country or society.

However, regulation is not the only or necessarily the best solution to control AI. An alternative approach is to design better algorithms or to grant technicians greater access to explore technical solutions independently. Nevertheless, technicians are not the only ones who understand every aspect of protecting human rights, such as regulators, police officers, or judges, and they are not the primary actors responsible for addressing violations of privacy or fairness. Therefore, legal scholars have focused on traditional solutions that attempt to regulate algorithms, data, and machine learning. Even though there are several debates and many unanswered questions related to ethical AI principles, there is a general belief in the importance of regulating AI or establishing ethical AI guidelines as an essential step toward benefiting society.

Ethical Challenges Posed by AI and EU Efforts to Regulate AI

Several challenges arise in AI technology, and some of the most common include discrimination and bias, privacy concerns, transparency, accountability, justice, and fairness. These challenges demonstrate the need to justify AI systems and to design effective AI ethics guidelines. The EU AI Act 2024 adopts a risk-based regulatory approach and classifies AI risks into different categories, such as unacceptable risk, high risk, transparency risk, and minimal risk. Firstly, unacceptable risks are strictly prohibited under Article 5 of the Act, as they violate fundamental EU rights and values.

Secondly, high-risk AI systems include those that impact health, safety, or fundamental rights, such as systems subject to conformity assessments or post-market monitoring, and these are identified under explicit criteria in Article 6 of the Act. Thirdly, risks related to impersonation, manipulation, or deception—such as chatbots, deepfakes, or AI-generated content—are categorised as transparency risks, and state parties are obligated to comply with information and transparency requirements. Finally, minimal-risk AI systems, such as spam filters or recommender systems, are not subject to specific regulatory obligations. However, the EU AI Act mainly focuses on a regulatory framework, and its ethical guidelines for AI remain unclear. Although the 2019 EU Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI encourage AI systems to be lawful, ethical, and robust, they do not contain clear or explicit ethical sections or principles. To effectively regulate AI ethics, core ethical principles should be clearly articulated within the EU legal framework.

Defining AI Ethics by Key Stakeholders

Regulating technology is one of the most important duties of government, and it is not an easy task to perform perfectly in practice. Regardless of the outcome, governments must strive to protect public interests by providing legal frameworks to regulate AI. For example, the EU enacted the AI Act in 2024, introducing strict regulations and requirements for the benefit of the EU community. However, a value-oriented approach to defining AI ethics may be more effective than a purely regulatory legal framework, and governments should collaborate with technical experts to develop effective AI guidelines. While legal experts may lack sufficient technical knowledge of AI, technical experts and industries are at the forefront of AI advancement. Their involvement is beneficial because they possess the resources, expertise, and practical experience related to AI technologies. For instance, Google published its AI Principles in 2018 to address AI-related challenges, and Microsoft implemented the Responsible AI Standard based on six principles: fairness; reliability and safety; privacy and security; inclusiveness; transparency; and accountability.

In addition, academic researchers and legal scholars from both theoretical and practical domains of AI development should contribute to defining AI ethics. Inviting civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) can further encourage the creation of ethical frameworks that respect human rights, equality, and equity through an inclusive approach. For example, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism introduced measures for due diligence and impact assessments on AI technologies used by private and corporate sectors.

Furthermore, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights have demonstrated that Meta’s algorithms directly contributed to harm by amplifying anti-Rohingya content, including advocacy of hatred against the Rohingya, during the conflict between the Myanmar military and the Rohingya people. Additionally, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted the first intergovernmental AI principles in 2019 and updated them in 2024, comprising five value-based principles and five practical recommendations aimed at promoting trustworthy AI. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) also adopted the first global instrument on AI norms and ethics for its member states through consultations with international experts and organisations. Therefore, a multi-stakeholder approach to defining AI ethics, bringing together governments, companies, legal scholars, technical experts, and international bodies, is necessary to promote shared responsibility and transparency in AI ethical principles.

Accordingly, this article recommends implementing a multi-stakeholder approach to defining AI ethics in each country, using existing guidelines as references to develop well-designed, ethics-based frameworks.

REFERENCES
1. Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, “Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach”, 3rd Edition,2021
2. Ben Goertzel, Cassio Pennachin (Eds.), “Artificial General Intelligence” 2007
3. Michael Kearns and Aaron Roth, “The Ethical Algorithm: The Science of Socially Aware Algorithm Design”, Oxford University Press, 2020
4. Nathalie A. Smuha “The Cambridge Handbook of the Laws, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence”, KU Leuven Faculty of Law and Criminology,2025.
5. EU AI Act,2024.
6. https://ai.google/principles/
7. Microsoft Responsible AI Standard, v2, June 2022.
8. Brent Daniel Mittelstadt , Patrick Allo , Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra Wachter and Luciano Floridi, “The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the debate”, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 2 Alan Turing Institute, British Library, London, UK, 2016.
9. UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, 31st March,2024.
10. BBC, “Rohingya sue Facebook for $150 bn over Myanmar hate speech”, 8th December 2021.
11. UNESCO, “Recommendations on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence” 26th September 2024.

Lwin Nyein Chan Thu holds an LL.M. in Business Law from Thammasat University, Thailand, and is currently working as a researcher and lawyer providing free legal services to youth detainees during the military coup in Myanmar.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai

Severe air pollution in Yangon, driven by traffic, coal power, and weak regulation, has become a major public-health and social-justice crisis, threatening lives, livelihoods, and Myanmar’s sustainable development.

In the bustling streets of Yangon, the city’s skyline is often hazy and filled with fog. It can be recognised as dangerously polluted air in the city. Therefore, breathing clean air has become a daily challenge for the residents. It is not just an environmental issue but also a public‑health and social‑justice concern, deeply connected with Myanmar’s path toward sustainable development.

It is observed that Yangon’s air quality often reaches levels categorised as “unhealthy”. Burmese News International (BNI) (2025) recorded the city as one of the most polluted cities globally, with an Air Quality Index (AQI) of 165, on 27 January 2025. In addition, another report noted that AQI values in Yangon vary between 50 and 200, with levels around 200 considered harmful to health1.

The main reasons that contribute to the rise in air pollution in Yangon are increasing vehicle traffic, industrial emissions, trash burning, reliance on diesel generators (especially during power outages), and coal‑based energy generation, together with urbanisation and a weak regulatory framework¹. According to the Greenpeace report (2019)2, six out of 14 monitored towns in Myanmar exceeded the World Health Organisation guideline for annual average PM₁₀ levels, and none met the standard.

Air pollution imposes tangible burdens on people’s lives. With air pollution, fine particulate matter (PM₂.₅) and other airborne toxins seep into lungs, bloodstream and can trigger chronic diseases and complications. The 2019 Greenpeace report estimated that coal‑derived emissions alone could cause about 7,100 premature deaths per year in Myanmar if planned coal‑fired power plants go ahead. Furthermore, a report3 by Ohnmar from the University of Medicine 1, Yangon have found that exposure to dust, soot, lead and other pollutants reduces lung function, raises the prevalence of chronic bronchitis, and impairs cognitive or developmental health. Meanwhile, doctors in Yangon suggest that vulnerable groups, such as children, the elderly, and those with predisposed lung or heart conditions, stay indoors during high pollution periods and use masks when outdoors4.

Air pollution in Myanmar has impacts on the environmental, economic and social sectors. Firstly, polluted air degrades ecosystems, soils and water resources, especially when particulate matter settles, or when emissions come from coal‑plants that also affect nearby farmland and water supplies. Secondly, health impacts will result in lost productivity, higher healthcare costs and lower quality of life. Communities near polluting installations may lose livelihoods (e.g., farmers whose animals fall ill). Finally, pollution disproportionately affects the vulnerable group, those living in poorer districts or working in dusty jobs, deepening inequalities, as people with fewer resources have less ability to protect themselves (e.g., cannot avoid exposure or access care). Thus, addressing air pollution is not only about achieving cleaner air but also enabling healthier, fairer development.

Despite the urgency of the situation, Myanmar faces several significant obstacles, including a lack of regulatory standards for many coal‑fired power plants, making control of SO₂, NOₓ and multiple pollution sources. Because of resource constraints and infrastructure, investment for clean energy alternatives, improved waste management, air monitoring networks and health services are needed. To reduce the data gaps, reliable long‑term air quality data (especially PM₂.₅) and health‑impact studies, which are currently scarce in Myanmar, should be supported by the government and international networks, to make tracking progress and targeting interventions harder. As well as that, public awareness and behavioural change should be promoted in the community.

For Myanmar, the fight against air pollution is a critical chapter in sustainable development. It is not just an environmental challenge but a matter of public health, social justice and the future prosperity of cities like Yangon and beyond. By combining better data, stronger policy, cleaner energy, smarter transport, and active communities, Myanmar can move toward cleaner air, healthier people, stronger economies and more resilient societies.

Footnotes:

The article argues that global sustainability narratives remain “lost in translation” by privileging Western perspectives over local knowledge

Introduction

Orientalism was invented by European people who perceived the Eastern people as “the Orient” and as exotic and mysterious (Said, 1979, p. 1). And this Said’s Orientalism is still echoing in the current age, while it is believed that the world is moving towards sustainable development altogether. Lost in translation, as a contemporary artwork, illustrates this concept of Orientalism through artistic and narrative styles that are based on the Western perception. This essay will discuss some of these styles, including media dynamics, cultural binaries, misrepresentation, and incomprehension between Western and non-Western characters of the film, and connect these patterns with those of global discourse and movement towards sustainable development.

Media Dynamics

To describe orientalist media dynamics, it is the first to analyse current global media culture that emphasises the West’s imagination of ‘the East’ being exotic and mysterious (Said, 1979, p. 1). Lost in Translation serves as a contemporary artwork that subconsciously manifests Orientalism. There are controversial discussions surrounding Western loneliness and Eastern exoticism in this film. The film first tends to portray the unfamiliarity of American protagonists with Japanese culture with “dazzled humility” (King,2005, p.46). However, the film continues to portray Japanese characters as stereotypical Orient with the visuals including neon signs, bowing, strange customs, making them look unfamiliar and exotic, ultimately leading to “ bemused condescension” (King,2005, p.46). These visual settings and discriminatory scripts have spoken for Japanese culture from Western perceptions instead of the actual culture (King,2005, p.46). Said (1979) mentions that this cultural narrative is “ the corporate institution” in which the West controls the narrative and declares the statements about the Orient (p.3).

The pattern of orientalist media portrayal can be found in ingrained sustainable development discourse and agreement of the present and the past. Alagoz (2024) mentions in his “ Sustainable Orientalism” article that the notions of sustainable development and mutual benefits were visualised with the semi-naked African woman and the dressed European man: man exchanging finished goods and woman exchanging raw materials (p.139). These visuals aimed to promote “a gigantic colonial fantasy” of Europe and its territorial occupation of Africa and the Middle East for their economic sustainability, Alagoz (2024) further clarified (p.138). In the name of mutual benefits, the motives of the picture have manifested Orientalism by dominating the European features of a fine-dressed man and quality products in exchange for low-cost raw materials. This depiction influenced the narratives of geopolitical dynamics of post-colonisation, which are still mirroring cultural representation today. Said (1979) also mentioned this dynamic that “Orientalism is not just academic but a 'distribution of geopolitical awareness' through media, literature, art” (p.12).

Cultural Binaries

The intuitive argument countered from the West could be Occidentalism, which is the opposite of Orientalism. This term means Eastern people perceiving the West as rational: both of which are “man-made” (Said, 1979, p.5). This perception is depicted in the scenes of Lost in Translation, where Japanese characters look strange and confused by what the two Western protagonists are talking and where the male character is the tallest one in the elevator. However, most of these portrayals, such as East being the short and mysterious workers, and not subtitling the Japanese language, are mainly from the American characters that the images of “the cityscapes and curving off-ramps” are rendered like a tv screen to depict the western protagonists’ confusion and lost in translation of the signs (King,2005, p.48). Furthermore, this cultural domination is described by Said (1979) as Orientalism, separating the world into two: the Orient and Occident (p. 2). And, he further states that Europe found its cultural identity and strength in differentiating itself from the Orient (Said, 1979, p.3).

The similar cultural dichotomies between Western and Eastern states found in sustainable development, but in a different direction, are called Green Orientalism and Brown Occidentalism according to Heurtebise (2023, p.121). That means the West is in charge of all the environmental issues, climate change, and ecological disruption, such as global warming and loss of biodiversity (Heurtebise, 2023, p.125). Since the effects are not green, it is referred to as “brown,” leading to Brown Occidentalism (Heurtebise, 2023, p.125). On the contrary, Green Orientalism, being a self-identified term by Asians, is regarded as “holistic harmony” and “environmental wisdom,” unlike the European dualistic nature and capitalist (Heurtebise, 2023, p.125). The article continues to label this distinction as ‘Culturalization of Anthropocene" in Chinese Ecological Civilization that puts ecological crises as cultural binaries rather than augmenting these two (Heurtebise, 2023, p.126). However, what Alagoz (2024) defines as these cultural binaries is that the dividing lines between West and non-West show high and low cultural strength for developing economic and territorial highlighting the Western cultural domination (p.140).

Misrepresentation and Incomprehension

As the last part of assessing Lost in Translation in parallel to current sustainable discourse, the focus lies on the lack of cultural comprehension between Western people and non-Westerners. There is a hospital scene in the film where the Western protagonist has imitated and mimicked the question of a Japanese grandma since he did not understand it (King,2005, p.46). The highlight of what turned the tables is Western people imitating the Japanese language. However, it is rebutted with the fact that there was a lack of understanding or translation of the Japanese language, and this incomprehension in film ultimately leads to linguistic insignificance and undermining local power and knowledge (King,2005, p.48). This proves Said’s assertion that “ the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination…. hegemony” (Said, 1979, p.5). This point has been mirrored in Sustainable Orientalism, which is assessed by “ the circulation of thoughts” in the Western sustainability metrics (Alagoz, 2024, p.149). The imagination of sustainability is still ingrained as achieving the lifestyles of the First World without mere consideration of local culture and knowledge of non-Western (Alagoz, 2024, p.149). Thus, there is a need to address this cultural domination and binaries and work on representing the truth of both Eastern and Western cultures. And, it is claimed by Heurtebise (2023) that transcultural environmentalism as a solution means “transcending cultural specificities and linguistic barriers” (p.142).

Conclusion

In conclusion, Lost in Translation, in its attempt to portray loneliness and isolation of the Western protagonists surrounding the Eastern people, manifests Orientalism by dominating media portrayal, misrepresenting culture, and lacking linguistic comprehension. These ingrained trends mirror the discourse and agreement surrounding global sustainability, and this needs to be addressed by augmenting cultural binaries and breaking linguistic incomprehension to shape the actual sustainable development of the world.

References
Alagöz, G. (2024). Sustainable Orientalism: Hegemonic discourses for environmental sustainability and their transmission to non-Western habitats.
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7ww6h030
Heurtebise, J.-Y. (2023). Green orientalism, brown occidentalism, and Chinese ecological civilisation. Asian Studies, 21(1), 63–86.
https://journals.uni-lj.si/as/article/view/11669/11985
King, H. (2005). Lost in translation. Film Quarterly, 59(1), 12–21.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/fq.2005.59.1.45
Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. Vintage Books.

Khine Yin Thaw is a Bachelor of Arts student at Parami University, United States.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

Myanmar is increasingly dealing with environmental challenges as a result of urbanisation, a poorly functioning government, and an inadequate waste management system. However, an informal community of garbage collectors and junk shop operators offers minimal support for Myanmar’s recycling sector. In this context, the article takes a look at informal garbage collectors in Myanmar in terms of the circular economy concepts they have already adopted, the obstacles they confront, and how they may be integrated into a country’s sustainability strategy. This is a call for an inclusive circular economy that balances sustainability and social equality.

Key Takeawys:

1. Myanmar faces a significant waste and plastic pollution crisis in metropolitan areas due to insufficient municipal capacity, poor infrastructure, and regulatory gaps.

2. Informal workers (collected, scrap dealers, junk shops) play a crucial role in recycling and material recovery, reducing landfill use, pollution, and poverty. However, they are not recognised or protected under official CE regulations.

3. An efficient circular economy in Myanmar requires social inclusion through recognition, formal integration, and targeted support for informal workers. Towards environmental sustainability, good employment, equity, and resilience, “A just transition approach” can lead to ecologically sustainable growth and development.

Introduction: Circular Economy in the Myanmar Context

A Circular Economy (CE) can be defined as a high-tech, advanced economy that is common in industrialised countries. In simple terms, it is about using resources efficiently, which includes reducing waste, recycling, and reusing materials so that nothing gets wasted unnecessarily. In a transitory nation like Myanmar, the Circular Economy takes on a whole different form.

Myanmar does not follow a ‘take, make, dispose’ model. In fact, they have to deal with informal structures. The country produces about 0.44 kg of garbage per person each day, which is lower than the global average. However, there is a major issue with managing their waste. A serious waste management issue develops in major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay, where traditional trash management systems are overworked, and dump sites are already full.

In developing countries, CE ideals are well-suited to local culture and informal work. In the Chatham House Briefing, Preston & Lehne argue that CE can help reduce the requirement for landfills, creating green jobs, particularly for low-income people, improving resource security if local production capability is restricted, and strengthening climate resilience through waste reduction and recycling.

According to international sources such as UNEP research on the circular economy in Asia and the Pacific, informal trash industries are a significant driver of recycling markets in low- and middle-income nations.

Myanmar’s waste management network has significant obstacles. There are major gaps in waste collection, with city authorities unable to provide waste management services properly. As a result, solid trash is left in streets and canals or burned, affecting both air and water quality. Plastic solid trash is becoming increasingly prevalent, accounting for 13% of total solid garbage. Plastic garbage in coastal areas accounts for up to 87% of sea waste. Because of a lack of proper recycling stations, most processed materials are exported or supplied to local small companies.

How Informal Workers Contribute to Circularity

A highly effective recycling network is formed by informal waste workers, such as street collectors, travelling buyers, scrap dealers, and junk shop owners. They gather, sort, and market recyclables like glass, paper, metals, and plastics in both domestic and international recycling markets.

Informal collectors keep garbage out of disposal sites by reusing goods that would otherwise end up there. Although this promotes material reuse and recycling, lowering demand for new materials and thus reducing garbage generation, it can also be perceived negatively because it leads to littering and pollution in areas where informal collectors dispose of waste. Informal recycling reduces greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the need for new resources. In a fragile economy, informal recycling provides a source of income for those living in poverty.

Problems and Exclusion Experienced by Informal Wasteworkers

Although they perform an effective job, informal garbage collectors are occasionally ignored. Two significant challenges are:

1. Lack of Recognition and Policy Support.

They go unreported in formal waste policies and are viewed as a problem rather than a benefit. They cannot access waste streams or profit from national CE plans unless legally recognised.

2. Poor Working Conditions and Social Stigma.

Working circumstances for informal recycler groups are frequently unsafe, exposing them to potentially harmful substances without protective equipment and leaving them subject to exploitation. Criticised communities with waste-related jobs are less likely to get communal social services.

Social Inclusion: The Missing Link in Circularity

A circular economy will require social inclusion, with a focus on countries like Myanmar. When it comes to informal players like rubbish pickers who help keep cities clean, a significant issue in the present rules is disregarded. To achieve a just and sustainable conclusion, Myanmar can implement a “Just Transition” strategy, including the following elements:

1. Recognition: Waste pickers play an important role in city cleaning and recycling. As a result, individuals will be empowered rather than excluded and will play an essential role in trash management.

2. Integration: Provide a means for informal sector employees to be integrated into official waste management systems. It may involve reaching an agreement with cooperatives to employ rubbish pickers in a fair and controlled manner in a formal environment. It will increase employment certainty and make waste management a collective responsibility, leading to more favorable environmental outcomes.

3. Support: Providing specific assistance to ensure integration success. This consists of providing safety equipment, health insurance, and assistance in establishing equitable markets for recycled products. This will improve the quality of life for trash workers. With these approaches, Myanmar can start to shift to a more inclusive and sustainable circular economy in which all waste sector workers’ contributions are valued.

Barriers to Implementation

In Myanmar, several hurdles to an inclusive circular economy include legislative flaws, financial limits, and a lack of information. The existing regulation fails to handle the informal sector, which contributes significantly to the management of waste. The installation of infrastructure for processing hazardous waste is expensive, which serves as a constraint. Finally, information about waste and the informal sector is inaccurate, making it difficult to handle effectively.

Conclusion

Workers in Myanmar’s informal economy have intimate contact with the circular economy. The circular economy exists, but it faces numerous challenges. To enable this economic transition into the future, sustainability must be linked to social inclusion through measures such as formalising the informal economy, raising safety standards, and investing in community projects. Such approaches can help to maximise resource utilisation and recognise the vital role of waste pickers in building a sustainable future.

Pyae Phyoe Mon is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and an M.A. Candidate in Social Sciences at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

As thousands of Myanmar workers seek opportunities in Malaysia, this article examines their motivations, struggles, and broader social implications.

Introduction

Migration from Myanmar to Malaysia has become one of the most significant labour movements in Southeast Asia. Malaysia’s expanding industrial base and continuous demand for affordable labour have made it a primary destination for Myanmar migrants. Among the estimated 800,000 Myanmar workers living in Malaysia, many view migration as a means to escape economic hardship and political instability in their home country.
Despite their significant role in Malaysia’s economy, these workers often remain marginalised and underrepresented in public discourse. In early 2024, Frontier Myanmar reported that the Malaysian government introduced a voluntary repatriation program starting on 1 March 2024. The policy encouraged undocumented migrants to surrender to the authorities and return home without prosecution by paying a fine of 300–500 ringgit per immigration offence. This move signalled Malaysia’s increasingly strict approach toward undocumented labour, even though the country continues to rely heavily on migrant workers to sustain its industries.

Reasons for Migration

The migration of Myanmar citizens to Malaysia can be explained through both push and pull factors. Push factors stem from conditions within Myanmar. Persistent economic instability, unemployment, and political uncertainty have forced many citizens to seek opportunities abroad. The 2021 military coup further intensified the economic crisis, leading to inflation, rising poverty, and limited access to stable employment. For many rural families, labour migration has become one of the few viable strategies for survival and income generation.
Conversely, pull factors are linked to Malaysia’s expanding economy, which offers higher wages, greater job security, and improved living standards compared to Myanmar. The most common employment sectors include manufacturing, construction, agriculture, plantation work, and domestic service. Social networks also play a vital role in facilitating migration, as friends and relatives who have already migrated assist newcomers in finding jobs and navigating legal procedures. Over time, these social connections have established a strong and continuous migration corridor between Myanmar and Malaysia.

Theoretical View of the Intended Migration

The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) provides a useful framework for understanding the intentions of Myanmar workers to migrate. The theory suggests that human behaviour is influenced by three components: attitude toward the behaviour, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control.
For many Myanmar migrants, the attitude toward migration is highly positive. Young individuals, in particular, view working abroad as a means to achieve financial independence, support their families, and enhance their quality of life. Migration is perceived as a symbol of progress, ambition, and empowerment.
Subjective norms, or social expectations, also shape migration decisions. Within many Myanmar communities, migration to Malaysia is considered a mark of success. Families and neighbours often respect and admire those who send remittances home, which reinforces the idea that working abroad is both honourable and beneficial.

Finally, perceived behavioural control refers to an individual’s belief in their ability to migrate successfully and adapt to life in a new country. Despite knowing the challenges of working in so-called 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous, and difficult), many believe the opportunity to earn a higher income outweighs the associated risks.
According to UNDP (2024), approximately 40 per cent of Myanmar youth expressed a desire to migrate abroad if given the chance. This indicates that migration is not merely an economic decision, but also a social and psychological phenomenon deeply rooted in both community influence and personal ambition.

Issues and Challenges

Although Malaysia benefits from the labour of Myanmar migrants, these workers continue to face numerous legal, economic, and social challenges. Legal documentation remains one of the most pressing concerns. The Irrawaddy (2024) reported that around 500,000 Myanmar workers are officially registered, while the remaining 300,000 live and work without valid documentation. Undocumented migrants face the constant threat of arrest, detention, and deportation under Malaysia’s immigration laws. Although the 2024 repatriation initiative provided temporary relief, the requirement to pay fines ranging from 300 to 500 ringgit (USD 70–120) was financially burdensome for many low-income workers.
Exploitation and labour abuse are also widespread. Numerous human rights organisations have reported cases involving recruitment fraud, unpaid wages, passport confiscation, and unsafe working environments. Many migrants endure long working hours, minimal rest, and poor occupational safety. Furthermore, Myanmar migrants often encounter social discrimination and cultural exclusion. They are frequently viewed as temporary or low-status residents and are excluded from welfare programs. Language barriers, unclear legal rights, and frequent policy shifts further increase their vulnerability and insecurity.

Benefits to Myanmar’s Economy

Despite these hardships, the contribution of Myanmar migrant workers remains vital to the country’s economic development. According to the World Bank (2023), Myanmar migrants abroad remitted approximately USD 1.5 billion, representing around 2 per cent of the nation’s GDP. These remittances serve as a crucial lifeline for families, enabling access to education, healthcare, and improved living conditions while stimulating local business growth.

Conclusion

The situation of Myanmar migrant workers in Malaysia highlights the complex nature of labour migration, which is a process that provides opportunities for personal growth while exposing workers to structural inequalities and risks. Addressing these challenges aligns closely with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth, which emphasises fair labour practices, safe working conditions, and equal opportunities for all workers. For migration to become a truly sustainable and empowering process, both governments must strengthen labour governance, ensure fair recruitment, and expand legal migration pathways. Providing skill-development programs, digital training, and entrepreneurship opportunities such as SME and start-up support can also help migrants build long-term financial independence. Ultimately, when human dignity is respected and economic opportunities are shared equitably, migration can evolve from a necessity into a vehicle for inclusive growth and regional prosperity.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

Myanmar, particularly more than half of the population dependent on the livestock and agriculture sector, is now struggling with the prolonged polycrisis: the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing political conflict, severe economic downturn, severe human rights violations, and environmental degradation.

Key Takeaways:

1. The lack of technical and financial assistance from the government is a major challenge for rural livestock and agricultural farmers.

2. Circular feeding could be a significant agrarian change in the husbandry sector and help to improve sustainable development.

3. The ongoing civil war continues to hinder agricultural sector development, limiting market access and livelihood opportunities.

Already developed agricultural countries depend largely on machines and technology. However, least-developing and fragile countries like Myanmar rely heavily on conventional agriculture and traditional animal husbandry. According to the data from 2021, waste and by-products from the agriculture sectors around the world contribute approximately 11.7% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Since agriculture, including livestock farming, is the second largest source of GHG emissions worldwide, it is crucial to promote sustainable livestock farming practices that support long-term environmental sustainability and development.

Furthermore, agricultural practices in Myanmar are a major driver of climate change. An estimated 83 to 90% of the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions come from the agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) sector. That is significantly higher than the global average, where AFOLU contributes roughly one-quarter of total emissions.

The Impact of Varieties of Disasters on Farmers in Myanmar

Climate change is one of the challenges in achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) across the globe. Even small changes in temperature, as well as extreme weather conditions, have severe impacts on crop growth and the yields. In addition, resilient crop varieties and sustainable farming practices are one of the adaptation strategies for farmers to cope with climate change.

In Myanmar, disasters driven by climate change, such as floods, storms and earthquakes, have already affected crop and livestock production severely. In addition, the consequences of the 2021 military coup caused socio-economic disaster, especially in disadvantaged rural areas. Many villages were displaced, leading to the loss of farmland and the unsustainable expansion of new farmland in another area. At the same time, farmers are experiencing biological threats such as Apple snail infestations, which have destroyed several acres of paddy fields. In some cases, farmers are unable to re-cultivate paddy after the fields have been damaged. Moreover, pesticides are often ineffective, as the snails have adapted and developed resistance to commonly used chemicals.

On top of that, during the ongoing civil war, farmers have no access to receive any technical assistance from the government in a politically unstable country like Myanmar. And internationally funded projects can only be found in relatively stable regions. However, most of these projects prioritise humanitarian aid and disaster response rather than long-term sustainable livelihood development. Following the recent Mandalay earthquake in March 2025, even the livelihood-focused organisations such as LIFT also shifted their attention to post-earthquake relief efforts. Additionally, many project areas now overlap because NGOs are unable to reach conflict-affected regions due to restrictions from the Myanmar military government.

Current Agricultural and Livestock Farming Practice

Most farmers in Myanmar continue to rely on traditional (conventional) agricultural methods and outdated post-harvest technologies. Livestock production is also extensive and traditional, with nearly all rural households raising animals, particularly poultry and swine, for home consumption or supplementary income. Practices such as burning crop residues, overusing chemical fertilisers, disposing of animal manure improperly, and over-relying on commercial feed contribute significantly to environmental degradation. Waste and by-products from farms release methane, ammonia and nitrous oxide, all potent greenhouse gases which intensify climate change and global warming.

More than 60% of Myanmar’s labour force is employed in the agriculture and livestock sectors. Livestock farmers heavily rely on commercial feed, which is often expensive. Farmers prepare their feed with no knowledge of the quality of feed formulation and nutritional value. They particularly use carbohydrate-rich broken rice, rice bran, paddy seeds and groundnut cake.

Additionally, feeding costs have become a major challenge for farmers due to severe inflation. As of March 2025, Myanmar’s inflation rate has reached 28.67%, a significant increase from 0.75% in December 2020, two months before the military coup. From then on, the country’s socio-economic situation has further deteriorated since the 2021 military coup. During this period, the prices of livestock feed, chemical fertilisers, and other essential farm inputs have skyrocketed, causing a financial burden on farmers. In contrast, the farm-gate prices of paddy have not increased properly, resulting in leaving farmers with very low profits. Hence, farmers depend more on livestock farming for supplementary income. However, many smallholders struggle to afford commercial feed, ultimately threatening both their livelihoods and the long-term sustainability of the husbandry sector. This widening gap between production costs and income threatens farmers’ livelihoods and undermines the long-term sustainability and resilience of Myanmar’s agriculture and livestock sectors.

On top of that, nearly 300 agricultural students graduate annually from Yezin Agricultural University, making the imbalance ratio of agricultural professionals to the 7 million farmers. It further hinders the development of the agricultural sector.

Feasible Solutions for Agrarian Change

Since approximately 70% of the population in Myanmar resides in rural areas, livelihoods heavily depend on livestock and agriculture. These subsectors provide both income opportunities and access to nutrient-rich food. However, they also contribute to resource depletion, overuse of biomass, and over-rely on commercial feed, chemical fertilisers, and pesticides, resulting in greenhouse gas emissions and environmental degradation.

There are many potential solutions for sustainability in livestock farming, but one of the most effective approaches is circular feeding practice. Circular feeding not only reduces feeding costs but also contributes to SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), SDG 8 (Economic Growth), SDG 12 (Sustainable Consumption and Production), and SDG 13 (Climate Action). Commercial feed can be partially replaced with high-protein, farm-made alternatives, such as banana or hyacinth silage, fodder plants like duckweed, azolla and wolffia, and protein-rich insects like mealworm and BSF larvae. Additionally, by-products from livestock farming, such as animal manure, can be composted, used to produce biogas, or fed to Black Soldier Fly (BSF) larvae as protein conversion. To implement this effectively, farmers need both financial assistance and technical assistance.

The main nutrients required for poultry and swine are protein, minerals, vitamins, and carbohydrates. High protein can be obtained from insects and from fodder plants such as azolla, duckweed, and Wolffia, which also provide minerals. Banana and water hyacinth silage supply not only protein but also fibre, while carbohydrates can be sourced from farm by-products such as rice bran, broken rice, and maize bran.

Black Soldier Fly (BSF) larvae are highly protein-rich insects, containing 30–35% crude protein. Fodder plants such as azolla and Wolffia provide at least 20% protein and 20-30% of other minerals and vitamins. The advantage of it is that it can be cultivated in small spaces, even in the household farmyard. In addition, water hyacinth and banana silage, very easy to find in our surroundings and simple to process, have a higher crude protein content and fibre content than the fresh. During fermentation, water and carbohydrates decrease, concentration of the crude protein and fibre increases.

In addition, feed, in the livestock sector, accounts for around 83 % of total energy consumption through raw material sourcing, feed production, packaging and transport. By reducing reliance on commercial feed and replacing it with circular feed, farmers can lower greenhouse gas emissions from production and transport, reduce farm waste, and improve the feed conversion ratio (FCR) and increase income, ultimately enhancing both environmental sustainability and farm efficiency.

Another feasible and sustainable approach for both livestock and agriculture is the practice of polycultural agriculture, such as rice-duck farming and rice-fish farming, which are suitable for Myanmar’s agro-climatic context. Both farming systems are environmentally friendly as they reduce the need for chemical fertilisers and pesticides, thereby improving natural pest control, enhancing overall productivity and providing farmers with an additional source of income. Additional benefits include enhanced food security for smallholder households during the crisis and, over the long term, a reduction in methane emissions. Therefore, these farming methods in lowland rice production are recommended as an effective climate adaptation and mitigation strategy and supporting economic resilience.

Conclusion

To conclude, the lack of agricultural and livestock technicians is also a significant challenge in Myanmar. Ongoing civil conflicts have further hindered the development of sustainable agricultural practices, as foreign-funded NGO projects often cannot reach the least developed and conflict-affected areas. Promoting sustainable changes in animal husbandry, such as circular feeding, offers a viable solution to reduce environmental degradation while enhancing economic resilience. By adopting these practices, farmers can achieve a balance between environmental responsibility and economic stability, strengthening their capacity to withstand socio-economic shocks during periods of crisis.

Hnin Eaindra Khine is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also currently interning at RecyGlo Myanmar, where she supports various environmental sustainability projects.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

Help Sustain The Sabai Times - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai Times

The Myanmar Junta is planning a sham election not as a democratic transition but as a political strategy to consolidate military power, which can lead to more instability without genuine political dialogue.

Key Takeaways

• The junta’s upcoming elections are not a genuine democratic transition but a carefully staged performance to project an image of normalisation and legitimacy.

• With restrictive laws, the junta dissolved key political parties, and the exclusion of vast conflict-affected regions. Rather than reducing tensions, the result is likely to intensify Myanmar’s ongoing civil war and deepen the humanitarian crisis.

• A sustainable path toward peace requires the inclusion of the NUG and other opposition actors through meaningful political dialogue.

Introduction

Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s military junta has faced international condemnation and domestic resistance. After four years of civil wars and economic crisis, the junta plans to hold a multistage election as proof of its commitment to democracy. Junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced that it will hold general elections in late 2025 and early 2026. He presents these polls as fulfilling the “ASEAN five-point roadmap” to restore order and civilian rule. The junta also lifted the state of emergency and changed its name from the “State Administration Council” to “State Security and Peace Commission” and appointed itself as “Acting President”, aiming to shed its pariah status.

The elections come amid the civil war, years of airstrikes, mass arrests, repression of opposition parties and war crimes, where thousands have been killed as a pro-democracy rebellion takes on a heavily armed military. Yet the junta insists these elections progress toward “free and fair elections”. The movement is designed to manufacture legitimacy for the junta. The upcoming polls are only to whitewash the junta’s crimes against humanity. The junta’s sham election will only intensify the already dire human rights and humanitarian crisis, cementing the junta’s backing of China’s influence risk entrenching military dominance.

The Junta’s Democratic Narrative

The junta repeatedly claims that the 2025 elections reflect its commitment to democratic norms under the 2008 Constitution. It maintains that the coup was justified due to so-called “election fraud” in the 2020 polls, a claim discredited by international experts, independent observers, and domestic political actors.

The Junta regime highlights technical preparations, such as a partial census in 2024 and voter list updates, to present an image of professionalism and inclusiveness for polls. To reinforce this narrative, the junta appointed a new Union Election Commission (UEC) led by loyalist Than Soe.

Internationally, Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s high-profile trips to China, India, Russia, and Belarus aim to earn diplomatic endorsement. Junta statements at regional forums emphasise “progress,” portraying Myanmar as slowly returning to normalcy. Domestically, small-scale amnesties and repeated claims of holding elections only in “secure areas” attempt to depict the military as a stabilising institution willing to return power.

The 2008 Constitution reserves 25% of parliamentary seats for the military. This enables the military to hold veto power over any constitutional amendment. This entire so-called election process is crafted to guarantee military victory regardless of the vote.

Reality of Repression and Control

Despite democratic claims, the junta has intensified opposition suppression before the so-called election. The junta increases its attacks on civilians to expand its territorial and administrative control in advance of its sham election. The junta has committed numerous abuses, including crimes against humanity against protesters and activists, and war crimes in ethnic minority areas. Since the coup, the junta has launched more than 2,700 airstrikes, dramatically increasing year after year.

On 29 July 2025, the junta enacted the “Law on the Prevention of Obstruction, Disruption, and Sabotage of Multiparty Democratic General Election” and criminalised the criticism, protests or disruption of any part of the electoral process. The law states “three to five years in prison for election sabotage; five to 10 years for damaging ballot boxes, polling stations, or voting machines (or life imprisonment if committed as a group): and 10-20 years for causing serious injury to voters, polling staff, candidates, or election officials”, restricting freedom of expression and speech. The authorities have arrested 94 people under the new law since August, including at least 4 children and several prominent personalities from the film industry, to intensify fear among the civilians.

On the other hand, the junta raised requirements for parties to participate in elections to oppress the opposition parties according to the “Political Parties Registration Law”. The junta also made various amendments; the 1st amendment on 30 January 2024, the 2nd amendment in July 2025 and the 3rd amendment on 21 September 2025 to win seats for the military-backed or allied in the upcoming polls. The new amendments restrict the minimum number of party members, the minimum number of nationwide offices, large financial deposits and prohibit anyone convicted of a crime from joining a party. Moreover, the political parties have to re-register within 60 days or be dissolved.

As a result, the law dissolved 40 political parties which failed to imply including the famous National League for Democracy (NLD), amid their landslide win in the 2020 general election. Moreover, the UEC also disbanded four re-registered political parties: National Democratic Force Party (NDF) for not having enough members, Mon Women’s Party (MWP), Union Farmer-Labour Party and the Democratic Party of National Politics (DNP) for not having the required number of offices. All these efforts show the regime do not want to bring democracy but to act against the potential contenders and enforce their own rules.

To enhance the election process, the military administration granted amnesty to more than 3,000 people for opposing their regime and dropped charges against more than 5,500 others on November 27, 2025. According to the Assistant Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) – AAPP, over 22,000 political prisoners still languish in jails, including the infamous political leader Aung San Suu Kyi. More than 6,100 women and 629 children have been arrested since the 2021 coup, showcasing that the junta’s amnesty is an effort to cover their sham election.

Despite the military efforts, many experts, international governments and the United Nations state that the upcoming polls could never be free and fair. UN rights office spokesman Jeremy Laurence said, “This military-controlled ballot will be conducted in an atmosphere rife with threats and violence”. Usage of electronic voting machines, electronic surveillance technology utilising AI-biometric tracking, raises fraud concerns as civil society, media, and observers are barred.

The National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic armed groups reject the upcoming elections and call for decisive ASEAN actions, labelling the polls illegitimate. Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) documents failures against international standards for the upcoming polls, from voter suppression to a level playing field. ANFREL also warn that the election can only bring the country to fall deeper into conflict.

Why the Elections Cannot Solve the Crisis

The upcoming polls fail to address Myanmar’s fundamental political crisis. They ignore the core issues that have fueled conflict for decades: military domination, lack of federalism, and the public’s overwhelming rejection of the coup. The United States Institute of Peace states that over 92% of the population supports the NUG. The junta, on the other hand, rejects NUG, CRPH and defence forces, labelling them as terrorist groups. This designation blocks any form of political communication or negotiation between the parties and further entrenches the conflict.

Moreover, the elections will be held only in areas under military control, excluding large parts of the country administered by resistance forces or ethnic organisations. The result of the upcoming polls is predictable, as the military-backed or allied parties will hold the power, and this cannot solve the prolonged civil war and humanitarian crisis. This can only formalise the Myanmar military regime and deepen domestic conflict and instability.

Apart from that, views from international communities remain divided. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the European Union have imposed sanctions on Myanmar in response to the coup and have not recognised the Junta’s sham election plan. Even ASEAN faces a diplomatic dilemma over the upcoming sham election. The ASEAN stated that they will not send any monitors to the upcoming elections, and the junta regime should prioritise peace over elections, accept the upcoming polls, and it is undeniable that the military’s only hope is that the elections will end widespread opposition to their grip on power.

Conclusion

The 2025 elections are a political performance designed to legitimise Myanmar’s military rule and not restore democracy. Through the coordinated propaganda, restrictive laws, and selective amnesties, the junta is showcasing the appearance of democratic progress amid the systematic repression of its opposition parties.

The upcoming polls cannot resolve Myanmar’s political crisis as they exclude genuine political actors and aim to entrench military dominance. The current political situation cannot be solved by offering legitimacy to the brutal regime. Only real political reforms and settlements can bring peace and stability. The further political settlements and democratic transition processes must include NUG and opposition actors and end military violence for a sustainable nation-building process. It is undeniable that the current sham election is designed to legitimise power for the junta’s generals.

Mhue Aung is a final-year CDM student with over two years of experience in humanitarian work. He is currently a migrant worker in Thailand.