The global transition toward renewable energy and electric vehicles has accelerated demand for rare earth minerals, placing Myanmar’s conflict-affected borderlands at the center of emerging critical mineral supply chains. As rare earth extraction expands in Kachin State following the 2021 coup, environmental degradation, weak regulation, and fragmented governance structures have increasingly shaped the country’s role in the global green economy.

Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar has become the world’s third-largest producer of rare earth elements, after the US and China, for advanced renewable energy technologies, as China increasingly shifts environmentally destructive extraction beyond its borders into Myanmar’s weakly regulated frontier regions.

• The rapid expansion of rare earth mining in Kachin State after the 2021 coup reflects fragmented governance systems involving militias, armed actors, informal taxation networks, and opaque cross-border business arrangements operating with limited environmental oversight or accountability.

• Myanmar’s rare earth frontier exposes a deeper contradiction within the global green transition: while wealthier societies pursue cleaner energy and “greener” cities, the environmental and human costs of extracting critical minerals are increasingly displaced onto conflict-affected and politically fragile regions, creating zones of ecological sacrifice that remain largely invisible within global climate narratives.

Introduction

Rapidly reducing dependence on fossil fuels and accelerating the transition toward renewable energy have become central to global climate strategies and the pursuit of a net-zero future. Electric vehicles, wind turbines, batteries, and other low-carbon technologies are increasingly viewed as essential tools for addressing climate change and advancing sustainable development goals. Yet the technologies driving this transition depend heavily on critical minerals, particularly rare earth elements essential for renewable energy systems and advanced manufacturing industries.

As global demand for critical minerals intensifies, governments and industries face growing challenges surrounding supply chain security, environmental sustainability, and geopolitical competition. While the expanding critical mineral economy presents economic opportunities for resource-rich developing countries, it also risks reproducing patterns of environmental degradation, corruption, conflict, and unequal resource governance commonly associated with the “resource curse.”

Myanmar has emerged as an increasingly important supplier within regional rare earth supply chains linked to China’s processing industries. According to Global Witness, Myanmar’s exports of rare earth minerals to China increased dramatically from approximately US$1.5 million in 2014 to nearly US$780 million by 2021. Much of this extraction has concentrated in Kachin State along Myanmar’s northern borderlands, where long-standing conflict dynamics and contested territorial authority continue to shape local governance systems.

As extraction rapidly expands, Myanmar’s rare earth frontier increasingly reveals a deeper contradiction at the heart of the global green transition: while renewable energy technologies are promoted as environmentally sustainable solutions, the environmental and governance costs associated with critical mineral extraction are increasingly displaced onto fragile border regions affected by conflict and weak regulation.

Myanmar’s Rare Earth Boom and China’s Supply Chain Shift

Rare earth minerals have become strategically important because of their essential role in renewable energy technologies and advanced manufacturing industries. Heavy rare earth elements such as dysprosium and neodymium are particularly valuable because they are used in permanent magnets essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, batteries, smartphones, and high-performance electronics. As governments accelerate climate goals and low-carbon industrial strategies, global demand for these minerals has surged dramatically.

China has dominated the global rare earth industry since the 1980s and continues to control much of the world’s processing and refining capacity. However, the environmental consequences of rare earth extraction within China became increasingly severe over the past decade. Illegal mining, toxic waste, poisoned waterways, and long-term ecological degradation generated mounting environmental concerns, particularly in Jiangxi Province, often referred to as China’s “rare earth kingdom.”

In response, Chinese authorities intensified environmental enforcement measures after 2016 and shut down many domestic heavy rare earth mining operations. Yet while China reduced environmentally destructive extraction within its own territory, global demand for rare earth minerals continued to rise rapidly. Rather than reducing extraction overall, mining activities increasingly shifted across the border into Myanmar’s weakly regulated frontier regions. While China argues for a non-interference policy in the Myanmar crisis for Western powers, they are exploiting the Myanmar Civil War as a tool to increase China’s influence in Myanmar by dealing with both the military-led government and the ethnic military. China’s cooperation with KIA for rare earth minerals from Kachin state is evidence of China’s double standard in its own foreign policy towards Myanmar.

A six-month investigation by Global Witness documented how this highly polluting industry expanded rapidly into Myanmar’s Kachin Special Region 1, a semi-autonomous territory controlled by militia groups affiliated with Myanmar’s military establishment. Within just a few years, the region became one of the world’s largest suppliers of heavy rare earth minerals.

Reports indicate that thousands of Chinese workers and technicians crossed into Myanmar between 2016 and 2019 to establish and operate mining sites using the same in-situ leaching methods previously employed in Jiangxi. The mines continue to supply Chinese state-owned processing companies that dominate the global rare-earth refining industry. Commodity research firm Roskill noted in 2021 that nearly all major Chinese state-owned enterprises involved in heavy rare earth processing had become dependent on Myanmar as a source of raw materials.

The expansion of extraction into Myanmar demonstrates how stricter environmental governance in one country can displace ecological harm into weaker regulatory environments elsewhere. As one industry expert cited by Global Witness observed, “the environmental challenges that come with this type of mining in China have spread to a neighbouring nation.”

Fragmented Governance After the Coup

The rapid expansion of rare earth extraction in Myanmar cannot be understood solely through global market demand. It is also deeply connected to fragmented governance systems that intensified following the 2021 military coup.

Rather than producing a simple absence of governance, the post-coup crisis generated overlapping systems of competing authority involving military actors, militias, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), border business networks, and informal economic actors. In many extraction zones across northern Myanmar, governance operates through negotiated control, informal taxation systems, and localized power arrangements rather than centralized state regulation.

In Kachin Special Region 1, mining operations reportedly function through opaque agreements involving militia-controlled authorities and cross-border commercial actors. Although foreign investment in small- and medium-scale mineral extraction is technically illegal under Myanmar law, enforcement remains limited in conflict-affected borderlands where competing systems of authority overlap.

The Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar (ISP) reported that militia leaders and affiliated business networks have become central brokers in the rare-earth economy, facilitating mining operations, granting access to extraction sites, collecting informal taxes, and controlling cross-border trade routes into China. In many cases, Myanmar-registered companies reportedly function as fronts for Chinese investment operating through informal and opaque commercial arrangements.

The post-coup political environment has further weakened environmental oversight and institutional accountability. Under fragmented governance conditions, extraction activities continue with limited regulatory monitoring, while armed actors and border business networks benefit economically from the rapid expansion of rare earth mining.

Myanmar’s rare earth sector, therefore, illustrates how conflict-affected borderlands can become integrated into global supply chains through systems of shadow governance and informal extraction economies operating beyond effective environmental regulation.

Environmental Consequences in Kachin State and Beyond

The environmental consequences of rare earth extraction in Myanmar increasingly mirror the ecological devastation previously witnessed in China’s Jiangxi Province, where decades of poorly regulated mining contaminated waterways, destroyed forests, and generated massive long-term cleanup costs. China’s “Take profit without responsibility” policy in neighbouring countries for Rare-earth mining clearly downgrades China’s role as a global normative actor.

Mining operations in Kachin State commonly use in-situ leaching methods that inject chemical solutions such as ammonium sulfate directly into mountainsides to extract rare earth minerals. While highly profitable and relatively inexpensive, this process leaves behind toxic wastewater, contaminated soil, deforested landscapes, and unstable terrain vulnerable to erosion and landslides.

Global Witness documented how mining sites across Kachin State have expanded rapidly across mountainous terrain, with thousands of chemical collection pools identified near river systems and forest areas. Local communities have reported worsening access to clean water, dying fish populations, contaminated farmland, and the disappearance of wildlife from nearby forests. Residents also described growing fears about surrounding toxic exposure, respiratory illnesses, and long-term environmental destruction linked to chemical leaching processes.

The environmental consequences are no longer confined to isolated mining zones. Recent environmental monitoring in Thailand detected alarming levels of arsenic contamination in transboundary river systems linked to mining activities upstream in Myanmar, including areas associated with rare earth extraction. Investigations reported by Mongabay found growing concerns along the Salween River basin, where communities increasingly fear the impacts of toxic contamination on fisheries, agriculture, drinking water systems, and local livelihoods.

These developments highlight how environmental harm generated within Myanmar’s conflict-affected borderlands increasingly carries regional ecological and human security consequences. The contamination of shared river systems demonstrates that the environmental costs of weak extraction governance do not stop at national borders.

The long-term implications may prove severe. In China’s Jiangxi Province, authorities estimated that environmental cleanup costs linked to rare earth mining could exceed US$5.5 billion, with ecological recovery potentially taking up to a century. Myanmar currently lacks both the institutional capacity and regulatory mechanisms necessary to manage environmental remediation on a comparable scale.

The Hidden Contradiction of Global Green Transition

Myanmar’s rare earth frontier reveals a critical contradiction at the heart of the global green transition. Renewable energy technologies are frequently presented as environmentally sustainable solutions to climate change. Yet, the extraction systems that support these industries often impose severe environmental and social costs in politically fragile regions.

The environmental burdens associated with critical mineral extraction are not distributed equally. Instead, they are increasingly externalized onto vulnerable borderland communities where governance systems remain weak, fragmented, and conflict-affected. A green transition that ignores the social and environmental impacts on local communities is not truly green; it is simply greenwashing under the language of sustainability. While industries and consumers elsewhere benefit from electric vehicles, renewable energy infrastructure, and advanced technologies, the ecological and political consequences of extraction are concentrated in frontier regions such as northern Myanmar.

This dynamic raises broader questions about environmental governance, supply chain accountability, and the political economy of climate transition policies. Efforts to accelerate renewable energy adoption without addressing extraction governance risk reproduce new forms of environmental injustice and conflict-linked resource exploitation.

Myanmar’s rare earth frontier ultimately reveals a critical paradox at the heart of the global green transition: technologies designed to secure a sustainable future increasingly depend upon extraction systems rooted in environmental destruction, fragmented governance, and conflict-affected borderlands. Without stronger environmental accountability and conflict-sensitive supply chain governance, the pursuit of clean energy risks reproducing new forms of ecological injustice under the banner of sustainability.

Policy Recommendations

Addressing the environmental and governance challenges of rare earth extraction in Myanmar requires stronger international cooperation, conflict-sensitive environmental governance, and improved supply chain accountability.

Key priorities include:

• Strengthening environmental monitoring in conflict-affected extraction areas and tightening regulations on rare earth trade linked to environmentally harmful practices, particularly within Chinese-linked supply chains.

• Improving transparency and traceability in critical mineral supply chains, including the potential use of blockchain technologies to reduce illicit trade and improve accountability.

• Expanding responsible sourcing standards for companies and governments reliant on rare earth minerals for renewable energy, electric vehicles, and advanced manufacturing.

• Enhancing regional cooperation to address transboundary environmental impacts such as river pollution and ecological degradation. Local actors, including the NUG and EAOs, should also consider long-term environmental consequences in governance decisions.

• Encouraging ASEAN to take a more active role in addressing regional environmental risks stemming from Myanmar’s extractive and ecological crises.

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Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

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အီးဒ်ဒွလ်အသွာဟာလို့ ခေါ်ဆိုကြတဲ့ ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းက အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်တွေရဲ့ အသားစွန့်လှုမှု အလှုဒါနပွဲတော်ကို နှစ်စဥ်ကျင်းပကြတာဖြစ်ပြီး အဓိက အားဖြင့် ကျွဲ၊နွား၊ဆိတ်၊သိုးနှင့် ကုလားအုတ် စသည့် စမြုပ်ပြန်နိုင်တဲ့ သတ္တဝါ အမျိုးအစား ၅ မျိုးကို အဓိက စွန့်လှုကြကာ စွန့်လှုအသားများကို ၃ ပုံ အညီအမျှခွဲဝေပြီး ပထမတစ်ပုံကို လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း လူမျိုး၊ဘာသာမရွေးဆင်းရဲ့နွမ်းပါး၍အသားဓာတ်ချို့တဲ့သူများ၊ ဒုတိယတစ်ပုံကို ဆွေမျိုးရင်းချာများနှင့်လူမျိုးဘာသာမရွေးမိတ်ဆွေအပေါင်းအသင်းများ၊ တတိယတစ်ပုံကို ကာယံကာရှင်၏ မိသားစုအတွက် စသဖြင့် ခွဲခြမ်းကြရတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဆိုပါ အသားစွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ကို ရေရှည်တည့်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှု ၏ အဓိက ဒေါက်တိုင် ၃ ခုဖြစ်သော သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်၊ လူမှုဘဝနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ရူ့ထောင့် ၃ ခုမှ နေ၍ ယခုဆောင်းပါးတွင် ဆွေးနွေးတင်ပြသွားမှာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ယေဘုယျအားဖြင့် သတ္တဝါမွေးမြူရေးလုပ်ငန်းသည် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်ကျင်ရူ့ထောင့်ကြည့်လျှင် ရင်းမြစ်များစွာကို အသုံးပြုရသလို၊ သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိခိုက်မှုလည်း ရှိကာ လေထုထဲ ကာဗွန်ဒိုင်အောက်ဆိုဒ် ထုတ်လွှတ်မှုလည်း ကြီးမားတဲ့ လုပ်ငန်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တစ်ဖန် ၂၁ ရာစုလူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း တိရိစ္ဆာန်အခွင့်အရေးကိုပါ အလေးထားစဥ်စားလာကြသည့်ယခုအချိန်တွင် အသားစွန့်လှုမှု အလှုဒါန ပွဲတော်နှင့်စပ်လျဥ်း၍ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုရူ့ထောင့်မှ လည်းကောင်း၊ အစားအစာထုတ်လုပ်မှုစနစ်တွေဟာ အချိန်တိုအတွင်း၊ မြင်သာထင်သာရှိတဲ့ အချိန်ကာလတစ်ခုအတွင်းမှာ ဘယ်လိုပြုမူလုပ်ကိုင်သလဲဆိုတာကိုလည်း လေ့လာဖို့ ဒီစွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ဟာ အခွင့်အလမ်းကောင်းတစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

သို့သော် အီးဒ်ရဲ့ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ သက်ရောက်မှုတွေဟာ အသားစွန့်လှုခြင်း ဆိုသည့် ဘာသာရေးထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာတစ်ခုတည်းနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်တာမဟုတ်ပါဘူး။ ယင်းစွန့်လှုမှုကိုဗဟိုပြုပြီး တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးထုတ်လုပ်မှု၊ လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးမှု၊ မြို့ပြစျေးကွက်များနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဖြန့်ဖြူးမှုစနစ်များ တိုးတက်ပြောင်းလဲလာပုံကြောင့်လည်း သက်ရောက်မှုတွေဟာ မူရင်း ဘာသာရေးအရ စွန့်လှုမှု ဆိုတာကြောင့်ဆိုတာထက် ပိုလာပါတယ်။

အီးဒ်အသားစွန့်လှုမှုဟာ သီးခြား ဘာသာရေး၊ယဉ်ကျေးမှုဆိုင်ရာ အခမ်းအနားတစ်ခုအနေနဲ့ လည်ပတ်နေတာထက်၊ ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးစီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းတွေရဲ့ အချိန်ကာလတစ်ခုအတွင်း ဝယ်လိုအားနှင့် ရောင်းလိုအား အရှိန်မြှင့်တင်မှုတစ်ခုအနေနဲ့ သက်ရောက်မှုရှိနေတာလည်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်မတိုင်မီရက်သတ္တပတ်များအတွင်းမှာ၊ တိရစ္ဆာန်များကို ကျေးလက်စားကျက်မြေများမှ မြို့ပြနှင့် မြို့ပြအနီးပတ်ဝန်းကျင်စျေးကွက်များဆီသို့ သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ကြပြီး၊ ထိုနေရာမှာ မြင့်တက်လာသည့် ဝယ်လိုအားကို ဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းကြတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အီးဒ်စွန့်လှုမှုအလှုဒါနအတွက် ဈေးကွက်ဝယ်လိုအားပေါ်မူတည်၍ အပြောင်းအရွေ့များကြောင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ဖိအားအသစ်ပုံစံမျိုးကို ဖန်တီးခြင်းထက်၊ လက်ရှိ ရှိနှင့်နေပြီးသား မွေးမြူရေးလုပ်ငန်းနယ်ပယ်၏ လုပ်ငန်းလည်ပတ်မှုသဘောတရားအရ သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ်သက်ရောက်မှုများကို ပိုပြီးထင်သာမြင်သာ တွေ့မြင့်ခွင့်ရတာသာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးထုတ်လုပ်မှုလုပ်ငန်း၏ဂေဟဗေဒခြေရာ (စမြုပ်ပြန်တိရစ္ဆာန်များမှ မီသိန်းဓာတ်ငွေ့ထုတ်လွှတ်မှု၊ စားကျက်မြေအသုံးပြုမှု၊ နှင့် အစာထုတ်လုပ်မှုစနစ်အတွက် ရေလိုအပ်ချက်) စသည် တစ်နှစ်ပတ်လုံး တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေး၊ထုတ်လုပ်မှုလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်တစ်လျှောက် ကာဗွန်ထုတ်လွှတ်မှုကို တွက်ချက်တာဖြစ်ပြီး၊ အီးဒ်အတွင်း ပြောင်းလဲသွားတာကတော့ သားကောင်ကို စွန့်လှုရန် ဇီဝိန်ချုပ်ခြင်း၊ သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ခြင်းနဲ့ ဖြန့်ဖြူးခြင်းတို့ရဲ့ အရှိန်နဲ့ အချိန်ကာလအပိုင်းအခြားပဲဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ရှုထောင့်ကကြည့်ရင်၊ ရက်သတ္တပတ်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်း ဝယ်လိုအားလွန်စွာ မြင့်တက်မှု့ကြောင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် အပေါ်သက်ရောက်မှုဟာ အခြေခံအားဖြင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ထိခိုက်မှုအသစ်တွေအဖြစ်ထက်၊ ဒေသအလိုက် တိရိစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူးရေးလုပ်ငန်းနှင့် စွန့်လှုသည့် နေရာများတွင် သက်ရောက်မှုတွေ ရုတ်တရက်ဖြစ်စေတာမျိုးဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဥပမာ။ မြို့ပြများရှိ သားသတ်ရုံများနှင့်ဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများသည် အချိန်တိုအတွင်း အော်ဂဲနစ်စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းအမြောက်အမြား (သွေးရည်ကြည်၊ အသားအကြွင်းအကျန်များ)နှင့် ထုပ်ပိုးမှုလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်မှ အမှိုက်များ အပါအဝင် သည် ရက်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်း အမှိုက်ထုတ်လုပ်မှုမြင့်တက်လာခြင်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

သို့သော်လည်း ဒေသအလိုက် သဘာဝတ်ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ်ညစ်ညမ်းမှုများဟာ တစ်နေရာနှင့် တစ်နေရာ တူညီမှုမရှိပါဘူး။ စနစ်တကျအားကောင်းသည့် မြူနီစပါယ်စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုများလုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်သည့်နေရာများနှင့် အအေးခန်းကွင်းဆက်စနစ်များ စနစ်တကျရှိသော ဒေသများတွင်၊ သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ် ဆိုးကျိုးသက်ရောက်မှုဖိအားကို ပိုမိုထိရောက်စွာ လျော့ကျနိုင်စေပါတယ်။

စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှာအားနည်းသော၊ အရင်းအမြစ်နည်းပါးသော ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်များတွင်မူ၊ အမှိုက်အညစ်အကြေးများ စုပုံခြင်းနှင့် ပျက်စီးယိုယွင်းခြင်းတို့သည် ပိုမိုမြင်သာစေနိုင်တဲ့ သက်ရောက်မှုတွေဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဆိုပါ ထိခိုက်မှုများသည့် စားသုံးသူကြောင့်ဖြစ်သော ထိခိုက်မှုသက်သက်ထက် အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံဆိုင်ရာ ကွာဟချက်များကို ဖော်ထုတ်ပြသနေခြင်းလည်း ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

လူမှုရေးရူထောင့်အရဆိုရင်၊ အီးဒ်ဟာ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများကို ပြန်လည်မျှဝေခြင်းနှင့် စုပေါင်းသက်သာချောင်ချိရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံမူများနဲ့ နက်ရှိုင်းစွာ ဆက်နွယ်နေတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စွန့်လှုအသားကို မိသားစုဝင်များ၊ ဆွေမျိုးများနှင့် လိုအပ်နေသူများကြားတွင် ခွဲဝေပေးသည့် ကျင့်သုံးမှုသည် သိသာထင်ရှားသည့် အစားအစာမျှ (ရင်းမြစ်များကို) မျှဝေခြင်းယန္တရားကို ဖန်တီးပေးကာ ဝင်ငွေနည်းအိမ်ထောင်စုများစွာအတွက် တိရစ္ဆာန်ပရိုတင်းကို လက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်မှုကိုလည်း ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဤပြန်လည်မျှဝေခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းသည် နောက်ဆက်တွဲလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်တစ်ခုမဟုတ်ပဲ၊ ဘာသာရေးထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာ၏ အဓိကကျင့်ဝတ်ဆိုင်ရာ အစိတ်အပိုင်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုအရဆိုရင်၊ ၎င်းသည် တရားဝင်နိုင်ငံတော်၏ လူမှုဖူလုံရေးစနစ်များအပြင်ဘက်တွင် လည်ပတ်နေသော လူမှုရေးဖှုလုံရေးကွန်ရက်ပုံစံတစ်ခုကို ကိုယ်စားပြုပါတယ်။ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင်၊ လျင်မြန်သော မြို့ပြအသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုနှင့် စားသုံးမှုပုံစံများ ပြောင်းလဲလာမှုသည် ဤပြန်လည်ခွဲဝေမှု မည်သို့ဖြစ်ပွားသည်ကို ပြောင်းလဲစေပြီး၊ မြို့ကြီးများစွာတွင် ထုပ်ပိုးထားသော အသားဝန်ဆောင်မှုများနှင့် အလုပ်အပ်နှင်းခံရသည့် သားသတ်လုပ်ငန်းများအပေါ် မှီခိုမှု တိုးလာလျက်ရှိပါတယ်။

စီးပွားရေးအရဆိုရင်၊ အီးဒ်သွလ်အသွာဟာဟာ တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးစီးပွားရေးအတွက် ရာသီအလိုက် စျေးကွက်အရှိန်မြှင့်တင်ပေးမှုတစ်ခုအဖြစ် လည်း သက်ရောက်စေပါတယ်။ ကျေးလက်ဒေသထုတ်လုပ်သူများသည် စွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ကို အဓိကဝင်ငွေရကာလတစ်ခုအဖြစ် မှီခိုလေ့ရှိပြီး၊ လပေါင်းများစွာ တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူမှုကို ငွေကြေးစီးဆင်းမှု (ဝင်ငွေ) အဖြစ် အချိန်တိုအတွင်း ပြောင်းလဲရောင်းချကြတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဤရာသီပေါ် ဝယ်လိုအားသည် မွေးမြူရေးနှင့် အသေးစားလယ်သမားများအတွက် အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်းမှုကို အထောက်အကူပြုကာ၊ ကျေးလက်-မြို့ပြ စီးပွားရေးဆက်သွယ်မှုများကို အားဖြည့်ပေးပါတယ်။ သို့သော် ၎င်းသည် မတည်ငြိမ်မှုကိုလည်း ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေပြီး၊ အထူးသဖြင့် အီးဒ်မတိုင်မီရက်သတ္တပတ်များအတွင်း တိရစ္ဆာန်စျေးနှုန်းများ သိသိသာသာ မြင့်တက်လာတတ်ခြင်းသည့် မြို့ပြစျေးကွက်များတွင် အချို့သောအိမ်ထောင်စုများကို စွန့်လှုရာတွင် အပြည့်အဝပါဝင်နိုင်မှုမရှိအောင် ကန့်သတ်ထားသလိုဖြစ်စေပါတယ်။ ခေတ်သစ်ကုန်သွယ်မှုကွန်ရက်များသည် ဤသယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းအများစုကို လွှမ်းမိုးထားပြီး၊ အသေးစားထုတ်လုပ်သူများအတွက် လက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်မှုကို ဖန်တီးပေးသလို၊ စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ကြီးကြပ်မှုအတွက် စိန်ခေါ်မှုများလည်း ဖန်တီးပေးပါတယ်။

မျက်မှောက်ခေတ်ကာလတွင် အီးဒ်၏ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုကို ပုံဖော်နေသော အဓိကပြောင်းလဲမှုတစ်ခုမှာ ပွဲတော်ကို အခြေပြု၍ စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းသဘောသဘာဝ ပိုမိုကြီးထွားလာခြင်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ရိုးရာ၊ ရပ်ရွာဗဟိုပြု သားကောင်ကိုဇီဝိန်ချုပ်၍ စွန့်လှုခြင်းအလေ့အထများမှသည် စက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းဆန်ဆန်၊ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုအခြေပြု အီးဒ်စီးပွားရေးများဆီသို့ ကူးပြောင်းခြင်းသည် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ရောက်မှုအတွက် သိသာထင်ရှားဆုံး အနှုတ်လက္ခဏာဆောင်သည့် ဖိအားများထဲမှ တစ်ခုအဖြစ် ပေါ်ထွက်လာပါတယ်။

ဤစီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းတွင် ထုပ်ပိုးထားသော အသားပို့ဆောင်မှုဝန်ဆောင်မှုများ၊ သားကောင်းကို ဇီဝိန်ချုပ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ အဆောက်အအုံများ၊ ဗဟိုမှ ချုပ်ကိုင်သည့်တိရစ္ဆာန်စျေးကွက်များနှင့် စူပါမားကတ်များက မောင်းနှင်သည့် တိရစ္ဆာန်ဝယ်ယူမှုများ ပါဝင်ပါတယ်။ ဤစနစ်များသည် သန့်ရှင်းရေး၊ ထောက်ပံ့ပို့ဆောင်ရေးစွမ်းဆောင်ရည်နှင့် အဆင်ပြေမှုကို ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်စေနိုင်သော်လည်း၊ ထောက်ပံ့ရေးကွင်းဆက်၏ ရှုပ်ထွေးမှုကို တိုးမြှင့်စေပြီး သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေး၊ အအေးခန်းထားရှိမှုနှင့် ပြုပြင်ထုတ်လုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများမှတစ်ဆင့် စွမ်းအင်သုံးစွဲမှုကိုလည်း တိုးပွားစေပါတယ်။ အရေးကြီးတာက၊ ဤဖွဲ့စည်းပုံဆိုင်ရာ အသွင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုသည် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ အနှုတ်ပြသည့်အကျိုးဆက်များကို ပိုမိုပုံဖော်လာနေခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ဘာသာရေးထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာ အီးဒ်ပွဲတော်ကကိုယ်တိုင်က ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေတာမဟုတ်ပါဘူး။ ယနေ့ခေတ် အီးဒ်၏ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုမှုဆိုင်ရာ စိန်ခေါ်မှုသည် သားကောင်းကို စွန့်လှူရန် အသက်ဇီဝိန်ချုပ်ခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်မှ မဟုတ်ပဲ၊ ထိုစွန့်လှုမှုလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်၏ အတိုင်းအတာကြီးမားလာမှု၊ စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းအဖြစ်အဖြစ်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းနှင့် မြို့ပြနှင့် ပေါင်းစည်းလာမှုတို့ကြောင့် အဓိက ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

နည်းလမ်းများစွာဖြင့် စီးပွားဖြစ် အီးဒ်စနစ်ပုံစံဆီသို့ ကူးပြောင်းခြင်းသည် ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ စားသောက်ကုန်လုပ်ငန်းစီးပွားရေးတွင် ကျယ်ပြန့်သော အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုတစ်ခုကို ကိုယ်စားပြုပါတယ်။ ၎င်းမှာ ဒေသအလိုက်၊ လူမှုရေးအရ အခြေပြုထားသော အလေ့အထများမှ စက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းဆန်ဆန်၊ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုကို ဦးတည်သည့် စားသုံးမှုကွင်းဆက်များဆီသို့ ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဤအပြောင်းအလဲသည် ဘာသာရေးအရ စွန့်လှုပြန်လည်မျှဝေခြင်းယန္တရားကို အားနည်းစေပြီး၊ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင် ဗဟိုမှချုပ်ကိုင်သည့် ထောက်ပံ့ပို့ဆောင်ရေးနှင့် ထုပ်ပိုးမှုစွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းများမှတစ်ဆင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ခြေရာကို တိုးမြှင့်စေနိုင်ပါတယ်။ ဤသို့ဖြစ်၍ အီးဒ်စွန့်လွှတ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သတ်၍ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ ဆွေးနွေးငြင်းခုံမှုသည် မူလအစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာ၏ လမ်းညွှန်ချက်များနှင့် ၎င်းပတ်လည်တွင် ကြီးထွားလာသော စီးပွားရေးခေတ်သစ်စနစ်များကို ပိုင်းခြားသိမြင်ရန်လိုအပ်မည်ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ဤသို့ခွဲခြမ်းစိတ်ဖြာချက်အရ၊ အီးဒ်ဒွလ်အသွာဟာစွန့်လှုမှု၏ လူမှုရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ အကျိုးကျေးဇူးများကို ထိန်းသိမ်းပေးရင်း သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ရောက်မှုများကို လျှော့ချပေးနိုင်မယ့် မူဝါဒလမ်းညွှန်ချက်များစွာ ပေါ်ထွက်လာစေနိုင်ရန်အရေးကြီးတာကို တွေ့နိုင်ပါတယ်။

• ပထမဦးစွာ၊ အစိုးရများနှင့် ဒေသဆိုင်ရာမြူနီစပါယ်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် မြို့ပြအတွင်းရှိ စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှု ဖိအားကို လျှော့ချရေးနှင့် သန့်ရှင်းရေးနှင့် စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းထိန်းချုပ်မှုကို ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်စေမယ့် ဗဟိုချုပ်ကိုင်မှုလျှော့ချထားသော်လည်း စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းရှိသည့် သားသတ်ခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများတွင် ဖန်တီးရာတွင်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• ဒုတိယအနေဖြင့်၊ ရပ်ရွာအဆင့်တွင် အအေးခန်းကွင်းဆက်နှင့် အသားသိုလှောင်မှုစနစ်များကို အားဖြည့်ပေးခြင်းသည် စွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ကာလအတွင်း ပျက်စီးယိုယွင်းမှုနှင့် အစားအစာစွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းကို သိသိသာသာ လျှော့ချပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• တတိယအနေဖြင့်၊ ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာပြီး တရားမျှတသော တိရစ္ဆာန်စျေးကွက်များကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးသည့် မူဝါဒများသည် စျေးနှုန်းမတည်ငြိမ်မှုကို တည်ငြိမ်စေရင်း အသေးစားလယ်သမားများကို ခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်သော ပွဲစားများထံမှ ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• စတုတ္ထအနေဖြင့်၊ ပွဲတော်အချိန်ကာလအတွက် အထူးဒီဇိုင်းထုတ်ထားသော တရားဝင်စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းစီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုစနစ်များ (ဥပမာ အော်ဂဲနစ်စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းစုဆောင်းခြင်းနှင့် ပြုပြင်ခြင်းစနစ်များ) ကို ပေါင်းစည်းခြင်းသည် မြို့ပြဗဟိုဌာနများတွင် ကာလတိုသဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ညစ်ညမ်းမှုကို လျှော့ချပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• နောက်ဆုံးအနေဖြင့်၊ ရိုးရာအစဉ်အလာအတိုင်း အသားပြန်လည်ခွဲဝေခြင်းကွန်ရက်များ (ပရဟိတဖြန့်ဖြူးရေးစနစ်များ အပါအဝင်) ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ်ခြင်းနှင့် ပံ့ပိုးခြင်းသည် စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်း ကျယ်ပြန့်လာသည်နှင့်အမျှ အီးဒ်စွန့်လှုမှု၏ လူမှုတန်းတူညီမျှမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကျိုးကျေးဇူးများ ဆုံးရှုံးမသွားစေရန် ဂရုပြုရန်လိုအပ်ပါတယ်။

အချုပ်အားဖြင့်၊ အိီးဒ်အသွာဟာ၏ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုကို ၎င်း၏ ဘာသာရေးအခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်များတစ်ခုတည်းက ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်မဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ ခေတ်သစ်အစားအစာဖြန့်ဝေရေး စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုစနစ်များက ၎င်း၏ကျင့်သုံးမှုကို မည်သို့ထိန်းညှိပေးနိုင်မလဲ ဆိုသည့်အချက်က အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပါတယ်။

စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းများ အရှိန်မြှင့်လာသည်နှင့်အမျှ၊ အဓိကစိန်ခေါ်မှုမှာ အသားစွန့်လှုမှုအီးဒ်ရှိသင့်၊ မရှိသင့်ဆိုတာမဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ ခေတ်စနစ်နှင့်အညီ ပြောင်းလဲလာသော အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများကို သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ခံနိုင်ရည်ရှိမှု၊ လူမှုတန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် စီးပွားရေးအရအကျိုးအမြတ်ရနိုင်မှုတို့ကြား မည်သို့ မျှတအောင် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်မလဲဆိုတာပဲ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

တင်သျှိုင်းအောင်သည် ပေါ်တူဂီနိုင်ငံ လစ္စဘွန်းတက္ကသိုလ် မှ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ သုတေသီတစ်ဦးဖြစ်ဦး လက်ရှိတွင် ရွှေတောင်သာဂသူစင်တာ၏ အတိုင်ပင်ခံဒါရိုက်တာလည်း ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

“ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ရေးလှုံ့ဆော်ရင်းအနာဂတ်ကိုတည်ဆောက်ကြစို့”

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Myanmar is facing a severe and often hidden mental health crisis, shaped by ongoing conflict and systemic disruption. This article examines the key drivers, impacts, and current responses to mental health challenges within the country’s polycrisis context.

Key Takeawys:

• Myanmar’s mental health crisis is driven by conflict and systemic limitations, creating both visible and invisible burdens.

• Community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible short-term solutions.

• Long-term progress depends on political stability and sustained system strengthening.

Political unrest has severe effects on population health, particularly increasing the mental health burden. People living in conflict settings commonly experience anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, and suicidal thoughts. Evidence from Afghanistan and Ukraine also shows high levels of PTSD and depression in conflict settings.

In Myanmar, the ongoing conflict has led to a sharp rise in mental health problems. Depression and anxiety increased from 14.3% and 22.2% in mid-2021 to 61.39% and 58.02% by October, and by late 2022, one in four people experienced moderately severe to severe depression. Therefore, mental health remains a severe and often hidden public health crisis.

Mental Health in Myanmar’s Polycrisis Context

Mental health is not regarded as a priority due to competing needs, as families struggle to survive in a context of multiple overlapping crises. In 2021, a military coup overthrew the elected government, triggering widespread anti-coup protests across Myanmar. These peaceful demonstrations were met with violence, human rights violations, and attacks on civilians. Many people were killed, arrested, or displaced, and repression later expanded beyond protesters, with journalists being killed or detained. Women have also faced sexual violence, causing lasting psychological trauma. Forced conscription of adults aged 18 and above into frontline conflict pushed many young people to flee abroad or move to urban areas. At the same time, three in four Myanmar youths are no longer engaged in education or training due to unsafe learning environments, unaffordable educational costs, and limited scholarship opportunities, particularly among low- and middle-income families. As a result, many youths, who are essential to the country’s future resilience and recovery, face growing distress and anxiety over an uncertain future.

Ongoing conflict has displaced thousands of families, leaving them without adequate shelter or basic services, while also causing family separation. At the same time, the targeting of social service providers and the withdrawal of government workers under the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) have significantly weakened essential public services, including healthcare. Many CDM workers face arrests, torture, and threats against their families. Some are forced to move between safe houses for safety. In addition, the military regime has restricted passport issuance for CDM workers and increased questioning and detention at airports to prevent them from leaving the country. Without documentation and under constant risk of arrest or imprisonment, many CDM members continue to live in fear, insecurity, and anxiety.

Since the coup, inflation has risen to 28.58%, while the poverty rate reached 32.10%, leaving nearly one-third of the population in poverty. Agricultural productivity has declined by 16%, and around 15 million people are at risk of food insecurity. Meanwhile, the cost of essential goods and unemployment have both increased significantly. Salaries, however, have remained largely unchanged, making even daily commuting a financial burden. Many can no longer afford basic leisure or personal items. Some are forced to skip meals or reduce spending. Under such conditions, survival takes priority over mental health care, which costs between $7 and $12 per session.

Stigma is another major barrier. Mental health problems are often viewed as a source of shame, linked to evil spirits or karma, reflecting a limited understanding. Seeking professional care remains highly stigmatized, making people reluctant to access services. Many fear burdening others, hospitalization, or discussing their condition. As a result, individuals often endure problems silently and hide their condition, leading to underestimation of mental health needs.

The lack of adequate mental health care further worsens the situation. There is a major imbalance between professionals, facilities, and patients, especially between urban and rural areas. Only 1.4% of government health spending is allocated to mental health, and although the National Mental Health Policy (2021–2025) was approved, its implementation has stalled due to political unrest and limited resources. Consequently, stigma, low awareness, and limited access to care continue to deteriorate mental health outcomes.

At the same time, Myanmar citizens face additional crises such as COVID-19, cyclones, and earthquakes, causing loss of loved ones, livelihoods, and housing, creating compounded trauma. When these crises overlap, their impacts intensify, making recovery extremely difficult. Weak disaster governance and poor preparedness further worsen these impacts.

As a result, many Myanmar people are carrying invisible wounds. Rising prices have made simple activities unaffordable for many. Rising crime and worsening public transport have increased insecurity. Safety concerns also extend online, as user data has been handed over to the military. Daily life is further disrupted by power cuts, fuel shortages, and strict refuelling limits, while travel restrictions and detentions limit mobility. Anxiety has become a daily reality, driven by insecurity, forced conscription, limited opportunities, and uncertainty about the future.

The Hidden Costs of Mental Health Crisis

The psychological impact of the Myanmar polycrisis does not end with ceasefire agreements. It may contribute to trans-generational trauma, shaping families and communities. For example, people born in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide have experienced trauma passed down over time. Children are especially vulnerable, as violence and displacement impair development and learning. In some cases, trauma may alter gene expression, increasing the risk of future mental health problems and creating cycles of inherited distress.

Mental health issues not only affect a person’s mind but also their physical health. They can lead to alcohol and substance abuse, as well as other coping behaviors, and in severe cases, suicide. Anxiety and chronic stress can significantly reduce work productivity and income, while also placing emotional and economic burdens on families. High out-of-pocket healthcare costs further strain households. Over time, it contributes to reduced human capacity and increased pressure on the country’s overall economic and social systems.

Current Responses and Limitations

The institutional infrastructure, regulation, and oversight of mental health services in Myanmar remain limited, with a significant imbalance between care providers and patients. Individuals with severe mental distress require professional support at higher levels of the Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) care pyramid. Due to system neglect, cultural beliefs, and stigma, many rely on traditional approaches such as support from Buddhist monks, religious practices, or meditation. Online community groups also provide peer support. While useful for daily coping, these methods are not sufficient for severe conditions.

Mobile psychiatric clinics offer free services through periodic community visits, but this may increase workload and burnout among providers. Earlier efforts to integrate mental health into primary healthcare were also not fully implemented. The parallel government, NUG, prioritizes mental health by offering free telemental health services and awareness campaigns. However, the lack of in-person care limits support for frontline and on-ground individuals, especially those who have lost family members or suffered severe injuries, requiring intensive emotional support. For instance, some civilians have survived junta airstrike while losing family members. Such experiences leave survivors with severe trauma while caring for remaining family members with little or no access to mental health support.

NGOs and international organisations, such as UNFPA, also contribute through online platforms and training programs. At the same time, there has been a rise in short-term training courses, many lacking regulation and proper standards. Some individuals with minimal training offer services, raising safety and quality concerns. While approaches like Psychological First Aid are useful, they should be part of a broader system with proper training and supervision. More structured, evidence-based counselling programmes are needed.

Comments and Way Forward

Given the current polycrisis, community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible in the short term. However, long-term improvement requires a coordinated approach that includes policy reform, workforce strengthening, awareness, and integration into primary healthcare. Political stability is also critical due to its direct and indirect impacts on mental health systems and overall well-being. At the primary care level, clear guidelines and better training are required. Community volunteers can provide basic psychosocial support locally. Reducing stigma is critical. Community-based outreach, culturally appropriate education, and engagement with local and religious leaders are essential. Digital campaigns can reach wider populations. Mental health information should also be provided in multiple ethnic languages to reflect Myanmar’s diversity.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s mental health crisis is deeply shaped by the current polycrisis, making it widespread and complex. While existing responses provide some relief, they remain insufficient for long-term needs. Addressing this crisis requires coordinated efforts, along with improved political stability, to strengthen systems, reduce stigma, and expand access to care.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Myanmar is a resource-rich country with abundant deposits of jade, gold, and rare earth minerals, yet it faces increasing environmental degradation and social harm.

Key Takeaways:

1. Weak governance, not resource scarcity, is the main driver of environmental degradation and social harm in Myanmar’s mining sector.

2. The benefits of mining are concentrated among powerful actors, while local communities bear the environmental, health, and livelihood costs.

3. Unregulated extraction is linked to conflict economies and cross-border impacts, making mining a regional governance and sustainability issue.

Introduction

Mining activities often fail to comply with laws and Environmental Impact Assessment procedures, leading to land loss, water scarcity, and severe pollution that directly affect local communities. This pattern reflects a long history of extractive waves driven by global demand. Since the 2021 military coup, governance breakdown has accelerated unregulated mining, intensifying these impacts. Mining in Myanmar is therefore not only an environmental issue, but also a broader social and governance crisis.

Background: Mining and Governance Context

Myanmar’s mining sector has long been central to its economy, supported by abundant deposits of minerals such as tin, tungsten, copper, jade, and gemstones, and shaped by successive political regimes from independence to military rule and partial democratisation. Across these periods, mining has expanded under different governance systems, but weak enforcement of environmental laws and fragmented control among the government, military, ethnic armed groups, and foreign actors have limited effective oversight.

During the post-independence period (1948–1962), the government sought to develop the mining sector through national planning and partnerships with foreign companies, but progress was constrained by internal conflict and limited institutional capacity. Under military rule (1962–2010), mining governance became increasingly centralised yet opaque, with the expansion of state control and military-linked enterprises alongside widespread illegal and artisanal mining, leading to growing environmental degradation and social impacts. Many laws and governance structures during this period were still based on outdated colonial-era legal frameworks. The democratic transition period (2011–2021) introduced legal reforms and opened the sector to foreign investment, but governance remained weak, as the Permanent Secretaries of every ministry were appointed by the previous administration, which created a barrier for the NLD-appointed ministers to plan for the reform.

Since the 2021 military coup, these challenges have intensified as the rule of law deteriorated and illegal mining activities surged, contributing to widespread deforestation and environmental damage. International sanctions reduced foreign investment, pushing the military regime to rely more heavily on natural resources to finance its operations. This has accelerated the expansion of rare earth mining, particularly in border regions controlled by armed groups and foreign-linked actors. On the other hand, after the 2021 coup, environmental and climate-related initiatives were disrupted as international funding withdrew, and many civil society organisations reduced or redirected their activities due to political instability and security concerns. As a result, Myanmar’s mining sector increasingly reflects an “open-access” system, where overlapping authorities and weak governance enable uncontrolled extraction and concentration of benefits among powerful actors.

Governance Framework and Its Gaps

Myanmar has established a formal governance framework to regulate its mining sector, including the Myanmar Mines Law (2015), Mining Rules (2018), and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures, which require companies to minimize environmental damage and comply with environmental standards. These frameworks are supported by institutional oversight from the Environmental Conservation Department (ECD), and in principle align with international practices by incorporating environmental management plans and compliance requirements. However, while regulatory systems exist, their implementation remains weak. Even before 2021, only a small proportion of EIA-related reports were approved due to limited institutional capacity and poor-quality submissions, highlighting long-standing weaknesses in enforcement that have likely worsened under current governance conditions. Monitoring is also inadequate, as compliance inspections are often conducted only in response to complaints rather than through regular enforcement mechanisms.

Significant governance gaps persist across the sector. Transparency and accountability are limited, with local communities often lacking access to information about mining projects and decision-making processes. The post-coup crisis also weakened local civil society participation, as many organisations reduced environmental activities and some community leaders were arrested or unable to engage due to security risks. Overlapping authorities and unclear jurisdiction further complicate governance, while enforcement of regulations remains weak during project implementation. In many cases, consultation processes are superficial and can be influenced by economic incentives or pressure, undermining genuine community participation. As a result, governance in Myanmar’s mining sector exists formally through laws and regulations, but fails functionally in practice.

Governance Breakdown in Practice

In practice, governance of Myanmar’s mining sector is highly fragmented, with control divided among military-linked actors, ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), and foreign stakeholders, particularly in border regions. These actors operate with limited coordination, and local communities are largely excluded from decision-making processes despite being directly affected by mining activities. Rather than approaching natural resources from a sustainable development perspective, many military actors and armed groups increasingly treat mining as a source of revenue to strengthen their financial and political position during the ongoing conflict. In many areas, extractive projects are closely tied to political and economic interests, where access to resources provides both financial benefits and strategic power for armed groups and elites.

Mining is deeply embedded in Myanmar’s conflict economy. Revenues generated from resource extraction often fund armed actors, reinforcing cycles of conflict and instability. In regions such as Kachin State, ethnic armed organisations have taken on governance-like roles, controlling mining activities and taxation systems linked to cross-border trade. At the same time, China acts as a double-edged sword by engaging with both the military and ethnic armed groups, while exploiting Myanmar’s weak rule of law to sustain continued extraction and secure access to rare earth minerals for global markets.

Since the 2021 military coup, these dynamics have intensified. The breakdown of law and order has led to a surge in illegal and informal mining, especially in remote areas. The number of rare earth mining sites has increased rapidly, reflecting a broader expansion of unregulated extraction. As governance weakens, mining activities continue to grow without effective oversight, prioritising short-term gains over environmental sustainability and social protection.

Environmental Costs

Mining activities in Myanmar have caused severe environmental damage, particularly to water resources. The use of toxic chemicals such as mercury, cyanide, and acids contaminates rivers and groundwater, making water unsafe for drinking, agriculture, and aquatic life. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining along the Ayeyarwady River has long served as an important livelihood strategy for local communities with limited economic alternatives. In some mining areas, water samples have been found to pose substantial risks to ecosystems and are entirely unsuitable for human use. These impacts are intensified by the expansion of large-scale and mechanized mining, which increases pressure on water resources and contributes to widespread pollution. Evidence from border areas shows that toxic discharge from mining has entered tributaries linked to the Thanlwin (Salween) system, contaminating downstream water sources and affecting agriculture and fisheries in nearby communities.

Deforestation and land degradation are also major consequences of mining. Forest clearing for extraction has led to significant forest loss, estimated at around 46,000 hectares, particularly in resource-rich regions such as Kachin and Sagaing. Mining activities accelerate soil erosion, reduce agricultural productivity, and damage local ecosystems. Biodiversity loss follows as habitats are destroyed and ecosystems collapse, affecting both terrestrial and aquatic species.

Environmental disasters, including landslides and flooding, are increasingly common in mining areas, causing long-term ecological damage and risks to human life. These impacts are not accidental but are directly linked to weak governance systems. Historically, Myanmar’s governance system has prioritized state revenue collection, including taxes on the extraction of state-owned resources. Without effective regulation and accountability, mining continues to operate unsustainably, while the exclusion of local communities from decision-making further limits environmental protection.

Social Costs of Mining

Mining in Myanmar also imposes high social costs, particularly on communities living near extraction sites. Livelihoods are increasingly undermined as agricultural land is lost to mining activities and access to forests and clean water is reduced, contributing to long-term economic insecurity. In many cases, mining operations have damaged homes, farmland, and community spaces without compensation, leaving local populations with limited means of recovery.

Public health risks are also severe. Exposure to contaminated water and toxic chemicals has led to respiratory illnesses, skin diseases, and other chronic health conditions among both workers and nearby communities. A health survey conducted in an artisanal and small-scale gold mining community in Mandalay Region found that 9 out of 18 miners showed warning levels of mercury contamination, while 3 out of 18 miners displayed neurological signs and symptoms associated with chronic mercury intoxication. Workers face especially dangerous conditions, including frequent landslides and accidents in mining areas. For example, deadly jade mine collapses in Kachin State have killed hundreds of miners in recent years, highlighting the extreme risks associated with poorly regulated extraction. Many workers receive little or no medical support or compensation, even in cases of injury or death.

The risks and benefits are unequally distributed, while local communities have little opportunity to raise concerns under the military regime. Profits are concentrated among powerful actors such as military-linked groups and foreign stakeholders, while local communities bear the environmental and social burdens. Mining revenues also contribute to conflict, reinforcing instability in resource-rich regions. Weak governance enables this imbalance, shifting the costs of extraction onto vulnerable populations while concentrating gains among those with power.

Why This Is a Governance Issue

The environmental and social impacts of mining in Myanmar should not be understood as isolated outcomes of extractive activities, but as symptoms of deeper governance failures. At its core, the issue is not the existence of mining itself, but the conditions under which it operates. Sustainability means maintaining the equilibrium among social, economic, and environmental well-being through effective governance. After the coup weakened governance, the entire system came under stress, showing that this is fundamentally a governance issue. In the case of Mogok’s ruby mines, control over the area has shifted between the junta and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), with reports indicating that the TNLA returned the area following China-mediated negotiations and diplomatic pressure. These challenges are further worsened by political instability, forming part of a broader polycrisis in which conflict, economic pressures, and environmental degradation reinforce one another. In this context, mining reflects deep-rooted dynamics of power, control, and conflict.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Myanmar’s mining crisis is not only environmental, but also deeply social and rooted in governance failures. Its impacts extend beyond national borders, as pollution from mining contaminates rivers and ecosystems in neighboring countries such as Thailand, while broader environmental decline contributes to regional instability and displacement. Addressing these challenges requires stronger enforcement, improved transparency and accountability, and conflict-sensitive resource governance. Similarly, local communities must be meaningfully included in decision-making processes. Looking ahead to 2026, ongoing political uncertainty and parallel governance structures will continue to shape the sector. Myanmar is going to face more and more climate-related disasters, and this could increase the vulnerability of local communities. Without governance reform, resource wealth will continue to drive environmental degradation and social inequality rather than sustainable development.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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The devastating earthquake in Myanmar has exposed the junta’s mismanagement.

Key takeaways:

• Myanmar’s military regime has prioritised its interest in fuelling the war and maintaining political control over disaster preparation, worsening the earthquake devastation.

• Discrimination under the junta has left minority communities more vulnerable to the earthquake’s impact.

• The military’s post-quake response shows continued mismanagement and disregard for the Myanmar people.

Already struggling under the weight of the world’s longest-running civil war, genocide, war crimes, and climate-related disasters, Myanmar was struck by a devastating earthquake on March 28th. The magnitude 7.7 tremor, centred along the Sagaing Fault, caused a slip of up to five meters within just ninety seconds. This catastrophic event, followed by a magnitude 6.4 aftershock, wreaked havoc across major cities, including Mandalay, Nay Pyi Taw, and Sagaing, as well as historic towns such as Ava and Amarapura. Even in Yangon, hundreds of miles away, people fled into the streets as buildings swayed violently.

By May 9th, Myanmar’s military-run state media had reported over 3,800 deaths, with more than 5,000 injured. However, local sources suggest the actual toll could be significantly higher, with the US Geological Survey estimating that the final death count could exceed 10,000. In response, the military junta declared a week of national mourning, with flags flown at half-mast until April 6th.

Seismologists Judith A. Hubbard and Kyle Bradley noted that, “As with all great earthquakes on known active faults, this M7.7 earthquake was both completely expected (the location and magnitude), and completely unexpected (the timing).” This observation raises a critical question: What disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures, if any, did Myanmar have in place before the quake, and how has the government handled disaster management in its aftermath?

Myanmar military’s mismanagement

Since gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar has been dominated by military rule, which has profoundly shaped its political landscape. From direct military governance and the so-called Myanmar Way to Socialism to a power-sharing arrangement under the 2008 Constitution, military control has remained a central feature. The 2008 Constitution granted the military 25% of parliamentary seats, control over key ministries, and the power to nominate a vice president. However, in 2021, the military, led by third-generation dictator Min Aung Hlaing, staged a coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Since seizing power, the junta has severely undermined Myanmar’s disaster risk management and climate adaptation efforts, which had been gradually developed under semi-democratic administrations between 2011 and 2021. Despite adopting the National Disaster Management Law in 2013, the military has largely ignored the Myanmar National Framework for Community Disaster Resilience, a critical guideline for building community-level disaster preparedness.

The Myanmar Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction was once a vital blueprint for enhancing community resilience and preparing for natural disasters. However, following the 2021 coup, the junta shifted its priorities dramatically, diverting vast resources to its military operations. In the fiscal year 2024-25, the military allocated a staggering 41 trillion kyats (≅ €17.38 billion) to sustain its ongoing civil war—a record-high figure—while quietly siphoning 400 billion kyats ≅ €169.6 million) from the Myanmar National Disaster Management Fund. Initially intended for disaster relief, this money was rerouted into the State Economic Promotion Fund, aimed at propping up an economy battered by international sanctions. In essence, the junta prioritised its grip on power over protecting its citizens from foreseeable disasters.

This raises a critical question: If scientists had long warned of the seismic risks along the Sagaing Fault, why did the military divert essential disaster funds elsewhere? How frequently were residents in cities like Mandalay, Nay Pyi Taw, or Sagaing provided with earthquake awareness programs or preparedness drills? While the collapse of ancient pagodas, mosques, and churches can partly be attributed to their age, the structural failure of modern buildings, such as the Sky Villa and the newly built Buddhist monastery complex in Mandalay, exposes glaring deficiencies in enforcing construction regulations.

Additionally, this disaster highlights broader concerns about the rule of law in Myanmar. Were construction sites properly inspected to ensure compliance with building standards? Did negligence play a role in the collapse of buildings that should have been able to withstand seismic shocks? Or is systemic corruption from high-ranking officials like Min Aung Hlaing down to junior officers ultimately responsible for these failures? The military’s mismanagement of disaster preparedness and infrastructure safety further underscores its incompetence as a governing body.

Moreover, the higher death toll from last year’s Typhoon Yagi in Myanmar, despite the storm striking indirectly, compared to Vietnam, a country directly in the typhoon’s path, serves as another stark example of the military’s failure in disaster response and management.

A Nationalist agenda and systemic discrimination

The military’s nationalist agenda and decades-long discriminatory policies have also exacerbated the earthquake’s devastation. Centuries-old mosques, many of which had been denied even basic maintenance, such as leak repairs to prevent water damage, suffered extensive damage. Reports indicate that over 130 mosques were destroyed, with more than 700 Burmese Muslims dying during Friday prayers. This disproportionate death rate compared with just 5% of the Burmese Muslim population in Myanmar highlights deliberate neglect and systemic discrimination, the military’s direct responsibility for preventable deaths, exposing its failure to protect all communities during a disaster.

This raises another critical question: In the aftermath of the earthquake, will the military permit the rebuilding of collapsed mosques and churches, or will its oppressive policies continue to obstruct the restoration of vital places of worship for minority communities? The answer to this question will determine whether the junta is genuinely willing to support all communities in their recovery or whether it will persist in its pattern of exclusion and discrimination.

The military’s recent actions are telling, it has refused to allow international media into Myanmar to cover earthquake updates, continued bombing civilian areas, rejected a ceasefire request from revolutionary forces, and blocked a Taiwanese rescue team from assisting victims. Additionally, it made the controversial decision to reschedule the national Grade 12 examination on June 16th for students in earthquake-affected regions, such as Mandalay and Sagaing, following the destruction of their original answer sheets in a fire at Mandalay University caused by the earthquake. While the students have no responsibility since they have done what they need to do, these inhumane actions reflect a regime disconnected from the needs of the people it claims to govern, showing little concern for the suffering of its citizens.

Despite saffron washing itself as the protector of Myanmar and its dominant religion, Buddhism, the military’s actions have plunged the country into a state of polycrisis, exacerbating both natural and man-made disasters. Its reckless mismanagement and discriminatory policies have left Myanmar more vulnerable to future disasters, revealing the depth of its governance failures.

Conclusion

The military’s failure to prioritise disaster preparedness, mismanagement of vital resources, and systemic discrimination are the underlying causes of the catastrophic damage caused by the earthquake in Myanmar. As the country struggles to recover, it is painfully clear that the military’s incompetence has deepened the crisis, leaving its citizens to bear the brunt of the devastation. The junta’s refusal to address these systemic issues and its continued disregard for the well-being of Myanmar’s diverse communities make it increasingly clear that it is unfit to govern. It must be held accountable for its failures, as the evidence of its mismanagement continues to mount.

Tin Shine Aung is the Consulting Director at the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). In addition to his professional roles, Tin Shine Aung is pursuing a PhD in Sustainability Science at the University of Lisbon, Portugal.

The 2026 Israel-Iran war is shaking up energy markets around the world. In Myanmar, this has led to fuel shortages, rising costs, and greater pressure on agriculture and people’s livelihoods.

Key Takeaways

• Myanmar’s heavy reliance on imported fuel (over 90%) leaves it highly exposed to global disruptions, with instability in the Strait of Hormuz triggering shortages, price spikes, and long fuel queues domestically.

• Rising fuel and fertiliser costs are disrupting agriculture, reducing productivity, and increasing food prices, putting pressure on farmers and worsening food insecurity across the country.

• Fragmented government policies, combined with crony control of sectors like the EV market, allow elites to benefit during the crisis while ordinary citizens face shortages, higher living costs, and limited access to resources.

Introduction

The U.S.-Israel-Iran war, often known as the 2026 Iran war, started on February 28, 2026. Coordinated Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran started the conflict, which rapidly intensified once the Iranian supreme leader and civilians were killed. As the Middle East is a key hub for energy production and international shipping routes, instability in the region can have widespread economic consequences. One of the most critical factors is the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping route between Iran and Oman. It is one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, with around a quarter of global crude oil shipments passing through it daily. On April 22, WTI crude futures stayed above $89 per barrel after peace talks between the US and Iran failed, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is mostly blocked.

These problems have had significant effects on global supply chains, especially because fuel prices are going up and energy flows are being limited. Myanmar is especially vulnerable because it is an underdeveloped country that has been affected by internal conflict and relies heavily on imported fuel, which makes up more than 90% of its domestic consumption. Myanmar relies heavily on suppliers in the region, like Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. They are also imposing export controls as a precaution because of global uncertainty, while domestic production in Myanmar accounts for only about 3% of consumption. This article argues that the Israel-Iran War has intensified Myanmar’s economic fragility by disrupting fuel imports, increasing agricultural costs, and worsening economic inequality, while exposing governance limitations and policy gaps.

Why is Myanmar highly vulnerable?

1 Dependence on Structure and Energy Insecurity

Dependency theory explains why Myanmar is so vulnerable to the global fuel crisis. It shows how economies on the edge rely on resources from outside the nation’s borders. Approximately 90–95% of the petroleum products that the country uses come from other countries, which shows that it is dependent heavily on foreign sources. At the same time, there isn’t sufficient refining capacity in the country, and local production only meets a small part of national demand. In the largest city, Yangon, long queues at gas stations usually take around 5 hours to buy the limited amount of petrol in the heat, which causes fainting. Myanmar’s ability to import fuel is limited by insufficient foreign exchange reserves, resulting in this structural imbalance being significantly worse. Because of this, outside shocks, like problems with the global oil supply, lead to shortages and higher prices at the national level.

2 Insufficient Oil Production despite oilfields

Experts and former oil industry workers say that Myanmar does make crude oil, although it can’t refine it adequately for use in the country, so it has to rely heavily on imported fuel. One big reason is that the country’s refinery factories are old and do not have the latest technology, so they can’t turn crude oil into high-quality petroleum that meets industrial standards. Also, crude oil made in the area is often of low quality and needs chemical refining, which makes things more expensive and complicated. The situation is even worse because there isn’t enough electricity, and there are security problems in some oil-producing areas that have been controlled by local revolutionary forces. Limited government budgets also make it hard to invest in refinery and energy infrastructure improvements. In consequence of this, Myanmar is still structurally dependent on foreign refined fuel, even though it holds its own oil resources.

3 Agricultural Sector in Myanmar

The Iran conflict is also impacting the availability of critical raw materials. The region is a major exporter of fertilisers, petrochemicals, and energy-based products used in agriculture and manufacturing. Any disruption would strike the imports of Myanmar fertilisers worth over USD 500 million a year. People are queuing to purchase fuel to irrigate their fields and harvest their summer rice fields during this summer rice planting season, and it is difficult to get plenty to plant in their farms. A severe shortage of diesel, necessary for agricultural machinery, threatens food security. The increase in diesel price and oil shortage is leading to unable to operate their tractors and irrigation pumps for rice farming, as well as transportation to the market. Farmers are struggling with fuel prices, which are nearing 4,000 kyats per litre. Planting could be delayed, and yields could drop. On 21 March, Myanmar Rice Federation (MRF) made a statement, urging the stakeholders in the industry to avoid panic buying of fuel and fertilizers. However, MRF cannot control fuel prices or global shortages directly. The price of agricultural products, especially in the rice market, will dramatically increase along with the other food markets if the situation continues in the next three months.

4 Vulnerability of Myanmar Civilians

The crisis is not limited to farmers, but it is also severely affecting day-to-day workers who depend on transportation to earn a living. Low-income workers, particularly trishaw drivers (scooters with sidecars used for local passenger transport), taxi drivers, and those commuting daily from suburban or rural areas, are facing escalating fuel costs. As a result, their income is shrinking while the cost of essential goods continues to rise. At the same moment, the government’s increased airstrikes on civilian areas are compounding these hardships by disrupting local economies, displacing communities, and increasing insecurity. Recent reports say that airstrikes have killed hundreds of civilians in many areas and caused a lot of damage to schools, clinics, and religious buildings. This doubled pressure, economic strain from the fuel crisis, and continuous airstrikes make it even more challenging for civilians.

Government and NUG Responses

1 Government’s Actions

The head of Myanmar’s junta, Min Aung Hlaing, has swapped his uniform for the top civilian office and become the president on 3 April. In response to the worsening fuel crisis triggered by the Israel-Iran conflict, the new regime led by President Min Aung Hlaing has implemented a series of short-term measures to reduce domestic fuel consumption. Between March 7 and April 3, authorities introduced multiple fuel control systems, including the odd–even license plate policy, which disrupted transportation-dependent businesses, reducing operating capacity and income for logistics providers, small traders, and service workers. The old and revised Barcode/QR distribution systems a mechanism that allocate fuel based on vehicle engine type. This QR system has revealed systemic misconduct that goes beyond inefficiency. Because of the system’s reliance on static data, legal owners are unable to access their own fuel quotas, allowing actors with fake license plates to take control of them. In addition to making illegal trade easier, this crack puts car owners who are harmed by a flawed regulatory system under a great deal of financial and psychological strain. Also, authorities are conducting office work from home on Wednesdays of each week. These rapidly changing policies suggest a lack of preparedness for an urgent crisis of this scale. At the same time, Energy Minister U Ko Ko Lwin travelled to China and Russia, where discussions focused on long-term fuel imports at lower prices, including electricity cooperation and fertiliser imports, but the implementation will not solve the current economic recession.

On the other hand, ASEAN countries have taken steps to lessen the economic shock. For instance, Malaysia has fiscal space in its budget to deal with outside pressures because its currency is stable, inflation is under control, and its bond markets are strong. Indonesia has set aside about 381.3 trillion rupiah (about USD 22.5 billion) for energy subsidies. This includes paying state-owned businesses to keep fuel and electricity prices low. The Philippines has also introduced targeted subsidies to help with rising oil prices and the costs of basic goods. Vietnam, on the other hand, has taken proactive steps to make sure that fuel supplies stay stable during global disruptions.

However, Myanmar lacks comparable fiscal power or policy flexibility. The current regime already relies on printing money to make up for its budget shortfall, so it is unlikely to give out a lot of subsidies. Instead, it is focusing on getting fuel for the military instead of for civilians. In consequence of this, farmers, workers, and low-income families bear an unfair share of the burden of rising food and fuel prices, making the situation harder for those who are already struggling financially and starving.

2 Cronies & Myanmar EV market

Myanmar’s electric vehicle (EV) market is largely controlled by businesses linked to Min Aung Hlaing’s family, particularly his children, who dominate EV imports and distribution. This reflects their close ties, through crony capitalism, to the current president, who emerged from the widely criticised 2025 “sham election.” The existing regulatory framework is biased in favour of military-related organizations, and competition is restricted, which contributes to economic inequality. During the current Israel-Iran conflict, the public was restricted to fuel, including the “odd-even” policy, which exempted EVs, which boosted the demand artificially in a market dominated by military-related companies. As a result, EV prices surged dramatically, with some models rising from around 195 million (about US$44,318) to 285 million kyats ($64,777). This lack of regulation permits price fixing and monopoly, which explains how patronage networks can help elites to make money under crisis circumstances, as normal citizens remain trapped in fuel shortages and rising living costs.

2 Role of NUG in the Oil Shortage

The National Unity Government (NUG) has responded to Myanmar’s fuel crisis, mainly in areas under its control. It has introduced a fuel transit permit system to regulate and monitor petroleum flows, requiring official approval for transportation into regions such as Kachin, Chin, and Rakhine, primarily to prevent supplies from reaching the military junta. However, this policy has created friction with Chin and Rakhine allies, as this letter can create potential dissent among the public. The NUG also uses fuel control as a wartime strategy to weaken the regime’s logistics capacity. However, these restrictions have contributed to local shortages, higher prices, and logistical delays in some areas. Overall, its role is indirect and politically driven rather than solving structural fuel supply problems.

Recommendation & Implementation

1. Myanmar should monitor and adjust fuel allocation policies, learning from successful practices in neighbouring countries to reduce the risk of severe fuel shortages.

2. The country needs to strategically diversify fuel import channels, expand national energy reserves, and reduce dependence on limited external suppliers.

3. The NUG, EAOs, and other local defence forces should reach a mutual consensus on fuel management strategies and oil control policies to prevent misuse by military actors.

4. In the long term, the agricultural sector must transition from fuel-dependent mechanised farming to a hybrid resilience model, combining limited diesel use with renewable energy and cooperative farming systems.

5. Above all, Myanmar needs political stability since no technological or economic programme can be successfully implemented or maintained in the absence of transparent institutions and decent administration.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s crisis illustrates how geopolitical conflicts can deepen economic instability in vulnerable states, highlighting the urgent need for resilience-building policies. Energy prices are a key factor in supply chain operations because industries such as the agricultural sector, the manufacturing sector, and logistics depend heavily on fuel. When oil and gas prices increase, transportation and production costs rise, profit margins shrink, and consumers face higher prices. This creates ongoing pressure for supply chain professionals to improve efficiency and manage cost fluctuations effectively.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

Key Takeaways

• AI strengthens state power in fragile authoritarian contexts by expanding capacity without sufficient accountability, increasing risks of surveillance and misuse.

• AI amplifies existing systems of propaganda by accelerating and scaling disinformation and narrative control.

• AI-driven development can deepen inequality due to unequal data representation, digital access gaps, and low levels of AI literacy.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly embedded in governance systems worldwide, reshaping public administration, security infrastructures, and service delivery mechanisms. Governments are adopting AI-driven tools not only to enhance efficiency but also to advance development objectives aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in healthcare, education, and economic growth.

In response, a growing number of jurisdictions have developed AI governance frameworks emphasising risk-based regulation, data protection, and ethical standards. Prominent examples include the frameworks advanced by the EU AI Act, the OECD AI Principles, and the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. These models promote transparency, accountability, and human-centred AI.

However, these frameworks largely presuppose the existence of stable democratic institutions, regulatory capacity, and accountability mechanisms. Using Myanmar as a case study, this article argues that AI does not simply enhance governance in fragile and authoritarian contexts; it also reshapes state power, amplifies information control, and risks reinforcing structural inequality.

Artificial Intelligence and Governance under Polycrisis

Artificial intelligence has the potential to transform development outcomes across sectors. In healthcare, AI supports disease detection and treatment optimisation; in agriculture, it enables precision farming and climate adaptation; and in education, it expands access through digital learning platforms. These applications highlight AI’s potential to support inclusive development. However, the effectiveness of AI depends heavily on governance conditions. Its impact is increasingly shaped by what scholars describe as a polycrisis, the intersection of multiple, overlapping crises such as political instability, economic disruption, technological change, and information disorder. In contexts like Myanmar, these crises do not occur in isolation. Political instability following the 2021 Myanmar Coup, combined with digital fragmentation, economic constraints, and social inequalities, creates a complex environment in which AI systems are introduced and deployed.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often framed as a tool for enhancing state capacity. Yet in contexts where governance structures are weak, it may instead produce unaccountable capacity. In Myanmar:

• Regulatory institutions are limited

• Legal safeguards are weak

• Oversight mechanisms are minimal

According to Access Now (2023), the rapid and unchecked deployment of AI systems, particularly in surveillance and public-sector decision-making, creates conditions in which these technologies operate without the necessary transparency, accountability, or safeguards. Rather than strengthening governance, AI risks reinforcing centralised control without checks and balances.

AI and Information Control in a Fragile Authoritarian Country

In authoritarian contexts, artificial intelligence is increasingly used to enhance information manipulation and political control. The governments of several countries have drawn on disinformation techniques originally pioneered in Russia to implement sophisticated information operations that spread messages via fake Facebook accounts and false news stories, in cases intentionally contributing to communal violence against religious minorities. Across the region, governments, activists, and non-state armed groups actively use social media to gain domestic and international support for their cause. Similarly, in Myanmar, propaganda and disinformation are not new; they have long been embedded in state and military communication strategies.

Recent reporting by The Irrawaddy shows how the military regime has institutionalised its information operations. For example, the junta has established a multilingual propaganda body to counter international criticism, demonstrating a coordinated effort to shape narratives beyond domestic audiences. In another case, the regime dismissed reports of civilian casualties as “fake news”, reflecting a broader strategy of denying accountability and controlling information flows.

These examples illustrate that information manipulation in Myanmar is already systematic and strategic. Social media platforms such as Facebook have further amplified this dynamic, enabling the rapid dissemination of misleading content and contributing to public confusion and polarisation.

The emergence of AI technologies significantly intensifies these existing practices. AI-generated content, including synthetic images, videos, and text, can:

• scale propaganda production rapidly

• produce highly realistic but fabricated content

• enable targeted and adaptive disinformation campaigns

Scholarly research on synthetic media highlights how these technologies can erode trust in information ecosystems and undermine accountability, particularly in environments with weak media literacy and restricted access to independent information (see Pawelec, 2022). Myanmar has long experienced state-led information control, but digital technologies have significantly expanded its reach. Social media platforms, particularly Meta’s Facebook, play a central role in shaping public discourse, often acting as the primary source of information.

A notable case in Myanmar illustrates how emerging technologies intersect with existing propaganda practices. The junta was accused of using deepfake technology to support corruption allegations against Aung San Suu Kyi, after releasing a video confession by a detained official. The footage triggered widespread public skepticism, with observers noting inconsistencies such as unsynchronised lip movements and unusual audio patterns. While experts debated whether the video was definitively a deepfake or a coerced statement, the incident highlights a critical issue: in low-trust and restricted information environments, the mere possibility of AI manipulation is enough to shape public perception and generate uncertainty.

At the same time, misinformation does not always require advanced AI. A recent report by Agence France-Presse found that social media posts falsely presented an old image of Aung San Suu Kyi as a recent photo, demonstrating how easily misleading content can circulate in Myanmar’s information environment. Public discourse has pointed to suspected manipulated or synthetic content, which has fueled speculation and public anxiety, particularly regarding high-profile political figures. In this context, AI acts as a force multiplier - scaling both the speed and reach of information manipulation. Such cases show that low-tech misinformation and high-tech AI-generated content exist on the same spectrum, reinforcing each other.

In Myanmar, where verification is already difficult due to censorship and limited media freedom, AI-generated or AI-suspected misinformation presents even greater risks. These risks are further amplified by the growing use of encrypted platforms such as Telegram, where military-linked channels and affiliated networks have been reported to circulate large volumes of unverified and, in some cases, AI-generated videos related to the ongoing conflict. In the wake of the 2021 coup, the military regime, or State Administration Council (SAC), quickly shifted its primary information operations from Facebook to alternative platforms, including Telegram, highlighting the adaptability of disinformation networks. The closed and decentralized nature of such platforms makes monitoring and verification significantly more difficult, allowing misleading or fabricated content to spread rapidly with limited accountability.

At the same time, there are rising concerns about the use of AI tools to generate non-consensual and sexually explicit content, particularly targeting women. Reports and public discussions indicate that manipulated or synthetic 18+ videos have been used to harass, intimidate, and discredit female activists, journalists, and public figures. These practices reflect a broader pattern in which digital technologies are weaponised along gendered lines, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and reinforcing social harms.

AI, Inequality, and Digital Literacy Gaps

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often presented as a tool for improving access to information and expanding opportunities. However, its impact is deeply shaped by existing social and digital inequalities. In contexts such as Myanmar, these inequalities are not only economic or geographic; they are also reflected in uneven access to digital knowledge, skills, and information systems. AI systems are fundamentally dependent on data, making them highly sensitive to existing structural inequalities. In fragile and linguistically diverse contexts such as Myanmar, these inequalities are not only social but also embedded in digital infrastructures.

Key challenges include:

• unequal access to digital infrastructure between urban and rural communities

• limited inclusion of minority groups and languages in digital systems

• significant gaps in digital and AI literacy across different segments of society

These factors influence who benefits from AI and who is left behind. Communities with limited connectivity or lower levels of digital literacy are less able to access AI-driven services, while also being more vulnerable to misinformation and manipulation.

A critical dimension of this challenge is the generational divide in digital and AI literacy. Younger populations, particularly in urban areas, are generally more active users of social media and digital platforms. They are more likely to engage with emerging AI tools and integrate them into everyday activities such as learning, communication, and content creation. However, this familiarity does not always translate into critical understanding. People need to have digital literacy to verify the information and not contribute to the rapid spread of misinformation.

In contrast, older generations often face barriers in accessing and navigating digital technologies. Limited exposure, lower confidence in using AI tools, and difficulties in evaluating online information can lead to exclusion from digital services or increased susceptibility to misleading content. In some cases, this results in dependence on informal information networks, which may further amplify misinformation.

Platforms such as Facebook and Telegram play a central role in shaping these dynamics. Information spreads rapidly across these platforms, often without effective verification mechanisms. In such environments, both overconfidence among younger users and limited digital literacy among older users contribute to an existing fragile information ecosystem.

These structural gaps shape how AI systems interpret and represent reality. When datasets exclude or simplify certain populations, AI outputs risk becoming systematically biased, incomplete, or misleading. A particularly illustrative example is Myanmar’s long-standing use of Zawgyi encoding, a non-standard font system historically used across digital platforms. Unlike Unicode, which is internationally standardised, Zawgyi is not fully compatible with modern computational systems. For example, during the transition period, Facebook reported that identical posts written in Zawgyi and Unicode were treated differently by its algorithms, affecting content visibility, moderation, and information retrieval. Google similarly noted measurable improvements in search and input tools following Unicode standardisation. This demonstrates a critical point: when linguistic systems are fragmented, AI systems inherit and reproduce that fragmentation.

Therefore, AI does not create inequality, but it encodes, scales, and amplifies existing disparities across data, language, and generational access. AI does not create inequality, but it can significantly amplify it.

Fragmented Governance and Emerging Actors

Myanmar’s governance landscape is increasingly fragmented, with alternative actors such as the National Unity Government (NUG) playing a growing role. While the National Unity Government (NUG) actively counters military narratives through official statements, social media engagement, and diaspora-supported networks, it does not yet operate a formalised AI governance or verification system. As a result, its responses to misinformation remain largely reactive and decentralized rather than systematic.

At the same time, the absence of trusted, institutionalised verification mechanisms combined with the proliferation of AI-generated and manipulated content contributes to a broader environment of information uncertainty. In such conditions, competing narratives circulate simultaneously, making it increasingly difficult for the public to distinguish credible information from misinformation.

This raises important questions about the future of AI governance:

• Can alternative actors develop more accountable digital systems?

• How can AI support service delivery in contested areas?

• What role can decentralised governance play in shaping technology use?

At present, these dynamics remain underdeveloped, highlighting a critical area for further research and policy engagement.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Context-Sensitive AI Governance Frameworks

Global AI governance models must be adapted to fragile contexts. This includes prioritising minimum safeguards, even in low-capacity environments, such as transparency standards and basic oversight mechanisms. Efforts to strengthen AI governance in Myanmar should also consider broader regional developments in Southeast Asia. Several countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, have already adopted national AI strategies or ethical frameworks to guide investment, innovation, and risk management (see). These initiatives highlight a growing regional trend toward integrating AI into economic development and public service delivery.

However, Myanmar remains significantly behind in terms of AI readiness, governance capacity, and digital infrastructure. At the same time, past cases such as the role of social media in amplifying violence against the Rohingya population underscore the risks of unregulated digital ecosystems

2. Investment in AI Literacy and Public Capacity

Improving AI literacy is essential to reduce misuse and vulnerability to misinformation. Targeted education initiatives should focus on:

• digital literacy

• critical media skills

• responsible use of AI tools

3. Addressing Data Inequality

Efforts should be made to ensure more inclusive data systems by:

• incorporating minority languages

• improving rural data representation

• supporting equitable digital infrastructure

4. Safeguarding Information Ecosystems

International organisations and civil society actors should prioritize:

• monitoring disinformation

• supporting independent media

• strengthening fact-checking systems

5. Supporting Alternative Governance Innovation

Emerging governance actors should be supported in developing:

• transparent digital systems

• accountable AI applications

• inclusive service delivery models

Ultimately, strengthening AI governance in Myanmar requires more than technical solutions; it demands coordinated efforts across institutions, society, and regional partnerships. Without such efforts, AI risks reinforcing existing patterns of inequality, misinformation, and political control. Ensuring that AI contributes to inclusive and accountable development will depend on sustained investment in capacity, trust, and governance.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Extreme heat is becoming a serious and growing risk to public health in Myanmar’s cities.

Key Takeaways

• Extreme heat in Myanmar is increasing rapidly, with record-breaking temperatures and rising heat-related deaths showing it is already a serious public health risk.

• Urban conditions, such as dense infrastructure, limited green space, unreliable electricity, and ongoing conflict, are intensifying heat exposure, especially for vulnerable groups.

• Despite growing impacts, heat stress remains under-recognised and under-addressed, requiring urgent, coordinated action at both national and urban levels.

1. Importance of addressing the problem

Across Southeast Asia, heatwaves are becoming more frequent, longer, and more intense due to global warming. Recent years have seen record-breaking heat causing deaths, hospitalisations, school closures, and economic losses. Scientists warn that this trend will continue, with each year becoming hotter than the last.

Myanmar is part of this regional pattern and is highly vulnerable to climate change. Temperatures have already increased over recent decades, and extreme weather events, including heatwaves, are becoming more frequent and intense. Limited capacity to respond further increases the country’s risk.

Heat stress is driven mainly by climate change, which increases temperatures and leads to more frequent and intense heatwaves. Natural factors like El Niño can worsen extreme heat, while human activities, such as deforestation, land-use change, and rapid urbanisation, reduce natural cooling and make cities hotter.

Despite these risks, extreme heat is still not widely recognised as a major public health issue, with gaps in data, research, and policy attention. As a so-called “silent killer,” heatwaves are likely causing more deaths than reported, especially in urban areas where exposure is highest.

2. Evidence of Extreme Heat Stress in Myanmar

Evidence shows that extreme heat in Myanmar is increasing in both frequency and intensity. Temperature data indicate a clear warming trend. Myanmar’s mean annual temperature has risen by about 0.82°C over the past 50 years and is projected to increase by up to 2.07°C by 2060. Long-term projections also suggest that both minimum and maximum temperatures could rise by up to 2.7°C by the end of the century. In recent years, temperatures during the hot season have regularly exceeded 40°C, with some areas experiencing temperatures above 44°C. This reflects a broader global pattern, as the past decade has been the warmest on record.

Historical records show that extreme heat events have occurred before, but are becoming more severe. For example, a heatwave in 2010 recorded temperatures as high as 47°C in Mandalay.

More recently, new records have been set. In April 2024, Myanmar recorded its highest-ever April temperature of 48.2°C in Chauk, while Yangon exceeded 40°C and Mandalay reached 44°C. According to Eldorado Weather, four cities from Myanmar have been listed among the world’s 15 hottest cities in March 2026. At the same time, projections indicate that sea levels could rise by 20–41 cm by the 2050s (up to 83 cm by the 2080s), potentially submerging 30% of the Ayeyarwady Delta and leading to 43% land loss .

These data confirm that climate risks in Myanmar are increasing rapidly year by year.

3. Urban Heat Stress & its Contributing Factors

Urban areas in Myanmar face higher heat stress due to a combination of environmental and socio-economic factors.

Changes in land use, including the loss of vegetation, reduce the ability of the environment to regulate heat. One key driver is the urban heat island effect. Dense buildings, concrete, and asphalt surfaces absorb and retain heat, making cities significantly hotter than surrounding areas. Rapid urbanisation, combined with limited green spaces, reduces natural cooling and prevents temperatures from dropping, especially at night. Rapid urbanisation is worsened by corruption and weak land-use regulation in Myanmar, leading to the conversion of green spaces into built-up areas. In cities like Yangon, high humidity combined with trapped heat in crowded living environments makes it even harder for residents to cope with extreme temperatures. As urban populations grow, these challenges are expected to worsen.

Beyond environmental factors, broader sustainability challenges also increase vulnerability. Ongoing conflict has displaced many people into temporary or poorly ventilated shelters, where protection from extreme heat is limited. At the same time, the conflict has forced people to move from rural areas to cities like Yangon, placing additional pressure on already overstretched urban centers like Yangon.

Limited access to electricity further worsens the situation. Many households experience unstable and insufficient power supply, making it difficult to use fans or air conditioning during extreme heat. Electricity has increasingly become a luxury rather than a basic service for the public, due to structural challenges, resource shortages, and political instability. In many areas, power is available for only around eight hours per day, often at unpredictable times due to supply shortages. Although there are other alternative energy sources, such as solar power, access to them remains limited, as high installation costs make them affordable only for wealthier households.

These factors together make urban populations in Myanmar particularly exposed to heat stress.

4. Heat Stress Impacts in Myanmar: Evidence and Trends

The rise in extreme heat is already having serious impacts on human health in Myanmar.

Heatwaves are prolonged periods of unusually high temperatures that can harm both human health and ecosystems. Health risks are especially high in urban areas, where dense infrastructure and limited cooling increase exposure.

Recent events show the scale of these impacts. During the 2024 heatwave, at least 1,473 people reportedly died from heat-related causes in a single month. This represents a significant increase compared to 2010, when 260 heat-related deaths were recorded during the summer. Such figures suggest that heat-related mortality is rising rapidly alongside increasing temperatures.

While people in Myanmar are accustomed to high temperatures, increasingly deadly heat extremes are being recorded. This can create a false sense of safety, as some may believe they are prepared for the heat. However, those who do not seek information on heat-related risks may face higher exposure during heatwaves. As a result, heat stress is emerging as a significant but often overlooked public health risk in Myanmar.

5. Public Health Risks

Extreme heat poses serious and wide-ranging public health risks in Myanmar, particularly for vulnerable populations.

Exposure to high temperatures can lead to a range of health problems, including heat exhaustion, heatstroke, dehydration, and worsening of cardiovascular and respiratory conditions. Evidence from Myanmar also shows that people experience symptoms such as fatigue, headaches, skin problems, and difficulty concentrating during heatwaves. In many cases, these effects can last beyond the heatwave period and increase the risk of mortality.

The impacts are not evenly distributed. Older people are particularly vulnerable, as their bodies are less able to cope with extreme heat, and most excess deaths during heatwaves occur among the elderly. Children are also at higher risk, as heat can affect their physical and cognitive development. Outdoor workers, such as construction workers and street vendors, face prolonged exposure and a higher risk of heat-related illness.

Social and economic inequalities further increase vulnerability. Low-income communities and those living in informal settlements often lack proper housing, ventilation, and access to cooling, increasing their exposure to heat. Women, especially those who are pregnant or postpartum, also face additional health risks, as exposure to extreme heat has been linked to higher risks of preterm birth, low birth weight, stillbirth, congenital abnormalities, and neonatal mortality, yet gender-sensitive responses remain limited.

Current conditions in Myanmar can further worsen these risks. Fuel shortages have led to long queues at petrol stations, with people waiting for hours under extreme heat. Some reports on social media and certain sources suggest that individuals have fainted or even died while queuing in these conditions.

These patterns show that heat stress is not only a health issue, but also a question of social inequality in Myanmar’s context.

6. Recommendations to mitigate and adapt to the risks

Addressing heat stress in Myanmar requires both immediate responses and long-term planning.

In Myanmar, some initiatives are already being implemented, although they remain limited. The Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) has been supporting communities through early warning messages, awareness campaigns, first aid services, and the creation of shaded spaces during heatwaves. However, these efforts face constraints due to limited resources and ongoing political challenges, which restrict wider implementation. Since the 2021 military coup, reductions in international funding, the withdrawal of aid programmes, and increasing restrictions on NGO operations have significantly weakened the capacity of civil society organisations to deliver services and support vulnerable communities. In addition, Myanmar still lacks advanced heat monitoring systems, such as standardised heat stress measurement tools, which limits effective early warning and response.

At the regional level, neighbouring countries are adopting more structured approaches. For example, Bangkok has introduced cooling centres and public cooling spaces, along with a heat warning system to guide public behaviour during extreme heat. Other Countries in Southeast Asia are also using data and technology to improve responses. Singapore applies climate modelling and urban monitoring systems to inform heat-resilient urban planning, while cities like Malacca use low-cost sensors and nature-based solutions to reduce urban heat.

In the short term, expanding green spaces, improving access to water, strengthening public education and awareness on the risks of extreme heat, and ensuring access to electricity for cooling are critical to reduce immediate risks. In the long term, improving urban design, strengthening early warning systems, and addressing energy supply issues are essential to build resilience against rising temperatures.

Heat stress in Myanmar is a silent and growing crisis, caused by both climate change and ongoing structural challenges. Without greater recognition and integration into policy and response systems, it will continue to increase risks, especially for the most vulnerable.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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This article analyses the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as a high-stakes geopolitical bypass, where Beijing’s pursuit of energy security through a fragmented Myanmar risks permanent regional instability.

Key Takeaways

• The Strategic Bypass: The Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and the Muse-Mandalay railway provide China with a critical “back door” to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the naval vulnerabilities of the Straits of Malacca.

• Institutional Dependency: Myanmar increasingly functions as a “sub-contractor” state, with the junta setting up special committees to expedite Chinese projects like the Muse-Mandalay railway despite a complete lack of territorial control.

• Local Marginalisation: Large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Kyaukphyu SEZ threaten the livelihoods of over 5,000 fishing households and risk the relocation of 20,000 people, fuelling deep-seated local resentment.

The Strategic Imperative: Bypassing the Straits

For Beijing, Myanmar represents not merely a neighbouring state but a critical geographic solution to a persistent strategic vulnerability. China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma”, its dependence on energy imports transiting the narrow and potentially contested Strait of Malacca, has compelled policymakers to conceptualize the Bay of Bengal as an alternative strategic corridor. Within this framework, the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port in Rakhine State functions as a central node.

The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is designed to operate as a dedicated conduit for China’s economic and energy security. By linking the Rakhine coastline directly to Yunnan Province through operational oil and gas pipelines (established in 2013 and 2017, respectively) and the proposed Muse–Mandalay railway, China can circumvent contested maritime zones, particularly those in the South China Sea. This infrastructure significantly reduces geopolitical exposure while enhancing logistical efficiency.

The Role of the Junta: A Centralised Partner in a Fragmented State

Recent reporting indicates that Myanmar’s military government is actively attempting to demonstrate its strategic relevance to Beijing. The junta has established a dedicated administrative body to expedite the Muse–Mandalay railway project, which is intended to connect the Chinese border with central Myanmar. This initiative reflects a broader pattern in which military leadership emphasises the continuity of Chinese-backed infrastructure projects despite ongoing internal conflict.

However, China’s engagement in Myanmar is becoming increasingly fragmented. While Beijing traditionally favours a centralised, top-down governance model, the authority of the military government is progressively eroding. Of Myanmar’s total foreign investment stock of approximately $43 billion, China accounts for roughly 32% (approximately $14 billion). A transition toward a decentralized or federal political system could compel China to renegotiate existing agreements with multiple subnational actors, thereby increasing political and contractual complexity.

The “Subcontractor” Model and Labor Enclaves

The governance structure of major infrastructure projects in Myanmar reveals a pronounced asymmetry in power relations. Within the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), the China-based CITIC Consortium retains dominant decision-making authority. In contrast, the Myanmar state assumes a more limited role, functioning effectively as a “subcontractor” responsible for land acquisition and regulatory facilitation. At the same time, China provides capital investment, technological expertise, and, in many cases, labor.

This model has generated significant local contention, particularly because it relied on imported Chinese labor. By circumventing domestic labor markets, such practices restrict employment opportunities for local populations, thereby limiting the distribution of economic benefits. At the same time, local communities remain disproportionately exposed to environmental degradation and social disruption.

The Myitsone Dam project further exemplifies these dynamics. Situated at the headwaters of the Irrawaddy River, the country’s “spinal cord” was structured to export 90% of its electricity to China, fuelling concerns of resource extraction without domestic benefit. According to International Rivers, the venture was a lopsided partnership: the China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) was to retain 70% of the profits, leaving only 20% for the Myanmar government and 10% for the local firm Asia World as a service fee. This lopsided profit-sharing highlights Myanmar’s role as a junior partner in its own strategic development.

Community Concerns and Territorial Control

Residents in Kyaukphyu express deep dejection as the deep-sea port project, a 4,200-acre cornerstone of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” moves forward with little community transparency. Despite the port providing Beijing a critical strategic bypass to the Bay of Bengal for oil imports, the joint venture remains heavily asymmetric, with China controlling 70% of the project compared to Myanmar’s 30%. As the two governments prepare to begin construction on a 600-acre site this year, villagers face widespread job losses and remain marginalised from the decision-making process.

It is estimated that over 5,000 households may lose access to fishing grounds, while the International Commission of Jurists warns that up to 20,000 individuals could face displacement. These developments have contributed to rising local discontent.

The Conflict and Governance Focus

The current landscape of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is defined by a profound disconnect between official administrative authority and de facto territorial control. While the State Administration Council (SAC) in Naypyidaw acts as the formal gatekeeper, signing high-level addendums to revive the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and forming committees to expedite the Muse-Mandalay Railway, its actual power is increasingly confined to isolated urban centers. In a strategic shift to win local compliance in Myitkyina, the junta is now promising that the majority of the electricity generated will remain in Myanmar for domestic and residential use from the Myitsone Dam mega-project, which was suspended in 2011 over environmental and humanitarian concerns. By projecting a narrative of “business as usual,” the junta attempts to maintain the image of a stable investment partner despite losing significant ground to resistance forces.

In contrast, the physical security of these corridors is now dictated by Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government (NUG). In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) has achieved what the Institute for Strategy and Policy- Myanmar describes as full or partial control over the majority of Chinese projects, effectively encircling the Kyaukphyu SEZ. Similarly, the Three Brotherhood Alliance maintains a stranglehold on the Northern Shan State transit routes due to China’s intervention in 2025. In total, the regime has reclaimed about 11.3% of the territory it lost in Northern Shan State, securing control over 44.4% of the Mandalay–Muse trade route. Meanwhile, the NUG challenges the SAC’s legal legitimacy by warning Beijing that agreements signed with an illegal junta may not be honoured by a future democratic government. Through its “10-Point Policy,” the NUG offers a tactical alternative, promising to safeguard legitimate Chinese investments while firmly rejecting “lifeblood“ sacrifices like the Myitsone Dam. This creates a fragmented reality where China must balance its long-term infrastructure goals against the shifting frontlines of a nation in revolt.

Historical Continuity: From 1988 to the Lancang–Mekong Fund

China’s relationship with Myanmar’s military establishment can be traced to the post-1988 period, during which Beijing emerged as a principal economic and political partner for a regime isolated by Western sanctions. Over time, this relationship has evolved into a multilayered framework encompassing both large-scale infrastructure investments and smaller development initiatives.

Between 2017 and 2025, Myanmar received 132 projects valued at approximately $38.6 million through the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Special Fund, with over 100 projects implemented. This funding mechanism enables China to extend its influence at the local level while simultaneously supporting the military government’s broader strategic infrastructure agenda.

Implications and Recommendations

1. The Risk of the “Stability Trap.”

China’s current approach reflects a strategic gamble predicated on the assumption that the military government can eventually restore stability and secure key economic corridors. However, continued support for the junta risks entrenching conflict dynamics by positioning Chinese investments as targets for resistance groups. Failure to address local grievances, particularly those related to environmental degradation and socioeconomic exclusion, may result in long-term instability that undermines the viability of these projects.

2. Navigating the “Civilian” Pivot

The anticipated shift to an “elected” government, likely generals in civilian attire, will mirror the Thein Sein era, where project suspensions are used as tactical “reform” signals to lift Western sanctions. To mitigate this, China must move beyond fragile military-to-military deals toward a legalised investment framework ratified by parliament. By insisting on multi-stakeholder oversight, Beijing can gain “political insurance,” ensuring projects aren’t used as bargaining chips by a pseudo-civilian regime desperate to prove its independence or legitimacy.

3. Engagement with Territorial Stakeholders

China should broaden its diplomatic engagement to include EAOs and the National Unity Government (NUG). Agreements concluded solely with a central authority lacking territorial control are inherently fragile, both legally and operationally.

4. Reform of the Labor Model

To reduce local opposition, the current subcontractor model should be restructured. Future project phases, including the Muse–Mandalay railway and Kyaukphyu SEZ, should incorporate mandatory local employment quotas alongside investments in vocational training to enhance workforce capacity.

5. Environmental Accountability

All major infrastructure initiatives should be subject to transparent and independent Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs). These assessments must include enforceable provisions capable of halting projects if significant risks to ecosystems, such as mangrove forests or local water systems, are identified.

Sevil Khikmatova is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and a Policy Analyst at STEAR with a focus on climate governance and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Myanmar’s disaster response is weak due to poor systems, political issues, and lack of coordination, affecting people, the economy, and the environment. At the same time, non-state and international groups bring both challenges and opportunities to improve disaster management.

Key Takeaways:

• Disaster impacts are driven not only by hazards but by governance failures.

• Non-state actors are essential but face major constraints.

• Inclusive and effective governance is critical for improving disaster response.

The common classification of disasters as natural or man-made is misleading. The United Nations emphasises that a hazard becomes a disaster only when it affects vulnerable populations lacking protection due to poverty, exclusion, or social disadvantage.

Myanmar is highly exposed to disaster risks and is the most climate hazard–prone globally due to its geographical location and diverse topography. The country is also highly vulnerable, with weak coping capacity and limited ability to support long-term recovery.

Governance plays a key role in reducing disaster impacts. Evidence shows that higher government effectiveness is linked to lower disaster mortality. Understanding governance gaps is therefore essential to explain failures in disaster management and reduce future risks.

State-Driven Disaster Governance Gaps

1. Restrictions on Humanitarian Aid Delivery

The military regime imposes strict controls on humanitarian aid, especially in conflict-affected areas where needs are greatest. It restricts and monitors aid, limiting access for local and international actors and worsening conditions. After the 2025 Sagaing earthquake, rescue teams were denied immediate entry and required official approval despite urgent needs. Aid was confiscated, preventing delivery to areas most in need, particularly those controlled by the NUG and ethnic resistance groups. Curfews further delayed operations.

Restrictions also affect international organisations. The 2022 Registration Law requires disclosure of staff, funding, and operations, restricts engagement with local actors, and imposes penalties for non-compliance. Since the 2021 coup, hundreds have reportedly been arrested under these rules, while travel authorisations are frequently delayed or denied.

Information control further limits response. Internet shutdowns, media restrictions, and bans on digital platforms reduce public awareness. Similar patterns were observed during Cyclone Nargis (2008) and Cyclone Mocha (2023), where aid delivery was delayed and restricted.

2. State Negligence and Abuse During Disasters

The military regime has failed to fulfil its obligation to protect affected populations. During the 2025 earthquake, military involvement in relief was minimal, with limited troop deployment and reports of looting by soldiers. Support prioritised government and military groups, particularly in Naypyitaw, while vulnerable populations such as IDPs were neglected.

Despite announcing ceasefires, the military continued airstrikes in affected areas, causing civilian casualties and damaging shelters, including religious buildings. In one case, a monastery hosting medical teams was targeted. These actions have been widely criticised as inhumane and indicative of disregard for human rights. Similar patterns occurred during Typhoon Yagi and Cyclone Mocha. Rescue support was limited, evacuation efforts were inadequate, and aid was redirected to military-aligned areas. Entire communities, especially Rohingya and resistance-aligned groups, lacked food and shelter.

Overall, humanitarian aid has been politicised, used to reward loyalty and restrict opposition rather than to save lives.

3. Weak Disaster Preparedness

Despite high exposure to hazards, preparedness remains weak due to limited infrastructure and coordination. Disasters therefore cause greater damage and casualties than in comparable countries. This is evident in Typhoon Yagi (2024). Countries like Vietnam implemented early warnings, evacuations, and large-scale mobilisation, while Myanmar’s response was limited. Although affected only by storm remnants, Myanmar recorded a comparable death toll, highlighting governance failures.

Existing disaster frameworks are undermined by poor implementation, weak coordination, and limited community engagement. Although Myanmar has a formal disaster management structure, gaps persist due to centralised control, weak institutional capacity, and inadequate local resources. State priorities often focus on military operations rather than disaster response, increasing risks to civilians.

4. Fiscal Prioritisation and Underinvestment

Financial allocation remains a major challenge. Military spending far exceeds disaster investment, with defence expenditure nearly 200 times higher. The government relies on limited reserve funds covering less than 1% of disaster damage, while the National Natural Disaster Management Fund provides minimal support. Budget rigidity limits flexibility during emergencies. These issues have worsened. In 2022, disaster funds were diverted to economic support, reducing resources for emergency response. During the 2025 earthquake, shortages of equipment and support highlighted severe underinvestment.

5. Limited Manpower In Disaster Response

Myanmar faces significant human resource constraints. There is a shortage of trained rescue personnel, and state responders are often absent, with some reports of misconduct. Response efforts, therefore, rely heavily on local communities and volunteers.

The workforce has further declined due to arrests, killings, forced conscription, and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Unlike past disasters with large-scale mobilisation, recent responses involve small, less coordinated volunteer groups. The healthcare workforce is also critically insufficient. Even before the crisis, workforce numbers have dropped below WHO standards, worsened by arrests and killings of health workers. During the 2025 earthquake, limited facilities were overwhelmed, particularly in Mandalay.

Weak institutional capacity and coordination further limit effective emergency response, increasing dependence on local networks.

Role of Political Opposition and International Actors

1. National Unity Government (NUG)

The NUG has emerged as a parallel governance actor since 2021. It provides humanitarian aid in areas under its influence, often working with EAOs, and coordinates through its Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, with local communities, CSOs, and international partners.

A key strength of the NUG is its ability to deliver structured and transparent responses despite limited resources. During Cyclone Mocha, it established coordination mechanisms, issued early warnings, supported evacuations, and allocated funds for relief and recovery. Engagement with international actors has also increased since 2024, with actors such as the United States, the European Union, and some UN agencies.

However, its reach is restricted by the SAC restrictions on access, as well as resource constraints, relying on domestic fundraising and diaspora support with limited international funding. Institutional challenges, including limited human resources, technical capacity, and administrative systems, further affect its ability to coordinate large-scale responses and deliver aid consistently.

2. Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs)

EAOs have become key service providers in many regions. Their strengths include local access, territorial control, and strong community trust. Organizations such as the Karen National Union (KNU), with established governance structures, have developed dedicated administrative systems to deliver social services and coordinate emergency response for local populations. During Cyclone Mocha, groups such as the Arakan Army conducted early warning, needs assessments, and relief operations. Their efforts are often supported by strong community trust and collaboration with CSOs and NGOs.

However, they face key limitations. Resource constraints limit large-scale response, while fragmentation and lack of recognition hinder coordination and engagement with international actors. Ongoing conflict further restricts operations, and some groups face concerns related to human rights and environmental practices, affecting credibility.

3. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and International Actors

CSOs, CBOs, NGOs, and international actors are primary humanitarian providers, especially in hard-to-reach areas. Local actors deliver frontline responses, while international actors provide funding and technical support.

However, effectiveness is constrained by access restrictions, funding limitations, and capacity gaps. Tensions between local priorities and international neutrality requirements also affect cooperation. Many INGOs are reluctant to partner with informal actors due to legal and donor constraints, and top-down funding systems reinforce unequal power dynamics and slow delivery. Finally, humanitarian funding has declined due to competing global crises and donor caution, compounded by military restrictions on banking transactions, which disrupt fund transfers and limit operational capacity.

Impacts of Disaster Governance Gaps

1. Social Impacts

Cyclone Nargis (2008) caused over 77,000 deaths. In 2024, Typhoon Yagi affected around 887,000 people, while the 2025 earthquake resulted in about 9,000 deaths and injuries. Health conditions worsen due to damaged water systems, leading to disease outbreaks. Displacement into temporary shelters increases risks of infection, while repeated shocks, conflict, and displacement create psychological trauma, especially for children. Disasters often cause shortages of food, clean water, shelter, medicine, and electricity. Education is also disrupted, with thousands of schools affected, and temporary learning spaces remain insufficient. Disasters have caused widespread destruction of homes, roads, bridges, and communication systems. Essential facilities as well as cultural heritage sites have been damaged. Human rights are often compromised due to restricted aid, delayed response, and attacks on civilian areas. Some communities lack adequate food, shelter, or evacuation support, increasing risks. Restrictions on information further limit access to life-saving assistance. Displacement remains severe, with millions internally displaced and increased migration.

2. Economic Impacts

Livelihoods are heavily affected, with damage to agriculture and fisheries reducing income. For example, Typhoon Yagi (2024) flooded farmland during a key planting season. The 2025 earthquake affected over 3.5 million workers, with losses up to US$36.8 million per day. Infrastructure damage disrupts economic activity and supply chains, increasing poverty rates. Recovery often exceeds initial damage estimates, placing long-term pressure on public finances.

3. Environmental Impacts

Disasters damage water systems, causing contamination and scarcity. Disasters contribute to soil degradation and land loss. Riverbank erosion is a major issue in regions such as Ayeyarwady. Floods and extreme weather damage crops, irrigation, and storage, reducing agricultural output. Disasters harm ecosystems and severely damage mangrove forests and surrounding ecosystems. Disasters alter landscapes through landfall, landslides, and ground fractures, as seen during Cyclone Nargis and the 2025 earthquake.

4. Governance Impacts

Repeated failures reduce public trust, weakening cooperation and policy implementation. Disasters strain already fragile public systems, limiting their ability to respond effectively. All the above impacts are intensified by limited preparedness, weak coordination, and constraints in response and recovery capacity.

Recommendations

Disasters cannot be prevented, but their impacts can be reduced through effective governance. Given Myanmar’s limited institutional capacity and reliance on external support, responsibility extends to the international community. As structural challenges are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the following recommendations focus on strengthening non-state and international actors.

Disaster governance should be decentralised, inclusive, and effectively implemented at all levels, especially locally. Strong coordination among CSOs, EAOs, NUG, and NGOs/INGOs is key, with a focus on conflict sensitivity and vulnerable groups. Invest in resilient infrastructure, essential supplies, and community preparedness. Strengthen human capacity through training and support, improve early warning systems, and ensure flexible, well-prioritised disaster funding. Support local actors as primary responders and simplify funding access. Strengthen partnerships between local and international organisations to improve coordination and aid effectiveness.

Conclusion

Disaster governance in Myanmar is weak due to poor planning, limited resources, and restricted aid. Non-state actors try to help, but face political, financial, and coordination challenges. As a result, disasters have severe impacts. Improving this requires more inclusive, locally led efforts with stronger international support.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Around one million Rohingya refugees have been living in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district since the large-scale persecution by Myanmar’s armed forces in Rakhine State in 2017. However, the camps are facing significant reductions in international humanitarian aid, increasing Bangladesh’s burden to sustain the livelihoods and security of the refugee population. This article examines the policy challenges surrounding Rohingya repatriation and explores options for the long-term and sustainable management of the refugee camps.

Key Takeaways

• The 2026 hearings at the International Court of Justice increase international accountability for the persecution of the Rohingya. Still, they do not address the current long-term humanitarian conditions faced by Rohingya refugees living in camps in Cox’s Bazar.

• Rohingya refugee camps are experiencing significant reductions in international humanitarian aid, creating growing challenges for both the refugees and the host country, Bangladesh.

• Bangladesh continues to advocate for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State, but any sustainable solution will require strong international coordination and guarantees of safety and rights for returnees.

The Rohingya: the background

The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority who are primarily located in the Rakhine State (formerly Arakan State) in western Myanmar, particularly in the northern townships bordering Bangladesh. Despite their long presence in the country, they have been denied citizenship under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, which excludes them from the list of officially recognised ethnic groups. As a result, the Rohingya have been rendered effectively stateless and have faced decades of discrimination, restrictions on movement, and periodic violence by the Tatmadaw, the armed forces.

Most Rohingya lived in Rakhine State, a coastal region bordering Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal. The situation escalated dramatically in August 2017 when the Myanmar military launched large-scale “clearance operations.” These operations resulted in mass killings, sexual violence, and the destruction of villages. Estimates suggest that at least 6,700 people were killed in the first month alone, while more than 730,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.

According to the United Nations, the Rohingya are widely described as the “most persecuted minority in the world.” Today, the Cox’s Bazar region hosts the largest refugee settlement globally, with more than one million Rohingya living in camps. Meanwhile, approximately 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, where they continue to face severe restrictions on movement, access to healthcare, and economic opportunities.

Refugees in Bangladesh also experience significant challenges, including restrictions on employment, limited access to education, growing security concerns, and increasing exposure to climate-related disasters. As international humanitarian funding declines partly due to shifting global priorities and evolving donor policies, particularly under the second administration of Donald Trump, which has emphasised reduced foreign aid commitments and an “America First” approach, Bangladesh faces mounting pressure regarding the long-term hosting of Rohingya refugees. Consequently, a key policy debate has emerged: whether Bangladesh should pursue the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar or continue hosting them while seeking alternative, durable solutions.

International Legal Context: The ICJ Case

The year 2026 marked an important moment for the Rohingya community as proceedings continued before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The case, The Gambia v. Myanmar, concerns alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The case was filed by The Gambia, which argues that Myanmar committed acts of genocide against the Rohingya population during the military operations of 2016 and 2017. During hearings, Gambian representatives presented witness testimony describing widespread violence, including killings, sexual assault, and the burning of villages.

Myanmar, however, rejects these allegations. Its representatives argue that the military operations were legitimate counter-terrorism measures carried out in response to attacks by armed groups in northern Rakhine State. Myanmar also disputes the reliability of evidence presented by international investigators and maintains that questions related to citizenship and identity are unrelated to genocide claims.

The NUG claims to represent the democratic will of the Myanmar people and has distanced itself from the military’s policies toward the Rohingya. It generally supports accountability for crimes committed during the military operations. It has expressed concern that allowing the junta to represent Myanmar in international courts could undermine the principles of the United Nations and the rule of law.

Domestic attitudes toward the Rohingya in Myanmar

Another complication in the case concerns who legitimately represents Myanmar before international institutions. Following the 2021 Myanmar military coup, a parallel government known as the National Unity Government (NUG) was formed by elected lawmakers and activists.

Domestic public opinion in Myanmar has also played a significant role in shaping attitudes toward the Rohingya and the genocide case. Among many within the Buddhist majority, perceptions of the Rohingya are strongly influenced by religious nationalism and Islamophobia. These concerns have been amplified by nationalist movements such as the 969 Movement and organisations like Ma Ba Tha.

In addition, the Rohingya are widely portrayed as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, often referred to as “Bengalis,” rather than as an indigenous ethnic group. Influential monks, including Ashin Wirathu, have helped spread anti-Muslim narratives through sermons and social media campaigns. These narratives have contributed to the denial or justification of violence against the Rohingya, with military operations often framed domestically as necessary counter-terrorism measures.

Camps in Bangladesh: humanitarian, environmental, and security concerns

Despite increasing international legal attention to the Rohingya crisis, legal proceedings do little to address the immediate humanitarian conditions faced by refugees in Bangladesh. The camps in Cox’s Bazar remain extremely overcrowded and are highly dependent on international humanitarian aid.

Refugees face severe restrictions on employment and education, while access to healthcare and formal schooling remains limited. At the same time, Bangladesh faces growing financial and security pressures related to the long-term hosting of such a large displaced population.

Environmental risks further complicate the situation. Both Bangladesh and Myanmar rank among the countries most vulnerable to extreme weather events. Cox’s Bazar is particularly prone to cyclones, floods, and landslides. The Cyclone Mocha damaged thousands of shelters and affected millions of people across the region.

Another relocation site, Bhasan Char, currently hosts around 32,574 Rohingya refugees but lies only about two meters above sea level, making it highly vulnerable to storm surges and sea-level rise.

These environmental risks contribute to secondary displacement and have pushed some Rohingya to undertake dangerous maritime journeys. In 2023 alone, around 4,500 Rohingya attempted irregular sea crossings, with more than 569 reported missing or dead. According to UNHCR, the number of Rohingya fleeing by boat increased to 9,195 in 2024, which is more than double the number recorded the previous year.

In addition to humanitarian and environmental challenges, the prolonged presence of a large refugee population has generated growing security concerns both for the refugees and for Bangladesh. The camps in Cox’s Bazar creatе conditions that increase vulnerability to crime, trafficking, and the activities of armed groups. One group that has drawn particular attention is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed organisation that originally emerged in Rakhine State. Although the majority of Rohingya refugees are civilians with no involvement in militant activities, the presence of armed factions and criminal groups has contributed to instability within the camps and raised national security concerns, urging Bangladesh to start the repatriation.

Bangladesh’s leadership has increasingly framed the protracted refugee situation as a long-term security and governance challenge. During discussions with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus reiterated the government’s position that “the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar remains the only sustainable solution to the crisis.” Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which means that it is not legally bound by the international framework that defines refugee rights and state obligations, thus hosting the Rohingya primarily on humanitarian grounds.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Prioritise safe and voluntary repatriation with international guarantees.

Bangladesh should continue advocating for safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar. However, the repatriation should occur only under internationally monitored conditions, guaranteeing security, citizenship rights, and freedom of movement or a safe zone for refugees.

2. Increase international responsibility sharing

The Rohingya crisis should not be solely Bangladesh’s burden. Donor states and international organisations must increase financial humanitarian contributions to Cox Bazar’s camps and support long-term assistance programs that target disaster risk prevention and access to livelihood opportunities.

3. Strengthen security governance in camps

Bangladesh should strengthen security governance in camps to address criminal networks, human trafficking, and armed group activity. However, security policies should not go against the human rights of refugees.

4. Reassess engagement with Myanmar’s evolving political landscape

Recent political developments in Myanmar, including a military-organised election led by Min Aung Hlaing following the 2021 Myanmar coup, may signal a shift from direct military rule to a nominally civilian government. While this transition could be presented internationally as a step toward legitimacy, in practice, the leadership and power structures are likely to remain unchanged, particularly regarding Rohingya rights.

Bangladesh and the international community should therefore approach engagement cautiously, ensuring that any negotiations or repatriation initiatives are based on verifiable improvements on the ground rather than formal political changes alone.

Sevil Khikmatova is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and a Policy Analyst at STEAR with a focus on climate governance and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Water insecurity in Myanmar is a multifaceted crisis driven by environmental change, weak governance, economic decline, and social inequality, requiring coordinated infrastructure, community, and policy solutions to ensure sustainable access to safe water.

Key Takeaways

• Water insecurity in Myanmar is driven by environmental factors, governance failures, economic decline, and social inequalities.

• Limited access to safe water impacts on health, education, livelihoods, ecosystems, and institutional capacity.

• Addressing the crisis requires integrated solutions combining infrastructure investment, community capacity building, and stronger governance coordination.

Introduction

Although water covers 70% of the planet, only about 3% is freshwater that we can drink or use to irrigate our farm fields. In Myanmar, access to safely managed drinking water has improved over the past two decades, rising from 27.11% in 2000 to 58.83% in 2020, yet water insecurity remains a critical challenge. Water insecurity happens when water is insufficient for human daily needs. More than 60% of households still lack safely managed drinking water services, and over 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) require WASH assistance.

Drivers of Water Insecurity

1. Environmental Factors

According to meteorologist U Tun Lwin, rising temperatures and deforestation are two key environmental causes of water scarcity, with impacts further intensified by disasters. Climate change has contributed to increasingly erratic rainfall, shifting monsoon cycles, and prolonged dry seasons. In addition, over the past three decades, the Central Dry Zone has experienced an approximate 2.4°C increase in baseline temperature, contributing to prolonged dry seasons and more frequent droughts. These climatic shifts have reduced the reliability of surface water sources. For example, in Rakhine State, ponds and small lakes are drying up, limiting water available for drinking and cooking. Similarly, in Htoke Kaw Koe Village in Karen State, wells that traditionally sustained local communities now fail during peak dry months. Consequently, households have to rely on shallow, unprotected, and often contaminated water sources. Extreme weather events further intensify these vulnerabilities. For example, Cyclone Mocha in May 2023 caused storm surges that contaminated unprotected community ponds with saline water. Moreover, earthquakes can disrupt groundwater systems, causing fluctuations in groundwater levels and damage to wells. Following the 2025 Sagaing earthquake in Myanmar, many tubes and dug wells were displaced or damaged.

2. Governance Failures

Weak policy implementation, limited regulatory enforcement, and insufficient investment in water infrastructure have undermined water management systems and disaster preparedness. In some areas, poor oversight has contributed to declining water quality, including arsenic contamination in some areas. Institutional weaknesses also limit effective disaster response. Limited preparedness and coordination can delay recovery efforts, leaving affected communities without reliable access to safe water following disasters. For example, in April 2025, approximately 1.6 million people in Myanmar lost access to clean water following disaster-related disruptions.

Governance failures are further compounded by weak intersectoral coordination and restrictions on humanitarian assistance. Since the 2021 military takeover, access limitations have hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly for IDPs. Conflict has also damaged critical water infrastructure. Reports indicate that wells, water tanks, and supply routes have been destroyed in some areas during armed confrontations. Such actions disrupt water supply systems and affect civilian populations who depend on these sources for daily survival.

Mass displacement represents another governance-linked driver of water insecurity. Ongoing political instability has displaced nearly 3.5 million people nationwide. Many displaced populations live in overcrowded camps where water supply systems are limited. In such environments, residents frequently rely on unsafe sources such as collected rainwater stored in temporary containers, highlighting the link between governance failures and water insecurity.

3. Economic Decline

Since the 2021 political crisis, the national economy has contracted while inflation has surged to approximately 28.6%, pushing the poverty rate to 32.1%, reducing both government capacity to invest in water infrastructure and household ability to secure safe water. At the structural level, economic decline limits public spending on water infrastructure, maintenance, and service delivery. Water utilities face shrinking operational budgets, constraining system expansion and repair. Economic shocks, including natural disasters, such as the, 2025 earthquake, have further damaged water systems and intensified supply disruptions. At the household level, declining incomes reduce the ability of families to afford safe water. Many low-income households have to depend on private water vendors. Although wholesale mineral water prices range between US$0.42 and US$1.64 per kilogram (minimum wage US$1.9 per day), these costs represent a significant burden for low-income families. As a result, 16.3% of households lack sufficient water for daily needs.

4. Social Inequalities

Rural–urban disparities remain significant. Urban populations benefit more frequently from piped water systems and municipal treatment facilities, while rural communities often rely on natural sources such as ponds, rivers, and shallow wells. With roughly two-thirds of Myanmar’s population living in rural areas, uneven infrastructure development creates structural disparities in water access.

Education and awareness also influence water practices. Limited knowledge of safe water storage and sanitation practices contributes to the use of untreated water and poor hygiene behaviours. Social marginalisation further intensifies vulnerability. Communities located in border regions, mountainous areas, and conflict-affected zones often face infrastructure neglect and barriers to humanitarian assistance. Government restrictions on aid delivery, together with regulatory pressures and operational risks, have constrained humanitarian operations and led many international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to scale down or relocate their activities. As a result, communities that previously depended on externally supported WASH services face reduced assistance, while many displaced communities rely on temporary camps and aid-dependent water systems with limited storage capacity.

Impacts of Water Insecurity

1. Economic Impacts

At the household level, families often spend additional income purchasing water from vendors. Health risks associated with unsafe water can also increase medical expenses and reduce working time due to illness. In water-scarce areas, households may spend several hours per day collecting water, reducing opportunities for income-generating activities. At the national level, widespread water insecurity can affect workforce productivity and place additional pressure on healthcare systems. Reduced agricultural productivity and labor capacity can slow economic growth and lower overall economic performance.

2. Social Impacts

Unsafe water increases the spread of waterborne diseases. In late 2025, approximately 300 people were affected by a cholera outbreak in Myanmar, with several confirmed deaths. Displacement camps have reported widespread cases of diarrhea and other illnesses associated with contaminated water sources. These risks have been further exacerbated by the reduction of international humanitarian support following the withdrawal or relocation of many INGOs, which has disrupted WASH service provision and weakened disease prevention and response capacity in vulnerable communities. Children face particularly high vulnerability. In fragile contexts, children under five are significantly more likely to die from diarrheal diseases linked to unsafe water. Long-term exposure to contaminated groundwater also poses serious health threats, including arsenic contamination in regions such as the Ayeyarwady Delta. Beyond disease, the physical burden of carrying water over long distances contributes to musculoskeletal pain. Education outcomes are also affected. School attendance is closely linked to proximity to water sources, where collection requires long hours, and absenteeism and dropout rates increase. Water collection responsibilities also reinforce gender inequality. Women and girls are typically responsible for collecting water and may travel long distances to reach water sources. In conflict-affected areas, these journeys expose them to risks of harassment, assault, and violence.

3. Environmental Impacts

Reduced water availability disrupts plant physiological processes, limiting nutrient uptake, slowing photosynthesis, and restricting plant growth. Declining soil moisture reduces crop yields and agricultural productivity. Prolonged drought conditions can also degrade soil health by reducing microbial activity and weakening soil structure. Groundwater over-extraction can further accelerate environmental degradation. Excessive pumping lowers water tables and reduces groundwater discharge to connected rivers and streams, diminishing water availability in surrounding ecosystems. These pressures are evident in urban areas such as Yangon, where population growth and post-2021 displacement have increased water demand. More than half of the city’s population relies on groundwater, with widespread extraction through private wells. Studies indicate that actual groundwater abstraction far exceeds official estimates, placing severe stress on aquifer systems. Excessive extraction has been linked to declining groundwater levels, increased risk of land subsidence, saltwater intrusion, and broader environmental degradation.

4. Governance Impacts

Waterborne diseases, sanitation-related illnesses, and outbreaks linked to unsafe water significantly increase patient loads, stretching already limited medical resources. Water insecurity can place additional strain on existing water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) systems. Furthermore, inadequate water infrastructure in rural and displacement settings makes consistent service delivery difficult. These pressures extend beyond the health sector. Reduced productivity due to illness and time spent collecting water can influence economic performance and public sector functioning.

Recommendations

1. Infrastructure and Technical Solutions

Strengthening physical water infrastructure is essential to ensure a reliable and climate-resilient water supply in Myanmar. At the national and municipal levels, governments should invest in dual-purpose water infrastructure systems that provide reliable water services while enhancing resilience to natural hazards. This includes the protection and management of raw water sources, as well as investment in water treatment plants, storage facilities, pumping stations, and distribution networks, supported by robust monitoring, control, and maintenance systems.

In rural and drought-prone regions, decentralized technical solutions, often implemented through community initiatives or by NGOs, can play a key role. Solar-powered water systems are particularly suitable in these areas, where solar panels can power groundwater pumps while reducing dependence on fuel. Rehabilitation of dug wells, including roofing, aprons, and proper drainage, can improve water quality and reduce contamination risks. In upland areas, gravity-flow systems that channel water from higher elevation streams into village storage tanks offer a low-cost and low-maintenance solution.

At the community and household levels, smaller-scale interventions can further enhance water security. These include rainwater harvesting systems, basic water treatment technologies such as chlorination, pond rehabilitation, restoration of wells and boreholes, salinity barriers in coastal areas, emergency water tankering, and improved household water storage facilities.

2. Institutional and Community Capacity

Infrastructure alone is insufficient without institutional and community capacity. At the community level, WASH education programs should be implemented in villages and schools to improve hygiene practices and safe water storage. Training residents in the operation and maintenance of water systems can strengthen local ownership and ensure long-term sustainability. At the governance level, decentralized water management should be strengthened at village and township levels through the establishment or reinforcement of local water management committees with clear responsibilities and accountability mechanisms. Restoring damaged public water systems is particularly critical in conflict-affected areas. Integrating water management planning into broader climate adaptation and environmental policies will further enhance resilience.

In addition, the governance bodies have to facilitate humanitarian access to ensure emergency WASH assistance reaches internally displaced and vulnerable populations. At the same time, INGOs should maintain engagement in Myanmar by adopting more adaptive and locally grounded approaches despite ongoing regulatory constraints and security risks. In particular, they should strengthen collaboration with civil society organisations, which have access and contextual knowledge to reach hard-to-reach and conflict-affected areas. INGOs should also support and accelerate the 2023 UN-led localization strategy by expanding consultation and support for locally led aid operations, thereby improving the effectiveness and reach of humanitarian assistance.

3. Financial Support

The national government should prioritise budget allocation for water infrastructure development, system maintenance, and rural water supply programs. Targeted subsidies can help vulnerable households overcome affordability barriers to safe water access. Public–private partnerships may mobilize additional resources to support water system expansion and service delivery. At the same time, international financial assistance should be adapted to the current operational context in Myanmar. Given existing governance and access constraints, reliance on traditional delivery channels alone may limit the effectiveness of aid distribution. Thus, donors should expand direct and flexible funding to civil society organisations, such as increased risk-sharing, simplified compliance requirements, and the use of pooled funding mechanisms to ensure that financial resources reach vulnerable populations more efficiently.

Conclusion

​​Water insecurity in Myanmar is a complex problem caused by environmental changes, social inequalities, and weak institutional systems. Climate change, groundwater depletion, and disasters have made water sources less reliable, while unequal infrastructure and conflict have made access more difficult. The withdrawal or reduced presence of international actors and ongoing access restrictions have also limited the delivery of WASH services, especially for vulnerable communities.

To address this crisis, practical and coordinated actions are needed. Improving climate-resilient infrastructure, promoting community-based water systems, and supporting civil society organisations can help improve access to safe water. At the same time, more flexible and localised funding approaches are important to ensure that assistance reaches those most in need. Without sustained efforts, water insecurity will continue to affect human well-being and future development in Myanmar.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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When Myanmar’s military seized power on 1 February 2021, the immediate consequences were political: mass protests, violent repression, and the collapse of a fragile democratic transition. Five years later, the deeper consequences are institutional. Myanmar is now experiencing a prolonged polycrisis, armed conflict, economic contraction, displacement, and humanitarian emergency, but at its core lies a crisis of governance.

Key Takeaways

• After five years of the military coup, Myanmar’s healthcare system has shifted from a fragile public service to a fragmented and increasingly privatised survival mechanism.

• Service disruption, funding instability, and institutional fragmentation have weakened Myanmar’s healthcare system.

• Workforce depletion, declining immunisation coverage, and rising out-of-pocket spending demonstrate a reversal in progress toward Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3).

Healthcare provides one of the clearest indicators of governance failure. Before the coup, Myanmar’s health system was fragile but was gradually improving. Public spending remained limited, yet vaccination coverage was rising, HIV and tuberculosis (TB) programs were expanding, and international partnerships were strengthening service delivery. The trajectory was uneven, but it was forward. Since 2021, that trajectory has reversed.

Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3) commits states to universal health coverage, financial risk protection, and epidemic preparedness. These are governance obligations requiring institutional capacity, fiscal prioritisation, territorial coordination, and professional autonomy. Myanmar’s post-coup experience demonstrates how quickly these foundations can erode.

This regression can be understood through three interrelated governance failures:

(1) collapse of access to healthcare;

(2) disruption of financing and financial risk protection; and

(3) institutional and territorial fragmentation driven by Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) participation and mass displacement.

1. Collapse of Access: Institutional Erosion and Service Breakdown

The most visible consequence of post-coup governance failure is declining access to healthcare. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), escalating conflict, displacement, and economic collapse have created a severe humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, with 19.9 million people requiring humanitarian assistance, including 12.9 million in need of humanitarian health services (WHO, 2025). Conflict-affected areas, including Sagaing, Rakhine, Kachin, Kayah, and northern Shan, face repeated disruptions to clinics, referral systems, and outreach services. Since 2021, approximately 433 attacks on healthcare facilities have been reported, according to WHO surveillance data (WHO, 2024).

Workforce depletion has critically weakened service capacity. Before the coup, Myanmar’s health workforce density stood at 17.8 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 population (WHO, 2024), already below the WHO benchmark of 22.8 required for SDG-compatible service coverage. By 2022-2023, reported figures fell to roughly 1.01 doctors and 1.96 nurses per 10,000 population (WHO, 2024). Nursing availability declined by an estimated 73 percent between 2019 and 2022 (WHO, 2024). These figures indicate systemic incapacity rather than temporary disruption.

Preventive services have similarly regressed. WHO and UNICEF WUENIC estimates show DTP3 coverage declining to around 48 percent in 2021 before partially recovering to 76 percent in 2023 (WHO, 2024). WHO estimates that around 1.2 million children in Myanmar are zero-dose or under-immunised, reflecting major disruptions to routine immunisation services following the political crisis (WHO, 2023). The WHO Global TB Reports (2024) document declines in TB case detection following the coup compared to pre-2021 notification levels. HIV testing and treatment continuity were also disrupted in conflict-affected regions (WHO, 2024f). Treatment interruptions increase risks of transmission and drug resistance, undermining previous gains.

Analyses in global health journals similarly highlight how conflict, health worker participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement, and infrastructure disruptions have collectively weakened routine healthcare delivery (BMJ Global Health, 2026; The Lancet, 2024).

2. Funding Disruption and the Re-Privatisation of Health Risk

Healthcare sustainability depends on financial protection as much as service availability. The 2023 Myanmar National Health Accounts show that 71 percent of total health expenditure was out-of-pocket (WHO, 2024g), among the highest in Southeast Asia. While public spending remained limited, international funding played a stabilising role in HIV, TB, malaria, and immunisation programs.

Several international humanitarian programmes have also been disrupted or suspended since the coup. Before 2021, international NGOs played a central role in supporting Myanmar’s health sector, particularly in HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria control, and maternal and child health services. However, political instability, operational restrictions, and new registration requirements have forced many organisations to scale back or suspend activities. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that Myanmar’s national HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis programmes effectively “shut down” after the coup as the public health system collapsed and partnerships with the Ministry of Health were disrupted (The New Humanitarian, 2021). Although other funding did not disappear entirely, coordination weakened, and long-term system strengthening stalled.

Simultaneously, domestic fiscal priorities shifted toward security expenditures amid economic contraction and declining tax revenues (WHO, 2024).Investigative reporting by Athan News has highlighted how public hospitals increasingly require patients to purchase medicines and supplies externally. The economic crisis has sharply increased household vulnerability. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study warned that the combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 military coup could push up to 25 million people, nearly half of Myanmar’s population, below the national poverty line, reversing over a decade of poverty reduction (UNDP, 2021). When 76 percent of health expenditure was already out-of-pocket prior to the coup, further fiscal retrenchment deepens financial vulnerability and shifts health risk directly onto households (WHO, 2024g). Financial risk protection, central to SDG 3, has eroded, widening inequality.

3. CDM Participation, Displacement, and Territorial Fragmentation

Institutional fragmentation represents the third structural driver of health system unsustainability. Following the coup, an estimated half of the public-sector health workforce participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), withdrawing from state institutions in protest against military rule (Amnesty International, 2021). The mass walkout of doctors, nurses, teachers, and other civil servants significantly disrupted public service delivery, including healthcare, education, and social welfare systems.

While the CDM has been a central component of resistance to military rule, the withdrawal of large numbers of public-sector professionals created additional pressures on already fragile service systems. These disruptions occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and amid escalating conflict, further constraining the health sector’s ability to maintain routine services and emergency response capacity. At the same time, conflict-related displacement has fragmented service delivery across regions, weakening referral systems and continuity of care.

Moreover, procurement systems and medical supply chains have deteriorated due to import licensing delays, transport insecurity, and currency instability. Restrictions on transporting medicines and medical equipment to conflict-affected and opposition-controlled areas have further complicated humanitarian delivery, particularly in territories outside military control. These constraints have contributed to shortages of essential medicines, including tuberculosis drugs and other life-saving treatments.

Conflict escalation has displaced millions. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 19.9 million people were estimated to require humanitarian assistance in 2025, including approximately 4 million internally displaced persons and 1.5 million refugees (OCHA, 2024). Displacement disrupts vaccination records, HIV and TB treatment adherence, maternal health services, and chronic disease management. Health systems depend on territorial coherence, stable populations, referral networks, and administrative coordination. In Myanmar, territorial control is increasingly fragmented, and service provision varies significantly by region.

Long-established ethnic health systems in areas administered by organisations such as the Kachin Independence Organization and the Karen National Union have historically maintained parallel healthcare governance structures and community-based service networks. These systems have helped sustain basic services in some conflict-affected regions. However, newly contested territories under resistance forces such as the Sagaing Region aligned with the National Unity Government often lack comparable institutional infrastructure (BMJ Global Health, 2026). In such areas, healthcare provision frequently relies on mobile clinics, community volunteers, or humanitarian actors, resulting in uneven coverage and limited continuity of care (BMJ Global Health, 2026; WHO, 2024). Prolonged fragmentation risks institutionalising geographic inequalities in access to healthcare.

Implications and Recommendations

Myanmar’s health crisis demonstrates that humanitarian assistance cannot substitute for governance recovery. Sustainable progress toward SDG 3 requires restoring institutional functionality alongside emergency support.

Protection of health workers and facilities must be prioritised to safeguard service continuity and professional autonomy. Financial risk protection mechanisms require stabilisation through accountable pooled financing that supports essential medicines and primary care, particularly for displaced and low-income populations. Strengthening transparency and oversight in health financing and procurement is also critical. Even before the coup, Myanmar’s health system faced governance challenges, including weak regulatory oversight and risks of corruption in procurement and pharmaceutical supply chains. Since 2021, institutional collapse and severe staff shortages have further weakened accountability, with reports indicating that patients in some public hospitals have been forced to pay informal fees or bribes to access treatment and basic services (Frontier Myanmar, 2023). Finally, adaptive coordination among state, ethnic, and community-based providers is necessary to mitigate fragmentation and expand equitable coverage.

Health outcomes will remain the clearest indicator of whether governance recovery is taking place. Without institutional resilience, fiscal prioritisation of social sectors, and territorial coordination, healthcare will continue shifting from a public good to a private burden borne disproportionately by the poor and displaced.

References

Amnesty International Thailand. (2021). After coup, Myanmar military puts chokehold on people’s basic needs.

BMJ Global Health. (2026). Health system disruption and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.

Frontier Myanmar. (2024). Myanmar’s public hospitals are failing their patients.

Human Rights Watch. (2025). Myanmar: Junta assault on health care hinders quake response.

Insecurity Insight. (2022). Myanmar: Attacks on health care in 2021 – Factsheet.

The Lancet. (2024). Health and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup.

The New Humanitarian. (2025). Myanmar healthcare and disease prevention are neglected casualties of war.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2021). COVID-19, coup d’état and poverty: Compounding negative shocks and their impact on human development in Myanmar.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2024). Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2023). Decreasing zero-dose children threefold amidst pandemic and political unrest in Myanmar.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024a). Myanmar External Public Health Situation Analysis.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024b). Global tuberculosis report 2024. Geneva: WHO.

Frontier Myanmar. (2023). “No remedy”: A broken public health system fosters neglect and corruption.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024c). Global Health Expenditure Database: National Health Accounts country profile.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Myanmar’s ongoing polycrisis has accelerated inflation and poverty, placing growing pressure on households and increasing the urgent need for inclusive recovery and social protection measures.

Key Takeaways

1. Myanmar’s post-2021 polycrisis has driven persistently high inflation, weakening household incomes and purchasing power.

2. Inflation reflects structural problems in fiscal management, currency policy, trade systems, and political instability. At the same time, rising living costs have forced households to rely on harmful coping strategies that weaken their long-term economic resilience.

3. Without coordinated reforms and stronger social investment, Myanmar risks long-term poverty and inequality.

Nature of the Polycrisis (Post-2021 Context)

Since 2021, Myanmar has been experiencing a complex “polycrisis” driven by overlapping political, economic, social, and environmental shocks. Political instability and armed conflict have weakened public institutions and disrupted markets. The COVID-19 pandemic further strained already fragile health and education systems. At the same time, forced conscription, insecurity, and limited job opportunities have encouraged young and skilled workers to migrate, leading to serious human capital loss.

By 2024–2025, around half of the population was living below the poverty line, with another one-third close to it. Electricity access fell below 50 percent, while agricultural productivity declined due to rising input costs and restricted market access. Environmental degradation also increased climate risks. As incomes fell, households increasingly relied on selling assets and reducing consumption. These coping strategies have become long-term survival mechanisms rather than temporary responses, indicating deep fragility as a system.

Inflation in Myanmar

Inflation has been one of the defining features of Myanmar’s economic crisis. In 2023 and 2024, inflation remained extremely high, reaching nearly 30 percent year-on-year. By October 2024, end-period inflation stood at 29.7 percent. From April 2025, inflation began to ease as the kyat strengthened and food supply conditions improved. By October 2025, year-on-year inflation had declined to 19.8 percent, while average inflation fell from 27.9 percent in 2024 to 23.1 percent in 2025. This decline was driven mainly by slower food inflation, supported by humanitarian assistance and tighter price controls. At the same time, continued economic cooperation with China, including project financing and alternative financial arrangements after the 2021 coup, has provided the military government with an additional source of external funding despite Western sanctions. However, non-food inflation remained high, especially in energy, health, and transport, reflecting ongoing import restrictions and conflict-related disruptions. Overall, inflation has moderated from its peak but remains structurally elevated.

Several structural factors explain this pattern. First, monetary financing has fueled inflation. In 2023, two-thirds of the budget deficit was financed by the Central Bank of Myanmar, with the deficit reaching 5.6 percent of GDP. This expanded the money supply without corresponding growth in production. Second, supply constraints reduced the availability of goods. Import restrictions, conflict-related transport disruptions, and energy shortages limited both domestic and external supplies. Third, policy responses were largely ineffective. Price controls failed to manage inflation and instead created shortages, while the issuance of high-denomination notes in 2023 weakened public confidence in monetary management. Finally, depreciation of the kyat increased import costs, transmitting currency instability into higher domestic prices.

Together, these factors show that inflation in Myanmar reflects a combination of fiscal weakness, supply disruptions, and policy distortions rather than short-term market fluctuations.

Effects on Households

Inflation has severely affected household welfare, mainly because incomes have not kept pace with rising prices. In 2023, 57 percent of households reported no income growth, and 30 percent reported declines. Real household income fell by 15 percent between 2022 and 2023, while median incomes remained close to survival levels. Job losses, business decline, and farm disruptions were key causes. Informal employment increased, and job quality deteriorated, reversing earlier economic progress. The minimum wage has remained unchanged since 2018.

At the same time, prices of basic goods rose sharply. Food inflation reached 39 percent in late 2024. Non-food inflation was also high, especially in health, transport, and energy. Conflict-affected regions faced higher inflation due to transport disruptions and market fragmentation.

Urban households faced heavy cost burdens. Rent rose by 24.6 percent, petrol prices increased by 44 percent between Q4 of 2023 and 2024, and city inflation ranged between 21 and 26 percent. In cities, prices increased more rapidly than in rural areas because businesses faced higher transport and operating costs, while the arrival of displaced people also raised demand for housing, food, and services. Urban consumption fell by nearly 20 percent between 2017 and 2023. In March 2026, the military government introduced an even-odd” licensing scheme driving rule for private vehicles to conserve fuel amid global supply disruptions linked to conflict in the Middle East. This policy suggests limited fuel reserves and could further increase transport costs and inflationary pressure in Myanmar.

Rural households were affected by declining agricultural viability. Agricultural employment fell from 43 percent to 34 percent, while rising input costs reduced farm incomes. Rural consumption declined by 6 percent.

Marginalised communities experienced frequent shortages, displacement, and restricted market access. Low-income households across all areas lacked savings and secondary incomes. Overall, inflation has deepened inequality and weakened household resilience.

Coping Strategies

As economic pressure increased, households relied more on negative coping strategies. Many reduced their food intake and cut spending on health and education. Among the poorest households, 42 percent reported eating less. These practices weakened nutrition and human capital development.

Savings were rapidly depleted. By late 2024, only 20 percent of households had any savings or bank deposits. Informal borrowing became widespread. About 64 percent of loans came from relatives and friends, while 22 percent came from moneylenders who usually charge high rates. Most loans were used for food and health expenses, indicating distress borrowing. Many households sold productive assets such as land, bicycles, and tools, reducing their future earning capacity.

As financial pressure increased, some households turned to risky income-generating activities, with about 5 percent reporting engagement in such strategies nationwide. Economic stress has also been linked to rising drug and alcohol use, domestic and gender-based violence, and increased vulnerability among adolescents and young people, who face greater risks of harmful behaviours due to disrupted education and limited job opportunities.

Migration became one of the most important coping mechanisms. Around 10 percent of households sent migrants in 2024, and about 3.7 million Myanmar migrants lived in Thailand. Migrants to Thailand and Malaysia earned two to three times domestic wages, while those in Japan and Korea earned much more. The introduction of compulsory military service in 2024 has also accelerated outward migration, as many young people left the country to avoid conscription. Remittances supported about 7.5 percent of households and improved nutrition. However, forced currency conversion and taxation reduced net benefits and encouraged informal transfers.

Overall, while these coping strategies help households survive immediate shocks, they are largely unsustainable and weaken long-term resilience.

Consequences

The combined effects of inflation and conflict have severely damaged health, nutrition, and education. Many households reduced meals, relied on cheaper food, or borrowed food. Around 25 percent of households experienced acute food insecurity in early 2024. Adult diet quality deteriorated, and more than 20 percent of children had inadequate diets. Unmet healthcare needs reached 8.1 percent nationally and over 14 percent in conflict-affected regions. Limited access to medicines and medical services further increased health risks.

Education has also been deeply affected. In 2023/24, 21 percent of children were out of school. Low-income households spent only 2 percent of their budgets on education, compared with 4 percent among wealthier households. Financial pressure forced many families to withdraw children from school.

As household incomes declined, some families relied on child labour and early marriage to cope with financial stress. The introduction of the conscription law has further intensified these pressures, as some families arrange early or forced marriages for young women to avoid military service obligations. Informal and community-based education systems struggled with limited resources and security risks. These trends have reduced learning outcomes and skill development.

Together, deteriorating health and education outcomes threaten Myanmar’s future productivity and social mobility. Loss of human capital increases long-term vulnerability and limits the country’s capacity to recover from a crisis.

Poverty Trap

Myanmar’s poverty levels have risen sharply over the past decade due to overlapping political and economic crises. By the end of 2023, 49.7 percent of the population lived below the national poverty line, while another 25 percent remained just above it, meaning around 42 million people were living at or near subsistence levels. This marks a dramatic increase from 24.8 percent in 2017. Child poverty has also worsened, with 53 percent of children, about 8.9 million, living in poverty by 2022.

At the same time, the poverty gap has widened, showing that poor households are becoming more vulnerable. Reduced spending on health, education, and nutrition is reinforcing long-term disadvantage, while the middle class continues to shrink. Without the post-2021 crisis, poverty would likely have been close to 11 percent in 2023, with around eight million fewer poor people (WB04). These trends indicate that Myanmar is entering a self-reinforcing poverty trap.

Conclusion

Between 2021 and 2026, Myanmar’s economy has been shaped by structural inflation, currency instability, and prolonged trade disruptions. These pressures have weakened household resilience and accelerated the erosion of human capital. As incomes stagnated and prices surged, families increasingly relied on negative coping strategies that undermine long-term well-being. The combined effects of poor governance, policy distortions, and conflict have reinforced poverty and inequality, pushing many households into a cycle of vulnerability.

These trends not only deepen domestic hardship but also highlight major challenges in achieving SDG2 (Zero Hunger), SDG3 (Health), SDG4 (Education), and SDG8 (Decent Work). Without political stabilisation and institutional reforms, as well as improvements in monetary governance, exchange rate management, trade facilitation, social protection, and sustained investment in health and education, Myanmar will face prolonged stagnation and intergenerational poverty.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

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Education in rural Myanmar remains a critical challenge shaped by limited resources, language barriers, economic hardship, and unequal access to qualified teachers, yet it also presents an important opportunity for youth-led initiatives to drive inclusive and sustainable development.

Quality education has long been a central challenge in rural Myanmar due to limited access to schools, a shortage of qualified teachers, and socioeconomic barriers. Myanmar has been struggling with political instability and educational disparities between rural and urban areas. Achieving quality education is fundamental to long-term development and inclusive growth. There are many reasons why students in rural areas cannot access quality education.

Firstly, quality education is strongly reliant on teachers’ competence and the effective allocation of resources. The Myanmar Ministry of Education reports that over 20% of rural teachers are unqualified and often lack formal teacher training or university degrees. Most rural teachers are local people who finished only secondary education. They only use the rote learning method rather than a critical one.

According to administrators from ethnic education departments, language barriers affect the quality of education. Burmese is the only language used in the national curriculum. As a result, ethnic students find it difficult to learn lessons, lag behind peers, and lose interest in learning.

Another one is the economic barrier in rural areas. Economic barriers deeply influence access to quality education in rural areas. Even though learning at a government school is officially free, families struggle with indirect expenses such as uniforms and school supplies. And also, parents with a low education level focus more on immediate survival ahead of long-term education.

Infrastructure shortage is another critical barrier to providing quality education. Many rural schools lack basic facilities such as teaching aids, electricity, clean water, sanitary facilities and safe classrooms. According to the World Bank’s report, more than 70% of rural people lack electricity, which makes it impossible for teachers to use contemporary teaching resources, and for students, it can limit their study time and academic advancement.

Quality education aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 4 and youth participation in local communities are an important part of solving these problems. Young people can be leaders, mentors and innovators who can change educational disparities. Youth-led initiatives use critical methods and localised curriculum textbooks and make education more relevant. Youth can create a robust education system that supports social empowerment and quality education by making investments in youth-led initiatives.

There are 3 ways to strengthen quality education by focusing on sustainable strategies for youth-led initiatives. These are (1) Developing youth leadership and capacities, (2) Encouraging volunteerism and community- based learning, (3) Incorporating youth voices into national education.

Strengthening youth leadership through training in digital literacy and sustainable development would equip them to contribute more effectively. Capacity-building programs offer leadership, educational innovation and social awareness. Expanding youth-led digital literacy initiatives can accelerate community-based learning solutions. Linking youth-led education to livelihood opportunities can increase family support for schooling and reduce the number of students who drop out because of economic barriers.

Volunteer networks, community-based training facilities, and youth-led non-governmental organisations are essential for long-term educational growth. These organisations have successfully reached out-of-school children. However, their long-term impact is still limited by their lack of government recognition. In order to formalise their contributions, non-formal education programs, civil society, and government agencies should work together more closely through certification frameworks, resource support, and policy integration.

To ensure equitable and culturally relevant education in rural Myanmar, it is crucial to invest in young educators, especially those from ethnic minority backgrounds. Both the demand for instruction that respects language and cultural diversity and the lack of trained teachers can be addressed by funding teacher training programs for these young people. Schools that prioritise mother-tongue-based multilingual education (MTB-MLE) and participatory teaching methods tend to achieve higher student engagement. Myanmar may foster a cycle of long-term local leadership and educational resilience by allowing young educators to serve in their own communities.

By establishing Youth Advisory Councils within the Ministry of Education, composed of representatives from diverse regions and ethnic groups, it would help a lot for educational disparities. These councils would offer suggestions for policy implementation, teacher preparation, and curriculum development. Youth representatives could be part of local village education committees that serve as a contact between local government, parents, and schools. This participative approach guarantees the lived reality of youth in rural and conflict-affected areas.

Empowering youth in rural areas is an investment for the country’s long-term stability. Youth engagement offers a potential way for advancing quality education and achieving the broader vision of an inclusive, resilient, and sustainably governed society.

Thiri San Min holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from East Yangon University. She is currently researching the Belt and Road Initiative and its impacts on Myanmar.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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In the Rohingya refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, education remains trapped between emergency relief and long-term sustainability, leaving an entire generation uncertain about its future.

Only a limited amount of education is available in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. For more than a million displaced people, learning has become fragile, erratic, and uncertain. Although education in refugee settings is often discussed as a humanitarian issue, it is fundamentally a sustainability concern. Without access to high-quality, continuous education, entire generations risk being excluded from sustainable development, deepening inequality and instability far beyond the camps.

Education directly supports the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 4 (Quality Education) and Sustainable Development Goal 10 (Reduced Inequalities). However, budget cuts, structural disparities in learning levels, and policy restrictions continue to limit Rohingya children’s access to education. These barriers not only deprive children of their rights but also weaken the long-term resilience of displaced communities.

Two primary education systems are operating in the camps. The first consists of community-based schools run informally by Rohingya teachers during early morning and evening hours. These classes are often led by instructors who either developed their skills within the camps or previously taught in Myanmar. Families typically pay nominal fees. Although these schools are unlicensed, underfunded, and lack official certification, they sometimes offer instruction using the Myanmar curriculum up to Grades 10 or even 12.

Alongside them are learning centres supported by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and funded by local partners and international donors such as UNICEF. Some centres follow in-house programs focused on foundational literacy and life skills, while others use the Myanmar curriculum. These facilities are more structured, yet they generally provide education only up to lower secondary levels. Notably, there are no government-run schools, colleges, or universities operating within the camps. For most students who reach Grade 10, the educational pathway effectively ends.

This educational dead end significantly affects children’s motivation. Many begin school with aspirations of becoming doctors, engineers, teachers, or computer scientists. Over time, however, they realise that the system cannot support their ambitions. When education is not linked to viable opportunities, attendance declines, child labour increases, and early marriage, particularly among girls, becomes more common. Education shifts from being a pathway out of poverty to merely a temporary refuge from hardship.

Teacher recruitment and training further complicate the situation. In NGO-supported centres, teachers are hired by implementing organisations and paid through donor funding. Training is provided after recruitment, but it is often brief and inconsistent. Experienced educators are sometimes overlooked in favour of less qualified candidates due to administrative or regulatory constraints. As a result, teaching quality varies widely, and effective pedagogical methods, especially in science, mathematics, and digital skills, are not consistently applied.

From a sustainability perspective, this model is short-sighted. An education system that ends at basic literacy does not prepare young people for climate adaptation, sustainable livelihoods, or civic participation. Many young refugees express a strong interest in digital literacy, computer skills, vocational training, and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. These ambitions are not abstract; they reflect a genuine desire to contribute meaningfully to society if given the opportunity.

Investing in refugee education, therefore, is not charity; it is prevention. Education reduces dependency, mitigates social risks, and equips displaced populations to contribute to host communities and future reconstruction efforts. Reports from international organisations, including the United Nations and the World Bank, consistently demonstrate that education strengthens social cohesion and economic resilience, particularly in crisis-affected contexts.

To advance sustainability, education in refugee camps must evolve from an emergency response model to a long-term development strategy. This includes expanding secondary and post-secondary pathways, standardising teacher recruitment and training, integrating digital and vocational education, and recognising refugee-led initiatives as partners rather than temporary stopgaps. Donors and policymakers must align educational support with sustainability goals to ensure continuity rather than repeated cycles of disruption.

If sustainability means meeting present needs without compromising future generations, then denying refugee children access to quality education is inherently unsustainable. At its core, the Rohingya crisis is not only about displacement, but it is also about whether the global community is willing to invest in human potential where it has been most disrupted. Education is not a luxury reserved for stable societies; it is the foundation of stability itself.

Ata Ullah is a Rohingya refugee researcher, writer, and education advocate based in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. He is the founder of the NextGen Rohingya Network, focusing on refugee education, sustainability, and youth advocacy.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Strengthening community-based recycling and integrating the informal sector is key to improving waste management and advancing a circular economy in Myanmar.

Myanmar has been facing the challenge of solid waste management, especially plastic, which is flowing into landfills, waterways, and informal channels at a concerning pace. At the same time, in the current context of economic decline, political instability, and polycrisis, the practice of “repair, reuse, recycle” is familiar to many Myanmar households and communities.

These everyday practices, such as repairing old appliances, reusing containers, or selling recyclables to small junk shops, reflect long-standing cultural habits shaped by necessity. Because of weak national infrastructure and governance, community-level recycling systems can be a viable route for waste governance and circular economy growth. However, with limited infrastructure, heavy reliance on the informal sector, and a fragile institutional environment, building strong community recycling systems in Myanmar is urgent and necessary for sustainable development.

Current State of Community Recycling in Myanmar

Municipal waste collection in Myanmar remains inconsistent, particularly outside major cities, and many wastes end up in unmanaged dumps or open landfills. Recycling is mostly driven by the informal sector, and waste-pickers, scrap collectors, and small buyers dominate the system. For example, according to a survey in 2017 in Yangon, approximately 86 tonnes of recyclable materials were recovered daily from landfill sites, and 57% was glass, 15% paper/cardboard, 13% cardboard/paper, 7% plastic and 7% tin cans (Premakumara et al., 2017).

Neighbourhood drop-off points and small junk shops are common community-level practices, but there is no standardised recycling system applied across townships. Data on recycling volumes and source-segregation are scarce, making strategic planning difficult (Premakumara et al., 2017; Prevent Plastics Myanmar, 2021). Public awareness of waste sorting is low overall, although many households recognise high-value materials (such as aluminium cans, plastic bottles, cardboard) because they can be sold to informal collectors. This awareness of “value in waste” offers a foundation for community engagement.

Key Challenges

Weak infrastructure: Myanmar has very few dedicated materials-recovery facilities (MRFs) and limited municipal recycling services. Collection schedules are often unreliable, and transport vehicles and equipment are insufficient
Policy and enforcement gaps: Although some bans (for example, on thin plastic bags) exist in city areas, enforcement is weak, and incentives for households or communities are unclear. For example, the recycling value chain remains informal with little official policy integration (ECD & MONREC, 2018; Premakumara et al., 2017).

Informal sector vulnerabilities: While the informal waste-picker network is fundamental and contributes significantly to recycling, workers often face unsafe working conditions, unstable prices for recyclables, and a lack of social protections. A recent mapping in Yangon and Hpa-An found that waste-picker livelihoods depend heavily on fluctuating scrap values and minimal regulation (Win et al., 2024).

Social and behavioural barriers: Cultural habits such as dumping, burning or littering remain widespread in many communities. Convenience-driven disposal practices (throwing all waste into one bin) persist, and source separation is rarely practised. These habits hinder effective recycling at the community level.
Economic barriers: Community-led recycling projects receive limited financial support, and many recycling markets in Myanmar are low-profit, especially for plastic types with little resale value. For example, research notes that even though Myanmar’s informal sector achieves high rates of recovery for “valuable” materials, single-use plastics with low resale value often escape collection (Jeske, 2023).

Opportunities for Strengthening Community Systems

Integrate and recognise the informal sector: Recognising the role of informal actors is key. Policymakers should provide protective equipment, training programs, and partnerships between municipal authorities and waste-picker groups. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) highlights that recognising informal waste workers improves efficiency and inclusion of recycling systems (Chen, 2023).
Community-based collection models: Neighbourhood sorting centres, school or monastery-led recycling hubs, and incentive-based systems (points, rebates for recyclables) can encourage recycling locally. Because many households already resell high-value materials, a more formal collection network can build on this behaviour.
Improving public awareness: Campaigns targeted at the household and quarter level, and youth-led initiatives, can tap into Myanmar’s culture of reuse and repair (for example, repair shops for umbrellas or electronic appliances) and increase recycling habits. Since many communities already engage in reuse due to resource scarcity, this is an ideal environment for behaviour change.

Policy recommendations:
• Introduce local-level bylaws mandating separation at source, tailored to township realities.
• Offer financial incentives or subsidies to recycling SMEs to make community recycling viable.
• Provide subsidies for purchasing materials with recycled content, stimulating demand for recyclables and closing the loop.

Conclusion

Community-level recycling systems offer a strong entry point for Myanmar’s transition toward a circular economy and stronger waste governance in the current context of Myanmar. By establishing collection, sorting, and education in neighbourhoods and by integrating the informal sector into formal systems, Myanmar can build resilience despite its governance and infrastructure constraints. Strengthening these local systems also helps communities take ownership of environmental challenges at a time when national-level attention to waste management remains limited. Moreover, as economic pressures continue to shape household behaviour, community recycling can build on existing cultural practices of reuse and repair, making sustainability both practical and accessible. With inclusive policies, targeted investments, and local innovation, community recycling can scale up, offering a hopeful path forward for both people and the environment, even amid Myanmar’s ongoing uncertainties.

References:

Chen, S. (2023, December 28). Unsung Heroes: Four Things Policymakers Can Do to Empower Informal Waste Workers. UNDP. https://www.undp.org/blog/unsung-heroes-four-things-policymakers-can-do-empower-informal-waste-workers

ECD, & MONREC. (2018). National Waste Management Strategy and Master Plan for Myanmar (2018-2030). https://optoce.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Myanmar-National-Waste-Management-Strategy_Mar-2018.pdf

Jeske, F. (2023, March 10). Plastic Waste in Myanmar: How Poverty (Paradoxically) Can Drive Circularity. Regional Knowledge Centre for Marine Plastic Debris. https://rkcmpd-eria.org/zero-in-on-plastic/plastic-waste-in-myanmar-how-poverty-paradoxically-can-drive-circularity

Premakumara, D. G. J., Hengesbaugh, M., Onogawa, K., & Horizono, S. (2017). Waste Management in Myanmar: Current Status, Key Challenges and Recommendations for National and City Waste Management Strategies. United Nations Environment Programme.

Prevent Plastics Myanmar. (2021). Best Practices: Waste Management Systems in Myanmar. Prevent Plastic. https://preventplastics.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Waste-management-best-practices.Eng-.pdf

Win, N. N., Thu, Y., Yee, H. L., & Jeske, F. (2024). Waste Picker mapping in Myanmar. Thant Myanmar.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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This article explores Bangkok’s PM2.5 crisis, emphasising sustainable policies, clean transport, and community action to protect public health and urban resilience.

Background
The worldwide increase in urbanisation and industrial activity has made air pollution a major sustainability problem, endangering both environmental health and human health. The danger of PM2.5 arises because its tiny particles can penetrate deep into the lungs and bloodstream, causing severe respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. Bangkok illustrates this problem through its ongoing violation of international PM2.5 safety limits due to rising vehicle traffic, industrial activity, and rapid urban growth. The high pollution levels in the city threaten human health while damaging its long-term sustainability. Sustainable urban development depends on PM2.5 pollution control through unified policy efforts, technological advancements, and public participation. The city of Bangkok can build a sustainable future with improved health and environmental quality by successfully reducing PM2.5 pollution.

Why Air Quality Matters
A sustainable city needs to maintain clean air because it serves as the base for residents to live, work and breathe safely. The health of public populations depends on clean air, while urban communities need it to build sustainable economic and social systems. The presence of poor air pollution reveals multiple problems in transportation systems, urban planning and environmental justice systems, which create disproportionate harm to vulnerable communities. The protection of air quality enables sustainable cities to reach their climate action targets through the promotion of clean transportation systems and efficient urban development. The protection of clean air serves as a sustainability duty because it guarantees future generations will receive a habitable world instead of dealing with rising health expenses and environmental deterioration from present-day pollution.

Analysis of Current Approaches
Bangkok demonstrates recognition of air pollution problems through its management efforts, yet these initiatives have not produced substantial decreases in PM2.5 concentrations. The main source of Bangkok's pollution stems from vehicle emissions, which generate 60% of the total pollution. The city has established Euro V/VI engine upgrade programs and expanded emission checkpoint networks and low-emission zones, but these initiatives have not produced substantial results. The process of implementing higher emission standards has encountered multiple delays because of insufficient personnel, excessive vehicle numbers, and non-compliant drivers. The majority of polluting vehicles operate without facing any enforcement actions.
The construction and industrial sectors have established rules to manage dust and emissions, but their monitoring systems are unreliable, and new environmentally friendly technologies have not gained widespread acceptance. The combination of construction activities and factory operations produces major PM2.5 pollution events throughout the year, but these events become more severe during dry months because of reduced atmospheric dispersion.
The city of Bangkok works to establish permanent solutions through its electric vehicle promotion program and public transportation system improvements. The current lack of sufficient charging stations and insufficient mass transit coverage in various city areas hinders electric vehicle adoption. The growing public interest in sustainable transportation faces a major obstacle because people lack access to practical alternative transportation options.

The success of Bangkok's air quality policies depends on better enforcement, more defined rules, additional infrastructure funding, and public participation instead of depending on regulations alone.

Solutions
The solution to Bangkok's air quality problems needs transportation solutions, urban planning solutions, and community participation to achieve lasting improvements. The city needs to transform its transportation system because this approach will deliver the most significant results. The combination of financial benefits with defined rules and a complete electric vehicle charging system will help Bangkok residents switch from fossil fuel-based transportation to electric vehicles. The public transportation system needs enhancement through better connectivity for underserved areas and the adoption of electric buses and motorcycles to reduce private vehicle usage. The combination of safer cycling lanes with pedestrian-friendly infrastructure will promote low-emission travel while improving public health.

Sustainable urban planning stands as an essential factor for success. The implementation of expanded low-emission zones together with enhanced pollution controls in areas with high air pollution levels will help control the movement of vehicles that produce significant emissions. The implementation of stronger buffer zones between industrial facilities and residential areas protects residential areas from particulate pollution exposure. The implementation of these measures throughout Bangkok's urban development plan will maintain air quality protection as a fundamental element of the city's growth path.

Conclusion
The success of long-term sustainability depends on active involvement from both the public and essential stakeholders. The combination of environmental NGO partnerships with health impact education and awareness programs will help people understand the benefits of using cleaner transportation methods. The combination of vehicle scrapping rebates and technology adoption subsidies for households and businesses creates positive behavioural change. The combination of these coordinated efforts will enhance Bangkok's ability to create a sustainable urban space that promotes environmental health and community wellness.

This article is based on my public policy and planning analysis titled ‘Better Policies, Cleaner Air: Strengthening Bangkok Metropolitan Area’s Pollution Control’ (2025).

Dr Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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