In conflict-affected Myanmar, engaging men in SRHR programming offers a critical yet challenging pathway toward transforming entrenched gender norms and hegemonic masculinities.

Key Takeaways:

• Effectiveness of men’s engagement in gender transformative SRHR programming is assumed to be shaped by the intersection of socio-cultural norms and ongoing politically unstable conditions, including poverty and conflict.

• Local grassroots organisations play a critical role in delivering SRHR awareness and challenging hegemonic masculinities, but their programs are constrained by donor-driven priorities, limited institutional capacity and resources, gender-sensitive expertise, time, and insecurity.

• Impact of these interventions may be interrupted, as social stigma, including local perceptions towards gender equality, can influence the extent of male participation in SRHR programming.

What is SRHR

The programme for gender equality has long been framed around the empowerment of women and the promotion of women’s rights, particularly within Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) initiatives. While this focus has contributed meaningfully to expanding women’s agency and participation, many scholars have argued that such approaches remain insufficient when relational drivers of gender inequality, especially the role of men in gender and development discourse, are left unaddressed. While sexual and reproductive health is a crucial part of social relationships, relating to physical, mental, and social well-being for human beings, these rights-based movements should advance human rights and gender equality. In terms of SRHR programming, it is not limited to local educational training, national awareness campaigns, or global feminist movements for reproductive rights.

Why male engagement is necessary (the importance of male engagement)

Since the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development as well as the 1995 Beijing Plan of Action, global gender and development agendas explicitly identified partnership with men as central to advancing gender equality and preventing violence against women and girls by foregrounding men’s roles in transforming unequal power relations. Therefore, engaging with men for gender equality means including men and boys not as perpetrators or bystanders, but as active allies and partners in SRHR programming to address structural inequality. Such engagement aims to improve intimate partner relationships, reduce gender-based violence, and support better family planning practices for future generations by reimagining masculinities. Existing research also shows that central to this work is challenging hegemonic masculinities and unequal power relations, moving away from dominant norms towards positive masculinities.

Male Engagement in the SRHR programming in Myanmar

While SRHR programming in Myanmar has historically emphasized women-related health issues, there have been growing efforts to involve men in these programs in recent years, reflecting broader global shifts towards gender-transformative interventions. However, there is limited knowledge of how these organizations navigate male engagement strategies in practice locally to challenge hegemonic masculinity as part of addressing unequal gender power relations, particularly in Myanmar. In addition, although a growing body of literature identifies cultural gender norms as key barriers to male engagement, fewer studies highlight how barriers to organizational practices are simultaneously shaped by broader socio-economic and political conditions. Since Myanmar is under an authoritarian regime and restrictions on civil society organizations on the ground, the possibilities and limitations of these approaches under the conditions of socioeconomic and political constraints require careful attention to create a better lifestyle and healthy relationships among family members and social relations.

Limitations of men’s engagement in SRHR initiatives

Despite growing international attention to engaging men and boys for gender transformative change in SRHR and violence prevention, evidence shows that such interventions remain relatively low, and often difficult to sustain, particularly in low- income and fragile settings. In Myanmar, deeply conservative gender norms, patriarchal ideology, and longstanding authoritarian rule create structural barriers to the meaningful engagement of men in gender and development interventions. Essentially, SRHR programs face conservative cultural norms and strong taboos around sexuality, which restrict SRH literacy, open discussion, and access to services. In this low-income and fragile setting, conflict and authorised military rule further undermine accountability mechanisms for SRHR programming, with severe disruption in rural conflict-affected areas, compared to urban settings in Myanmar.

In this regard, community-based and non-governmental organizations have become crucial providers of SRHR awareness training and educational workshops on the ground. International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 2023 reports highlight that their operations are working with chronic under-resourcing and limited civic space. Recent evidence and gap mapping validate that male engagement in SRHR interventions is deeply intersectional, shaped by political, economic, and sociocultural forces. This identifies a clear gap for research on how Myanmar’s current sociocultural and political factors influence whether men’s meaningful involvement in SRHR programs is restricted. Secondly, men’s primary provider roles and livelihood pressures will be one of the main reasons for low participation in these programmes.

Possibilities to create inclusive engagement

Therefore, meaningful engagement requires shifting their representation from perpetrators or passive bystanders to active allies and partners who can challenge structural inequalities and contribute to advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). Such engagement aims to improve intimate partner relationships, reduce gender-based violence, and support better family planning practices for future generations by reimagining masculinities. Based on the contextual conditions, engaging with men in programming can vary across regions. According to previous studies, SRHR programs would be more effective if they give training exclusively to men or women only, based on specific local contexts, culture, and tradition. Additionally, in order to encourage their participation, some organisations will provide family incentives/allowances for equal participation under socioeconomic constraints and the culture of men being in charge of the economic provider of the household, challenging them to fully participate in these awareness and education training. However, the effectiveness of men’s engagement is not determined by training alone but by the interaction of socio-cultural norms, organisational capacities, donor logics, and local perceptions of SRHR issues; not least, to create a sustainable practice of men’s engagement in these programs requires not only stable support from the government, which is currently challenging in Myanmar.

Conclusion

Having said that, the role of local organisations working towards SRHR programs is crucial in challenging hegemonic masculinity in the country where power is held by militarised masculinity, translating as power above by subordinating women is a primitive danger for Myanmar, which is already dominated by some toxic cultures, strengthening toxic masculinity by subordinating women. By ensuring the involvement of men in discussing the variety of topics around violence against women, family planning and consent, these programs will definitely create a safe space for men to question long-rooted ideas around decision-making and economic provider roles, contraceptive-related health issues for their partners, as well as the perspectives towards how real men should behave and how gender equality threatens men’s power authority. So that would lead to gender transformative change by potentially transforming household-level power relations, such as joint decision-making on SRHR-related decisions, men’s involvement in unpaid labor, attitudes towards GBV, which are central to gender equality, while we consider a localised approach to gender-transformative change.

Naychi Thel Kyaw Tun, a gender and minority rights advocate, is a Program Manager at the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and is currently pursuing a master's degree in Gender and Development Studies at the University of Melbourne, Australia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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As Myanmar’s private sector navigates a complex polycrisis of political instability, economic disruption, energy shortages, and shifting global trade standards, ESG transformation is emerging not only as a sustainability imperative but also as a pathway to resilience, competitiveness, and continued access to international markets.

Key Takeaways:

• ESG is becoming an economic necessity, not merely a CSR choice; Global sustainability and supply-chain standards increasingly influence market access, competitiveness, and long-term business survival.

• Myanmar faces a major sustainability–survival dilemma; Economic instability, electricity shortages, logistics constraints, limited financing, and weak digital infrastructure make it difficult for local businesses to meet increasingly demanding ESG requirements.

• Localised, low-cost compliance can support both sustainability and resilience; Measures such as rooftop solar, basic ESG data tracking, responsible sourcing, workplace audits, and supply-chain transparency can help Myanmar businesses reduce operational risks while maintaining access to international markets.

The profound structural shift in the global marketplace has become highly noticeable in recent years. Decades ago, corporate sustainability was treated as mere ethical compliance, often categorized under voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives or public relations campaigns. Today, however, sustainable transformation is no longer a matter of moral positioning; it is an operational imperative tied directly to financial materiality, risk mitigation, and long-term corporate viability. As the global market accelerates its shift toward strict Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) mandates and transparent value chains, these principles have evolved from a defensive compliance exercise into a core driver of competitive advantage and value creation. Simply put, competitive advantage no longer relies solely on capital and speed, but on how deeply an organisation embeds sustainability into its core operations.

The costs associated with sustainability and ESG standards are undoubtedly intended for the greater good, but they generate immense externalities and intense debates regarding fairness for developing countries. While these standards are well-intentioned, they are almost entirely designed by wealthy, advanced economies (like the US and the European Union) that possess the infrastructure and capital to support them. This raises a critical question: How can a developing country like Myanmar, currently navigating a severe compound crisis, achieve economic growth when the fundamental rules of international trade have been so drastically rewritten?

According to European trade monitoring data, the European Union (EU) remains one of Myanmar’s most significant export destinations, specifically for consumer apparel. The EU stands as Myanmar’s fourth-largest trading partner, accounting for roughly 10% of the country’s total international trade. This trade relationship is heavily weighted in Myanmar’s favor, driven by an export volume that has historically crossed the €3 billion mark in recent trade cycles. Crucially, nearly 80% of all Myanmar goods exported to the European market are concentrated in the textiles, apparel, and footwear sectors. This concentration is a stark signal of how deeply Myanmar’s economic lifeline and survival are dependent on international trade preferences. Understanding these trade dynamics is essential for analyzing the country’s current polycrisis, as macroeconomic vulnerabilities directly impact local livelihoods and regional development.

The need for sustainable transformation is theoretically clear, but its practical execution faces overwhelming domestic barriers. Reports from international financial institutions explicitly note that the private sector in Myanmar is currently trapped in a “survival loop,” where long-term planning has been entirely replaced by day-to-day risk management. Local enterprises face severe operational challenges. Constant, unpredictable electricity outages force factories to rely on expensive, carbon-heavy diesel generators just to maintain production lines, while volatile price fluctuations continually distort operational costs. Furthermore, persistent logistics bottlenecks at border crossings, restricted access to international capital, and a lack of formalized digital data infrastructure make tracking granular ESG metrics incredibly difficult. Advanced green technology and sustainability concepts sound promising in theory, but in reality, local enterprises view them as heavy operational barriers. Expecting resource-constrained domestic firms to adopt complex sustainability frameworks while they are fighting just to stay alive in the short term is an unrealistic approach.

Consequently, the most viable actionable pathway for the private sector is not to wait for large-scale macroeconomic stabilization or a lifting of geopolitical sanctions. Instead, it lies in adopting localized models of “Responsible Sourcing and Micro-Compliance.” Rather than pursuing expensive green transformation, domestic enterprises can focus on practical, dual-purpose adjustments. For instance, integrating decentralized rooftop solar arrays directly addresses the severe electricity deficit, additionally reducing reliance on costly diesel, while simultaneously fulfilling renewable energy demands from international buyers. Further, by utilizing low-cost, basic digital data tracking tools, local factories can securely document labor indicators, wage payments, and workplace safety without requiring overwhelming financial investments. Local businesses must actively engage with established supply chain transparency frameworks, such as the EU-funded Multi-Stakeholder Alliance for Decent Employment (MADE) in Myanmar project. By proactively auditing workplace conditions and proving a strict decoupling from sanctioned or high-risk entities, the local manufacturing sector can provide international buyers with the verifiable evidence required to justify their continued sourcing.

To conclude, Myanmar’s path to economic recovery cannot be separated from the global sustainability agenda. While the challenges of operating within a polycrisis are undeniable, treating sustainability as a secondary priority will only lead to further economic isolation. By transforming strict sustainability mandates from an abstract trade barrier into a practical toolkit for resilience, Myanmar’s private sector can safeguard nearly half a million civilian livelihoods and preserve its most critical economic lifeline.

Sann Htet Htun Lwin is a Master’s student in Development Studies at the Yangon University of Economics.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Sustainability is often associated with protecting the environment, but it is also about improving the quality of life for people today without creating problems for future generations.

Key Takeaways:

• Plastic is a waste-management problem, not just an environmental problem.

• Bans alone are insufficient; incentives, infrastructure, and community action are needed.

• Myanmar can combine modern solutions with traditional, locally rooted practices.

In Myanmar, one of the biggest sustainability challenges is plastic waste. Plastic bags are commonly used in markets and shops because they are cheap and convenient. However, many of these bags are used only once before being thrown away. Poor waste management and limited recycling systems allow plastic to accumulate in streets, rivers, and drainage systems, creating environmental and public health problems. Addressing this issue requires not only better policies but also changes in everyday habits and stronger community participation.Unlike high-income nations where waste is whisked away to unseen landfills or incinerators, Myanmar's waste infrastructure is intensely visible.
The infrastructure deficit in Myanmar’s waste management is structural. Municipal bodies like the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC) and Mandalay City Development Committee (MCDC) collect thousands of tons of garbage daily, but their reach is largely confined to urban centers, and even there, resources are stretched thin. In suburban townships and rural villages, formalized trash collection is virtually non-existent.
Consequently, domestic waste follows a predictable, destructive lifecycle. It is either burned in backyard piles releasing toxic dioxins into the air or discarded into nearby creeks, roadside ditches, and drainage alleys.
During the dry season, these plastic-choked gutters sit silent. But when the monsoon hits, the consequences are immediate. The plastic acts as a watertight seal over municipal drainage networks. Streets transform into rivers within minutes of a downpour, ruining ground-floor businesses and creating stagnant pools where dengue-carrying mosquitoes breed.
Further downstream, the problem scales up. The Irrawaddy River, the nation’s economic and cultural lifeblood, is now cited by international researchers as one of the top twenty most plastic-polluted rivers in the world. The river acts as a conveyor belt, carrying hundreds of tons of macro and microplastics daily into the Andaman Sea, devastating marine ecosystems and threatening the coastal fisheries that millions rely on for protein.
Plastic pollution also has serious consequences for public health. When plastic waste is burned in open spaces, it releases harmful chemicals into the air that can contribute to respiratory diseases and other long-term health problems. In addition, tiny plastic particles, known as microplastics, can enter rivers, farmland, and the food chain. As people consume contaminated fish or drink polluted water, these particles may eventually affect human health. Therefore, reducing plastic pollution is not only an environmental issue but also an important investment in the well-being of Myanmar's people.
Historically, the knee-jerk reaction to environmental crises is to pass a law. Myanmar has tried this. Over the years, various regional governments have announced bans on the production and import of thin plastic bags. Fines have been threatened; occasional raids on wholesalers have made local headlines.
Yet, the bags remain. Why? Because top-down bans fail when there are no viable, affordable alternatives for the poorest segments of society. If a government bans a 5-kyat plastic bag but the closest biodegradable alternative costs 50 kyats, the policy is effectively a tax on the poor. In an economic climate weighed down by inflation and instability, expecting citizens to absorb environmental premiums is unrealistic.
True sustainability cannot be policed into existence; it has to be designed into the daily rhythm of communities.
If policies lack teeth, the solution must pivot toward localized, cultural levers. Myanmar actually possesses a deep historical precedent for sustainable packaging. Before the mid-1990s plastic boom, grocery shopping looked entirely different.
Fish and meat were wrapped in broad, waxy banana leaves tied with natural twine. Rice and dry goods were carried in woven bamboo baskets, and snacks were held in repurposed newspaper cones. While returning entirely to a pre-modern economy is impractical, modernizing these traditional practices offers a path forward.
Change is starting to spark from the ground up. In various neighborhoods, youth-led volunteer groups conduct weekly trash-collection drives, physically clearing blocked waterways. Social enterprises are popping up to turn collected plastic waste into construction materials, eco-bricks, or upcycled consumer goods.
Crucially, the informal sector holds the key to scalable recycling.
If municipal policies shifted away from punitive bans and toward supporting these informal networks perhaps by subsidizing the collection of low-value plastics like plastic bags we would see an immediate economic incentive for clean streets.
Navigating out of this plastic quagmire requires a psychological shift. It means moving away from the mindset that waste management is solely the government’s job, and moving toward a model of radical civic ownership.
For consumers, it means normalizing the small inconveniences: refusing a bag for an item that can be carried, keeping a reusable canvas tote in a motorbike seat, and separating organic waste from plastics at home. For local market committees, it means establishing centralized, cleanly managed disposal points so waste pickers can sort materials safely.
Myanmar’s plastic crisis is undeniable, but it is not irreversible. By marrying modern waste incentives with the country’s inherent traditions of community cooperation and natural resourcefulness, a cleaner, healthier, and genuinely sustainable future can be pulled from the margins back into the mainstream.

Thin Thin Aye is an undergraduate student from Myanmar with a strong interest in sustainability issues, particularly those affecting Myanmar.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Myanmar's military government is leveraging the revival of the Myitsone Dam project as a diplomatic tool to secure support from China, resulting in severe environmental and social exploitation in the Kachin frontier.

Key Takeaways:

• Political Leverage Over Economics: The military government uses the Myitsone Dam revival as a diplomatic tool to secure political and economic backing from China, prioritising political exchange over development.

• Resource and Green Colonialism: The dam project drives the expansion of rare earth element extraction, creating a “territorial sacrifice zone” that serves external demands under the guise of green initiatives.

• Frontier Marginalisation: This model of authoritarian extraction concentrates environmental destruction, forced displacement, and political marginalisation within Kachin communities, reinforcing unequal governance structures.

Myanmar’s military government announced that it wanted to revive the long-suspended Myitsone Dam, with a statement that the Myitsone Dam will be the answer to Myanmar’s growing energy crisis. On the surface, it is a reasonable explanation for the country’s crisis. The country’s power grid has suffered severely since the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, and the electricity is frequently interrupted, affecting households and businesses throughout the nation. Yet framing Myitsone as an energy project misses the important story. The dam has come to represent so much more than just a large-scale energy project; it’s a symbol of how global efforts for clean energy can drive political dependency, resource extraction, and the burden on communities that are not directly benefiting from the dam’s construction.

This contradiction sits at the heart of what many scholars describe as Green Colonialism. The term does not imply that renewable energy is harmful. Instead, it refers to situations where projects promoted under the banner of sustainability recreate the patterns of inequality while allowing powerful governments or corporations to secure land, water, and minerals, while local communities have to bear the burden of environmental and social consequences. In other words, the technologies enabling a greener future are not necessarily fair; they are shaped by political choices and decisions on who changes their landscape, who will bear the burden, and who will ultimately gain from the transition.

This is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in Kachin State, Myanmar. The Myitsone Dam is located at the confluence of Mali and N’Mai rivers, the headwaters of Ayeyarwady (also called Ayeyawaddy) River, Myanmar’s cultural and ecological lifeline. The project has been met with persistent opposition since its initiation in 2009, since the project has displaced Kachin communities, had negative impacts on biodiversity and there is a widespread concern that most of the electricity would be exported to China and not used for energy in the country. In 2011, the project was suspended after much public pressure forced President Thein Sein to back down, one of the country’s significant environmental victories. More than a decade later, however, Myanmar’s military regime appears willing to revisit the matter, the deeper its political and economic dependence on China grows.

The timing is no coincidence. China’s demand for strategic resources has been growing at a fast rate, as the world pushes forward with transitioning to decarbonised economies. Myanmar occupies a central position within the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of the Belt and Road Initiative that provides China with overland access to the Indian Ocean. Hydropower, transmission infrastructure, and the rare earth minerals used in electric vehicles and wind turbines have become central to national energy security and industrial policy. Now, with the proposed dam in its midst, Kachin State finds itself in a strategic position in this transition, with one of the world’s most important sources of heavy rare earth elements.

The significance of Kachin State extends well beyond hydropower. Over the past decade, the region has now supplied one of the world’s most significant sources of heavy rare earths, particularly dysprosium and terbium, which are essential for permanent magnets used in electric vehicles, offshore wind turbines, military technologies and advanced electronics. As China tightened environmental regulations on domestic mining, production increasingly shifted to Myanmar, where weak governance and ongoing conflict created favourable conditions for extraction. Weak governance and ongoing conflict made it attractive for production to move across the border. The materials are essential to clean-energy technologies, with the environmental costs of having left communities with polluted waterways, deforested hillsides, and environmental effects and forced migration that benefit the consumers in other parts of the world.

The juxtaposition of the Myitsone Dam and the Kachin’s rare earth boom is a troubling paradox. The very same global transition celebrated for reducing carbon emissions can also lead to new forms of injustices when the need for clean energy comes at the cost of the sacrifices of politically marginalised areas. The hydropower and mining industries are not separate stories; they should be understood as part of the same political economy, where the interdependence of infrastructure, critical minerals and geopolitical influence strengthen each other. The world’s need for renewable energy is no longer a question. The question is whether or not a transition can be considered “green” if its environmental burdens continue to fall so unevenly. A just energy transition goes beyond replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy.

It also requires institutions that are capable of protecting the rights of affected communities, providing meaningful participation of community voice in environmental decision-making, and sharing the benefits and burdens of decarbonisation more equitably. Without these regulations, the transition risks becoming more than just a technological shift; it may be a new geography of environmental injustice.

Ingyin Hmwe is a researcher at Norwegian Agency for Exchange Cooperation (NOREC) and an MSc candidate in Climate Change and Sustainable Development at Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Disposable waste is material or an item that is discarded after use and is no longer wanted or usable. The national waste generation rate in Myanmar is reported to be about 0.56 kg per person per day (World Bank). Plastic waste is the most visible and most harmful waste type as it easily gets into drains, rivers, and open spaces. Most of the plastic waste is polluting water, soil, and the environment. Thus, waste management systems and the reduction of urban living space in Myanmar are interrelated to social, economic, and institutional welfare.

Key Takeaways

• Plastic waste in Myanmar is now more than an environmental issue. It also points to deeper problems of urban governance, waste disposal and the safeguarding of public health.

• Littering has become a common habit, environmental awareness is still low and civic responsibility is often weak or ignored, which continues to result in improper disposal of waste.

• Cities struggle to effectively manage their waste due to poor municipal infrastructure, limited investment and weak enforcement of waste management regulations. This often results in garbage piling up on the streets, blocking drains and polluting rivers and waterways.

• This results in blocked drainage, recurrent flooding of urban areas, increased mosquito breeding and a greater risk of disease outbreaks, all of which diminish the quality of life and resilience of urban communities of Myanmar.

Why do plastic waste and urban decline matter?

Plastic waste matters because it links everyday disposal habits to broader urban failure. The waste sector in Myanmar continues to be hindered by low collection coverage, inadequate disposal systems, and institutional challenges. At the same time, blocked drains and poor solid-waste management worsen flooding in cities and make the public more vulnerable to health problems.

This is also important because it points to a deeper social problem, where a lack of environmental awareness, normalised careless disposal and limited civic responsibility allow waste to keep reappearing on streets, drains and open spaces. This trend is reinforced in Myanmar by the demand for public education and increased cooperation between individuals and municipal authorities.

Rooted Mindset on waste management in Myanmar

Cultural Stigma and Misconceptions

In the Myanmar context, poor waste disposal practices are not merely a matter of convenience, but are deeply intertwined with social status and cultural misconceptions. On one hand, a persistent social stigma causes individuals to feel ashamed to collect public litter, as handling trash is culturally stigmatized. On the other hand, affluent societal groups often operate under the misconception that wealth absolves them from micro-level environmental responsibility, operating under the assumption that someone else can always be paid to clean up after them. Together, these social-psychological norms perpetuate a cycle where littering is normalized and personal accountability is discarded. To foster genuine community participation, public messaging has begun directly confronting these cultural attitudes, rallying around slogans like “Picking up litter is not shameful; littering is shameful” to redefine public responsibility across all socioeconomic classes.

Low environmental awareness & Weak policy enforcement

Low environmental awareness remains a central obstacle to effective waste management in Myanmar, because many residents still do not fully connect improper disposal with drainage blockage, pollution, and disease. At the same time, weak policy enforcement allows poor practices to continue, since environmental authorities face limited resources, weak institutional capacity, and waste management is often treated as a lower priority than other development needs.

Public-awareness campaigns and local cleanup efforts show that education is still necessary, but lasting improvement requires stronger regulations, better implementation, and sustainable community cooperation. Despite the National Plastic Management Action Plan (2026-2035), municipal authorities are non-elected officials who answer exclusively to higher government hierarchies rather than to the public they serve. The removal of elected municipal councilors following the 2021 military coup further dismantled local democratic accountability, leaving residents with no formal channels to influence municipal decisions or demand better public services. Also, Myanmar’s Urban Waste Management System lacks financial incentives for technology development, such as limited funding and no subsidies for developing waste management technologies.

Environmental Degradation and Daily Economic Struggles

In Myanmar, environmental degradation is deeply linked to everyday economic hardship, and for many households and local authorities, immediate survival is a greater concern than the long-term health of the environment.. A fundamental social value in Myanmar society is summarized by the saying “Only when the stomach is full can one keep the moral precepts”. Pollution, waste accumulation and ecological decline have been driven by economic pressure, over-exploitation of natural resources and densely populated urban areas, with further pressure exerted by conflict and instability.

Poor municipal services worsen the problem, as weak collection systems, inadequate drainage maintenance, and limited sanitation capacity allow waste to remain in streets and back lanes. To shift away from open dumping and transition to a sustainable circular economy, the government established the National Plastic Management Action Plan and the National Waste Management Strategy and Master Plan. However, Municipal systems are not capable of fully responding, which leads to sanitation burdens falling on residents and worsening living conditions.

Urban Environmental Shift under the NLD Government (2016–2021)

In the National League for Democracy (NLD)’s electoral victory in 2015, urban environmental stewardship became a visible symbol of public service and civic responsibility. One symbolic event occurred in December 2015, when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi participated in a public garbage-collecting activity in Kawhmu Township, together with residents. From the movement, similar clean-up campaigns and the alley gardens projects were expanded across different townships in Yangon, involving local communities, youth groups, and civil society organizations like Doh Eain.

Crucially, this civic momentum was underpinned by institutional reforms in local governance. While Myanmar’s municipal governance was historically illustrated by the restricted 2014 Yangon municipal election where voting was limited to one ballot per household, the NLD administration enacted the 2018 Yangon City Development Law. This led to the landmark March 2019 YCDC elections, the first held under universal suffrage. These activities reflected a progressive environmental movement by promoting public awareness about waste disposal, urban hygiene, and shared responsibility for public spaces. However, this progress was abruptly halted by the 2021 military coup, which stripped local councils of their democratic mandate and reinstated top-down military administration.

U-turn in Post-Coup

The 2021 military coup made a significant U-turn in Myanmar’s urban environmental progress, reversing earlier movements toward cleaner public spaces and community-based urban management. In Yangon, the rapid increase of internally displaced people (IDPs) has placed additional pressure on urban areas as people move to cities and surrounding townships for safety, housing, and economic opportunities. Local media have reported that overcrowded urban spaces, limited infrastructure, and insufficient public green areas have intensified sanitation challenges.

Furthermore, the structural firing of elected local officials, paired with broader post-coup instability, paralyzed urban planning and environmental enforcement across major cities like Yangon and Mandalay. Without elected councilors to advocate for local needs or facilitate community participation, state-civic cooperation collapsed. Conflict, economic hardship, and declining institutional coordination limited effective infrastructure development and long-term city management. Studies on post-coup Myanmar emphasize widespread governance disruption, insecurity, and reduced public confidence, which affected many aspects of daily urban life.

Consequences

Drainage Blockage and Mosquito Breeding

The decline of urban environmental management has created contingent challenges affecting public health, sanitation, and the quality of living spaces. One major consequence is drainage blockage and increased mosquito breeding. Although municipal authorities in cities such as Yangon and Mandalay continue to carry out waste collection and drain-cleaning activities, these efforts are often constrained by limited resources, rapid urbanization, and the increasing volume of plastic waste. The accumulation of plastic waste and unmanaged garbage has clogged drainage systems, creating stagnant water areas that provide suitable breeding environments for mosquitoes. This situation has increased the risk of mosquito-borne diseases, particularly during the rainy season.

Spread of Disease

The public-health impact extends beyond flooding and mosquito breeding. Studies on waste disposal in Myanmar show that poor sanitation practices are associated with higher diarrheal risk, while recent reporting on dengue and malaria confirms that mosquito-borne disease remains a major concern in the country. In 2025, Myanmar reportedly recorded 5,066 dengue cases and 26 deaths by July 19, underscoring the seriousness of the threat

Impact on Clean Living Spaces

The decline in urban cleanliness has damaged green living spaces and community well-being. Public areas that were previously maintained through community participation have become more vulnerable to neglect, reducing residents’ sense of safety, comfort, and civic responsibility. The combination of weak governance, poor waste management, and declining urban services has transformed environmental issues into broader social and public health challenges.

Conclusion

The combination of weak waste management, blocked drainage, and declining urban governance has transformed environmental problems into broader public health and social challenges, making urban areas less safe, less healthy, and less sustainable.

Implications and Recommendations

• Encourage youth groups, schools, and communities to lead clean-up campaigns, recycling activities, and environmental education to build long-term civic responsibility.

• Provide accessible public bins for convenience, waste-separation points, regular collection services, and recycling facilities so citizens can easily follow waste-management rules.

• Re-Install municipal Elections to encourage civil society participation with municipal accountability

• Expand Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle programs by involving both formal businesses and informal waste workers in the recycling system.

• Execute a functional Waste Management System by Municipal Authorities to maintain clean and accessible public spaces.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar’s polycrisis has collapsed NCD care through underfunding, health worker shortages, medicine scarcity, and attacks on healthcare.

• Existing responses show resilience but remain severely limited by resources and access constraints.

• Restoring NCD care requires not only technical health interventions but progress toward peace, stable governance, and intersectoral coordination.

Understanding NCDs

Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are long-lasting conditions arising from genetic, physiological, environmental, and behavioural factors, driven by modifiable risk factors including tobacco use, physical inactivity, unhealthy diet, and harmful alcohol use. NCDs require long-term management to prevent exacerbation and complications. NCDs are responsible for 74% of all global deaths, and a 2023 WHO report estimated that 25% of deaths among those aged 30 to 70 in Myanmar were NCD-related. Low- and middle-income countries with fragile health systems bear a disproportionate burden, and Myanmar is no exception.

Responses and Their Limitations

State Administration Council (SAC)

Myanmar’s health system comprises public and non-state actors (NSAs), with the public sector delivering around 86% of services. In 2017, the Ministry of Health and Sports adopted the WHO’s Package of Essential NCD (PEN) interventions, integrating screening, treatment, and referral into primary healthcare (PHC). However, the coup accelerated the collapse of Myanmar’s fragile health system, severely weakening PEN and causing Myanmar to miss key NCD targets. Contributing factors include equipment shortages, health worker shortages, frequent medicine stock-outs, and low public awareness, all driving high loss to follow-up, a key challenge for successful implementation.

Despite improved health outcomes and spending over 2010–2020, the junta has since allocated only 2.5% of the union budget to health while committing at least 1,846 incidents of violence against or obstruction of healthcare. Healthcare professionals who lost trust in the junta joined the civil disobedience movement (CDM), withdrawing from public service, a shortage further compounded by the junta’s detention, arrest, and killing of medical professionals, and barring facilities from hiring staff who opposed SAC or forcing them to shut down, with no state effort to address the gap.

Essential medicines are in short supply, available only in select private pharmacies at tripled price, driven by import licensing delays, customs restrictions, and barriers on goods movement. When supplies run out, clinicians rotate to alternative medications, but differing side effects destabilise patients and increase complication risks, creating critical gaps in care continuity. Community clinics could not open for new case-finding, and cancer patients were transferred to private facilities for continued treatment. Compounding this, the junta has denied prisoners access to basic NCD treatment, a violation of fundamental human rights. Security concerns and deep mistrust of the public sector further deter people from seeking care.

National Unity Government (NUG)

The NUG Ministry of Health (MOH) has adopted a decentralised approach, empowering local communities and frontline health workers. Although no NCD-specific data is available, the NUG delivers PHC through on-ground services in governed areas and Telekyanmar, a free telemedicine platform. Since 2021, over 1,000 facilities have been established across 190 townships, and underground, bomb-resistant hospitals are being constructed to protect staff and patients. Telekyanmar reaches 322 townships domestically and users across 50 countries, while health education content is regularly distributed online. To address workforce gaps, the NUG has invested in training, workshops, and volunteer recruitment, with 5,098 healthcare professionals currently serving nationwide.

The MOH has also coordinated with international donors, including joint advocacy with ethnic leaders. International response has been mixed. Most countries have kept engagement informal, while The United States, European Union, and European Parliament have moved closer, recognising the CRPH and NUG as legitimate representatives, and UN organisations have increasingly sought cooperation.

Despite this resilience, NUG health networks face severe constraints. The MOH has limited financial resources due to reduced funding from international donors. In addition, the supply of essential medicines is frequently disrupted because of the SAC’s strict control over medical supply to NUG-governed areas. Facilities in conflict zones are often underground, mobile, or improvised, leaving them vulnerable and limited in reach. Online services are hampered by inconsistent internet access, and workforce shortages persist due to limited clinical training opportunities and the continued killing and arrest of medical professionals.

Non-state Actors (NSAs)

NSAs, including local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), ethnic health organisations (EHOs), and private providers, play a significant role in healthcare delivery, particularly in fragile settings. Before the coup, the international community channelled technical and financial support largely, and NGOs supported PEN rollout, with slow but clearly directed progress, until the coup brought it to a halt.

The 2022 Organisation Registration Law has hindered humanitarian operations; hundreds of aid workers have been arrested, and the military restricts and monitors aid delivery. Donors have withdrawn funding to avoid subsidising the military government, suspending or reducing operations, worsened by USAID funding cuts affecting border area populations. Despite this, NSAs have demonstrated adaptive capacity by restoring parallel systems, using informal communication channels, maintaining buffer stocks, and adjusting supply chains and training models. Funding remains the primary constraint.

Patients favour private providers for accessibility, convenience, and the quality of communication and health education they offer. Some clinics serve low- and middle-income households through affordable consultations and free check-ups. However, the high cost of routine tests and specialist care deters some patients from recommended procedures, and access remains considerably low in rural or conflict-affected areas.

The Cost of Being Sick in a Broken State

As a Myanmar proverb goes, “an empty sack cannot stand upright“. Amid displacement and economic hardship, many are forced to prioritise food, shelter, and basic needs over healthcare, a trade-off that accelerates disease progression and undermines long-term wellbeing. Rising NCD costs impede poverty reduction, pushing out-of-pocket expenditure to 71.13%, and those already vulnerable get sicker sooner and die earlier than those in higher socioeconomic positions, creating a compounding cycle where illness deepens poverty and poverty worsens illness. The burden extends to caregivers, most often women and family members, who frequently reduce or leave paid work to provide care. For both patients and caregivers, chronic illness generates stress, anxiety, and depression, all largely unaddressed in a collapsing health system.

The Way Forward

Reforming PHC to integrate NCD prevention and management strengthens health system resilience, reduces costs, and optimises resources. A sustainable community-to-PHC referral system and regular follow-up are essential for medication adherence, and early detection of complications, as demonstrated by home visit programmes in Bhutan.

Community interventions that build health literacy encourage lifestyle changes, routine screening, and treatment adherence. Since most NCD risk factors are modifiable, raising awareness through print, broadcast, and online channels is crucial. Accurate risk perception motivates preventive behaviour, making public awareness a cost-effective entry point in resource-limited settings.

Sustained investment in manpower, supply chains, and technology is required. Uninterrupted medicine and equipment supply must precede PEN expansion. mHealth services, telemedicine, and digital platforms offer viable delivery options, and mobile-based CVD risk assessment tools proven feasible in rural India, could be adapted for Myanmar.

Capacity building for health facility staff should be included within PHC following WHO guidelines. Task-shifting to paramedics and community health workers is critical for high-risk identification, screening, and follow-up. Workforce allocation needs decentralisation to grant state and regional Health Directors greater authority over context-specific decisions. Effective NCD response requires coordinated action across public, private, and non-governmental sectors, spanning health, finance, education, agriculture, and transport.

Increased health spending must be implemented to reduce out-of-pocket expenditure. Aid should flow through multiple channels, prioritising local civil society actors in conflict-affected areas. Maintaining parallel funding streams has proven resilient when one channel fails, and flexibility remains central to effective humanitarian response.

Population-wide policy enforcement is necessary, covering smoking restrictions, health warnings on packaging, alcohol age and time restrictions, and taxation on alcohol, imported sugar, ultra-processed foods, and beverages. Regulating unhealthy food marketing and strengthening food labelling standards are equally critical for reducing modifiable risk factors at scale.

Monitoring NCD trends and risk factors guides policy priorities, making operational and implementation research a critical investment for evidence-based policymaking. Since NCD treatment gaps are deeply intertwined with socioeconomic, governance, and environmental crises, these recommendations can only yield meaningful results alongside progress toward peace and stable governance.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s polycrisis has systematically dismantled the conditions necessary for NCD care to function. Underfunding, attacks on healthcare infrastructure, workforce depletion, medicine shortages, and shrinking humanitarian access have pushed NCD patients further from care, deepening a cycle of poverty, inequality, and preventable suffering. Addressing this burden requires more than technical health interventions; it demands restored governance, sustained financing, community-centred care, cross-sectoral coordination, and a health system rebuilt on equity. Meaningful progress cannot be achieved without peace, yet Myanmar’s NCD patients cannot wait for perfect conditions. Therefore, all relevant stakeholders should take immediate action to address this issue.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Education is one of the most important foundations for sustainable community development. It is not only a process of acquiring knowledge but also a way to empower individuals, strengthen communities, and create opportunities for future generations. Sustainable development requires inclusive societies where people have the skills, confidence, and ability to participate in decision-making and contribute to positive change.

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals recognize quality education as a key factor for achieving sustainable development. Sustainable Development Goal 4 emphasizes the importance of ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all (United Nations, 2015). In Myanmar, education has a particularly important role because communities continue to experience social, economic, and political challenges that affect learning opportunities.

Despite these difficulties, education remains a pathway toward building resilient communities. By improving access to quality education, empowering young people, and promoting equal opportunities, Myanmar can strengthen its human resources and create a more sustainable future.

The Importance of Education for Community Development
Education contributes significantly to community development by improving people’s knowledge, skills, and ability to participate in society. Educated individuals are more likely to find employment opportunities, contribute to local development, and participate in solving community challenges. According to UNESCO (2021), education plays a central role in reducing inequalities and supporting sustainable development by developing individuals’ capabilities.

However, many communities in Myanmar face barriers to education. Rural areas, conflict-affected regions, and marginalized communities often experience limited access to learning resources, trained teachers, and educational facilities. Economic difficulties and social challenges can also prevent children and young people from continuing their education.

These barriers not only affect individuals, but they also influence the long-term development of communities. When young people lose educational opportunities, communities lose potential future leaders, professionals, and contributors. Therefore, supporting education is an investment in both individuals and society.

Education During Challenging Times in Myanmar
Myanmar has experienced significant social and political challenges that have affected many aspects of life, including education. In some areas, students and teachers face difficulties due to instability, displacement, and limited resources. During such circumstances, maintaining education opportunities becomes essential for protecting the future of communities.

In some conflict-affected areas of Myanmar, the expression “one hand holding a gun and the other hand holding a book” reflects the idea that security and education are both important concerns during difficult times. While this expression comes from a conflict context, it also highlights a broader message that education should continue even when communities face uncertainty.

Education during challenging periods provides more than academic learning. It helps individuals develop critical thinking, resilience, and problem-solving skills. UNICEF (2023) emphasises that education in emergencies can provide stability, protection, and hope for children and young people affected by crises.

Therefore, maintaining access to education is not only about continuing classes. It is also about supporting communities to remain strong and preparing future generations to contribute to rebuilding and development.

Education and Youth Empowerment
Young people are important actors in sustainable community development. Through education, youth can develop leadership skills, confidence, and the ability to participate actively in society. Supporting youth education creates opportunities for young people to become responsible citizens and future community leaders.

My experience as a Teaching Assistant at Young Ni Federal School helped me understand the importance of education in personal development. Supporting classroom and online learning activities showed me that education is not only about academic knowledge but also about creating a supportive environment where students can build confidence, communication skills, and motivation.

In addition, my involvement in youth education activities through Youth Society for Education strengthened my understanding of how educational opportunities can encourage young people to engage with their communities. These experiences showed me that even small educational activities can create meaningful impacts on individuals and communities.

Education, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunities
Sustainable community development cannot be achieved without inclusion. Education should provide equal opportunities regardless of gender, ethnicity, social background, or location. Inclusive education helps reduce inequality and allows more people to contribute to society.

Gender equality is especially important in education. When girls and women have access to education, they gain greater opportunities to participate in economic activities, leadership roles, and decision-making processes. UNESCO (2020) highlights that inclusive education is essential for ensuring that all learners have opportunities to succeed.

In Myanmar, supporting equal access to education requires cooperation among communities, educational institutions, and development organizations. Programs should consider the different challenges faced by learners and create supportive environments where everyone can participate.

The Role of Community-Based Education
Community participation is essential for creating sustainable education systems. Schools and organizations alone cannot solve all educational challenges. Parents, teachers, local leaders, and young people must work together to identify problems and develop suitable solutions.

Community-based education approaches are effective because they consider local needs and encourage people to take ownership of development activities. Development organisations can support communities through training, resources, and capacity-building programs.

According to the United Nations Development Program (2022), sustainable development requires inclusive participation and cooperation among different groups. Education programs that involve communities are more likely to create long-term positive impacts.

Recommendations
To strengthen education as a pathway toward sustainable community development in Myanmar, several actions should be considered.

First, improving access to quality education should be a priority, especially for vulnerable and underserved communities. Investment in teachers, learning materials, and safe learning environments is necessary.

Second, education programs should focus on both academic knowledge and practical skills such as communication, leadership, and critical thinking. These skills help individuals contribute effectively to their communities.

Third, partnerships among communities, government institutions, and development organisations should be strengthened. Collaboration can create more effective and sustainable education initiatives.

Finally, young people should be encouraged to participate in community development activities. Empowering youth through education can help create future leaders who contribute to positive social change.

Conclusion
Education is a powerful pathway toward sustainable community development in Myanmar. It empowers individuals, strengthens communities, and creates opportunities for future generations. Although Myanmar faces many challenges, education remains an essential tool for building resilience, equality, and social progress. My experiences in education and youth engagement have shown me that education can create meaningful changes in people’s lives. By promoting inclusive education, supporting youth development, and encouraging community participation, Myanmar can move toward a more sustainable and resilient future.

References
UNESCO. (2020). Global education monitoring report 2020: Inclusion and education – All means all. UNESCO. https://www.unesco.org/gem-report/
UNESCO. (2021). Reimagining our futures together: A new social contract for education. UNESCO. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/
UNICEF. (2023). Education in emergencies. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/education
United Nations. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development. United Nations. https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda
United Nations Development Programme. (2022). Human development report 2021/2022: Uncertain times, unsettled lives. UNDP. https://hdr.undp.org/

Khin Phyo Thu is a Bachelor of Political Science graduate from Mai Ja Yang College and is currently working as a Digital Resources and Information Management Intern at Inya Institute.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar’s SMEs are navigating an economy shaped by inflation, power shortages, trade disruptions, labor migration, and policy uncertainty, forcing many businesses to prioritise survival over growth.

• Despite these challenges, SMEs have demonstrated resilience through practical adaptation strategies, including alternative energy use, flexible workforce arrangements, informal financing, and digital innovation.

• Strengthening SME resilience through supportive policies, improved infrastructure, access to finance, and capacity-building initiatives will be critical for Myanmar’s long-term economic sustainability and recovery.

1. Introduction

Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has faced a prolonged polycrisis characterised by political instability, inflation, currency depreciation, power shortages, trade disruptions, and labor migration. More recently, fuel supply disruptions linked to the Middle East conflict have further increased production and transportation costs, amplifying existing economic vulnerabilities. While large firms may possess greater financial capacity to absorb shocks, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been disproportionately affected. Yet despite operating in an environment where uncertainty has become the norm, many SMEs continue to adapt and survive. This article examines how Myanmar’s SMEs are coping with an economy of uncertainty.

2. Myanmar’s Current Economic Situation

Although Myanmar’s economy showed signs of a modest recovery in early 2026, the improvement remains fragile amid ongoing political instability and economic uncertainty. Inflation rose to 24.6 percent in April 2026, driven largely by higher fuel and transportation costs, while the depreciation of the kyat increased the price of imported goods and raw materials. At the same time, foreign exchange controls and import restrictions have made it more difficult for businesses to access essential inputs, while conflict-related disruptions continue to raise logistics costs and delay deliveries. Businesses also face persistent electricity shortages, forcing many to rely on generators and alternative energy sources, which increase operating costs. Meanwhile, labor migration, skills shortages, and compulsory military service have made recruitment increasingly difficult. Together, these challenges have pushed many SMEs to prioritize survival and adaptation over growth.

3. The Role of SMEs in Myanmar’s Economy

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are widely recognized as the backbone of Southeast Asian economies, accounting for over 90 percent of businesses and employing a large share of the workforce. In Myanmar, SMEs make up 94 percent of enterprises and between 52 and 97 percent of total employment. Beyond their economic contribution, SMEs play an important social role by creating livelihoods, supporting local communities, and generating income opportunities in both urban and rural areas.

However, despite their importance, SMEs continue to face significant structural challenges. Previous studies have highlighted constraints such as limited access to finance, outdated technology, low productivity, and poor market access. Moreover, formal policy support for SMEs remains limited, reducing their ability to reach their full economic potential.

4. Challenges Facing SMEs

Since 2021, Myanmar’s SMEs have faced overlapping economic, operational, workforce, and financial challenges. Unlike large corporations, SMEs are often more vulnerable to external shocks and have fewer resources to absorb rising costs.

Inflation, currency depreciation, and fuel price increases have significantly raised production and transportation costs, while weaker consumer purchasing power has reduced demand and squeezed profit margins. At the same time, frequent power outages, import restrictions, and supply chain disruptions continue to increase operational uncertainty and business expenses.

International sanctions have added further pressure on some SMEs. Although sanctions primarily target military-linked entities, Myanmar’s military-dominated economy means that restrictions on financial transactions, trade, and supply chains can also create unintended spillover effects for civilian-led SMEs. These indirect impacts make it more difficult for businesses to access foreign currency, credit, imported inputs, and international markets, placing additional pressure on firms with limited financial resources.

Labor shortages have become another major challenge, driven by skills gaps, outward migration, and compulsory military service, resulting in higher recruitment and training costs. Access to finance also remains limited, as many SMEs face difficulties obtaining affordable credit and must cope with ongoing liquidity constraints.

Together, these challenges have created a business environment where many SMEs prioritise survival and continuity rather than growth and expansion.

5. Resilience of SMEs in Myanmar

Despite operating in an increasingly uncertain environment, many Myanmar SMEs have demonstrated remarkable resilience by adapting their business models and day-to-day operations. Rather than pursuing expansion, many firms have focused on maintaining continuity, preserving cash flow, and responding flexibly to changing circumstances.

5.1 Energy Adaptation

Frequent power outages have forced businesses to invest in alternative energy sources such as diesel generators and off-grid solar systems. In October 2025, approximately 42 percent of firms’ electricity consumption came from diesel generators and off-grid power sources. While these investments increase operating costs, they enable businesses to continue production and maintain essential services during prolonged outages.

5.2 Workforce Adaptation

To cope with labor shortages caused by outward migration, skills mismatches, and compulsory military service, many SMEs have adjusted how they manage their workforce. As the labor market shifts toward more informal, part-time, and casual employment, particularly in urban areas, firms have adapted by relying on more flexible labor arrangements to maintain business operations. Many businesses have also raised wages and provided short-term training to attract and retain workers, despite the additional costs involved. These workforce adjustments have enabled SMEs to sustain operations in an increasingly constrained labor market.

5.3 Financial Adaptation

Limited access to formal credit has encouraged SMEs to explore both formal and informal financing mechanisms. Following the 2025 earthquake, state-backed recovery loans and subsidised lending programs contributed to a significant increase in SME lending. At the same time, informal financing remains an important coping mechanism. Some firms rely on loans from friends and family, while many businesses facing cash-flow shortages use personal networks to sustain operations. These informal support systems often serve as an important source of resilience when formal financial channels are difficult to access.

5.4 Digital Adaptation

Myanmar’s digital economy has long been shaped by social commerce, with Facebook serving as a major platform for communication, marketing, and online sales. However, internet restrictions and the nationwide VPN block introduced in 2024 disrupted access to many digital platforms and reduced online business activity. In response, SMEs have diversified their digital presence by adopting alternative channels such as Telegram, Viber, and TikTok to reach customers and maintain sales. This ability to adapt to a rapidly changing digital environment highlights the flexibility and innovation that characterise many Myanmar SMEs.

Although these adaptive strategies have helped businesses survive, resilience should not be mistaken for recovery. Many firms continue to face significant constraints and remain focused on sustaining operations rather than pursuing long-term growth.

6. Recommendations

Strengthening the resilience of Myanmar’s SMEs requires coordinated efforts from businesses, policymakers, and development partners.

For SMEs

• SMEs should continue investing in energy diversification through solar power and other alternative energy solutions to reduce vulnerability to electricity disruptions.

• Businesses should also adopt digital tools such as e-commerce websites, chatbots, artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled customer service, and digital payment systems to improve efficiency and expand market access.

• Where possible, firms can strengthen local supply chains by sourcing raw materials domestically to reduce dependence on imports and foreign exchange volatility.

• Developing workforce retention strategies, including employee training, flexible working arrangements, and career development opportunities, may also help address labor shortages.

For Policymakers

• Policymakers should prioritise improving electricity infrastructure, facilitating access to affordable financing, and simplifying import and licensing procedures.

• Expanding vocational training programs and workforce development initiatives can help address skills shortages.

• In addition, targeted tax relief and regulatory support for SMEs could reduce operational burdens and encourage business investment.

For Development Partners and the International Community

• Development partners can support SME resilience through renewable energy programs, digital literacy initiatives, business continuity training, and concessional financing schemes.

• Technical assistance and capacity-building programs can also help SMEs strengthen their ability to adapt to future economic shocks while contributing to inclusive and sustainable economic development.

• Governments imposing sanctions, such as the EU and the United States, should strengthen targeted sanctions while minimizing unintended impacts on civilian-led SMEs by maintaining access to essential financial services, trade, and humanitarian support.

7. Conclusion

Myanmar’s SMEs support SDG 8 and SDG 9 by creating employment, sustaining livelihoods, and demonstrating innovation in the face of economic challenges. SMEs are operating under extraordinary economic pressures arising from inflation, energy shortages, trade disruptions, labor migration, and political uncertainty. Despite these challenges, many businesses continue to survive through adaptation, flexibility, and innovation. From investing in alternative energy sources to adopting new digital platforms and informal financing mechanisms, SMEs have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of prolonged uncertainty.

However, resilience should not be viewed as a substitute for structural economic reform. The future of Myanmar’s economic sustainability will depend not only on macroeconomic stabilisation and improved infrastructure but also on strengthening the resilience of SMEs.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Restrictions on menstrual products in resistance-controlled areas demonstrate how Myanmar’s polycrisis amplifies everyday vulnerabilities.

Key Takeaways

• Menstrual insecurity interacts with healthcare collapse, displacement, inflation, and gender inequality to create multidimensional social consequences.

• The impacts extend beyond hygiene, contributing to deteriorating health outcomes, economic hardship, reduced mobility, and social exclusion.

• Addressing menstrual health should be viewed as part of humanitarian resilience and social recovery rather than solely as a women’s health issue.

Myanmar’s ongoing conflict has led to a complex polycrisis in which political instability, armed violence, economic decline, humanitarian displacement, and institutional collapse reinforce one another. While much attention has focused on military operations, displacement, and humanitarian needs, less visible disruptions to everyday life are also producing significant social consequences.

One such example is the reported restriction on menstrual hygiene products in resistance-controlled areas. According to reports by The Guardian, Myanmar’s military authorities have increasingly restricted the transportation and distribution of menstrual products in conflict-affected regions, particularly in areas under resistance influence. Authorities have reportedly justified these restrictions by claiming that sanitary pads are being diverted to support resistance medical operations. Activists and humanitarian workers suggest that the measures form part of the broader “four cuts” strategy, which seeks to deprive resistance groups of supplies and support networks.

Although presented as a security measure, the reported restrictions have consequences that extend far beyond resistance actors. Limiting access to essential menstrual hygiene products disproportionately affects civilian women and girls, raising concerns regarding the protection of civilians and adherence to humanitarian principles. The policy also highlights how military decision-making can overlook gender-specific humanitarian needs. Despite the military’s public portrayal of itself as a modern professional force that includes women, senior command positions remain overwhelmingly occupied by men. This limited representation of women in senior leadership may contribute to the marginalisation of women’s health considerations in military planning, allowing policies to be implemented with insufficient attention to their gender-specific humanitarian consequences. More broadly, the reported restrictions illustrate how menstrual hygiene products, ordinarily recognised as essential health commodities, become reclassified as strategic resources during armed conflict, with disproportionate consequences for civilian women and girls.

Since August, the transportation of menstrual products has reportedly been blocked along certain routes connecting Sagaing Region and Mandalay. Although the military government has issued no official announcement, activists argue that the restrictions may be more widespread than publicly recognised due to the social stigma surrounding menstruation and the limited public discussion of menstrual health needs.

At first glance, the issue may appear to be a simple shortage of hygiene products. However, in a country already experiencing healthcare collapse, economic hardship, mass displacement, and weakened social protection systems, menstrual insecurity becomes much more than a supply problem. This article argues that menstrual product restrictions illustrate how Myanmar’s polycrisis amplifies existing vulnerabilities for women. By interacting with healthcare breakdown, inflation, displacement, and social stigma, menstrual insecurity becomes a multiplier of health risks, economic exclusion, reduced mobility, and social marginalisation for women and girls. Beyond its health and economic consequences, menstrual insecurity undermines the dignity of women and girls by depriving them of the privacy, safety, and confidence required to participate fully in everyday life.

Menstrual Insecurity and Healthcare Collapse

The first consequence emerges through the interaction between menstrual insecurity and Myanmar’s deteriorating healthcare system.

In many conflict-affected areas, healthcare infrastructure has been severely disrupted by armed conflict, displacement, and shortages of medical supplies. Clinics have been destroyed or abandoned, healthcare workers displaced, and access to medicine remains limited. Under these conditions, restrictions on menstrual products create risks that extend beyond discomfort. Women and girls who cannot access sanitary pads are often forced to rely on unsafe alternatives such as reused cloths, improvised materials, or prolonged use of disposable products. These coping strategies increase the likelihood of urinary tract infections (UTIs), reproductive tract infections, skin irritation, and other preventable health complications.

Under normal circumstances, many of these conditions are easily treatable. However, in areas where antibiotics, medical personnel, and healthcare facilities are scarce, minor infections can develop into chronic health problems. The resulting public health burden is therefore not caused by menstruation itself but by the interaction between material scarcity and healthcare collapse. This illustrates a defining characteristic of polycrisis: multiple vulnerabilities combine to produce outcomes more severe than any single crisis.

Menstrual Insecurity and Economic Hardship

The second pathway operates through Myanmar’s worsening economic crisis. Years of conflict, inflation, currency depreciation, and market disruption have significantly reduced household purchasing power. Within this environment, restrictions on menstrual products have contributed to supply shortages and increased dependence on informal markets.

Reports indicate that the price of sanitary pads has tripled from approximately 3,000 kyat to 9,000 kyat per packet. This exceeds Myanmar’s minimum daily wage of 7,800 kyat. For households already struggling to afford food, transportation, and basic necessities, menstrual products become increasingly inaccessible. As a result, many households in conflict-affected areas are forced to make impossible choices between purchasing menstrual hygiene products and meeting other essential needs, such as food. This dilemma highlights how the crisis compels families to choose between fundamental rights, including the right to adequate food and the right to health, dignity, and menstrual hygiene.

At the same time, Myanmar’s prolonged economic crisis has placed growing pressure on women to contribute financially through paid work alongside their male counterparts. Yet unlike many household expenses, menstrual health is both recurring and unavoidable. Women and girls cannot simply postpone the need for menstrual products during times of economic hardship. Consequently, families often resort to unsafe alternatives or divert scarce resources from other essential needs. For women who rely on paid employment to support their households, inadequate access to menstrual products may also affect their ability to work safely and consistently. What begins as a supply restriction therefore becomes a form of gendered economic exclusion, deepening existing inequalities while undermining household resilience during a period of economic crisis.

Menstrual Insecurity and Humanitarian Displacement

A third dimension of Myanmar’s polycrisis emerges through mass displacement. Since the 2021 military coup, millions of people have been internally displaced, many living in temporary shelters, monasteries, schools, or forest encampments with limited access to clean water, sanitation facilities, healthcare, and privacy. In these settings, menstrual hygiene management becomes not only a health issue but also a humanitarian and protection challenge.

Displacement disrupts the infrastructure needed for safe menstrual hygiene. Women and girls often lack private spaces to change menstrual products, wash reusable materials, or dispose of used pads safely. Many displaced women report waiting until nighttime to change menstrual products to avoid being seen, while others carry used pads with them because there is no safe place for disposal. Access to water is equally constrained, with some displaced communities prioritising drinking water over bathing or washing clothes. Although reusable menstrual products, such as menstrual cups and reusable cloth pads, are often promoted as sustainable alternatives during humanitarian crises, their use in Myanmar is constrained by both practical and sociocultural barriers. Limited access to clean water and private washing facilities makes it difficult to use and maintain reusable products safely, while persistent menstrual stigma, limited familiarity with menstrual cups, and cultural concerns surrounding their insertion reduce their acceptability among many women and girls. As a result, the loss of access to disposable menstrual products cannot be readily offset by switching to reusable alternatives.

These challenges are further intensified by conflict. Ongoing military operations, road blockages, and restrictions on humanitarian access make it difficult for aid organisations to deliver menstrual products to displaced communities. At the same time, insecurity limits women’s ability to travel to local markets even when products are available.

As a result, menstrual insecurity is intensified by the conditions of displacement. The interaction between forced displacement, inadequate sanitation, and restricted humanitarian access transforms what is ordinarily a manageable aspect of daily life into a multidimensional humanitarian challenge. This demonstrates how Myanmar’s displacement crisis magnifies the social consequences of menstrual product restrictions and further erodes the dignity, health, and well-being of women and girls.

Menstrual Insecurity, Social Exclusion, and the Invisibility of Crisis

The cumulative effects of healthcare collapse, economic hardship, and displacement ultimately extend beyond women’s physical well-being to shape their participation in social and civic life. Menstrual insecurity affects not only how women manage their health but also their ability to remain active within their communities. Many women report feeling embarrassed or lacking confidence to attend school, work, displacement camps, or community spaces because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate protection.

This reduction in mobility can limit participation in education, livelihood activities, community meetings, and political engagement. In resistance-controlled areas, where communities increasingly depend on collective action and mutual support to sustain basic services, women’s reduced participation weakens both individual agency and community resilience. This includes not only civilian participation in everyday governance and social support systems, but also the involvement of women engaged in political organizing and resistance activities, where sustained presence and mobility are essential. What begins as a shortage of menstrual products therefore evolves into a broader form of social exclusion.

Beyond its physical consequences, menstrual insecurity also imposes a significant psychological burden on women and girls living in conflict-affected areas. The constant uncertainty over whether menstrual products will be available each month, combined with the inability to manage menstruation safely and privately, can generate persistent stress and anxiety. Many women experience shame, fear of humiliation, and a loss of dignity when they are unable to manage menstruation according to accepted social norms. For women already coping with armed conflict, displacement, economic hardship, and the trauma of violence, menstrual insecurity becomes another source of emotional distress that compounds existing psychological pressures. Rather than being a temporary inconvenience, it contributes to a chronic state of insecurity in which women must continually worry about meeting a basic bodily need while navigating an increasingly precarious environment.

These challenges are further reinforced by persistent menstrual stigma. In many parts of Myanmar, menstruation remains a sensitive topic that is rarely discussed openly. Women often hesitate to request menstrual products from humanitarian volunteers because aid distribution is frequently managed by men, while camp managers may overlook menstrual needs altogether (see here). This cultural silence discourages women from seeking support, contributes to underreporting, and limits public recognition of menstrual insecurity as a humanitarian concern.

Menstrual Insecurity, Social Exclusion, and the Invisibility of Crisis

The cumulative effects of healthcare collapse, economic hardship, and displacement extend beyond women’s physical well-being to shape their participation in social, economic, and civic life. Menstrual insecurity affects not only how women manage their health but also their ability to remain active within their communities. Many women report feeling embarrassed or lacking confidence to attend school, work, displacement camps, or community spaces because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate menstrual protection.

Beyond its physical consequences, menstrual insecurity also imposes a significant psychological burden on women and girls living in conflict-affected areas. The constant uncertainty over whether menstrual products will be available each month, combined with the inability to manage menstruation safely and privately, can generate persistent stress and anxiety. Many women experience shame, fear of humiliation, and a loss of dignity when they are unable to manage menstruation according to accepted social norms. For women already coping with armed conflict, displacement, economic hardship, and the trauma of violence, menstrual insecurity becomes another source of emotional distress that compounds existing psychological pressures. Rather than being a temporary inconvenience, it contributes to a chronic state of insecurity in which women must continually worry about meeting a basic bodily need while navigating an increasingly precarious environment.

These psychological pressures often translate into behavioural changes that reduce women’s participation in everyday life. Women may avoid attending school, work, community meetings, displacement camp activities, or humanitarian distributions because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate protection. Such absences can limit participation in education, livelihood activities, community decision-making, and political engagement. In resistance-controlled areas, where communities increasingly depend on collective action and mutual support to sustain basic services, women’s reduced participation weakens both individual agency and community resilience. This includes not only civilian participation in local governance and social support networks but also the involvement of women engaged in political organising and resistance activities, where sustained mobility and physical presence are essential. For women participating in resistance movements, inadequate access to menstrual products may affect their ability to remain deployed, undertake physically demanding tasks, or participate consistently in political and military activities. What begins as a shortage of menstrual products therefore evolves into a broader form of social exclusion that limits women’s participation in both civilian and resistance contexts.

These challenges are further reinforced by persistent menstrual stigma. In many parts of Myanmar, menstruation remains a sensitive topic that is rarely discussed openly. Women often hesitate to request menstrual products from humanitarian volunteers because aid distribution is frequently managed by men, while camp managers may overlook menstrual needs altogether. This cultural silence not only discourages women from seeking assistance but also reinforces feelings of embarrassment and isolation, causing many women to internalise menstrual insecurity as a private problem rather than a humanitarian concern. As a result, menstrual needs remain underreported and frequently overlooked in humanitarian planning and response.

Within Myanmar’s polycrisis, stigma functions as a force multiplier. By obscuring the physical, psychological, and social consequences of menstrual insecurity, it allows armed conflict, displacement, healthcare collapse, and economic hardship to reinforce one another while limiting effective humanitarian intervention. Menstrual insecurity is therefore not simply a hidden health issue but a multidimensional humanitarian concern that undermines health, dignity, psychological well-being, and social participation. It illustrates how everyday forms of gendered vulnerability become embedded within broader patterns of conflict and social fragility.

Conclusion

The reported restriction of menstrual products in Myanmar’s resistance-controlled areas offers an important illustration of how polycrisis functions in practice. The issue is not merely a shortage of hygiene products. Rather, it reveals how multiple crises interact and reinforce one another.

Healthcare collapse transforms preventable infections into long-term health risks. Economic decline makes essential products unaffordable. Displacement intensifies difficulties in managing menstrual health safely. Social stigma keeps the resulting harms largely invisible. Together, these overlapping pressures create consequences that extend far beyond the original restriction.

Understanding menstrual insecurity through the lens of polycrisis highlights the importance of examining how everyday needs intersect with broader structural challenges. As Myanmar continues to navigate conflict, displacement, and economic instability, ensuring access to basic menstrual products should be recognised not only as a health concern but also as an essential component of social resilience, human dignity, and long-term recovery.

Policy Recommendations

Expand Community-Based Menstrual Health Support in Conflict Areas

Local civil society organisations, women’s groups, and humanitarian actors should strengthen the distribution of menstrual hygiene kits through community-based networks, particularly in displacement camps and conflict-affected areas. Where disposable products remain inaccessible, support should include reusable menstrual products alongside menstrual health education, soap, and sanitation materials to reduce health risks.

Strengthen International Advocacy And Cross-border Aid

The United Nations, ASEAN, and international partners should press Myanmar’s military to end inhumane restrictions on menstrual hygiene products and expand cross-border humanitarian assistance to ensure women and girls in conflict-affected areas have access to essential menstrual health supplies.

Integrate Menstrual Health into Humanitarian and Public Health Responses

Humanitarian agencies should treat menstrual health as an essential component of health and protection programming rather than a secondary hygiene concern. Menstrual products, antibiotics for common infections, and reproductive health services should be incorporated into emergency healthcare responses, especially in areas experiencing displacement and limited medical access.

Reduce Menstrual Stigma Through Community Awareness and Education

Local organisations, educators, and community leaders should promote menstrual health awareness to challenge stigma and improve access to information. Greater public discussion can help ensure that menstrual insecurity is recognised as a legitimate humanitarian and public health issue rather than a private concern that remains invisible in policy discussions.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Key Takeaways:

• AI’s greatest gender-related risk in Southeast Asia is its ability to amplify narratives that have historically been used to mobilise violence and silence women.

• Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia demonstrate how AI is entering digital environments where gender is already weaponised for conflict, political competition, and social control.

• Current AI governance frameworks pay insufficient attention to the intersection of AI, conflict, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) concerns.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence has quickly become a central component of Southeast Asia’s digital future. Governments across the region are investing in AI infrastructure, developing national AI strategies, and positioning emerging technologies as engines of economic growth. Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have all identified AI as a strategic priority, while regional organisations increasingly discuss AI governance in terms of innovation, competitiveness, and digital transformation (see here).

At the same time, concerns regarding the societal impacts of AI have expanded beyond technical questions of privacy and algorithmic bias. International organisations, researchers, and civil society groups have warned that AI systems can reinforce existing inequalities, including gender inequalities. Much of this discussion has focused on representation, fairness, and inclusion within AI systems. While these concerns are important, they overlook a critical dimension of the Southeast Asian context.

Across the region, AI is not entering politically neutral environments. Instead, it is being introduced into information ecosystems shaped by conflict, polarisation, disinformation, and increasingly sophisticated forms of digital political competition (see here). In these environments, gender is not simply a social category affected by technological change. Rather, gender often functions as a political instrument through which actors mobilize support, construct threats, and undermine opponents.

This distinction matters because the most significant risk associated with AI may not be that it creates entirely new forms of gendered harm. Rather, AI may amplify existing practices through which gender has long been weaponized within conflict and political struggles. For instance, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia illustrate how this process is already unfolding across Southeast Asia.

Myanmar: When Gender Becomes a Conflict Narrative

Myanmar demonstrates that gender can play a central role in how conflict narratives are constructed and legitimised. Much of the international discussion surrounding Myanmar’s information environment has focused on the role of Facebook in facilitating anti-Rohingya hate speech and misinformation. Investigations conducted by the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission found that social media platforms contributed to the spread of inflammatory content and failed to adequately moderate dangerous speech in local languages. The mission concluded that Facebook had become a significant vehicle for the dissemination of hate speech and incitement against the Rohingya population. However, the role of gender within these narratives has received comparatively less attention.

Research examining digital disinformation in Myanmar has shown that rumours concerning violence against women frequently circulated online during periods of escalating communal tension. Stories portraying Muslim men as threats to Buddhist women became powerful mobilising tools within broader anti-Rohingya campaigns (see here). Allegations of sexual violence and threats against women were repeatedly invoked to frame violence as a form of protection rather than persecution. At the same time, gender-based discrimination also exists within the Rohingya community itself. Despite facing genocide and seeking justice, some members of the community have targeted Rohingya women activists through harassment and gender-based attacks( see here).

Artificial intelligence is often perceived as a neutral technology, yet its outputs are shaped by the data on which it is trained. Because AI systems learn from existing online content, they can reproduce and amplify societal, political, and gender biases embedded in that data. In conflict settings, these biases can reinforce harmful narratives rather than challenge them. As one interviewee cited in regional research on AI and conflict observed, rumours circulating on social media regarding violence against women often preceded violence on the ground. By the time claims could be verified or disproven, communal tensions had already escalated, and attacks had begun. The significance of this case extends beyond misinformation. It demonstrates how women’s bodies, safety, and social status can become symbolic battlegrounds within conflict. Gendered narratives were not peripheral to the conflict; they were part of the mechanism through which hostility was mobilised.

This experience raises important questions about the future role of generative AI. If recommendation algorithms helped amplify inflammatory rumours during the Rohingya crisis, generative AI may significantly increase the speed and scale at which similar narratives can be produced. AI-generated text, images, and videos can now be created at minimal cost and distributed across multiple platforms within minutes. In highly polarised environments, synthetic content does not need to be entirely believable to be effective. It only needs to reinforce existing fears and prejudices. The concern, therefore, is not simply that AI will spread misinformation. It is possible that AI may accelerate the production of gendered narratives that have historically contributed to violence.

The Philippines: From Disinformation to Political Intimidation

While Myanmar illustrates how gendered narratives can contribute to communal conflict, the Philippines demonstrates how they can be used to discipline and silence political opponents. Over the past decade, the Philippines has become one of the world’s most studied cases of digital political manipulation. Researchers have documented the emergence of organised online influence networks that combine political messaging, coordinated trolling, and algorithmic amplification to shape public discourse ( see here).

Women have often been among the primary targets. The experience of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Ressa and the journalists of Rappler provides one of the clearest examples (see here). Reporting by Rappler and independent researchers documented sustained online harassment campaigns involving misogynistic abuse, threats of sexual violence, and coordinated attacks intended to undermine credibility. Rather than focusing on professional performance or political positions, many attacks relied on gendered language designed to portray women as immoral, emotional, or untrustworthy. Importantly, these campaigns were not random expressions of online hostility. They functioned as political tools. The objective was not merely to insult individual women but to discourage criticism, weaken independent journalism, and shape public discourse ( see here).

Generative AI has the potential to transform these tactics. Political actors no longer need large teams to generate content continuously. AI systems can produce thousands of variations of narratives, social media posts, images, and videos targeted at specific audiences. Synthetic audio and video technologies further increase the possibility of reputational attacks based on fabricated evidence. In this sense, AI may not create a new form of political intimidation. Rather, it may dramatically reduce the costs associated with existing practices. What once required coordinated networks of operators can increasingly be automated, personalized, and scaled.

Indonesia: The Normalisation of Digital Gender-Based Violence

Indonesia highlights a third dimension of the challenge: the normalisation of digital gender-based violence. Organisations such as Komnas Perempuan and SAFEnet have documented a steady increase in online gender-based violence over the past decade. Women activists, journalists, academics, and human rights defenders frequently report harassment, doxxing, image-based abuse, and threats intended to discourage public participation ( see here). Similar patterns have also emerged among Rohingya communities, where some women activists have reportedly been targeted by members of their own community through online harassment, including the circulation of AI-generated images intended to discredit, intimidate, and silence their advocacy (see here). These cases demonstrate how AI-enabled abuse can reinforce existing gender inequalities and restrict women’s participation in civic and public life.

These patterns did not emerge with digital technologies alone. They are rooted in broader social and gender inequalities that continue to shape women’s participation in public life. Despite significant progress in women’s rights, Indonesian women continue to face discrimination linked to patriarchal norms, restrictive gender expectations, and unequal access to political and economic opportunities. Women who speak publicly on political, religious, or social issues are often subjected to heightened scrutiny and attacks on their morality, sexuality, or family roles rather than their professional qualifications or policy positions (see here). Researchers have noted that gendered stereotypes remain deeply embedded in both political discourse and everyday social interactions, creating an environment in which women are more vulnerable to intimidation and reputational attacks see here).

Unlike in Myanmar, these incidents are not primarily associated with armed conflict. Unlike in the Philippines, they are not always directly linked to organized political campaigns. Instead, they reveal how technology-facilitated gendered abuse has become embedded within everyday digital life. This trend is significant because it creates fertile ground for AI-enabled harm.

The growing availability of generative AI tools lowers the technical barriers required to create manipulated images, synthetic videos, and fabricated narratives. Activities that once required specialised expertise can now be carried out using publicly accessible applications. As a result, the production of harmful content is becoming increasingly democratised. The challenge is therefore not simply that AI creates new risks. It is that AI allows existing forms of abuse to be replicated more quickly, more cheaply, and by a wider range of actors. For women already navigating hostile online environments, this may further increase the costs associated with public participation.

Conclusion

The experiences of Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia demonstrate that AI is entering information environments where gender has long been used as a political tool. In Myanmar, gendered narratives helped mobilize violence; in the Philippines, they became instruments of political intimidation; and in Indonesia, they underpin increasingly normalized forms of digital abuse. Generative AI does not create these dynamics, but it enables them to be produced, distributed, and amplified at an unprecedented scale.

As Southeast Asian governments continue to develop AI governance frameworks, the challenge extends beyond questions of innovation and ethics. AI must also be understood through the lenses of conflict prevention, digital security, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Without such an approach, AI risks becoming a force multiplier for existing patterns of gendered harm and exclusion across the region.

Policy Recommendations

1. Integrate gender and conflict perspectives into AI governance to assess how AI may amplify disinformation, digital violence, and exclusion in fragile environments.

2. Strengthen local-language monitoring and response mechanisms to detect and counter AI-enabled gendered disinformation and online abuse.

3. Myanmar already suffered the first-ever social media-fueled genocide, and to prevent AI-fueled genocide or another mass crime, the UN or international organisations need to act to manage the AI regulation in the polycrisis context

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Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Key Takeaways:

• Deforestation in Myanmar is closely connected to political transition, militarised governance, and extractive economic policies. Myanmar lost about 12,000 km² of forest cover nationwide between 1990 and 2000, the worst period of forest loss under the military regime. Forest destruction increased in 2008 and accelerated after 2017, coinciding with rare-earth exports to China.

• Resource extraction and conflict economies continue to be a major cause of environmental degradation. Rare-earth mining, jade extraction, logging, agribusiness expansion, and hydropower projects expanded through networks of military actors, ethnic armed organisations, border militias, domestic cronies, and foreign investors, particularly in Shan, Kachin, and Tanintharyi.

• The impacts are severe and multidimensional: loss of biodiversity, carbon emissions, river contamination, soil erosion, and the displacement of Indigenous and forest-dependent communities, threatening Myanmar’s long-term environmental and human security.

Introduction

Myanmar possesses one of Southeast Asia’s most ecologically significant forest systems, including tropical rainforests, montane forests, mangroves, and biodiverse river basins. However, decades of authoritarian governance, armed conflict, weak environmental regulation, and extractive economic development have transformed Myanmar into one of the region’s most alarming deforestation hotspots. This article will discuss the causes and effects of Myanmar’s deforestation in the prominent political cycle.

Historical Triggers of Military Rule (1990–2008)

The decade of greatest deforestation in Myanmar was from 1990 to 2000, under the military regimes of the SLORC and SPDC. FAO said the country lost 12,000 km² of forest cover nationwide in this decade alone. Forests became an important source of income for the military government, which relied on timber exports, especially teak, to fund military campaigns, state expansion, and patronage networks.

Military-linked companies and politically connected elites frequently received logging concessions with minimal environmental oversight. In ethnic border zones like Kachin, Shan, and Karan States, the forest became linked with conflict and military control. Poor governance, corruption, and militarised extraction have accelerated forest loss and opened up pristine forest areas to commercial exploitation.

Military-Backed Economic Reforms and Agribusiness Expansion (2008–2015)

Deforestation increased again after 2008 as Myanmar opened its economy and pursued market-oriented reforms. Under President Thein Sein and the military-backed USDP government, large-scale land concessions were granted to domestic groups, foreign investors, and crony companies for agricultural business, mineral mining, hydropower, and infrastructure development.

Commercial agriculture became one of the major drivers of forest conversion. In Tanintharyi Region, large rainforest areas were cleared for large-scale oil palm concessions, including the controversial Myanmar Stark Prestige Plantation (MSPP), which has been linked to forest clearance as well as land and labour rights concerns affecting Karen communities. Roads, special economic zones, and infrastructure corridors also expanded into previously forested areas. At the same time, major infrastructure projects such as the Dawei Special Economic Zone (DSEZ), the Dawei Deep-Sea Port, and the Dawei–Thailand Road Corridor expanded into previously forested areas. Although these projects were promoted as part of economic modernization, many lacked proper environmental assessments and displaced local communities without adequate compensation.

Commercial agriculture became one of the major drivers of forest conversion. In Tanintharyi Region, large rainforest areas were cleared for large-scale oil palm concessions, including the controversial Myanmar Stark Prestige Plantation (MSPP), which has been linked to forest clearance as well as land and labour rights concerns affecting Karen communities. Roads, special economic zones, and infrastructure corridors also expanded into previously forested areas. At the same time, major infrastructure projects such as the Dawei Special Economic Zone (DSEZ), the Dawei Deep-Sea Port, and the Dawei–Thailand Road Corridor expanded into previously forested areas. While environmental and social impact assessment processes were undertaken or proposed for some of these projects, civil society organizations and environmental groups raised concerns regarding the adequacy, transparency, and public accessibility of these assessments, as well as the extent of meaningful community consultation and compensation for affected populations.

The NLD Government: Reform Efforts and Structural Challenges (2015–2021)

When the National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power in 2016, the government introduced stronger environmental policies. A nationwide logging ban was implemented between 2016 and 2017, timber extraction quotas were reduced, and gemstone mining licenses in Hpakant were suspended to reassess environmental impacts.

Despite these reforms, the government faced major structural limitations. Myanmar’s economy remained dependent on natural resource exports such as jade, natural gas, timber, and agricultural products. At the same time, economic cooperation with China continued through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

Large infrastructure projects and mining operations accelerated forest loss by extracting sites, roads, and waste disposal areas, while also contaminating rivers and degrading ecosystems through chemical runoff, erosion, and sedimentation. For example, rare-earth mining activities in Kachin State have been associated with forest clearance, toxic waste generation, and water contamination linked to extraction processes. The expansion of rare-earth mining during the late NLD period laid the foundation for a dramatic increase in production after the 2021 military coup. By the mid-2020s, Myanmar had emerged as one of the world’s largest suppliers of rare-earth elements, second only to China and the United States in some production estimates. Most of these minerals were exported to China for processing, while many mining sites operated in contested areas of Kachin State where environmental regulation and government oversight remained weak. Numerous reports have documented the involvement of Chinese-backed operators and highlighted concerns regarding inadequate environmental safeguards, toxic chemical use, deforestation, and water pollution associated with rare-earth extraction.

The NLD government also lacked full control over conflict-affected border regions. In states such as Kachin and Shan, ethnic armed organizations, militias, border guard forces, and military actors operated independently of the central government. Following the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015, some regions experienced a temporary reduction in armed clashes, creating expectations that environmental governance and resource management might improve. However, evidence suggests that many extractive activities continued during this period. As a result, illegal logging, jade mining, and other forms of resource exploitation persisted despite the relative decline in violence in certain areas

Rare-Earth Mining and Deforestation in Border Regions (2017–Present)

Rare-earth mining has emerged as one of the most destructive environmental issues in Myanmar since 2017. As global demand for rare-earth minerals increased, Myanmar became an important supplier to China. According to the Institute for Strategy and Policy - Myanmar (ISP- Myanmar), the country exported approximately USD 3.6 billion worth of rare-earth minerals to China since 2017, including nearly USD 4 billion after the 2021 military coup.

Most mining activities are concentrated in Kachin State and northern Shan State near the Chinese border. The rapid expansion of rare-earth extraction has caused severe deforestation due to road construction, land clearing, excavation, and tree cutting for fuelwood used in mineral processing. Satellite images and environmental monitoring reports indicate clear areas of forest loss around the mining zones. There has been significant expansion in the mining area from 2018 onwards, from about 26,000 hectares in April 2018 to 46,700 hectares in April 2024. By the end of 2024, they had identified nearly 400 sites for rare earth mining in Kachin State.

Ecological and Social Consequences of Deforestation

Deforestation in Myanmar has produced serious environmental and social consequences. Biodiversity loss is one of the most immediate concerns, as Myanmar’s forests contain many endangered species and ecologically sensitive habitats. Forest destruction fragments ecosystems, disrupts food chains, and threatens wildlife survival.

Deforestation also contributes to climate change. Forests act as important carbon sinks by absorbing and storing carbon dioxide. Large-scale forest clearance releases this stored carbon back into the atmosphere, worsening greenhouse gas emissions and reducing regional climate resilience.

At the same time, arsenic levels in some areas of the Salween River were found to be at 0.55 mg/l, which is 55 times the safe limit. Likewise, the river, which starts east of Mong Hsat township, Shan state, and flows into Thailand as the Kok River, was also found to be highly contaminated with arsenic due to rare-earth and gold mining. Due to the rivers’ flow across national boundaries, the downstream communities in the northern parts of Thailand have been impacted by contamination, which has become a growing concern for water quality, public health, agriculture, and fisheries.

This reflects that the environmental consequences of unsustainable resource extraction activities in Myanmar have become a regional matter and need to be addressed through more cooperation and environmental governance between Myanmar and neighboring countries such as Thailand and China. Forest loss also increases soil erosion, land degradation, and vulnerability to landslides, especially in mountainous conflict zones. Declining soil quality threatens agricultural productivity and food security for already vulnerable rural populations.

The 2021 Coup and the Expansion of Conflict Economies

The 2021 military coup accelerated environmental destruction across Myanmar. According to Global Forest Watch (GFW), more than $1.45 billion in official forest product imports from Myanmar have been reported since the coup, with China accounting for 64%. The collapse of governance systems, intensified armed conflict, and weakened environmental enforcement created conditions for widespread illegal logging and unregulated mining. Natural resources increasingly became part of Myanmar’s conflict economy. Armed groups, elites, and military authorities relied on timber, minerals, and land concessions to finance operations and maintain territorial control.

Among the major hotspots of deforestation, Global Forest Watch (GFW) recorded from 2002 to 2025 that Myanmar lost 830 kha (kilo-hectares) of humid primary forest. Deforestation there has been driven by mining, infrastructure projects, and commercial agriculture. Tanintharyi experienced large-scale forest clearance linked to oil palm and rubber plantations, while Kachin became heavily affected by jade extraction, rare-earth mining, and illicit logging.

Conclusion

Overall, Myanmar’s deforestation crisis is broadly a reflection of weak governance, conflict economies, geopolitical competition and resource dependence. Without greater political stability, stronger institutions and more accountable resource governance, there is little chance of achieving environmental protection. All stakeholders including the National Unity Government (NUG), should operate within their capacities to reduce dependency on unsustainable resource extraction and ensure that environmental sustainability becomes an integral part of Myanmar’s long-term recovery and development efforts to prevent environmental destruction in the long term.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Strengthen environmental governance, including the Central government, EAOs, and NGOs, through independent monitoring systems, satellite tracking, and stronger enforcement against illegal logging and mining activities.

2. Improve regulation of rare-earth mining and cross-border mineral trade, particularly through greater transparency and environmental accountability in Myanmar-China supply chains.

3. Regional organisations such as ASEAN should play a more active role in addressing the Myanmar crisis and its environmental consequences through supporting mechanisms,

4. Recognise and protect Indigenous land rights by involving local communities in forest management and resource governance processes.

5. Promote sustainable livelihoods such as community forestry, sustainable agriculture, and renewable energy while linking environmental protection with broader political stability and governance reforms.

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Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

As livelihoods in Myanmar become increasingly unstable, many households are struggling to meet basic needs and rely on survival-based coping strategies. This article examines the economic pressures facing Myanmar households, the coping mechanisms they adopt, and possible pathways for recovery and resilience.

Key Takeaways:

• Political instability, conflict, inflation, and environmental crises have pushed many Myanmar households into survival-based living conditions.

• Households increasingly rely on informal work, multiple jobs, migration, borrowing, and high-risk activities to cope with economic hardship.

• Long-term recovery requires stronger social protection, economic stability, and improved peace and governance.

Economic Pressures on Myanmar Households

Myanmar’s economy has sharply declined since the 2021 military takeover, with rising inflation, increasing poverty, and weakened investment, employment, and human capital development. While military elites and connected cronies remain financially insulated, ordinary workers, farmers, and low-income households bear a much heavier burden.

Many businesses struggle with rising costs and weak purchasing power, leading to factory layoffs and hardship for street vendors under the “100-Day Project”. Ongoing conflict, civilian deaths, and forced conscription have pushed more households into poverty, particularly female-headed households, which are more vulnerable due to limited gender-sensitive support.

Conflict, rising agricultural costs, disrupted trade, and currency depreciation continue to reduce farmers’ and exporters’ incomes. At the same time, overlapping crises including COVID-19, cyclones, earthquakes, inflation, and environmental degradation continue to damage livelihoods and housing. Despite rising living costs, salaries remain largely unchanged.

Weak law enforcement has also allowed cyber scam syndicates to target vulnerable Myanmar citizens increasingly. Overall, Myanmar people continue to endure a polycrisis driven by governance failures and compounding environmental shocks.

Households’ Coping Mechanisms and their Costs

Working Multiple Jobs

Worsening economic conditions have forced many Myanmar households to rely on multiple jobs to survive. Even before 2018, one in three Myanmar people reportedly held more than one job, with many combining full-time work and informal side jobs such as farming, casual labour, and small businesses. Although this may provide temporary income and financial security, it often results in stress, exhaustion, health problems, and reduced time for family and personal development. As household welfare remains fragile and the middle class continues to shrink, holding multiple jobs has become a survival strategy rather than a sustainable long-term solution.

Reliance on Informal Work

In the absence of stable formal employment, many households rely on informal work, which made up 80.7% of the workforce by 2020 and accounts for 50.1% of Myanmar’s GDP. Informal work includes activities such as street vending, farming, domestic work, and transport services, offering accessible income opportunities with low entry barriers, alongside flexible hours and home-based arrangements. However, workers often lack contracts, paid leave, health benefits, legal protection, and stable income. Women are particularly vulnerable to low pay, discrimination, poor working conditions, and mental health risks. Although informal work can continue during crises, unstable income and limited upward mobility continue to contribute to rising inequality.

Risky and Illegal Livelihoods

As a Myanmar proverb goes, “an empty sack cannot stand upright“ — when economic hardship deepens, some people turn to risky and illegal activities that reportedly pay several times more than ordinary jobs. Since the 2021 coup, job shortages, travel restrictions, and conscription have pushed many toward cyber scam work, including in border-area scam compounds where many face coercion, forced labour, and human rights abuses.

Illegal gambling has also expanded significantly, including two-digit and three-digit lotteries, football betting, and online gambling, driven by hopes of quick income despite risks of addiction, debt, and financial instability. Cyber scammers have exploited this desperation by promoting illegal gambling as a path to overnight wealth. Economic pressures have similarly pushed some women into sex work to support household expenses, exposing them to abuse, violence, HIV/AIDS, and social stigma due to limited legal protection.

At the same time, robberies, thefts, and other petty crimes have increased across post-coup Myanmar amid worsening economic hardship and weak law enforcement, which has prioritised cracking down on political activists and releasing criminal perpetrators. Although these activities may provide temporary income, they remain unsafe and unsustainable, exposing individuals to exploitation, violence, health risks, and even death.

Migration

A well-known Myanmar proverb states that “those who do not move to a new village will not rise to greatness,” reflecting the long-standing belief that migration can improve livelihoods. Since the 2021 coup, migration has become a major coping strategy, mainly for employment and conflict-related reasons. Many migrate to neighbouring countries seeking better wages and stable income. However, around 25% of migrants’ earnings are reportedly seized by the regime through unfair exchange rates, while undocumented workers often face exploitation, abuse, arrest, discrimination, wage theft, and limited access to healthcare, education, and social security. Stricter migration controls and military restrictions have further increased uncertainty, with some workers reportedly arrested even while waiting for brokers to transport them to jobs or falling victim to human traffickers. Although migration can improve income, it is increasingly driven by desperation rather than opportunity.

Asset Depletion, Borrowing, and Under-Consumption

Many Myanmar households survive by selling assets, depleting savings, borrowing money, reducing spending, and consuming less food. However, selling productive assets and relying on debt can weaken long-term financial stability and trap households in debt cycles. Borrowing from relatives may also strain personal relationships, while informal lenders often charge excessive interest rates and sometimes resort to threats and abuse.

Reducing food consumption has become a common coping mechanism, with many households eating less or switching to cheaper food options, increasing risks of malnutrition and starvation, particularly among children, pregnant women, and older people. Many households also reduce spending on healthcare and education, which weakens health, productivity, and long-term human capital development. Although these strategies may provide temporary relief, they significantly reduce long-term recovery capacity.

Recommendations

Skills Training and Livelihood Programmes

Expanding access to flexible and market-oriented skills training programmes, such as digital work, repair services, food processing, and sewing, can strengthen livelihoods. Improving women’s access to skills development and employment opportunities can also support household incomes and local socio-economic recovery.

Support for Small Businesses and Informal Workers

Support for small businesses and informal workers should include micro-grants, low-interest loans, and licensing systems that recognize their role in the economy. At the same time, government spending priorities should be rebalanced to better support economic recovery and household welfare, rather than being concentrated on military operations. Expanding legal protection and investing in infrastructure such as solar energy, clean water, sanitation, drainage, and storage facilities can improve working conditions and reduce dependence on unstable electricity and fuel supplies. These efforts should also be supported by stronger monetary management to control inflation and ensure that financial support remains effective and sustainable.

Strengthen Local Supply Chains

Investment in processing, transport, and storage systems can strengthen local supply chains. For example, reopening key trade corridors such as the Myawaddy–Hpa-an road for cargo movement is essential to improve market access and trade flow. Agricultural support should include input subsidies, fair pricing systems, climate-resilient farming methods, and improved access to affordable fertilizer, farm equipment, and irrigation systems. Promoting local production, reforestation, mangrove restoration, and sustainable resource management can also strengthen livelihoods and resilience while reducing climate-related risks.

Support Safe Migration and Remittance Systems

Safer migrant labour pathways require stronger legal protection, safer recruitment systems, and enforcement against abusive practices. Migrant workers should also receive greater awareness of labour rights and foreign labour laws. In addition, remittance systems should be safer, faster, and more accessible for migrant workers and their families, supported by a sound remittance policy and the abolition of multiple exchange rate policies.

Strengthen Household Social Protection

Strengthening social protection initiatives can improve societal well-being. Expanding cash-for-work programmes, direct cash assistance, and flexible loan repayment arrangements can help reduce financial pressure and prevent debt traps.

Improve Access to Basic Needs

Improving access to basic needs requires stabilizing fuel prices and essential commodity costs. Healthcare and education services should also continue through community-based approaches such as mobile clinics and temporary learning centres, particularly in conflict-affected and displaced communities.

Strengthen Community and Local Support Systems

Strengthening cooperation with NGOs and humanitarian organizations that already support vulnerable communities can support more localized and community-driven solutions. Community mutual support networks should also be strengthened to help households cope during crises and improve social and economic resilience.

Promote Long-Term Economic Recovery

Long-term recovery requires rebuilding stable labour markets, promoting positive international engagement, improving the investment environment, and implementing policy reforms that reflect on-the-ground economic realities. Since ongoing instability, conflict, inflation, and sanctions continue to weaken livelihoods, long-term household stability depends on peace, governance stability, and national economic recovery. Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) approaches remain essential for supporting both immediate needs and sustainable long-term recovery.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s economy has increasingly shifted toward survival-based livelihoods, with many households relying on unstable and informal income sources to cope with daily hardship. However, these coping mechanisms are often temporary and unsustainable. Therefore, sustainable recovery requires stronger social protection, livelihood opportunities, economic stability, and improvements in peace and governance.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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In many cities across Myanmar, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find accessible public green spaces where people can relax, exercise, or escape from crowded urban environments.

Key Takeaways:

• Rapid urbanization and population growth are increasing pressure on public spaces in Myanmar’s cities.

• Unequal access to green spaces affects social well-being, public health, and urban resilience.

• Green spaces should be recognized as essential urban infrastructure rather than optional amenities.

Parks, playgrounds, and community recreational spaces remain limited, while commercial buildings and housing developments continue to expand. During the last few years, major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay have experienced rapid population growth due to economic, social, and political pressures. According to the census data, Yangon’s population increased from 2.7 million in 1983 to around 5 million in 2024. Despite growing urban density, green spaces are still often treated as optional amenities rather than essential public infrastructure.

Factors behind Populated Cities

Migration to urban areas in Myanmar is driven by several economic, social, and political factors. One of the main reasons is that employment opportunities, education, and public services are concentrated in major cities such as Yangon. Migration from other states and regions to Yangon in search of economic and social opportunities has significantly contributed to the city’s high population density.

Rural-to-urban migration has accelerated since 2010, especially in Yangon, where internal migration represented a more significant trend than international migration. However, political instability following the 2021 military coup, combined with economic decline, inflation, and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, further added pressure to economic hardship and displacement pressures across the country. As a result, cities are facing growing demands for housing, transportation, and public infrastructure, while overcrowding and pressure on public spaces continue to increase.

Social Life in Myanmar

Myanmar society has traditionally been community-oriented, with strong social practices centred around religious events, cultural festivals, tea shops, markets, and neighbourhood spaces. These informal gathering places have long played an important role in building social cohesion and a sense of belonging. Social participation and community bonding are essential parts of social sustainability and urban resilience, particularly during periods of crisis and uncertainty. Communities with stronger social ties are often better able to support one another during disasters, economic hardship, and other social stresses.

Despite rapid urbanization, social trust and neighbourhood relationships remained relatively strong in Myanmar’s cities before the crises. However, urban density, privatization, and changing lifestyles are reducing communal interaction spaces. Housing limitations in Yangon, particularly in small apartments and informal rental accommodation, can reduce opportunities for community interaction and shared social life. Moreover, there are limited accessible public spaces where people can gather and socialize without needing to spend money.

Accessible public green spaces can therefore play an important role in strengthening community engagement, social inclusion, and mental well-being. Well-maintained public spaces with social and cultural activities can encourage interaction between diverse communities while reducing social isolation.

Urban Planning Failure and Its Impacts

Rapid urbanization in Yangon has taken place without systematic and long-term urban planning. Since 2021, many people have moved in search of safety and livelihood opportunities due to conflict, insecurity, and displacement . This could also have added pressure to Yangon’s housing, infrastructure, public services, and public spaces. As the population increased, traditional low-rise housing was gradually replaced by high-density apartments to accommodate growing urban populations. Moreover, this transition has also reduced open spaces and social infrastructure within the city.

Urban expansion has increasingly prioritized commercial and residential development over public welfare and environmental sustainability. In some cases, governance challenges and corruption have undermined the protection of public spaces, allowing commercial interests to take precedence over community and environmental needs. Urbanization in Yangon has expanded into agricultural land and open spaces, contributing to the gradual decline of public green areas. Public open spaces have also been privatized through real estate and commercial projects over the past two decades. For example, 10 acres of Kanthaya Park in North Okkalapa Township, Yangon, were replaced by a supermarket development.

At the same time, many low-income residents, migrants, and industrial workers are moving into suburban areas with limited infrastructure and public amenities. Residents living in dense apartment communities can experience stress related to the lack of recreational and social spaces, negatively affecting quality of life and community resilience. As green spaces continue to decline, cities face growing environmental challenges such as urban heat, flooding, air pollution, and overcrowding, while social cohesion and overall urban well-being are increasingly weakened.

The Need for Green Spaces

Green spaces are important not only for environmental purposes but also for social well-being, public health, and community resilience. In the context of urban sustainability, access to open spaces, local amenities, and green areas is considered important tangible elements that support quality of life, while social cohesion, inclusion, and a sense of belonging are equally important intangible aspects of social sustainability. In rapidly urbanizing cities like Yangon, the lack of green spaces and community facilities can weaken social participation and reduce opportunities for traditional and social activities.

As urban populations continue to grow, the need for accessible public spaces is becoming increasingly urgent. Yangon’s population is projected to continue rising significantly in the coming decades, increasing pressure on already limited public spaces. Without proactive efforts to preserve and develop green areas, the scarcity of communal spaces is likely to increase further.

Green spaces also provide multiple health benefits. Research has shown that access to nature and urban greenery can reduce stress, improve mental well-being, encourage physical activity, and strengthen social cohesion. Exposure to natural environments has been associated with lower stress levels and reduced symptoms of anxiety and depression. Parks and walkable green areas can also encourage recreational activities such as walking, jogging, and community exercise, which contribute to healthier lifestyles.

In addition, green spaces can help improve air quality, reduce urban heat, buffer noise pollution, and mitigate flooding risks. Well-maintained public spaces can also encourage community interaction and reduce social isolation, particularly among children, elderly people, and low-income residents. In this sense, green spaces should be viewed not as luxury amenities, but as essential urban infrastructure that supports healthier, more inclusive, and more resilient cities.

Current Gaps and Inequalities

Despite the growing importance of public green spaces, access to them remains highly limited and unequal, especially in Yangon. Yangon currently has far less green space per person than the minimum standard recommended by the World Health Organization. According to an official statement by the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC) in 2016, Yangon’s parks covered a total of 211.25 hectares, providing only 1.74 square meters of green space per person. Several townships still have no public parks at all, while many existing parks are concentrated in the Central Business District and Inner Urban City Zone. As a result, access to green spaces often depends on where people live and their socioeconomic conditions.

In densely populated areas, the shortage of public recreational facilities can further limit opportunities for social interaction and leisure. Some public parks and recreational spaces are also perceived as unsafe or poorly maintained, particularly for women and vulnerable groups. In addition, certain green areas such as private golf courses and open areas are located within exclusive zones or semi-private developments with limited public accessibility.

Although Yangon was once known as the “Garden of the East,” rapid urbanization since 2012 has intensified pressure on public spaces while urban planning has struggled to keep pace with population growth. Real estate development and commercial expansion continue to reduce accessible green areas, while clear standards for creating new parks and public spaces remain limited. At the same time, the unequal distribution of green spaces reflects broader social and spatial inequalities within the city.

Nevertheless, some local organizations and urban initiatives have started advocating for the preservation and revitalization of public spaces in Yangon, including heritage restoration and community-focused urban regeneration projects.

Recommendations

Addressing the shortage of green spaces in Myanmar’s cities requires stronger urban planning, long-term policy commitment and enforcement, and community participation. Public awareness campaigns can also play an important role in changing perceptions of green spaces from optional amenities to essential urban infrastructure. At the same time, stronger advocacy and collaboration with relevant government departments are needed to ensure that green space preservation and development become priorities in urban planning and decision-making. Existing public and urban greenery should be protected from commercial conversion, while future urban development plans should include accessible parks, community spaces, and pedestrian-friendly environments. This requires stronger governance, transparent and corruption-free permitting processes, and effective enforcement to prevent the loss of public spaces to unsustainable development. Neglected and underutilized urban spaces could also be transformed into community green spaces that encourage recreation, social interaction, and creative activities. One example is the Yangon Alley Garden Project led by Doh Eain, which revitalized previously neglected alleyways into community spaces with gardens, playgrounds, seating areas, and street art. At the same time, regularly evaluating existing projects can help identify challenges, learn from past experiences , and inform the design of future green space initiatives.

Moreover, public spaces should be safe, inclusive, and accessible to different groups, including women, children, elderly people, and low-income communities. Maintaining public parks and organizing social and cultural activities can also strengthen community engagement and social cohesion.

Conclusion

As Myanmar’s cities continue to grow under economic, political, and social pressures, the need for accessible public green spaces is becoming increasingly urgent and essential. Rapid urbanization, population growth, and unplanned development have reduced many communal and recreational spaces, particularly in densely populated urban areas. At the same time, growing urban stress, overcrowding, and environmental challenges have highlighted the importance of healthier and more inclusive urban environments.

Green spaces should not be viewed as luxury amenities available only to certain communities. They are essential urban infrastructure that supports social cohesion, mental and physical well-being, environmental sustainability, and community resilience. Accessible public spaces can create opportunities for social interaction, relaxation, and community engagement, especially during periods of uncertainty and crisis.

Building more sustainable and livable cities in Myanmar will require recognizing that green spaces are not optional additions to urban development, but an essential part of urban life and public well-being.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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The global transition toward renewable energy and electric vehicles has accelerated demand for rare earth minerals, placing Myanmar’s conflict-affected borderlands at the center of emerging critical mineral supply chains. As rare earth extraction expands in Kachin State following the 2021 coup, environmental degradation, weak regulation, and fragmented governance structures have increasingly shaped the country’s role in the global green economy.

Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar has become the world’s third-largest producer of rare earth elements, after the US and China, for advanced renewable energy technologies, as China increasingly shifts environmentally destructive extraction beyond its borders into Myanmar’s weakly regulated frontier regions.

• The rapid expansion of rare earth mining in Kachin State after the 2021 coup reflects fragmented governance systems involving militias, armed actors, informal taxation networks, and opaque cross-border business arrangements operating with limited environmental oversight or accountability.

• Myanmar’s rare earth frontier exposes a deeper contradiction within the global green transition: while wealthier societies pursue cleaner energy and “greener” cities, the environmental and human costs of extracting critical minerals are increasingly displaced onto conflict-affected and politically fragile regions, creating zones of ecological sacrifice that remain largely invisible within global climate narratives.

Introduction

Rapidly reducing dependence on fossil fuels and accelerating the transition toward renewable energy have become central to global climate strategies and the pursuit of a net-zero future. Electric vehicles, wind turbines, batteries, and other low-carbon technologies are increasingly viewed as essential tools for addressing climate change and advancing sustainable development goals. Yet the technologies driving this transition depend heavily on critical minerals, particularly rare earth elements essential for renewable energy systems and advanced manufacturing industries.

As global demand for critical minerals intensifies, governments and industries face growing challenges surrounding supply chain security, environmental sustainability, and geopolitical competition. While the expanding critical mineral economy presents economic opportunities for resource-rich developing countries, it also risks reproducing patterns of environmental degradation, corruption, conflict, and unequal resource governance commonly associated with the “resource curse.”

Myanmar has emerged as an increasingly important supplier within regional rare earth supply chains linked to China’s processing industries. According to Global Witness, Myanmar’s exports of rare earth minerals to China increased dramatically from approximately US$1.5 million in 2014 to nearly US$780 million by 2021. Much of this extraction has concentrated in Kachin State along Myanmar’s northern borderlands, where long-standing conflict dynamics and contested territorial authority continue to shape local governance systems.

As extraction rapidly expands, Myanmar’s rare earth frontier increasingly reveals a deeper contradiction at the heart of the global green transition: while renewable energy technologies are promoted as environmentally sustainable solutions, the environmental and governance costs associated with critical mineral extraction are increasingly displaced onto fragile border regions affected by conflict and weak regulation.

Myanmar’s Rare Earth Boom and China’s Supply Chain Shift

Rare earth minerals have become strategically important because of their essential role in renewable energy technologies and advanced manufacturing industries. Heavy rare earth elements such as dysprosium and neodymium are particularly valuable because they are used in permanent magnets essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, batteries, smartphones, and high-performance electronics. As governments accelerate climate goals and low-carbon industrial strategies, global demand for these minerals has surged dramatically.

China has dominated the global rare earth industry since the 1980s and continues to control much of the world’s processing and refining capacity. However, the environmental consequences of rare earth extraction within China became increasingly severe over the past decade. Illegal mining, toxic waste, poisoned waterways, and long-term ecological degradation generated mounting environmental concerns, particularly in Jiangxi Province, often referred to as China’s “rare earth kingdom.”

In response, Chinese authorities intensified environmental enforcement measures after 2016 and shut down many domestic heavy rare earth mining operations. Yet while China reduced environmentally destructive extraction within its own territory, global demand for rare earth minerals continued to rise rapidly. Rather than reducing extraction overall, mining activities increasingly shifted across the border into Myanmar’s weakly regulated frontier regions. While China argues for a non-interference policy in the Myanmar crisis for Western powers, they are exploiting the Myanmar Civil War as a tool to increase China’s influence in Myanmar by dealing with both the military-led government and the ethnic military. China’s cooperation with KIA for rare earth minerals from Kachin state is evidence of China’s double standard in its own foreign policy towards Myanmar.

A six-month investigation by Global Witness documented how this highly polluting industry expanded rapidly into Myanmar’s Kachin Special Region 1, a semi-autonomous territory controlled by militia groups affiliated with Myanmar’s military establishment. Within just a few years, the region became one of the world’s largest suppliers of heavy rare earth minerals.

Reports indicate that thousands of Chinese workers and technicians crossed into Myanmar between 2016 and 2019 to establish and operate mining sites using the same in-situ leaching methods previously employed in Jiangxi. The mines continue to supply Chinese state-owned processing companies that dominate the global rare-earth refining industry. Commodity research firm Roskill noted in 2021 that nearly all major Chinese state-owned enterprises involved in heavy rare earth processing had become dependent on Myanmar as a source of raw materials.

The expansion of extraction into Myanmar demonstrates how stricter environmental governance in one country can displace ecological harm into weaker regulatory environments elsewhere. As one industry expert cited by Global Witness observed, “the environmental challenges that come with this type of mining in China have spread to a neighbouring nation.”

Fragmented Governance After the Coup

The rapid expansion of rare earth extraction in Myanmar cannot be understood solely through global market demand. It is also deeply connected to fragmented governance systems that intensified following the 2021 military coup.

Rather than producing a simple absence of governance, the post-coup crisis generated overlapping systems of competing authority involving military actors, militias, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), border business networks, and informal economic actors. In many extraction zones across northern Myanmar, governance operates through negotiated control, informal taxation systems, and localized power arrangements rather than centralized state regulation.

In Kachin Special Region 1, mining operations reportedly function through opaque agreements involving militia-controlled authorities and cross-border commercial actors. Although foreign investment in small- and medium-scale mineral extraction is technically illegal under Myanmar law, enforcement remains limited in conflict-affected borderlands where competing systems of authority overlap.

The Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar (ISP) reported that militia leaders and affiliated business networks have become central brokers in the rare-earth economy, facilitating mining operations, granting access to extraction sites, collecting informal taxes, and controlling cross-border trade routes into China. In many cases, Myanmar-registered companies reportedly function as fronts for Chinese investment operating through informal and opaque commercial arrangements.

The post-coup political environment has further weakened environmental oversight and institutional accountability. Under fragmented governance conditions, extraction activities continue with limited regulatory monitoring, while armed actors and border business networks benefit economically from the rapid expansion of rare earth mining.

Myanmar’s rare earth sector, therefore, illustrates how conflict-affected borderlands can become integrated into global supply chains through systems of shadow governance and informal extraction economies operating beyond effective environmental regulation.

Environmental Consequences in Kachin State and Beyond

The environmental consequences of rare earth extraction in Myanmar increasingly mirror the ecological devastation previously witnessed in China’s Jiangxi Province, where decades of poorly regulated mining contaminated waterways, destroyed forests, and generated massive long-term cleanup costs. China’s “Take profit without responsibility” policy in neighbouring countries for Rare-earth mining clearly downgrades China’s role as a global normative actor.

Mining operations in Kachin State commonly use in-situ leaching methods that inject chemical solutions such as ammonium sulfate directly into mountainsides to extract rare earth minerals. While highly profitable and relatively inexpensive, this process leaves behind toxic wastewater, contaminated soil, deforested landscapes, and unstable terrain vulnerable to erosion and landslides.

Global Witness documented how mining sites across Kachin State have expanded rapidly across mountainous terrain, with thousands of chemical collection pools identified near river systems and forest areas. Local communities have reported worsening access to clean water, dying fish populations, contaminated farmland, and the disappearance of wildlife from nearby forests. Residents also described growing fears about surrounding toxic exposure, respiratory illnesses, and long-term environmental destruction linked to chemical leaching processes.

The environmental consequences are no longer confined to isolated mining zones. Recent environmental monitoring in Thailand detected alarming levels of arsenic contamination in transboundary river systems linked to mining activities upstream in Myanmar, including areas associated with rare earth extraction. Investigations reported by Mongabay found growing concerns along the Salween River basin, where communities increasingly fear the impacts of toxic contamination on fisheries, agriculture, drinking water systems, and local livelihoods.

These developments highlight how environmental harm generated within Myanmar’s conflict-affected borderlands increasingly carries regional ecological and human security consequences. The contamination of shared river systems demonstrates that the environmental costs of weak extraction governance do not stop at national borders.

The long-term implications may prove severe. In China’s Jiangxi Province, authorities estimated that environmental cleanup costs linked to rare earth mining could exceed US$5.5 billion, with ecological recovery potentially taking up to a century. Myanmar currently lacks both the institutional capacity and regulatory mechanisms necessary to manage environmental remediation on a comparable scale.

The Hidden Contradiction of Global Green Transition

Myanmar’s rare earth frontier reveals a critical contradiction at the heart of the global green transition. Renewable energy technologies are frequently presented as environmentally sustainable solutions to climate change. Yet, the extraction systems that support these industries often impose severe environmental and social costs in politically fragile regions.

The environmental burdens associated with critical mineral extraction are not distributed equally. Instead, they are increasingly externalized onto vulnerable borderland communities where governance systems remain weak, fragmented, and conflict-affected. A green transition that ignores the social and environmental impacts on local communities is not truly green; it is simply greenwashing under the language of sustainability. While industries and consumers elsewhere benefit from electric vehicles, renewable energy infrastructure, and advanced technologies, the ecological and political consequences of extraction are concentrated in frontier regions such as northern Myanmar.

This dynamic raises broader questions about environmental governance, supply chain accountability, and the political economy of climate transition policies. Efforts to accelerate renewable energy adoption without addressing extraction governance risk reproduce new forms of environmental injustice and conflict-linked resource exploitation.

Myanmar’s rare earth frontier ultimately reveals a critical paradox at the heart of the global green transition: technologies designed to secure a sustainable future increasingly depend upon extraction systems rooted in environmental destruction, fragmented governance, and conflict-affected borderlands. Without stronger environmental accountability and conflict-sensitive supply chain governance, the pursuit of clean energy risks reproducing new forms of ecological injustice under the banner of sustainability.

Policy Recommendations

Addressing the environmental and governance challenges of rare earth extraction in Myanmar requires stronger international cooperation, conflict-sensitive environmental governance, and improved supply chain accountability.

Key priorities include:

• Strengthening environmental monitoring in conflict-affected extraction areas and tightening regulations on rare earth trade linked to environmentally harmful practices, particularly within Chinese-linked supply chains.

• Improving transparency and traceability in critical mineral supply chains, including the potential use of blockchain technologies to reduce illicit trade and improve accountability.

• Expanding responsible sourcing standards for companies and governments reliant on rare earth minerals for renewable energy, electric vehicles, and advanced manufacturing.

• Enhancing regional cooperation to address transboundary environmental impacts such as river pollution and ecological degradation. Local actors, including the NUG and EAOs, should also consider long-term environmental consequences in governance decisions.

• Encouraging ASEAN to take a more active role in addressing regional environmental risks stemming from Myanmar’s extractive and ecological crises.

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Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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အီးဒ်ဒွလ်အသွာဟာလို့ ခေါ်ဆိုကြတဲ့ ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းက အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်တွေရဲ့ အသားစွန့်လှုမှု အလှုဒါနပွဲတော်ကို နှစ်စဥ်ကျင်းပကြတာဖြစ်ပြီး အဓိက အားဖြင့် ကျွဲ၊နွား၊ဆိတ်၊သိုးနှင့် ကုလားအုတ် စသည့် စမြုပ်ပြန်နိုင်တဲ့ သတ္တဝါ အမျိုးအစား ၅ မျိုးကို အဓိက စွန့်လှုကြကာ စွန့်လှုအသားများကို ၃ ပုံ အညီအမျှခွဲဝေပြီး ပထမတစ်ပုံကို လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း လူမျိုး၊ဘာသာမရွေးဆင်းရဲ့နွမ်းပါး၍အသားဓာတ်ချို့တဲ့သူများ၊ ဒုတိယတစ်ပုံကို ဆွေမျိုးရင်းချာများနှင့်လူမျိုးဘာသာမရွေးမိတ်ဆွေအပေါင်းအသင်းများ၊ တတိယတစ်ပုံကို ကာယံကာရှင်၏ မိသားစုအတွက် စသဖြင့် ခွဲခြမ်းကြရတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဆိုပါ အသားစွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ကို ရေရှည်တည့်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှု ၏ အဓိက ဒေါက်တိုင် ၃ ခုဖြစ်သော သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်၊ လူမှုဘဝနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ရူ့ထောင့် ၃ ခုမှ နေ၍ ယခုဆောင်းပါးတွင် ဆွေးနွေးတင်ပြသွားမှာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ယေဘုယျအားဖြင့် သတ္တဝါမွေးမြူရေးလုပ်ငန်းသည် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်ကျင်ရူ့ထောင့်ကြည့်လျှင် ရင်းမြစ်များစွာကို အသုံးပြုရသလို၊ သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိခိုက်မှုလည်း ရှိကာ လေထုထဲ ကာဗွန်ဒိုင်အောက်ဆိုဒ် ထုတ်လွှတ်မှုလည်း ကြီးမားတဲ့ လုပ်ငန်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တစ်ဖန် ၂၁ ရာစုလူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း တိရိစ္ဆာန်အခွင့်အရေးကိုပါ အလေးထားစဥ်စားလာကြသည့်ယခုအချိန်တွင် အသားစွန့်လှုမှု အလှုဒါန ပွဲတော်နှင့်စပ်လျဥ်း၍ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုရူ့ထောင့်မှ လည်းကောင်း၊ အစားအစာထုတ်လုပ်မှုစနစ်တွေဟာ အချိန်တိုအတွင်း၊ မြင်သာထင်သာရှိတဲ့ အချိန်ကာလတစ်ခုအတွင်းမှာ ဘယ်လိုပြုမူလုပ်ကိုင်သလဲဆိုတာကိုလည်း လေ့လာဖို့ ဒီစွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ဟာ အခွင့်အလမ်းကောင်းတစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

သို့သော် အီးဒ်ရဲ့ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ သက်ရောက်မှုတွေဟာ အသားစွန့်လှုခြင်း ဆိုသည့် ဘာသာရေးထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာတစ်ခုတည်းနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်တာမဟုတ်ပါဘူး။ ယင်းစွန့်လှုမှုကိုဗဟိုပြုပြီး တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးထုတ်လုပ်မှု၊ လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးမှု၊ မြို့ပြစျေးကွက်များနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဖြန့်ဖြူးမှုစနစ်များ တိုးတက်ပြောင်းလဲလာပုံကြောင့်လည်း သက်ရောက်မှုတွေဟာ မူရင်း ဘာသာရေးအရ စွန့်လှုမှု ဆိုတာကြောင့်ဆိုတာထက် ပိုလာပါတယ်။

အီးဒ်အသားစွန့်လှုမှုဟာ သီးခြား ဘာသာရေး၊ယဉ်ကျေးမှုဆိုင်ရာ အခမ်းအနားတစ်ခုအနေနဲ့ လည်ပတ်နေတာထက်၊ ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးစီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းတွေရဲ့ အချိန်ကာလတစ်ခုအတွင်း ဝယ်လိုအားနှင့် ရောင်းလိုအား အရှိန်မြှင့်တင်မှုတစ်ခုအနေနဲ့ သက်ရောက်မှုရှိနေတာလည်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်မတိုင်မီရက်သတ္တပတ်များအတွင်းမှာ၊ တိရစ္ဆာန်များကို ကျေးလက်စားကျက်မြေများမှ မြို့ပြနှင့် မြို့ပြအနီးပတ်ဝန်းကျင်စျေးကွက်များဆီသို့ သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ကြပြီး၊ ထိုနေရာမှာ မြင့်တက်လာသည့် ဝယ်လိုအားကို ဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းကြတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အီးဒ်စွန့်လှုမှုအလှုဒါနအတွက် ဈေးကွက်ဝယ်လိုအားပေါ်မူတည်၍ အပြောင်းအရွေ့များကြောင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ဖိအားအသစ်ပုံစံမျိုးကို ဖန်တီးခြင်းထက်၊ လက်ရှိ ရှိနှင့်နေပြီးသား မွေးမြူရေးလုပ်ငန်းနယ်ပယ်၏ လုပ်ငန်းလည်ပတ်မှုသဘောတရားအရ သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ်သက်ရောက်မှုများကို ပိုပြီးထင်သာမြင်သာ တွေ့မြင့်ခွင့်ရတာသာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးထုတ်လုပ်မှုလုပ်ငန်း၏ဂေဟဗေဒခြေရာ (စမြုပ်ပြန်တိရစ္ဆာန်များမှ မီသိန်းဓာတ်ငွေ့ထုတ်လွှတ်မှု၊ စားကျက်မြေအသုံးပြုမှု၊ နှင့် အစာထုတ်လုပ်မှုစနစ်အတွက် ရေလိုအပ်ချက်) စသည် တစ်နှစ်ပတ်လုံး တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေး၊ထုတ်လုပ်မှုလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်တစ်လျှောက် ကာဗွန်ထုတ်လွှတ်မှုကို တွက်ချက်တာဖြစ်ပြီး၊ အီးဒ်အတွင်း ပြောင်းလဲသွားတာကတော့ သားကောင်ကို စွန့်လှုရန် ဇီဝိန်ချုပ်ခြင်း၊ သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ခြင်းနဲ့ ဖြန့်ဖြူးခြင်းတို့ရဲ့ အရှိန်နဲ့ အချိန်ကာလအပိုင်းအခြားပဲဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ရှုထောင့်ကကြည့်ရင်၊ ရက်သတ္တပတ်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်း ဝယ်လိုအားလွန်စွာ မြင့်တက်မှု့ကြောင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် အပေါ်သက်ရောက်မှုဟာ အခြေခံအားဖြင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ထိခိုက်မှုအသစ်တွေအဖြစ်ထက်၊ ဒေသအလိုက် တိရိစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူးရေးလုပ်ငန်းနှင့် စွန့်လှုသည့် နေရာများတွင် သက်ရောက်မှုတွေ ရုတ်တရက်ဖြစ်စေတာမျိုးဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဥပမာ။ မြို့ပြများရှိ သားသတ်ရုံများနှင့်ဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများသည် အချိန်တိုအတွင်း အော်ဂဲနစ်စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းအမြောက်အမြား (သွေးရည်ကြည်၊ အသားအကြွင်းအကျန်များ)နှင့် ထုပ်ပိုးမှုလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်မှ အမှိုက်များ အပါအဝင် သည် ရက်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်း အမှိုက်ထုတ်လုပ်မှုမြင့်တက်လာခြင်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

သို့သော်လည်း ဒေသအလိုက် သဘာဝတ်ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ်ညစ်ညမ်းမှုများဟာ တစ်နေရာနှင့် တစ်နေရာ တူညီမှုမရှိပါဘူး။ စနစ်တကျအားကောင်းသည့် မြူနီစပါယ်စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုများလုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်သည့်နေရာများနှင့် အအေးခန်းကွင်းဆက်စနစ်များ စနစ်တကျရှိသော ဒေသများတွင်၊ သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ် ဆိုးကျိုးသက်ရောက်မှုဖိအားကို ပိုမိုထိရောက်စွာ လျော့ကျနိုင်စေပါတယ်။

စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှာအားနည်းသော၊ အရင်းအမြစ်နည်းပါးသော ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်များတွင်မူ၊ အမှိုက်အညစ်အကြေးများ စုပုံခြင်းနှင့် ပျက်စီးယိုယွင်းခြင်းတို့သည် ပိုမိုမြင်သာစေနိုင်တဲ့ သက်ရောက်မှုတွေဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဆိုပါ ထိခိုက်မှုများသည့် စားသုံးသူကြောင့်ဖြစ်သော ထိခိုက်မှုသက်သက်ထက် အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံဆိုင်ရာ ကွာဟချက်များကို ဖော်ထုတ်ပြသနေခြင်းလည်း ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

လူမှုရေးရူထောင့်အရဆိုရင်၊ အီးဒ်ဟာ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများကို ပြန်လည်မျှဝေခြင်းနှင့် စုပေါင်းသက်သာချောင်ချိရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံမူများနဲ့ နက်ရှိုင်းစွာ ဆက်နွယ်နေတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စွန့်လှုအသားကို မိသားစုဝင်များ၊ ဆွေမျိုးများနှင့် လိုအပ်နေသူများကြားတွင် ခွဲဝေပေးသည့် ကျင့်သုံးမှုသည် သိသာထင်ရှားသည့် အစားအစာမျှ (ရင်းမြစ်များကို) မျှဝေခြင်းယန္တရားကို ဖန်တီးပေးကာ ဝင်ငွေနည်းအိမ်ထောင်စုများစွာအတွက် တိရစ္ဆာန်ပရိုတင်းကို လက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်မှုကိုလည်း ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဤပြန်လည်မျှဝေခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းသည် နောက်ဆက်တွဲလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်တစ်ခုမဟုတ်ပဲ၊ ဘာသာရေးထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာ၏ အဓိကကျင့်ဝတ်ဆိုင်ရာ အစိတ်အပိုင်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုအရဆိုရင်၊ ၎င်းသည် တရားဝင်နိုင်ငံတော်၏ လူမှုဖူလုံရေးစနစ်များအပြင်ဘက်တွင် လည်ပတ်နေသော လူမှုရေးဖှုလုံရေးကွန်ရက်ပုံစံတစ်ခုကို ကိုယ်စားပြုပါတယ်။ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင်၊ လျင်မြန်သော မြို့ပြအသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုနှင့် စားသုံးမှုပုံစံများ ပြောင်းလဲလာမှုသည် ဤပြန်လည်ခွဲဝေမှု မည်သို့ဖြစ်ပွားသည်ကို ပြောင်းလဲစေပြီး၊ မြို့ကြီးများစွာတွင် ထုပ်ပိုးထားသော အသားဝန်ဆောင်မှုများနှင့် အလုပ်အပ်နှင်းခံရသည့် သားသတ်လုပ်ငန်းများအပေါ် မှီခိုမှု တိုးလာလျက်ရှိပါတယ်။

စီးပွားရေးအရဆိုရင်၊ အီးဒ်သွလ်အသွာဟာဟာ တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးစီးပွားရေးအတွက် ရာသီအလိုက် စျေးကွက်အရှိန်မြှင့်တင်ပေးမှုတစ်ခုအဖြစ် လည်း သက်ရောက်စေပါတယ်။ ကျေးလက်ဒေသထုတ်လုပ်သူများသည် စွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ကို အဓိကဝင်ငွေရကာလတစ်ခုအဖြစ် မှီခိုလေ့ရှိပြီး၊ လပေါင်းများစွာ တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူမှုကို ငွေကြေးစီးဆင်းမှု (ဝင်ငွေ) အဖြစ် အချိန်တိုအတွင်း ပြောင်းလဲရောင်းချကြတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဤရာသီပေါ် ဝယ်လိုအားသည် မွေးမြူရေးနှင့် အသေးစားလယ်သမားများအတွက် အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်းမှုကို အထောက်အကူပြုကာ၊ ကျေးလက်-မြို့ပြ စီးပွားရေးဆက်သွယ်မှုများကို အားဖြည့်ပေးပါတယ်။ သို့သော် ၎င်းသည် မတည်ငြိမ်မှုကိုလည်း ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေပြီး၊ အထူးသဖြင့် အီးဒ်မတိုင်မီရက်သတ္တပတ်များအတွင်း တိရစ္ဆာန်စျေးနှုန်းများ သိသိသာသာ မြင့်တက်လာတတ်ခြင်းသည့် မြို့ပြစျေးကွက်များတွင် အချို့သောအိမ်ထောင်စုများကို စွန့်လှုရာတွင် အပြည့်အဝပါဝင်နိုင်မှုမရှိအောင် ကန့်သတ်ထားသလိုဖြစ်စေပါတယ်။ ခေတ်သစ်ကုန်သွယ်မှုကွန်ရက်များသည် ဤသယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းအများစုကို လွှမ်းမိုးထားပြီး၊ အသေးစားထုတ်လုပ်သူများအတွက် လက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်မှုကို ဖန်တီးပေးသလို၊ စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ကြီးကြပ်မှုအတွက် စိန်ခေါ်မှုများလည်း ဖန်တီးပေးပါတယ်။

မျက်မှောက်ခေတ်ကာလတွင် အီးဒ်၏ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုကို ပုံဖော်နေသော အဓိကပြောင်းလဲမှုတစ်ခုမှာ ပွဲတော်ကို အခြေပြု၍ စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းသဘောသဘာဝ ပိုမိုကြီးထွားလာခြင်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ရိုးရာ၊ ရပ်ရွာဗဟိုပြု သားကောင်ကိုဇီဝိန်ချုပ်၍ စွန့်လှုခြင်းအလေ့အထများမှသည် စက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းဆန်ဆန်၊ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုအခြေပြု အီးဒ်စီးပွားရေးများဆီသို့ ကူးပြောင်းခြင်းသည် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ရောက်မှုအတွက် သိသာထင်ရှားဆုံး အနှုတ်လက္ခဏာဆောင်သည့် ဖိအားများထဲမှ တစ်ခုအဖြစ် ပေါ်ထွက်လာပါတယ်။

ဤစီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းတွင် ထုပ်ပိုးထားသော အသားပို့ဆောင်မှုဝန်ဆောင်မှုများ၊ သားကောင်းကို ဇီဝိန်ချုပ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ အဆောက်အအုံများ၊ ဗဟိုမှ ချုပ်ကိုင်သည့်တိရစ္ဆာန်စျေးကွက်များနှင့် စူပါမားကတ်များက မောင်းနှင်သည့် တိရစ္ဆာန်ဝယ်ယူမှုများ ပါဝင်ပါတယ်။ ဤစနစ်များသည် သန့်ရှင်းရေး၊ ထောက်ပံ့ပို့ဆောင်ရေးစွမ်းဆောင်ရည်နှင့် အဆင်ပြေမှုကို ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်စေနိုင်သော်လည်း၊ ထောက်ပံ့ရေးကွင်းဆက်၏ ရှုပ်ထွေးမှုကို တိုးမြှင့်စေပြီး သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေး၊ အအေးခန်းထားရှိမှုနှင့် ပြုပြင်ထုတ်လုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများမှတစ်ဆင့် စွမ်းအင်သုံးစွဲမှုကိုလည်း တိုးပွားစေပါတယ်။ အရေးကြီးတာက၊ ဤဖွဲ့စည်းပုံဆိုင်ရာ အသွင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုသည် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ အနှုတ်ပြသည့်အကျိုးဆက်များကို ပိုမိုပုံဖော်လာနေခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ဘာသာရေးထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာ အီးဒ်ပွဲတော်ကကိုယ်တိုင်က ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေတာမဟုတ်ပါဘူး။ ယနေ့ခေတ် အီးဒ်၏ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုမှုဆိုင်ရာ စိန်ခေါ်မှုသည် သားကောင်းကို စွန့်လှူရန် အသက်ဇီဝိန်ချုပ်ခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်မှ မဟုတ်ပဲ၊ ထိုစွန့်လှုမှုလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်၏ အတိုင်းအတာကြီးမားလာမှု၊ စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းအဖြစ်အဖြစ်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းနှင့် မြို့ပြနှင့် ပေါင်းစည်းလာမှုတို့ကြောင့် အဓိက ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

နည်းလမ်းများစွာဖြင့် စီးပွားဖြစ် အီးဒ်စနစ်ပုံစံဆီသို့ ကူးပြောင်းခြင်းသည် ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ စားသောက်ကုန်လုပ်ငန်းစီးပွားရေးတွင် ကျယ်ပြန့်သော အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုတစ်ခုကို ကိုယ်စားပြုပါတယ်။ ၎င်းမှာ ဒေသအလိုက်၊ လူမှုရေးအရ အခြေပြုထားသော အလေ့အထများမှ စက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းဆန်ဆန်၊ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုကို ဦးတည်သည့် စားသုံးမှုကွင်းဆက်များဆီသို့ ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဤအပြောင်းအလဲသည် ဘာသာရေးအရ စွန့်လှုပြန်လည်မျှဝေခြင်းယန္တရားကို အားနည်းစေပြီး၊ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင် ဗဟိုမှချုပ်ကိုင်သည့် ထောက်ပံ့ပို့ဆောင်ရေးနှင့် ထုပ်ပိုးမှုစွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းများမှတစ်ဆင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ခြေရာကို တိုးမြှင့်စေနိုင်ပါတယ်။ ဤသို့ဖြစ်၍ အီးဒ်စွန့်လွှတ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သတ်၍ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ ဆွေးနွေးငြင်းခုံမှုသည် မူလအစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာ၏ လမ်းညွှန်ချက်များနှင့် ၎င်းပတ်လည်တွင် ကြီးထွားလာသော စီးပွားရေးခေတ်သစ်စနစ်များကို ပိုင်းခြားသိမြင်ရန်လိုအပ်မည်ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ဤသို့ခွဲခြမ်းစိတ်ဖြာချက်အရ၊ အီးဒ်ဒွလ်အသွာဟာစွန့်လှုမှု၏ လူမှုရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ အကျိုးကျေးဇူးများကို ထိန်းသိမ်းပေးရင်း သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ရောက်မှုများကို လျှော့ချပေးနိုင်မယ့် မူဝါဒလမ်းညွှန်ချက်များစွာ ပေါ်ထွက်လာစေနိုင်ရန်အရေးကြီးတာကို တွေ့နိုင်ပါတယ်။

• ပထမဦးစွာ၊ အစိုးရများနှင့် ဒေသဆိုင်ရာမြူနီစပါယ်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် မြို့ပြအတွင်းရှိ စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှု ဖိအားကို လျှော့ချရေးနှင့် သန့်ရှင်းရေးနှင့် စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းထိန်းချုပ်မှုကို ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်စေမယ့် ဗဟိုချုပ်ကိုင်မှုလျှော့ချထားသော်လည်း စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းရှိသည့် သားသတ်ခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများတွင် ဖန်တီးရာတွင်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• ဒုတိယအနေဖြင့်၊ ရပ်ရွာအဆင့်တွင် အအေးခန်းကွင်းဆက်နှင့် အသားသိုလှောင်မှုစနစ်များကို အားဖြည့်ပေးခြင်းသည် စွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ကာလအတွင်း ပျက်စီးယိုယွင်းမှုနှင့် အစားအစာစွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းကို သိသိသာသာ လျှော့ချပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• တတိယအနေဖြင့်၊ ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာပြီး တရားမျှတသော တိရစ္ဆာန်စျေးကွက်များကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးသည့် မူဝါဒများသည် စျေးနှုန်းမတည်ငြိမ်မှုကို တည်ငြိမ်စေရင်း အသေးစားလယ်သမားများကို ခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်သော ပွဲစားများထံမှ ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• စတုတ္ထအနေဖြင့်၊ ပွဲတော်အချိန်ကာလအတွက် အထူးဒီဇိုင်းထုတ်ထားသော တရားဝင်စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းစီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုစနစ်များ (ဥပမာ အော်ဂဲနစ်စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းစုဆောင်းခြင်းနှင့် ပြုပြင်ခြင်းစနစ်များ) ကို ပေါင်းစည်းခြင်းသည် မြို့ပြဗဟိုဌာနများတွင် ကာလတိုသဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ညစ်ညမ်းမှုကို လျှော့ချပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• နောက်ဆုံးအနေဖြင့်၊ ရိုးရာအစဉ်အလာအတိုင်း အသားပြန်လည်ခွဲဝေခြင်းကွန်ရက်များ (ပရဟိတဖြန့်ဖြူးရေးစနစ်များ အပါအဝင်) ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ်ခြင်းနှင့် ပံ့ပိုးခြင်းသည် စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်း ကျယ်ပြန့်လာသည်နှင့်အမျှ အီးဒ်စွန့်လှုမှု၏ လူမှုတန်းတူညီမျှမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကျိုးကျေးဇူးများ ဆုံးရှုံးမသွားစေရန် ဂရုပြုရန်လိုအပ်ပါတယ်။

အချုပ်အားဖြင့်၊ အိီးဒ်အသွာဟာ၏ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုကို ၎င်း၏ ဘာသာရေးအခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်များတစ်ခုတည်းက ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်မဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ ခေတ်သစ်အစားအစာဖြန့်ဝေရေး စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုစနစ်များက ၎င်း၏ကျင့်သုံးမှုကို မည်သို့ထိန်းညှိပေးနိုင်မလဲ ဆိုသည့်အချက်က အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပါတယ်။

စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းများ အရှိန်မြှင့်လာသည်နှင့်အမျှ၊ အဓိကစိန်ခေါ်မှုမှာ အသားစွန့်လှုမှုအီးဒ်ရှိသင့်၊ မရှိသင့်ဆိုတာမဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ ခေတ်စနစ်နှင့်အညီ ပြောင်းလဲလာသော အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများကို သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ခံနိုင်ရည်ရှိမှု၊ လူမှုတန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် စီးပွားရေးအရအကျိုးအမြတ်ရနိုင်မှုတို့ကြား မည်သို့ မျှတအောင် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်မလဲဆိုတာပဲ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

တင်သျှိုင်းအောင်သည် ပေါ်တူဂီနိုင်ငံ လစ္စဘွန်းတက္ကသိုလ် မှ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ သုတေသီတစ်ဦးဖြစ်ဦး လက်ရှိတွင် ရွှေတောင်သာဂသူစင်တာ၏ အတိုင်ပင်ခံဒါရိုက်တာလည်း ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

“ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ရေးလှုံ့ဆော်ရင်းအနာဂတ်ကိုတည်ဆောက်ကြစို့”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai

Myanmar is facing a severe and often hidden mental health crisis, shaped by ongoing conflict and systemic disruption. This article examines the key drivers, impacts, and current responses to mental health challenges within the country’s polycrisis context.

Key Takeawys:

• Myanmar’s mental health crisis is driven by conflict and systemic limitations, creating both visible and invisible burdens.

• Community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible short-term solutions.

• Long-term progress depends on political stability and sustained system strengthening.

Political unrest has severe effects on population health, particularly increasing the mental health burden. People living in conflict settings commonly experience anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, and suicidal thoughts. Evidence from Afghanistan and Ukraine also shows high levels of PTSD and depression in conflict settings.

In Myanmar, the ongoing conflict has led to a sharp rise in mental health problems. Depression and anxiety increased from 14.3% and 22.2% in mid-2021 to 61.39% and 58.02% by October, and by late 2022, one in four people experienced moderately severe to severe depression. Therefore, mental health remains a severe and often hidden public health crisis.

Mental Health in Myanmar’s Polycrisis Context

Mental health is not regarded as a priority due to competing needs, as families struggle to survive in a context of multiple overlapping crises. In 2021, a military coup overthrew the elected government, triggering widespread anti-coup protests across Myanmar. These peaceful demonstrations were met with violence, human rights violations, and attacks on civilians. Many people were killed, arrested, or displaced, and repression later expanded beyond protesters, with journalists being killed or detained. Women have also faced sexual violence, causing lasting psychological trauma. Forced conscription of adults aged 18 and above into frontline conflict pushed many young people to flee abroad or move to urban areas. At the same time, three in four Myanmar youths are no longer engaged in education or training due to unsafe learning environments, unaffordable educational costs, and limited scholarship opportunities, particularly among low- and middle-income families. As a result, many youths, who are essential to the country’s future resilience and recovery, face growing distress and anxiety over an uncertain future.

Ongoing conflict has displaced thousands of families, leaving them without adequate shelter or basic services, while also causing family separation. At the same time, the targeting of social service providers and the withdrawal of government workers under the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) have significantly weakened essential public services, including healthcare. Many CDM workers face arrests, torture, and threats against their families. Some are forced to move between safe houses for safety. In addition, the military regime has restricted passport issuance for CDM workers and increased questioning and detention at airports to prevent them from leaving the country. Without documentation and under constant risk of arrest or imprisonment, many CDM members continue to live in fear, insecurity, and anxiety.

Since the coup, inflation has risen to 28.58%, while the poverty rate reached 32.10%, leaving nearly one-third of the population in poverty. Agricultural productivity has declined by 16%, and around 15 million people are at risk of food insecurity. Meanwhile, the cost of essential goods and unemployment have both increased significantly. Salaries, however, have remained largely unchanged, making even daily commuting a financial burden. Many can no longer afford basic leisure or personal items. Some are forced to skip meals or reduce spending. Under such conditions, survival takes priority over mental health care, which costs between $7 and $12 per session.

Stigma is another major barrier. Mental health problems are often viewed as a source of shame, linked to evil spirits or karma, reflecting a limited understanding. Seeking professional care remains highly stigmatized, making people reluctant to access services. Many fear burdening others, hospitalization, or discussing their condition. As a result, individuals often endure problems silently and hide their condition, leading to underestimation of mental health needs.

The lack of adequate mental health care further worsens the situation. There is a major imbalance between professionals, facilities, and patients, especially between urban and rural areas. Only 1.4% of government health spending is allocated to mental health, and although the National Mental Health Policy (2021–2025) was approved, its implementation has stalled due to political unrest and limited resources. Consequently, stigma, low awareness, and limited access to care continue to deteriorate mental health outcomes.

At the same time, Myanmar citizens face additional crises such as COVID-19, cyclones, and earthquakes, causing loss of loved ones, livelihoods, and housing, creating compounded trauma. When these crises overlap, their impacts intensify, making recovery extremely difficult. Weak disaster governance and poor preparedness further worsen these impacts.

As a result, many Myanmar people are carrying invisible wounds. Rising prices have made simple activities unaffordable for many. Rising crime and worsening public transport have increased insecurity. Safety concerns also extend online, as user data has been handed over to the military. Daily life is further disrupted by power cuts, fuel shortages, and strict refuelling limits, while travel restrictions and detentions limit mobility. Anxiety has become a daily reality, driven by insecurity, forced conscription, limited opportunities, and uncertainty about the future.

The Hidden Costs of Mental Health Crisis

The psychological impact of the Myanmar polycrisis does not end with ceasefire agreements. It may contribute to trans-generational trauma, shaping families and communities. For example, people born in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide have experienced trauma passed down over time. Children are especially vulnerable, as violence and displacement impair development and learning. In some cases, trauma may alter gene expression, increasing the risk of future mental health problems and creating cycles of inherited distress.

Mental health issues not only affect a person’s mind but also their physical health. They can lead to alcohol and substance abuse, as well as other coping behaviors, and in severe cases, suicide. Anxiety and chronic stress can significantly reduce work productivity and income, while also placing emotional and economic burdens on families. High out-of-pocket healthcare costs further strain households. Over time, it contributes to reduced human capacity and increased pressure on the country’s overall economic and social systems.

Current Responses and Limitations

The institutional infrastructure, regulation, and oversight of mental health services in Myanmar remain limited, with a significant imbalance between care providers and patients. Individuals with severe mental distress require professional support at higher levels of the Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) care pyramid. Due to system neglect, cultural beliefs, and stigma, many rely on traditional approaches such as support from Buddhist monks, religious practices, or meditation. Online community groups also provide peer support. While useful for daily coping, these methods are not sufficient for severe conditions.

Mobile psychiatric clinics offer free services through periodic community visits, but this may increase workload and burnout among providers. Earlier efforts to integrate mental health into primary healthcare were also not fully implemented. The parallel government, NUG, prioritizes mental health by offering free telemental health services and awareness campaigns. However, the lack of in-person care limits support for frontline and on-ground individuals, especially those who have lost family members or suffered severe injuries, requiring intensive emotional support. For instance, some civilians have survived junta airstrike while losing family members. Such experiences leave survivors with severe trauma while caring for remaining family members with little or no access to mental health support.

NGOs and international organisations, such as UNFPA, also contribute through online platforms and training programs. At the same time, there has been a rise in short-term training courses, many lacking regulation and proper standards. Some individuals with minimal training offer services, raising safety and quality concerns. While approaches like Psychological First Aid are useful, they should be part of a broader system with proper training and supervision. More structured, evidence-based counselling programmes are needed.

Comments and Way Forward

Given the current polycrisis, community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible in the short term. However, long-term improvement requires a coordinated approach that includes policy reform, workforce strengthening, awareness, and integration into primary healthcare. Political stability is also critical due to its direct and indirect impacts on mental health systems and overall well-being. At the primary care level, clear guidelines and better training are required. Community volunteers can provide basic psychosocial support locally. Reducing stigma is critical. Community-based outreach, culturally appropriate education, and engagement with local and religious leaders are essential. Digital campaigns can reach wider populations. Mental health information should also be provided in multiple ethnic languages to reflect Myanmar’s diversity.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s mental health crisis is deeply shaped by the current polycrisis, making it widespread and complex. While existing responses provide some relief, they remain insufficient for long-term needs. Addressing this crisis requires coordinated efforts, along with improved political stability, to strengthen systems, reduce stigma, and expand access to care.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Myanmar is a resource-rich country with abundant deposits of jade, gold, and rare earth minerals, yet it faces increasing environmental degradation and social harm.

Key Takeaways:

1. Weak governance, not resource scarcity, is the main driver of environmental degradation and social harm in Myanmar’s mining sector.

2. The benefits of mining are concentrated among powerful actors, while local communities bear the environmental, health, and livelihood costs.

3. Unregulated extraction is linked to conflict economies and cross-border impacts, making mining a regional governance and sustainability issue.

Introduction

Mining activities often fail to comply with laws and Environmental Impact Assessment procedures, leading to land loss, water scarcity, and severe pollution that directly affect local communities. This pattern reflects a long history of extractive waves driven by global demand. Since the 2021 military coup, governance breakdown has accelerated unregulated mining, intensifying these impacts. Mining in Myanmar is therefore not only an environmental issue, but also a broader social and governance crisis.

Background: Mining and Governance Context

Myanmar’s mining sector has long been central to its economy, supported by abundant deposits of minerals such as tin, tungsten, copper, jade, and gemstones, and shaped by successive political regimes from independence to military rule and partial democratisation. Across these periods, mining has expanded under different governance systems, but weak enforcement of environmental laws and fragmented control among the government, military, ethnic armed groups, and foreign actors have limited effective oversight.

During the post-independence period (1948–1962), the government sought to develop the mining sector through national planning and partnerships with foreign companies, but progress was constrained by internal conflict and limited institutional capacity. Under military rule (1962–2010), mining governance became increasingly centralised yet opaque, with the expansion of state control and military-linked enterprises alongside widespread illegal and artisanal mining, leading to growing environmental degradation and social impacts. Many laws and governance structures during this period were still based on outdated colonial-era legal frameworks. The democratic transition period (2011–2021) introduced legal reforms and opened the sector to foreign investment, but governance remained weak, as the Permanent Secretaries of every ministry were appointed by the previous administration, which created a barrier for the NLD-appointed ministers to plan for the reform.

Since the 2021 military coup, these challenges have intensified as the rule of law deteriorated and illegal mining activities surged, contributing to widespread deforestation and environmental damage. International sanctions reduced foreign investment, pushing the military regime to rely more heavily on natural resources to finance its operations. This has accelerated the expansion of rare earth mining, particularly in border regions controlled by armed groups and foreign-linked actors. On the other hand, after the 2021 coup, environmental and climate-related initiatives were disrupted as international funding withdrew, and many civil society organisations reduced or redirected their activities due to political instability and security concerns. As a result, Myanmar’s mining sector increasingly reflects an “open-access” system, where overlapping authorities and weak governance enable uncontrolled extraction and concentration of benefits among powerful actors.

Governance Framework and Its Gaps

Myanmar has established a formal governance framework to regulate its mining sector, including the Myanmar Mines Law (2015), Mining Rules (2018), and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures, which require companies to minimize environmental damage and comply with environmental standards. These frameworks are supported by institutional oversight from the Environmental Conservation Department (ECD), and in principle align with international practices by incorporating environmental management plans and compliance requirements. However, while regulatory systems exist, their implementation remains weak. Even before 2021, only a small proportion of EIA-related reports were approved due to limited institutional capacity and poor-quality submissions, highlighting long-standing weaknesses in enforcement that have likely worsened under current governance conditions. Monitoring is also inadequate, as compliance inspections are often conducted only in response to complaints rather than through regular enforcement mechanisms.

Significant governance gaps persist across the sector. Transparency and accountability are limited, with local communities often lacking access to information about mining projects and decision-making processes. The post-coup crisis also weakened local civil society participation, as many organisations reduced environmental activities and some community leaders were arrested or unable to engage due to security risks. Overlapping authorities and unclear jurisdiction further complicate governance, while enforcement of regulations remains weak during project implementation. In many cases, consultation processes are superficial and can be influenced by economic incentives or pressure, undermining genuine community participation. As a result, governance in Myanmar’s mining sector exists formally through laws and regulations, but fails functionally in practice.

Governance Breakdown in Practice

In practice, governance of Myanmar’s mining sector is highly fragmented, with control divided among military-linked actors, ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), and foreign stakeholders, particularly in border regions. These actors operate with limited coordination, and local communities are largely excluded from decision-making processes despite being directly affected by mining activities. Rather than approaching natural resources from a sustainable development perspective, many military actors and armed groups increasingly treat mining as a source of revenue to strengthen their financial and political position during the ongoing conflict. In many areas, extractive projects are closely tied to political and economic interests, where access to resources provides both financial benefits and strategic power for armed groups and elites.

Mining is deeply embedded in Myanmar’s conflict economy. Revenues generated from resource extraction often fund armed actors, reinforcing cycles of conflict and instability. In regions such as Kachin State, ethnic armed organisations have taken on governance-like roles, controlling mining activities and taxation systems linked to cross-border trade. At the same time, China acts as a double-edged sword by engaging with both the military and ethnic armed groups, while exploiting Myanmar’s weak rule of law to sustain continued extraction and secure access to rare earth minerals for global markets.

Since the 2021 military coup, these dynamics have intensified. The breakdown of law and order has led to a surge in illegal and informal mining, especially in remote areas. The number of rare earth mining sites has increased rapidly, reflecting a broader expansion of unregulated extraction. As governance weakens, mining activities continue to grow without effective oversight, prioritising short-term gains over environmental sustainability and social protection.

Environmental Costs

Mining activities in Myanmar have caused severe environmental damage, particularly to water resources. The use of toxic chemicals such as mercury, cyanide, and acids contaminates rivers and groundwater, making water unsafe for drinking, agriculture, and aquatic life. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining along the Ayeyarwady River has long served as an important livelihood strategy for local communities with limited economic alternatives. In some mining areas, water samples have been found to pose substantial risks to ecosystems and are entirely unsuitable for human use. These impacts are intensified by the expansion of large-scale and mechanized mining, which increases pressure on water resources and contributes to widespread pollution. Evidence from border areas shows that toxic discharge from mining has entered tributaries linked to the Thanlwin (Salween) system, contaminating downstream water sources and affecting agriculture and fisheries in nearby communities.

Deforestation and land degradation are also major consequences of mining. Forest clearing for extraction has led to significant forest loss, estimated at around 46,000 hectares, particularly in resource-rich regions such as Kachin and Sagaing. Mining activities accelerate soil erosion, reduce agricultural productivity, and damage local ecosystems. Biodiversity loss follows as habitats are destroyed and ecosystems collapse, affecting both terrestrial and aquatic species.

Environmental disasters, including landslides and flooding, are increasingly common in mining areas, causing long-term ecological damage and risks to human life. These impacts are not accidental but are directly linked to weak governance systems. Historically, Myanmar’s governance system has prioritized state revenue collection, including taxes on the extraction of state-owned resources. Without effective regulation and accountability, mining continues to operate unsustainably, while the exclusion of local communities from decision-making further limits environmental protection.

Social Costs of Mining

Mining in Myanmar also imposes high social costs, particularly on communities living near extraction sites. Livelihoods are increasingly undermined as agricultural land is lost to mining activities and access to forests and clean water is reduced, contributing to long-term economic insecurity. In many cases, mining operations have damaged homes, farmland, and community spaces without compensation, leaving local populations with limited means of recovery.

Public health risks are also severe. Exposure to contaminated water and toxic chemicals has led to respiratory illnesses, skin diseases, and other chronic health conditions among both workers and nearby communities. A health survey conducted in an artisanal and small-scale gold mining community in Mandalay Region found that 9 out of 18 miners showed warning levels of mercury contamination, while 3 out of 18 miners displayed neurological signs and symptoms associated with chronic mercury intoxication. Workers face especially dangerous conditions, including frequent landslides and accidents in mining areas. For example, deadly jade mine collapses in Kachin State have killed hundreds of miners in recent years, highlighting the extreme risks associated with poorly regulated extraction. Many workers receive little or no medical support or compensation, even in cases of injury or death.

The risks and benefits are unequally distributed, while local communities have little opportunity to raise concerns under the military regime. Profits are concentrated among powerful actors such as military-linked groups and foreign stakeholders, while local communities bear the environmental and social burdens. Mining revenues also contribute to conflict, reinforcing instability in resource-rich regions. Weak governance enables this imbalance, shifting the costs of extraction onto vulnerable populations while concentrating gains among those with power.

Why This Is a Governance Issue

The environmental and social impacts of mining in Myanmar should not be understood as isolated outcomes of extractive activities, but as symptoms of deeper governance failures. At its core, the issue is not the existence of mining itself, but the conditions under which it operates. Sustainability means maintaining the equilibrium among social, economic, and environmental well-being through effective governance. After the coup weakened governance, the entire system came under stress, showing that this is fundamentally a governance issue. In the case of Mogok’s ruby mines, control over the area has shifted between the junta and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), with reports indicating that the TNLA returned the area following China-mediated negotiations and diplomatic pressure. These challenges are further worsened by political instability, forming part of a broader polycrisis in which conflict, economic pressures, and environmental degradation reinforce one another. In this context, mining reflects deep-rooted dynamics of power, control, and conflict.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Myanmar’s mining crisis is not only environmental, but also deeply social and rooted in governance failures. Its impacts extend beyond national borders, as pollution from mining contaminates rivers and ecosystems in neighboring countries such as Thailand, while broader environmental decline contributes to regional instability and displacement. Addressing these challenges requires stronger enforcement, improved transparency and accountability, and conflict-sensitive resource governance. Similarly, local communities must be meaningfully included in decision-making processes. Looking ahead to 2026, ongoing political uncertainty and parallel governance structures will continue to shape the sector. Myanmar is going to face more and more climate-related disasters, and this could increase the vulnerability of local communities. Without governance reform, resource wealth will continue to drive environmental degradation and social inequality rather than sustainable development.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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The devastating earthquake in Myanmar has exposed the junta’s mismanagement.

Key takeaways:

• Myanmar’s military regime has prioritised its interest in fuelling the war and maintaining political control over disaster preparation, worsening the earthquake devastation.

• Discrimination under the junta has left minority communities more vulnerable to the earthquake’s impact.

• The military’s post-quake response shows continued mismanagement and disregard for the Myanmar people.

Already struggling under the weight of the world’s longest-running civil war, genocide, war crimes, and climate-related disasters, Myanmar was struck by a devastating earthquake on March 28th. The magnitude 7.7 tremor, centred along the Sagaing Fault, caused a slip of up to five meters within just ninety seconds. This catastrophic event, followed by a magnitude 6.4 aftershock, wreaked havoc across major cities, including Mandalay, Nay Pyi Taw, and Sagaing, as well as historic towns such as Ava and Amarapura. Even in Yangon, hundreds of miles away, people fled into the streets as buildings swayed violently.

By May 9th, Myanmar’s military-run state media had reported over 3,800 deaths, with more than 5,000 injured. However, local sources suggest the actual toll could be significantly higher, with the US Geological Survey estimating that the final death count could exceed 10,000. In response, the military junta declared a week of national mourning, with flags flown at half-mast until April 6th.

Seismologists Judith A. Hubbard and Kyle Bradley noted that, “As with all great earthquakes on known active faults, this M7.7 earthquake was both completely expected (the location and magnitude), and completely unexpected (the timing).” This observation raises a critical question: What disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures, if any, did Myanmar have in place before the quake, and how has the government handled disaster management in its aftermath?

Myanmar military’s mismanagement

Since gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar has been dominated by military rule, which has profoundly shaped its political landscape. From direct military governance and the so-called Myanmar Way to Socialism to a power-sharing arrangement under the 2008 Constitution, military control has remained a central feature. The 2008 Constitution granted the military 25% of parliamentary seats, control over key ministries, and the power to nominate a vice president. However, in 2021, the military, led by third-generation dictator Min Aung Hlaing, staged a coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Since seizing power, the junta has severely undermined Myanmar’s disaster risk management and climate adaptation efforts, which had been gradually developed under semi-democratic administrations between 2011 and 2021. Despite adopting the National Disaster Management Law in 2013, the military has largely ignored the Myanmar National Framework for Community Disaster Resilience, a critical guideline for building community-level disaster preparedness.

The Myanmar Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction was once a vital blueprint for enhancing community resilience and preparing for natural disasters. However, following the 2021 coup, the junta shifted its priorities dramatically, diverting vast resources to its military operations. In the fiscal year 2024-25, the military allocated a staggering 41 trillion kyats (≅ €17.38 billion) to sustain its ongoing civil war—a record-high figure—while quietly siphoning 400 billion kyats ≅ €169.6 million) from the Myanmar National Disaster Management Fund. Initially intended for disaster relief, this money was rerouted into the State Economic Promotion Fund, aimed at propping up an economy battered by international sanctions. In essence, the junta prioritised its grip on power over protecting its citizens from foreseeable disasters.

This raises a critical question: If scientists had long warned of the seismic risks along the Sagaing Fault, why did the military divert essential disaster funds elsewhere? How frequently were residents in cities like Mandalay, Nay Pyi Taw, or Sagaing provided with earthquake awareness programs or preparedness drills? While the collapse of ancient pagodas, mosques, and churches can partly be attributed to their age, the structural failure of modern buildings, such as the Sky Villa and the newly built Buddhist monastery complex in Mandalay, exposes glaring deficiencies in enforcing construction regulations.

Additionally, this disaster highlights broader concerns about the rule of law in Myanmar. Were construction sites properly inspected to ensure compliance with building standards? Did negligence play a role in the collapse of buildings that should have been able to withstand seismic shocks? Or is systemic corruption from high-ranking officials like Min Aung Hlaing down to junior officers ultimately responsible for these failures? The military’s mismanagement of disaster preparedness and infrastructure safety further underscores its incompetence as a governing body.

Moreover, the higher death toll from last year’s Typhoon Yagi in Myanmar, despite the storm striking indirectly, compared to Vietnam, a country directly in the typhoon’s path, serves as another stark example of the military’s failure in disaster response and management.

A Nationalist agenda and systemic discrimination

The military’s nationalist agenda and decades-long discriminatory policies have also exacerbated the earthquake’s devastation. Centuries-old mosques, many of which had been denied even basic maintenance, such as leak repairs to prevent water damage, suffered extensive damage. Reports indicate that over 130 mosques were destroyed, with more than 700 Burmese Muslims dying during Friday prayers. This disproportionate death rate compared with just 5% of the Burmese Muslim population in Myanmar highlights deliberate neglect and systemic discrimination, the military’s direct responsibility for preventable deaths, exposing its failure to protect all communities during a disaster.

This raises another critical question: In the aftermath of the earthquake, will the military permit the rebuilding of collapsed mosques and churches, or will its oppressive policies continue to obstruct the restoration of vital places of worship for minority communities? The answer to this question will determine whether the junta is genuinely willing to support all communities in their recovery or whether it will persist in its pattern of exclusion and discrimination.

The military’s recent actions are telling, it has refused to allow international media into Myanmar to cover earthquake updates, continued bombing civilian areas, rejected a ceasefire request from revolutionary forces, and blocked a Taiwanese rescue team from assisting victims. Additionally, it made the controversial decision to reschedule the national Grade 12 examination on June 16th for students in earthquake-affected regions, such as Mandalay and Sagaing, following the destruction of their original answer sheets in a fire at Mandalay University caused by the earthquake. While the students have no responsibility since they have done what they need to do, these inhumane actions reflect a regime disconnected from the needs of the people it claims to govern, showing little concern for the suffering of its citizens.

Despite saffron washing itself as the protector of Myanmar and its dominant religion, Buddhism, the military’s actions have plunged the country into a state of polycrisis, exacerbating both natural and man-made disasters. Its reckless mismanagement and discriminatory policies have left Myanmar more vulnerable to future disasters, revealing the depth of its governance failures.

Conclusion

The military’s failure to prioritise disaster preparedness, mismanagement of vital resources, and systemic discrimination are the underlying causes of the catastrophic damage caused by the earthquake in Myanmar. As the country struggles to recover, it is painfully clear that the military’s incompetence has deepened the crisis, leaving its citizens to bear the brunt of the devastation. The junta’s refusal to address these systemic issues and its continued disregard for the well-being of Myanmar’s diverse communities make it increasingly clear that it is unfit to govern. It must be held accountable for its failures, as the evidence of its mismanagement continues to mount.

Tin Shine Aung is the Consulting Director at the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). In addition to his professional roles, Tin Shine Aung is pursuing a PhD in Sustainability Science at the University of Lisbon, Portugal.

The 2026 Israel-Iran war is shaking up energy markets around the world. In Myanmar, this has led to fuel shortages, rising costs, and greater pressure on agriculture and people’s livelihoods.

Key Takeaways

• Myanmar’s heavy reliance on imported fuel (over 90%) leaves it highly exposed to global disruptions, with instability in the Strait of Hormuz triggering shortages, price spikes, and long fuel queues domestically.

• Rising fuel and fertiliser costs are disrupting agriculture, reducing productivity, and increasing food prices, putting pressure on farmers and worsening food insecurity across the country.

• Fragmented government policies, combined with crony control of sectors like the EV market, allow elites to benefit during the crisis while ordinary citizens face shortages, higher living costs, and limited access to resources.

Introduction

The U.S.-Israel-Iran war, often known as the 2026 Iran war, started on February 28, 2026. Coordinated Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran started the conflict, which rapidly intensified once the Iranian supreme leader and civilians were killed. As the Middle East is a key hub for energy production and international shipping routes, instability in the region can have widespread economic consequences. One of the most critical factors is the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping route between Iran and Oman. It is one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, with around a quarter of global crude oil shipments passing through it daily. On April 22, WTI crude futures stayed above $89 per barrel after peace talks between the US and Iran failed, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is mostly blocked.

These problems have had significant effects on global supply chains, especially because fuel prices are going up and energy flows are being limited. Myanmar is especially vulnerable because it is an underdeveloped country that has been affected by internal conflict and relies heavily on imported fuel, which makes up more than 90% of its domestic consumption. Myanmar relies heavily on suppliers in the region, like Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. They are also imposing export controls as a precaution because of global uncertainty, while domestic production in Myanmar accounts for only about 3% of consumption. This article argues that the Israel-Iran War has intensified Myanmar’s economic fragility by disrupting fuel imports, increasing agricultural costs, and worsening economic inequality, while exposing governance limitations and policy gaps.

Why is Myanmar highly vulnerable?

1 Dependence on Structure and Energy Insecurity

Dependency theory explains why Myanmar is so vulnerable to the global fuel crisis. It shows how economies on the edge rely on resources from outside the nation’s borders. Approximately 90–95% of the petroleum products that the country uses come from other countries, which shows that it is dependent heavily on foreign sources. At the same time, there isn’t sufficient refining capacity in the country, and local production only meets a small part of national demand. In the largest city, Yangon, long queues at gas stations usually take around 5 hours to buy the limited amount of petrol in the heat, which causes fainting. Myanmar’s ability to import fuel is limited by insufficient foreign exchange reserves, resulting in this structural imbalance being significantly worse. Because of this, outside shocks, like problems with the global oil supply, lead to shortages and higher prices at the national level.

2 Insufficient Oil Production despite oilfields

Experts and former oil industry workers say that Myanmar does make crude oil, although it can’t refine it adequately for use in the country, so it has to rely heavily on imported fuel. One big reason is that the country’s refinery factories are old and do not have the latest technology, so they can’t turn crude oil into high-quality petroleum that meets industrial standards. Also, crude oil made in the area is often of low quality and needs chemical refining, which makes things more expensive and complicated. The situation is even worse because there isn’t enough electricity, and there are security problems in some oil-producing areas that have been controlled by local revolutionary forces. Limited government budgets also make it hard to invest in refinery and energy infrastructure improvements. In consequence of this, Myanmar is still structurally dependent on foreign refined fuel, even though it holds its own oil resources.

3 Agricultural Sector in Myanmar

The Iran conflict is also impacting the availability of critical raw materials. The region is a major exporter of fertilisers, petrochemicals, and energy-based products used in agriculture and manufacturing. Any disruption would strike the imports of Myanmar fertilisers worth over USD 500 million a year. People are queuing to purchase fuel to irrigate their fields and harvest their summer rice fields during this summer rice planting season, and it is difficult to get plenty to plant in their farms. A severe shortage of diesel, necessary for agricultural machinery, threatens food security. The increase in diesel price and oil shortage is leading to unable to operate their tractors and irrigation pumps for rice farming, as well as transportation to the market. Farmers are struggling with fuel prices, which are nearing 4,000 kyats per litre. Planting could be delayed, and yields could drop. On 21 March, Myanmar Rice Federation (MRF) made a statement, urging the stakeholders in the industry to avoid panic buying of fuel and fertilizers. However, MRF cannot control fuel prices or global shortages directly. The price of agricultural products, especially in the rice market, will dramatically increase along with the other food markets if the situation continues in the next three months.

4 Vulnerability of Myanmar Civilians

The crisis is not limited to farmers, but it is also severely affecting day-to-day workers who depend on transportation to earn a living. Low-income workers, particularly trishaw drivers (scooters with sidecars used for local passenger transport), taxi drivers, and those commuting daily from suburban or rural areas, are facing escalating fuel costs. As a result, their income is shrinking while the cost of essential goods continues to rise. At the same moment, the government’s increased airstrikes on civilian areas are compounding these hardships by disrupting local economies, displacing communities, and increasing insecurity. Recent reports say that airstrikes have killed hundreds of civilians in many areas and caused a lot of damage to schools, clinics, and religious buildings. This doubled pressure, economic strain from the fuel crisis, and continuous airstrikes make it even more challenging for civilians.

Government and NUG Responses

1 Government’s Actions

The head of Myanmar’s junta, Min Aung Hlaing, has swapped his uniform for the top civilian office and become the president on 3 April. In response to the worsening fuel crisis triggered by the Israel-Iran conflict, the new regime led by President Min Aung Hlaing has implemented a series of short-term measures to reduce domestic fuel consumption. Between March 7 and April 3, authorities introduced multiple fuel control systems, including the odd–even license plate policy, which disrupted transportation-dependent businesses, reducing operating capacity and income for logistics providers, small traders, and service workers. The old and revised Barcode/QR distribution systems a mechanism that allocate fuel based on vehicle engine type. This QR system has revealed systemic misconduct that goes beyond inefficiency. Because of the system’s reliance on static data, legal owners are unable to access their own fuel quotas, allowing actors with fake license plates to take control of them. In addition to making illegal trade easier, this crack puts car owners who are harmed by a flawed regulatory system under a great deal of financial and psychological strain. Also, authorities are conducting office work from home on Wednesdays of each week. These rapidly changing policies suggest a lack of preparedness for an urgent crisis of this scale. At the same time, Energy Minister U Ko Ko Lwin travelled to China and Russia, where discussions focused on long-term fuel imports at lower prices, including electricity cooperation and fertiliser imports, but the implementation will not solve the current economic recession.

On the other hand, ASEAN countries have taken steps to lessen the economic shock. For instance, Malaysia has fiscal space in its budget to deal with outside pressures because its currency is stable, inflation is under control, and its bond markets are strong. Indonesia has set aside about 381.3 trillion rupiah (about USD 22.5 billion) for energy subsidies. This includes paying state-owned businesses to keep fuel and electricity prices low. The Philippines has also introduced targeted subsidies to help with rising oil prices and the costs of basic goods. Vietnam, on the other hand, has taken proactive steps to make sure that fuel supplies stay stable during global disruptions.

However, Myanmar lacks comparable fiscal power or policy flexibility. The current regime already relies on printing money to make up for its budget shortfall, so it is unlikely to give out a lot of subsidies. Instead, it is focusing on getting fuel for the military instead of for civilians. In consequence of this, farmers, workers, and low-income families bear an unfair share of the burden of rising food and fuel prices, making the situation harder for those who are already struggling financially and starving.

2 Cronies & Myanmar EV market

Myanmar’s electric vehicle (EV) market is largely controlled by businesses linked to Min Aung Hlaing’s family, particularly his children, who dominate EV imports and distribution. This reflects their close ties, through crony capitalism, to the current president, who emerged from the widely criticised 2025 “sham election.” The existing regulatory framework is biased in favour of military-related organizations, and competition is restricted, which contributes to economic inequality. During the current Israel-Iran conflict, the public was restricted to fuel, including the “odd-even” policy, which exempted EVs, which boosted the demand artificially in a market dominated by military-related companies. As a result, EV prices surged dramatically, with some models rising from around 195 million (about US$44,318) to 285 million kyats ($64,777). This lack of regulation permits price fixing and monopoly, which explains how patronage networks can help elites to make money under crisis circumstances, as normal citizens remain trapped in fuel shortages and rising living costs.

2 Role of NUG in the Oil Shortage

The National Unity Government (NUG) has responded to Myanmar’s fuel crisis, mainly in areas under its control. It has introduced a fuel transit permit system to regulate and monitor petroleum flows, requiring official approval for transportation into regions such as Kachin, Chin, and Rakhine, primarily to prevent supplies from reaching the military junta. However, this policy has created friction with Chin and Rakhine allies, as this letter can create potential dissent among the public. The NUG also uses fuel control as a wartime strategy to weaken the regime’s logistics capacity. However, these restrictions have contributed to local shortages, higher prices, and logistical delays in some areas. Overall, its role is indirect and politically driven rather than solving structural fuel supply problems.

Recommendation & Implementation

1. Myanmar should monitor and adjust fuel allocation policies, learning from successful practices in neighbouring countries to reduce the risk of severe fuel shortages.

2. The country needs to strategically diversify fuel import channels, expand national energy reserves, and reduce dependence on limited external suppliers.

3. The NUG, EAOs, and other local defence forces should reach a mutual consensus on fuel management strategies and oil control policies to prevent misuse by military actors.

4. In the long term, the agricultural sector must transition from fuel-dependent mechanised farming to a hybrid resilience model, combining limited diesel use with renewable energy and cooperative farming systems.

5. Above all, Myanmar needs political stability since no technological or economic programme can be successfully implemented or maintained in the absence of transparent institutions and decent administration.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s crisis illustrates how geopolitical conflicts can deepen economic instability in vulnerable states, highlighting the urgent need for resilience-building policies. Energy prices are a key factor in supply chain operations because industries such as the agricultural sector, the manufacturing sector, and logistics depend heavily on fuel. When oil and gas prices increase, transportation and production costs rise, profit margins shrink, and consumers face higher prices. This creates ongoing pressure for supply chain professionals to improve efficiency and manage cost fluctuations effectively.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

Key Takeaways

• AI strengthens state power in fragile authoritarian contexts by expanding capacity without sufficient accountability, increasing risks of surveillance and misuse.

• AI amplifies existing systems of propaganda by accelerating and scaling disinformation and narrative control.

• AI-driven development can deepen inequality due to unequal data representation, digital access gaps, and low levels of AI literacy.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly embedded in governance systems worldwide, reshaping public administration, security infrastructures, and service delivery mechanisms. Governments are adopting AI-driven tools not only to enhance efficiency but also to advance development objectives aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in healthcare, education, and economic growth.

In response, a growing number of jurisdictions have developed AI governance frameworks emphasising risk-based regulation, data protection, and ethical standards. Prominent examples include the frameworks advanced by the EU AI Act, the OECD AI Principles, and the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. These models promote transparency, accountability, and human-centred AI.

However, these frameworks largely presuppose the existence of stable democratic institutions, regulatory capacity, and accountability mechanisms. Using Myanmar as a case study, this article argues that AI does not simply enhance governance in fragile and authoritarian contexts; it also reshapes state power, amplifies information control, and risks reinforcing structural inequality.

Artificial Intelligence and Governance under Polycrisis

Artificial intelligence has the potential to transform development outcomes across sectors. In healthcare, AI supports disease detection and treatment optimisation; in agriculture, it enables precision farming and climate adaptation; and in education, it expands access through digital learning platforms. These applications highlight AI’s potential to support inclusive development. However, the effectiveness of AI depends heavily on governance conditions. Its impact is increasingly shaped by what scholars describe as a polycrisis, the intersection of multiple, overlapping crises such as political instability, economic disruption, technological change, and information disorder. In contexts like Myanmar, these crises do not occur in isolation. Political instability following the 2021 Myanmar Coup, combined with digital fragmentation, economic constraints, and social inequalities, creates a complex environment in which AI systems are introduced and deployed.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often framed as a tool for enhancing state capacity. Yet in contexts where governance structures are weak, it may instead produce unaccountable capacity. In Myanmar:

• Regulatory institutions are limited

• Legal safeguards are weak

• Oversight mechanisms are minimal

According to Access Now (2023), the rapid and unchecked deployment of AI systems, particularly in surveillance and public-sector decision-making, creates conditions in which these technologies operate without the necessary transparency, accountability, or safeguards. Rather than strengthening governance, AI risks reinforcing centralised control without checks and balances.

AI and Information Control in a Fragile Authoritarian Country

In authoritarian contexts, artificial intelligence is increasingly used to enhance information manipulation and political control. The governments of several countries have drawn on disinformation techniques originally pioneered in Russia to implement sophisticated information operations that spread messages via fake Facebook accounts and false news stories, in cases intentionally contributing to communal violence against religious minorities. Across the region, governments, activists, and non-state armed groups actively use social media to gain domestic and international support for their cause. Similarly, in Myanmar, propaganda and disinformation are not new; they have long been embedded in state and military communication strategies.

Recent reporting by The Irrawaddy shows how the military regime has institutionalised its information operations. For example, the junta has established a multilingual propaganda body to counter international criticism, demonstrating a coordinated effort to shape narratives beyond domestic audiences. In another case, the regime dismissed reports of civilian casualties as “fake news”, reflecting a broader strategy of denying accountability and controlling information flows.

These examples illustrate that information manipulation in Myanmar is already systematic and strategic. Social media platforms such as Facebook have further amplified this dynamic, enabling the rapid dissemination of misleading content and contributing to public confusion and polarisation.

The emergence of AI technologies significantly intensifies these existing practices. AI-generated content, including synthetic images, videos, and text, can:

• scale propaganda production rapidly

• produce highly realistic but fabricated content

• enable targeted and adaptive disinformation campaigns

Scholarly research on synthetic media highlights how these technologies can erode trust in information ecosystems and undermine accountability, particularly in environments with weak media literacy and restricted access to independent information (see Pawelec, 2022). Myanmar has long experienced state-led information control, but digital technologies have significantly expanded its reach. Social media platforms, particularly Meta’s Facebook, play a central role in shaping public discourse, often acting as the primary source of information.

A notable case in Myanmar illustrates how emerging technologies intersect with existing propaganda practices. The junta was accused of using deepfake technology to support corruption allegations against Aung San Suu Kyi, after releasing a video confession by a detained official. The footage triggered widespread public skepticism, with observers noting inconsistencies such as unsynchronised lip movements and unusual audio patterns. While experts debated whether the video was definitively a deepfake or a coerced statement, the incident highlights a critical issue: in low-trust and restricted information environments, the mere possibility of AI manipulation is enough to shape public perception and generate uncertainty.

At the same time, misinformation does not always require advanced AI. A recent report by Agence France-Presse found that social media posts falsely presented an old image of Aung San Suu Kyi as a recent photo, demonstrating how easily misleading content can circulate in Myanmar’s information environment. Public discourse has pointed to suspected manipulated or synthetic content, which has fueled speculation and public anxiety, particularly regarding high-profile political figures. In this context, AI acts as a force multiplier - scaling both the speed and reach of information manipulation. Such cases show that low-tech misinformation and high-tech AI-generated content exist on the same spectrum, reinforcing each other.

In Myanmar, where verification is already difficult due to censorship and limited media freedom, AI-generated or AI-suspected misinformation presents even greater risks. These risks are further amplified by the growing use of encrypted platforms such as Telegram, where military-linked channels and affiliated networks have been reported to circulate large volumes of unverified and, in some cases, AI-generated videos related to the ongoing conflict. In the wake of the 2021 coup, the military regime, or State Administration Council (SAC), quickly shifted its primary information operations from Facebook to alternative platforms, including Telegram, highlighting the adaptability of disinformation networks. The closed and decentralized nature of such platforms makes monitoring and verification significantly more difficult, allowing misleading or fabricated content to spread rapidly with limited accountability.

At the same time, there are rising concerns about the use of AI tools to generate non-consensual and sexually explicit content, particularly targeting women. Reports and public discussions indicate that manipulated or synthetic 18+ videos have been used to harass, intimidate, and discredit female activists, journalists, and public figures. These practices reflect a broader pattern in which digital technologies are weaponised along gendered lines, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and reinforcing social harms.

AI, Inequality, and Digital Literacy Gaps

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often presented as a tool for improving access to information and expanding opportunities. However, its impact is deeply shaped by existing social and digital inequalities. In contexts such as Myanmar, these inequalities are not only economic or geographic; they are also reflected in uneven access to digital knowledge, skills, and information systems. AI systems are fundamentally dependent on data, making them highly sensitive to existing structural inequalities. In fragile and linguistically diverse contexts such as Myanmar, these inequalities are not only social but also embedded in digital infrastructures.

Key challenges include:

• unequal access to digital infrastructure between urban and rural communities

• limited inclusion of minority groups and languages in digital systems

• significant gaps in digital and AI literacy across different segments of society

These factors influence who benefits from AI and who is left behind. Communities with limited connectivity or lower levels of digital literacy are less able to access AI-driven services, while also being more vulnerable to misinformation and manipulation.

A critical dimension of this challenge is the generational divide in digital and AI literacy. Younger populations, particularly in urban areas, are generally more active users of social media and digital platforms. They are more likely to engage with emerging AI tools and integrate them into everyday activities such as learning, communication, and content creation. However, this familiarity does not always translate into critical understanding. People need to have digital literacy to verify the information and not contribute to the rapid spread of misinformation.

In contrast, older generations often face barriers in accessing and navigating digital technologies. Limited exposure, lower confidence in using AI tools, and difficulties in evaluating online information can lead to exclusion from digital services or increased susceptibility to misleading content. In some cases, this results in dependence on informal information networks, which may further amplify misinformation.

Platforms such as Facebook and Telegram play a central role in shaping these dynamics. Information spreads rapidly across these platforms, often without effective verification mechanisms. In such environments, both overconfidence among younger users and limited digital literacy among older users contribute to an existing fragile information ecosystem.

These structural gaps shape how AI systems interpret and represent reality. When datasets exclude or simplify certain populations, AI outputs risk becoming systematically biased, incomplete, or misleading. A particularly illustrative example is Myanmar’s long-standing use of Zawgyi encoding, a non-standard font system historically used across digital platforms. Unlike Unicode, which is internationally standardised, Zawgyi is not fully compatible with modern computational systems. For example, during the transition period, Facebook reported that identical posts written in Zawgyi and Unicode were treated differently by its algorithms, affecting content visibility, moderation, and information retrieval. Google similarly noted measurable improvements in search and input tools following Unicode standardisation. This demonstrates a critical point: when linguistic systems are fragmented, AI systems inherit and reproduce that fragmentation.

Therefore, AI does not create inequality, but it encodes, scales, and amplifies existing disparities across data, language, and generational access. AI does not create inequality, but it can significantly amplify it.

Fragmented Governance and Emerging Actors

Myanmar’s governance landscape is increasingly fragmented, with alternative actors such as the National Unity Government (NUG) playing a growing role. While the National Unity Government (NUG) actively counters military narratives through official statements, social media engagement, and diaspora-supported networks, it does not yet operate a formalised AI governance or verification system. As a result, its responses to misinformation remain largely reactive and decentralized rather than systematic.

At the same time, the absence of trusted, institutionalised verification mechanisms combined with the proliferation of AI-generated and manipulated content contributes to a broader environment of information uncertainty. In such conditions, competing narratives circulate simultaneously, making it increasingly difficult for the public to distinguish credible information from misinformation.

This raises important questions about the future of AI governance:

• Can alternative actors develop more accountable digital systems?

• How can AI support service delivery in contested areas?

• What role can decentralised governance play in shaping technology use?

At present, these dynamics remain underdeveloped, highlighting a critical area for further research and policy engagement.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Context-Sensitive AI Governance Frameworks

Global AI governance models must be adapted to fragile contexts. This includes prioritising minimum safeguards, even in low-capacity environments, such as transparency standards and basic oversight mechanisms. Efforts to strengthen AI governance in Myanmar should also consider broader regional developments in Southeast Asia. Several countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, have already adopted national AI strategies or ethical frameworks to guide investment, innovation, and risk management (see). These initiatives highlight a growing regional trend toward integrating AI into economic development and public service delivery.

However, Myanmar remains significantly behind in terms of AI readiness, governance capacity, and digital infrastructure. At the same time, past cases such as the role of social media in amplifying violence against the Rohingya population underscore the risks of unregulated digital ecosystems

2. Investment in AI Literacy and Public Capacity

Improving AI literacy is essential to reduce misuse and vulnerability to misinformation. Targeted education initiatives should focus on:

• digital literacy

• critical media skills

• responsible use of AI tools

3. Addressing Data Inequality

Efforts should be made to ensure more inclusive data systems by:

• incorporating minority languages

• improving rural data representation

• supporting equitable digital infrastructure

4. Safeguarding Information Ecosystems

International organisations and civil society actors should prioritize:

• monitoring disinformation

• supporting independent media

• strengthening fact-checking systems

5. Supporting Alternative Governance Innovation

Emerging governance actors should be supported in developing:

• transparent digital systems

• accountable AI applications

• inclusive service delivery models

Ultimately, strengthening AI governance in Myanmar requires more than technical solutions; it demands coordinated efforts across institutions, society, and regional partnerships. Without such efforts, AI risks reinforcing existing patterns of inequality, misinformation, and political control. Ensuring that AI contributes to inclusive and accountable development will depend on sustained investment in capacity, trust, and governance.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

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