Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar’s SMEs are navigating an economy shaped by inflation, power shortages, trade disruptions, labor migration, and policy uncertainty, forcing many businesses to prioritise survival over growth.

• Despite these challenges, SMEs have demonstrated resilience through practical adaptation strategies, including alternative energy use, flexible workforce arrangements, informal financing, and digital innovation.

• Strengthening SME resilience through supportive policies, improved infrastructure, access to finance, and capacity-building initiatives will be critical for Myanmar’s long-term economic sustainability and recovery.

1. Introduction

Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has faced a prolonged polycrisis characterised by political instability, inflation, currency depreciation, power shortages, trade disruptions, and labor migration. More recently, fuel supply disruptions linked to the Middle East conflict have further increased production and transportation costs, amplifying existing economic vulnerabilities. While large firms may possess greater financial capacity to absorb shocks, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been disproportionately affected. Yet despite operating in an environment where uncertainty has become the norm, many SMEs continue to adapt and survive. This article examines how Myanmar’s SMEs are coping with an economy of uncertainty.

2. Myanmar’s Current Economic Situation

Although Myanmar’s economy showed signs of a modest recovery in early 2026, the improvement remains fragile amid ongoing political instability and economic uncertainty. Inflation rose to 24.6 percent in April 2026, driven largely by higher fuel and transportation costs, while the depreciation of the kyat increased the price of imported goods and raw materials. At the same time, foreign exchange controls and import restrictions have made it more difficult for businesses to access essential inputs, while conflict-related disruptions continue to raise logistics costs and delay deliveries. Businesses also face persistent electricity shortages, forcing many to rely on generators and alternative energy sources, which increase operating costs. Meanwhile, labor migration, skills shortages, and compulsory military service have made recruitment increasingly difficult. Together, these challenges have pushed many SMEs to prioritize survival and adaptation over growth.

3. The Role of SMEs in Myanmar’s Economy

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are widely recognized as the backbone of Southeast Asian economies, accounting for over 90 percent of businesses and employing a large share of the workforce. In Myanmar, SMEs make up 94 percent of enterprises and between 52 and 97 percent of total employment. Beyond their economic contribution, SMEs play an important social role by creating livelihoods, supporting local communities, and generating income opportunities in both urban and rural areas.

However, despite their importance, SMEs continue to face significant structural challenges. Previous studies have highlighted constraints such as limited access to finance, outdated technology, low productivity, and poor market access. Moreover, formal policy support for SMEs remains limited, reducing their ability to reach their full economic potential.

4. Challenges Facing SMEs

Since 2021, Myanmar’s SMEs have faced overlapping economic, operational, workforce, and financial challenges. Unlike large corporations, SMEs are often more vulnerable to external shocks and have fewer resources to absorb rising costs.

Inflation, currency depreciation, and fuel price increases have significantly raised production and transportation costs, while weaker consumer purchasing power has reduced demand and squeezed profit margins. At the same time, frequent power outages, import restrictions, and supply chain disruptions continue to increase operational uncertainty and business expenses.

International sanctions have added further pressure on some SMEs. Although sanctions primarily target military-linked entities, Myanmar’s military-dominated economy means that restrictions on financial transactions, trade, and supply chains can also create unintended spillover effects for civilian-led SMEs. These indirect impacts make it more difficult for businesses to access foreign currency, credit, imported inputs, and international markets, placing additional pressure on firms with limited financial resources.

Labor shortages have become another major challenge, driven by skills gaps, outward migration, and compulsory military service, resulting in higher recruitment and training costs. Access to finance also remains limited, as many SMEs face difficulties obtaining affordable credit and must cope with ongoing liquidity constraints.

Together, these challenges have created a business environment where many SMEs prioritise survival and continuity rather than growth and expansion.

5. Resilience of SMEs in Myanmar

Despite operating in an increasingly uncertain environment, many Myanmar SMEs have demonstrated remarkable resilience by adapting their business models and day-to-day operations. Rather than pursuing expansion, many firms have focused on maintaining continuity, preserving cash flow, and responding flexibly to changing circumstances.

5.1 Energy Adaptation

Frequent power outages have forced businesses to invest in alternative energy sources such as diesel generators and off-grid solar systems. In October 2025, approximately 42 percent of firms’ electricity consumption came from diesel generators and off-grid power sources. While these investments increase operating costs, they enable businesses to continue production and maintain essential services during prolonged outages.

5.2 Workforce Adaptation

To cope with labor shortages caused by outward migration, skills mismatches, and compulsory military service, many SMEs have adjusted how they manage their workforce. As the labor market shifts toward more informal, part-time, and casual employment, particularly in urban areas, firms have adapted by relying on more flexible labor arrangements to maintain business operations. Many businesses have also raised wages and provided short-term training to attract and retain workers, despite the additional costs involved. These workforce adjustments have enabled SMEs to sustain operations in an increasingly constrained labor market.

5.3 Financial Adaptation

Limited access to formal credit has encouraged SMEs to explore both formal and informal financing mechanisms. Following the 2025 earthquake, state-backed recovery loans and subsidised lending programs contributed to a significant increase in SME lending. At the same time, informal financing remains an important coping mechanism. Some firms rely on loans from friends and family, while many businesses facing cash-flow shortages use personal networks to sustain operations. These informal support systems often serve as an important source of resilience when formal financial channels are difficult to access.

5.4 Digital Adaptation

Myanmar’s digital economy has long been shaped by social commerce, with Facebook serving as a major platform for communication, marketing, and online sales. However, internet restrictions and the nationwide VPN block introduced in 2024 disrupted access to many digital platforms and reduced online business activity. In response, SMEs have diversified their digital presence by adopting alternative channels such as Telegram, Viber, and TikTok to reach customers and maintain sales. This ability to adapt to a rapidly changing digital environment highlights the flexibility and innovation that characterise many Myanmar SMEs.

Although these adaptive strategies have helped businesses survive, resilience should not be mistaken for recovery. Many firms continue to face significant constraints and remain focused on sustaining operations rather than pursuing long-term growth.

6. Recommendations

Strengthening the resilience of Myanmar’s SMEs requires coordinated efforts from businesses, policymakers, and development partners.

For SMEs

• SMEs should continue investing in energy diversification through solar power and other alternative energy solutions to reduce vulnerability to electricity disruptions.

• Businesses should also adopt digital tools such as e-commerce websites, chatbots, artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled customer service, and digital payment systems to improve efficiency and expand market access.

• Where possible, firms can strengthen local supply chains by sourcing raw materials domestically to reduce dependence on imports and foreign exchange volatility.

• Developing workforce retention strategies, including employee training, flexible working arrangements, and career development opportunities, may also help address labor shortages.

For Policymakers

• Policymakers should prioritise improving electricity infrastructure, facilitating access to affordable financing, and simplifying import and licensing procedures.

• Expanding vocational training programs and workforce development initiatives can help address skills shortages.

• In addition, targeted tax relief and regulatory support for SMEs could reduce operational burdens and encourage business investment.

For Development Partners and the International Community

• Development partners can support SME resilience through renewable energy programs, digital literacy initiatives, business continuity training, and concessional financing schemes.

• Technical assistance and capacity-building programs can also help SMEs strengthen their ability to adapt to future economic shocks while contributing to inclusive and sustainable economic development.

• Governments imposing sanctions, such as the EU and the United States, should strengthen targeted sanctions while minimizing unintended impacts on civilian-led SMEs by maintaining access to essential financial services, trade, and humanitarian support.

7. Conclusion

Myanmar’s SMEs support SDG 8 and SDG 9 by creating employment, sustaining livelihoods, and demonstrating innovation in the face of economic challenges. SMEs are operating under extraordinary economic pressures arising from inflation, energy shortages, trade disruptions, labor migration, and political uncertainty. Despite these challenges, many businesses continue to survive through adaptation, flexibility, and innovation. From investing in alternative energy sources to adopting new digital platforms and informal financing mechanisms, SMEs have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of prolonged uncertainty.

However, resilience should not be viewed as a substitute for structural economic reform. The future of Myanmar’s economic sustainability will depend not only on macroeconomic stabilisation and improved infrastructure but also on strengthening the resilience of SMEs.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Restrictions on menstrual products in resistance-controlled areas demonstrate how Myanmar’s polycrisis amplifies everyday vulnerabilities.

Key Takeaways

• Menstrual insecurity interacts with healthcare collapse, displacement, inflation, and gender inequality to create multidimensional social consequences.

• The impacts extend beyond hygiene, contributing to deteriorating health outcomes, economic hardship, reduced mobility, and social exclusion.

• Addressing menstrual health should be viewed as part of humanitarian resilience and social recovery rather than solely as a women’s health issue.

Myanmar’s ongoing conflict has led to a complex polycrisis in which political instability, armed violence, economic decline, humanitarian displacement, and institutional collapse reinforce one another. While much attention has focused on military operations, displacement, and humanitarian needs, less visible disruptions to everyday life are also producing significant social consequences.

One such example is the reported restriction on menstrual hygiene products in resistance-controlled areas. According to reports by The Guardian, Myanmar’s military authorities have increasingly restricted the transportation and distribution of menstrual products in conflict-affected regions, particularly in areas under resistance influence. Authorities have reportedly justified these restrictions by claiming that sanitary pads are being diverted to support resistance medical operations. Activists and humanitarian workers suggest that the measures form part of the broader “four cuts” strategy, which seeks to deprive resistance groups of supplies and support networks.

Although presented as a security measure, the reported restrictions have consequences that extend far beyond resistance actors. Limiting access to essential menstrual hygiene products disproportionately affects civilian women and girls, raising concerns regarding the protection of civilians and adherence to humanitarian principles. The policy also highlights how military decision-making can overlook gender-specific humanitarian needs. Despite the military’s public portrayal of itself as a modern professional force that includes women, senior command positions remain overwhelmingly occupied by men. This limited representation of women in senior leadership may contribute to the marginalisation of women’s health considerations in military planning, allowing policies to be implemented with insufficient attention to their gender-specific humanitarian consequences. More broadly, the reported restrictions illustrate how menstrual hygiene products, ordinarily recognised as essential health commodities, become reclassified as strategic resources during armed conflict, with disproportionate consequences for civilian women and girls.

Since August, the transportation of menstrual products has reportedly been blocked along certain routes connecting Sagaing Region and Mandalay. Although the military government has issued no official announcement, activists argue that the restrictions may be more widespread than publicly recognised due to the social stigma surrounding menstruation and the limited public discussion of menstrual health needs.

At first glance, the issue may appear to be a simple shortage of hygiene products. However, in a country already experiencing healthcare collapse, economic hardship, mass displacement, and weakened social protection systems, menstrual insecurity becomes much more than a supply problem. This article argues that menstrual product restrictions illustrate how Myanmar’s polycrisis amplifies existing vulnerabilities for women. By interacting with healthcare breakdown, inflation, displacement, and social stigma, menstrual insecurity becomes a multiplier of health risks, economic exclusion, reduced mobility, and social marginalisation for women and girls. Beyond its health and economic consequences, menstrual insecurity undermines the dignity of women and girls by depriving them of the privacy, safety, and confidence required to participate fully in everyday life.

Menstrual Insecurity and Healthcare Collapse

The first consequence emerges through the interaction between menstrual insecurity and Myanmar’s deteriorating healthcare system.

In many conflict-affected areas, healthcare infrastructure has been severely disrupted by armed conflict, displacement, and shortages of medical supplies. Clinics have been destroyed or abandoned, healthcare workers displaced, and access to medicine remains limited. Under these conditions, restrictions on menstrual products create risks that extend beyond discomfort. Women and girls who cannot access sanitary pads are often forced to rely on unsafe alternatives such as reused cloths, improvised materials, or prolonged use of disposable products. These coping strategies increase the likelihood of urinary tract infections (UTIs), reproductive tract infections, skin irritation, and other preventable health complications.

Under normal circumstances, many of these conditions are easily treatable. However, in areas where antibiotics, medical personnel, and healthcare facilities are scarce, minor infections can develop into chronic health problems. The resulting public health burden is therefore not caused by menstruation itself but by the interaction between material scarcity and healthcare collapse. This illustrates a defining characteristic of polycrisis: multiple vulnerabilities combine to produce outcomes more severe than any single crisis.

Menstrual Insecurity and Economic Hardship

The second pathway operates through Myanmar’s worsening economic crisis. Years of conflict, inflation, currency depreciation, and market disruption have significantly reduced household purchasing power. Within this environment, restrictions on menstrual products have contributed to supply shortages and increased dependence on informal markets.

Reports indicate that the price of sanitary pads has tripled from approximately 3,000 kyat to 9,000 kyat per packet. This exceeds Myanmar’s minimum daily wage of 7,800 kyat. For households already struggling to afford food, transportation, and basic necessities, menstrual products become increasingly inaccessible. As a result, many households in conflict-affected areas are forced to make impossible choices between purchasing menstrual hygiene products and meeting other essential needs, such as food. This dilemma highlights how the crisis compels families to choose between fundamental rights, including the right to adequate food and the right to health, dignity, and menstrual hygiene.

At the same time, Myanmar’s prolonged economic crisis has placed growing pressure on women to contribute financially through paid work alongside their male counterparts. Yet unlike many household expenses, menstrual health is both recurring and unavoidable. Women and girls cannot simply postpone the need for menstrual products during times of economic hardship. Consequently, families often resort to unsafe alternatives or divert scarce resources from other essential needs. For women who rely on paid employment to support their households, inadequate access to menstrual products may also affect their ability to work safely and consistently. What begins as a supply restriction therefore becomes a form of gendered economic exclusion, deepening existing inequalities while undermining household resilience during a period of economic crisis.

Menstrual Insecurity and Humanitarian Displacement

A third dimension of Myanmar’s polycrisis emerges through mass displacement. Since the 2021 military coup, millions of people have been internally displaced, many living in temporary shelters, monasteries, schools, or forest encampments with limited access to clean water, sanitation facilities, healthcare, and privacy. In these settings, menstrual hygiene management becomes not only a health issue but also a humanitarian and protection challenge.

Displacement disrupts the infrastructure needed for safe menstrual hygiene. Women and girls often lack private spaces to change menstrual products, wash reusable materials, or dispose of used pads safely. Many displaced women report waiting until nighttime to change menstrual products to avoid being seen, while others carry used pads with them because there is no safe place for disposal. Access to water is equally constrained, with some displaced communities prioritising drinking water over bathing or washing clothes. Although reusable menstrual products, such as menstrual cups and reusable cloth pads, are often promoted as sustainable alternatives during humanitarian crises, their use in Myanmar is constrained by both practical and sociocultural barriers. Limited access to clean water and private washing facilities makes it difficult to use and maintain reusable products safely, while persistent menstrual stigma, limited familiarity with menstrual cups, and cultural concerns surrounding their insertion reduce their acceptability among many women and girls. As a result, the loss of access to disposable menstrual products cannot be readily offset by switching to reusable alternatives.

These challenges are further intensified by conflict. Ongoing military operations, road blockages, and restrictions on humanitarian access make it difficult for aid organisations to deliver menstrual products to displaced communities. At the same time, insecurity limits women’s ability to travel to local markets even when products are available.

As a result, menstrual insecurity is intensified by the conditions of displacement. The interaction between forced displacement, inadequate sanitation, and restricted humanitarian access transforms what is ordinarily a manageable aspect of daily life into a multidimensional humanitarian challenge. This demonstrates how Myanmar’s displacement crisis magnifies the social consequences of menstrual product restrictions and further erodes the dignity, health, and well-being of women and girls.

Menstrual Insecurity, Social Exclusion, and the Invisibility of Crisis

The cumulative effects of healthcare collapse, economic hardship, and displacement ultimately extend beyond women’s physical well-being to shape their participation in social and civic life. Menstrual insecurity affects not only how women manage their health but also their ability to remain active within their communities. Many women report feeling embarrassed or lacking confidence to attend school, work, displacement camps, or community spaces because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate protection.

This reduction in mobility can limit participation in education, livelihood activities, community meetings, and political engagement. In resistance-controlled areas, where communities increasingly depend on collective action and mutual support to sustain basic services, women’s reduced participation weakens both individual agency and community resilience. This includes not only civilian participation in everyday governance and social support systems, but also the involvement of women engaged in political organizing and resistance activities, where sustained presence and mobility are essential. What begins as a shortage of menstrual products therefore evolves into a broader form of social exclusion.

Beyond its physical consequences, menstrual insecurity also imposes a significant psychological burden on women and girls living in conflict-affected areas. The constant uncertainty over whether menstrual products will be available each month, combined with the inability to manage menstruation safely and privately, can generate persistent stress and anxiety. Many women experience shame, fear of humiliation, and a loss of dignity when they are unable to manage menstruation according to accepted social norms. For women already coping with armed conflict, displacement, economic hardship, and the trauma of violence, menstrual insecurity becomes another source of emotional distress that compounds existing psychological pressures. Rather than being a temporary inconvenience, it contributes to a chronic state of insecurity in which women must continually worry about meeting a basic bodily need while navigating an increasingly precarious environment.

These challenges are further reinforced by persistent menstrual stigma. In many parts of Myanmar, menstruation remains a sensitive topic that is rarely discussed openly. Women often hesitate to request menstrual products from humanitarian volunteers because aid distribution is frequently managed by men, while camp managers may overlook menstrual needs altogether (see here). This cultural silence discourages women from seeking support, contributes to underreporting, and limits public recognition of menstrual insecurity as a humanitarian concern.

Menstrual Insecurity, Social Exclusion, and the Invisibility of Crisis

The cumulative effects of healthcare collapse, economic hardship, and displacement extend beyond women’s physical well-being to shape their participation in social, economic, and civic life. Menstrual insecurity affects not only how women manage their health but also their ability to remain active within their communities. Many women report feeling embarrassed or lacking confidence to attend school, work, displacement camps, or community spaces because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate menstrual protection.

Beyond its physical consequences, menstrual insecurity also imposes a significant psychological burden on women and girls living in conflict-affected areas. The constant uncertainty over whether menstrual products will be available each month, combined with the inability to manage menstruation safely and privately, can generate persistent stress and anxiety. Many women experience shame, fear of humiliation, and a loss of dignity when they are unable to manage menstruation according to accepted social norms. For women already coping with armed conflict, displacement, economic hardship, and the trauma of violence, menstrual insecurity becomes another source of emotional distress that compounds existing psychological pressures. Rather than being a temporary inconvenience, it contributes to a chronic state of insecurity in which women must continually worry about meeting a basic bodily need while navigating an increasingly precarious environment.

These psychological pressures often translate into behavioural changes that reduce women’s participation in everyday life. Women may avoid attending school, work, community meetings, displacement camp activities, or humanitarian distributions because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate protection. Such absences can limit participation in education, livelihood activities, community decision-making, and political engagement. In resistance-controlled areas, where communities increasingly depend on collective action and mutual support to sustain basic services, women’s reduced participation weakens both individual agency and community resilience. This includes not only civilian participation in local governance and social support networks but also the involvement of women engaged in political organising and resistance activities, where sustained mobility and physical presence are essential. For women participating in resistance movements, inadequate access to menstrual products may affect their ability to remain deployed, undertake physically demanding tasks, or participate consistently in political and military activities. What begins as a shortage of menstrual products therefore evolves into a broader form of social exclusion that limits women’s participation in both civilian and resistance contexts.

These challenges are further reinforced by persistent menstrual stigma. In many parts of Myanmar, menstruation remains a sensitive topic that is rarely discussed openly. Women often hesitate to request menstrual products from humanitarian volunteers because aid distribution is frequently managed by men, while camp managers may overlook menstrual needs altogether. This cultural silence not only discourages women from seeking assistance but also reinforces feelings of embarrassment and isolation, causing many women to internalise menstrual insecurity as a private problem rather than a humanitarian concern. As a result, menstrual needs remain underreported and frequently overlooked in humanitarian planning and response.

Within Myanmar’s polycrisis, stigma functions as a force multiplier. By obscuring the physical, psychological, and social consequences of menstrual insecurity, it allows armed conflict, displacement, healthcare collapse, and economic hardship to reinforce one another while limiting effective humanitarian intervention. Menstrual insecurity is therefore not simply a hidden health issue but a multidimensional humanitarian concern that undermines health, dignity, psychological well-being, and social participation. It illustrates how everyday forms of gendered vulnerability become embedded within broader patterns of conflict and social fragility.

Conclusion

The reported restriction of menstrual products in Myanmar’s resistance-controlled areas offers an important illustration of how polycrisis functions in practice. The issue is not merely a shortage of hygiene products. Rather, it reveals how multiple crises interact and reinforce one another.

Healthcare collapse transforms preventable infections into long-term health risks. Economic decline makes essential products unaffordable. Displacement intensifies difficulties in managing menstrual health safely. Social stigma keeps the resulting harms largely invisible. Together, these overlapping pressures create consequences that extend far beyond the original restriction.

Understanding menstrual insecurity through the lens of polycrisis highlights the importance of examining how everyday needs intersect with broader structural challenges. As Myanmar continues to navigate conflict, displacement, and economic instability, ensuring access to basic menstrual products should be recognised not only as a health concern but also as an essential component of social resilience, human dignity, and long-term recovery.

Policy Recommendations

Expand Community-Based Menstrual Health Support in Conflict Areas

Local civil society organisations, women’s groups, and humanitarian actors should strengthen the distribution of menstrual hygiene kits through community-based networks, particularly in displacement camps and conflict-affected areas. Where disposable products remain inaccessible, support should include reusable menstrual products alongside menstrual health education, soap, and sanitation materials to reduce health risks.

Strengthen International Advocacy And Cross-border Aid

The United Nations, ASEAN, and international partners should press Myanmar’s military to end inhumane restrictions on menstrual hygiene products and expand cross-border humanitarian assistance to ensure women and girls in conflict-affected areas have access to essential menstrual health supplies.

Integrate Menstrual Health into Humanitarian and Public Health Responses

Humanitarian agencies should treat menstrual health as an essential component of health and protection programming rather than a secondary hygiene concern. Menstrual products, antibiotics for common infections, and reproductive health services should be incorporated into emergency healthcare responses, especially in areas experiencing displacement and limited medical access.

Reduce Menstrual Stigma Through Community Awareness and Education

Local organisations, educators, and community leaders should promote menstrual health awareness to challenge stigma and improve access to information. Greater public discussion can help ensure that menstrual insecurity is recognised as a legitimate humanitarian and public health issue rather than a private concern that remains invisible in policy discussions.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Key Takeaways:

• AI’s greatest gender-related risk in Southeast Asia is its ability to amplify narratives that have historically been used to mobilise violence and silence women.

• Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia demonstrate how AI is entering digital environments where gender is already weaponised for conflict, political competition, and social control.

• Current AI governance frameworks pay insufficient attention to the intersection of AI, conflict, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) concerns.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence has quickly become a central component of Southeast Asia’s digital future. Governments across the region are investing in AI infrastructure, developing national AI strategies, and positioning emerging technologies as engines of economic growth. Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have all identified AI as a strategic priority, while regional organisations increasingly discuss AI governance in terms of innovation, competitiveness, and digital transformation (see here).

At the same time, concerns regarding the societal impacts of AI have expanded beyond technical questions of privacy and algorithmic bias. International organisations, researchers, and civil society groups have warned that AI systems can reinforce existing inequalities, including gender inequalities. Much of this discussion has focused on representation, fairness, and inclusion within AI systems. While these concerns are important, they overlook a critical dimension of the Southeast Asian context.

Across the region, AI is not entering politically neutral environments. Instead, it is being introduced into information ecosystems shaped by conflict, polarisation, disinformation, and increasingly sophisticated forms of digital political competition (see here). In these environments, gender is not simply a social category affected by technological change. Rather, gender often functions as a political instrument through which actors mobilize support, construct threats, and undermine opponents.

This distinction matters because the most significant risk associated with AI may not be that it creates entirely new forms of gendered harm. Rather, AI may amplify existing practices through which gender has long been weaponized within conflict and political struggles. For instance, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia illustrate how this process is already unfolding across Southeast Asia.

Myanmar: When Gender Becomes a Conflict Narrative

Myanmar demonstrates that gender can play a central role in how conflict narratives are constructed and legitimised. Much of the international discussion surrounding Myanmar’s information environment has focused on the role of Facebook in facilitating anti-Rohingya hate speech and misinformation. Investigations conducted by the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission found that social media platforms contributed to the spread of inflammatory content and failed to adequately moderate dangerous speech in local languages. The mission concluded that Facebook had become a significant vehicle for the dissemination of hate speech and incitement against the Rohingya population. However, the role of gender within these narratives has received comparatively less attention.

Research examining digital disinformation in Myanmar has shown that rumours concerning violence against women frequently circulated online during periods of escalating communal tension. Stories portraying Muslim men as threats to Buddhist women became powerful mobilising tools within broader anti-Rohingya campaigns (see here). Allegations of sexual violence and threats against women were repeatedly invoked to frame violence as a form of protection rather than persecution. At the same time, gender-based discrimination also exists within the Rohingya community itself. Despite facing genocide and seeking justice, some members of the community have targeted Rohingya women activists through harassment and gender-based attacks( see here).

Artificial intelligence is often perceived as a neutral technology, yet its outputs are shaped by the data on which it is trained. Because AI systems learn from existing online content, they can reproduce and amplify societal, political, and gender biases embedded in that data. In conflict settings, these biases can reinforce harmful narratives rather than challenge them. As one interviewee cited in regional research on AI and conflict observed, rumours circulating on social media regarding violence against women often preceded violence on the ground. By the time claims could be verified or disproven, communal tensions had already escalated, and attacks had begun. The significance of this case extends beyond misinformation. It demonstrates how women’s bodies, safety, and social status can become symbolic battlegrounds within conflict. Gendered narratives were not peripheral to the conflict; they were part of the mechanism through which hostility was mobilised.

This experience raises important questions about the future role of generative AI. If recommendation algorithms helped amplify inflammatory rumours during the Rohingya crisis, generative AI may significantly increase the speed and scale at which similar narratives can be produced. AI-generated text, images, and videos can now be created at minimal cost and distributed across multiple platforms within minutes. In highly polarised environments, synthetic content does not need to be entirely believable to be effective. It only needs to reinforce existing fears and prejudices. The concern, therefore, is not simply that AI will spread misinformation. It is possible that AI may accelerate the production of gendered narratives that have historically contributed to violence.

The Philippines: From Disinformation to Political Intimidation

While Myanmar illustrates how gendered narratives can contribute to communal conflict, the Philippines demonstrates how they can be used to discipline and silence political opponents. Over the past decade, the Philippines has become one of the world’s most studied cases of digital political manipulation. Researchers have documented the emergence of organised online influence networks that combine political messaging, coordinated trolling, and algorithmic amplification to shape public discourse ( see here).

Women have often been among the primary targets. The experience of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Ressa and the journalists of Rappler provides one of the clearest examples (see here). Reporting by Rappler and independent researchers documented sustained online harassment campaigns involving misogynistic abuse, threats of sexual violence, and coordinated attacks intended to undermine credibility. Rather than focusing on professional performance or political positions, many attacks relied on gendered language designed to portray women as immoral, emotional, or untrustworthy. Importantly, these campaigns were not random expressions of online hostility. They functioned as political tools. The objective was not merely to insult individual women but to discourage criticism, weaken independent journalism, and shape public discourse ( see here).

Generative AI has the potential to transform these tactics. Political actors no longer need large teams to generate content continuously. AI systems can produce thousands of variations of narratives, social media posts, images, and videos targeted at specific audiences. Synthetic audio and video technologies further increase the possibility of reputational attacks based on fabricated evidence. In this sense, AI may not create a new form of political intimidation. Rather, it may dramatically reduce the costs associated with existing practices. What once required coordinated networks of operators can increasingly be automated, personalized, and scaled.

Indonesia: The Normalisation of Digital Gender-Based Violence

Indonesia highlights a third dimension of the challenge: the normalisation of digital gender-based violence. Organisations such as Komnas Perempuan and SAFEnet have documented a steady increase in online gender-based violence over the past decade. Women activists, journalists, academics, and human rights defenders frequently report harassment, doxxing, image-based abuse, and threats intended to discourage public participation ( see here). Similar patterns have also emerged among Rohingya communities, where some women activists have reportedly been targeted by members of their own community through online harassment, including the circulation of AI-generated images intended to discredit, intimidate, and silence their advocacy (see here). These cases demonstrate how AI-enabled abuse can reinforce existing gender inequalities and restrict women’s participation in civic and public life.

These patterns did not emerge with digital technologies alone. They are rooted in broader social and gender inequalities that continue to shape women’s participation in public life. Despite significant progress in women’s rights, Indonesian women continue to face discrimination linked to patriarchal norms, restrictive gender expectations, and unequal access to political and economic opportunities. Women who speak publicly on political, religious, or social issues are often subjected to heightened scrutiny and attacks on their morality, sexuality, or family roles rather than their professional qualifications or policy positions (see here). Researchers have noted that gendered stereotypes remain deeply embedded in both political discourse and everyday social interactions, creating an environment in which women are more vulnerable to intimidation and reputational attacks see here).

Unlike in Myanmar, these incidents are not primarily associated with armed conflict. Unlike in the Philippines, they are not always directly linked to organized political campaigns. Instead, they reveal how technology-facilitated gendered abuse has become embedded within everyday digital life. This trend is significant because it creates fertile ground for AI-enabled harm.

The growing availability of generative AI tools lowers the technical barriers required to create manipulated images, synthetic videos, and fabricated narratives. Activities that once required specialised expertise can now be carried out using publicly accessible applications. As a result, the production of harmful content is becoming increasingly democratised. The challenge is therefore not simply that AI creates new risks. It is that AI allows existing forms of abuse to be replicated more quickly, more cheaply, and by a wider range of actors. For women already navigating hostile online environments, this may further increase the costs associated with public participation.

Conclusion

The experiences of Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia demonstrate that AI is entering information environments where gender has long been used as a political tool. In Myanmar, gendered narratives helped mobilize violence; in the Philippines, they became instruments of political intimidation; and in Indonesia, they underpin increasingly normalized forms of digital abuse. Generative AI does not create these dynamics, but it enables them to be produced, distributed, and amplified at an unprecedented scale.

As Southeast Asian governments continue to develop AI governance frameworks, the challenge extends beyond questions of innovation and ethics. AI must also be understood through the lenses of conflict prevention, digital security, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Without such an approach, AI risks becoming a force multiplier for existing patterns of gendered harm and exclusion across the region.

Policy Recommendations

1. Integrate gender and conflict perspectives into AI governance to assess how AI may amplify disinformation, digital violence, and exclusion in fragile environments.

2. Strengthen local-language monitoring and response mechanisms to detect and counter AI-enabled gendered disinformation and online abuse.

3. Myanmar already suffered the first-ever social media-fueled genocide, and to prevent AI-fueled genocide or another mass crime, the UN or international organisations need to act to manage the AI regulation in the polycrisis context

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Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Key Takeaways:

• Deforestation in Myanmar is closely connected to political transition, militarised governance, and extractive economic policies. Myanmar lost about 12,000 km² of forest cover nationwide between 1990 and 2000, the worst period of forest loss under the military regime. Forest destruction increased in 2008 and accelerated after 2017, coinciding with rare-earth exports to China.

• Resource extraction and conflict economies continue to be a major cause of environmental degradation. Rare-earth mining, jade extraction, logging, agribusiness expansion, and hydropower projects expanded through networks of military actors, ethnic armed organisations, border militias, domestic cronies, and foreign investors, particularly in Shan, Kachin, and Tanintharyi.

• The impacts are severe and multidimensional: loss of biodiversity, carbon emissions, river contamination, soil erosion, and the displacement of Indigenous and forest-dependent communities, threatening Myanmar’s long-term environmental and human security.

Introduction

Myanmar possesses one of Southeast Asia’s most ecologically significant forest systems, including tropical rainforests, montane forests, mangroves, and biodiverse river basins. However, decades of authoritarian governance, armed conflict, weak environmental regulation, and extractive economic development have transformed Myanmar into one of the region’s most alarming deforestation hotspots. This article will discuss the causes and effects of Myanmar’s deforestation in the prominent political cycle.

Historical Triggers of Military Rule (1990–2008)

The decade of greatest deforestation in Myanmar was from 1990 to 2000, under the military regimes of the SLORC and SPDC. FAO said the country lost 12,000 km² of forest cover nationwide in this decade alone. Forests became an important source of income for the military government, which relied on timber exports, especially teak, to fund military campaigns, state expansion, and patronage networks.

Military-linked companies and politically connected elites frequently received logging concessions with minimal environmental oversight. In ethnic border zones like Kachin, Shan, and Karan States, the forest became linked with conflict and military control. Poor governance, corruption, and militarised extraction have accelerated forest loss and opened up pristine forest areas to commercial exploitation.

Military-Backed Economic Reforms and Agribusiness Expansion (2008–2015)

Deforestation increased again after 2008 as Myanmar opened its economy and pursued market-oriented reforms. Under President Thein Sein and the military-backed USDP government, large-scale land concessions were granted to domestic groups, foreign investors, and crony companies for agricultural business, mineral mining, hydropower, and infrastructure development.

Commercial agriculture became one of the major drivers of forest conversion. In Tanintharyi Region, large rainforest areas were cleared for large-scale oil palm concessions, including the controversial Myanmar Stark Prestige Plantation (MSPP), which has been linked to forest clearance as well as land and labour rights concerns affecting Karen communities. Roads, special economic zones, and infrastructure corridors also expanded into previously forested areas. At the same time, major infrastructure projects such as the Dawei Special Economic Zone (DSEZ), the Dawei Deep-Sea Port, and the Dawei–Thailand Road Corridor expanded into previously forested areas. Although these projects were promoted as part of economic modernization, many lacked proper environmental assessments and displaced local communities without adequate compensation.

Commercial agriculture became one of the major drivers of forest conversion. In Tanintharyi Region, large rainforest areas were cleared for large-scale oil palm concessions, including the controversial Myanmar Stark Prestige Plantation (MSPP), which has been linked to forest clearance as well as land and labour rights concerns affecting Karen communities. Roads, special economic zones, and infrastructure corridors also expanded into previously forested areas. At the same time, major infrastructure projects such as the Dawei Special Economic Zone (DSEZ), the Dawei Deep-Sea Port, and the Dawei–Thailand Road Corridor expanded into previously forested areas. While environmental and social impact assessment processes were undertaken or proposed for some of these projects, civil society organizations and environmental groups raised concerns regarding the adequacy, transparency, and public accessibility of these assessments, as well as the extent of meaningful community consultation and compensation for affected populations.

The NLD Government: Reform Efforts and Structural Challenges (2015–2021)

When the National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power in 2016, the government introduced stronger environmental policies. A nationwide logging ban was implemented between 2016 and 2017, timber extraction quotas were reduced, and gemstone mining licenses in Hpakant were suspended to reassess environmental impacts.

Despite these reforms, the government faced major structural limitations. Myanmar’s economy remained dependent on natural resource exports such as jade, natural gas, timber, and agricultural products. At the same time, economic cooperation with China continued through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

Large infrastructure projects and mining operations accelerated forest loss by extracting sites, roads, and waste disposal areas, while also contaminating rivers and degrading ecosystems through chemical runoff, erosion, and sedimentation. For example, rare-earth mining activities in Kachin State have been associated with forest clearance, toxic waste generation, and water contamination linked to extraction processes. The expansion of rare-earth mining during the late NLD period laid the foundation for a dramatic increase in production after the 2021 military coup. By the mid-2020s, Myanmar had emerged as one of the world’s largest suppliers of rare-earth elements, second only to China and the United States in some production estimates. Most of these minerals were exported to China for processing, while many mining sites operated in contested areas of Kachin State where environmental regulation and government oversight remained weak. Numerous reports have documented the involvement of Chinese-backed operators and highlighted concerns regarding inadequate environmental safeguards, toxic chemical use, deforestation, and water pollution associated with rare-earth extraction.

The NLD government also lacked full control over conflict-affected border regions. In states such as Kachin and Shan, ethnic armed organizations, militias, border guard forces, and military actors operated independently of the central government. Following the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015, some regions experienced a temporary reduction in armed clashes, creating expectations that environmental governance and resource management might improve. However, evidence suggests that many extractive activities continued during this period. As a result, illegal logging, jade mining, and other forms of resource exploitation persisted despite the relative decline in violence in certain areas

Rare-Earth Mining and Deforestation in Border Regions (2017–Present)

Rare-earth mining has emerged as one of the most destructive environmental issues in Myanmar since 2017. As global demand for rare-earth minerals increased, Myanmar became an important supplier to China. According to the Institute for Strategy and Policy - Myanmar (ISP- Myanmar), the country exported approximately USD 3.6 billion worth of rare-earth minerals to China since 2017, including nearly USD 4 billion after the 2021 military coup.

Most mining activities are concentrated in Kachin State and northern Shan State near the Chinese border. The rapid expansion of rare-earth extraction has caused severe deforestation due to road construction, land clearing, excavation, and tree cutting for fuelwood used in mineral processing. Satellite images and environmental monitoring reports indicate clear areas of forest loss around the mining zones. There has been significant expansion in the mining area from 2018 onwards, from about 26,000 hectares in April 2018 to 46,700 hectares in April 2024. By the end of 2024, they had identified nearly 400 sites for rare earth mining in Kachin State.

Ecological and Social Consequences of Deforestation

Deforestation in Myanmar has produced serious environmental and social consequences. Biodiversity loss is one of the most immediate concerns, as Myanmar’s forests contain many endangered species and ecologically sensitive habitats. Forest destruction fragments ecosystems, disrupts food chains, and threatens wildlife survival.

Deforestation also contributes to climate change. Forests act as important carbon sinks by absorbing and storing carbon dioxide. Large-scale forest clearance releases this stored carbon back into the atmosphere, worsening greenhouse gas emissions and reducing regional climate resilience.

At the same time, arsenic levels in some areas of the Salween River were found to be at 0.55 mg/l, which is 55 times the safe limit. Likewise, the river, which starts east of Mong Hsat township, Shan state, and flows into Thailand as the Kok River, was also found to be highly contaminated with arsenic due to rare-earth and gold mining. Due to the rivers’ flow across national boundaries, the downstream communities in the northern parts of Thailand have been impacted by contamination, which has become a growing concern for water quality, public health, agriculture, and fisheries.

This reflects that the environmental consequences of unsustainable resource extraction activities in Myanmar have become a regional matter and need to be addressed through more cooperation and environmental governance between Myanmar and neighboring countries such as Thailand and China. Forest loss also increases soil erosion, land degradation, and vulnerability to landslides, especially in mountainous conflict zones. Declining soil quality threatens agricultural productivity and food security for already vulnerable rural populations.

The 2021 Coup and the Expansion of Conflict Economies

The 2021 military coup accelerated environmental destruction across Myanmar. According to Global Forest Watch (GFW), more than $1.45 billion in official forest product imports from Myanmar have been reported since the coup, with China accounting for 64%. The collapse of governance systems, intensified armed conflict, and weakened environmental enforcement created conditions for widespread illegal logging and unregulated mining. Natural resources increasingly became part of Myanmar’s conflict economy. Armed groups, elites, and military authorities relied on timber, minerals, and land concessions to finance operations and maintain territorial control.

Among the major hotspots of deforestation, Global Forest Watch (GFW) recorded from 2002 to 2025 that Myanmar lost 830 kha (kilo-hectares) of humid primary forest. Deforestation there has been driven by mining, infrastructure projects, and commercial agriculture. Tanintharyi experienced large-scale forest clearance linked to oil palm and rubber plantations, while Kachin became heavily affected by jade extraction, rare-earth mining, and illicit logging.

Conclusion

Overall, Myanmar’s deforestation crisis is broadly a reflection of weak governance, conflict economies, geopolitical competition and resource dependence. Without greater political stability, stronger institutions and more accountable resource governance, there is little chance of achieving environmental protection. All stakeholders including the National Unity Government (NUG), should operate within their capacities to reduce dependency on unsustainable resource extraction and ensure that environmental sustainability becomes an integral part of Myanmar’s long-term recovery and development efforts to prevent environmental destruction in the long term.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Strengthen environmental governance, including the Central government, EAOs, and NGOs, through independent monitoring systems, satellite tracking, and stronger enforcement against illegal logging and mining activities.

2. Improve regulation of rare-earth mining and cross-border mineral trade, particularly through greater transparency and environmental accountability in Myanmar-China supply chains.

3. Regional organisations such as ASEAN should play a more active role in addressing the Myanmar crisis and its environmental consequences through supporting mechanisms,

4. Recognise and protect Indigenous land rights by involving local communities in forest management and resource governance processes.

5. Promote sustainable livelihoods such as community forestry, sustainable agriculture, and renewable energy while linking environmental protection with broader political stability and governance reforms.

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Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

As livelihoods in Myanmar become increasingly unstable, many households are struggling to meet basic needs and rely on survival-based coping strategies. This article examines the economic pressures facing Myanmar households, the coping mechanisms they adopt, and possible pathways for recovery and resilience.

Key Takeaways:

• Political instability, conflict, inflation, and environmental crises have pushed many Myanmar households into survival-based living conditions.

• Households increasingly rely on informal work, multiple jobs, migration, borrowing, and high-risk activities to cope with economic hardship.

• Long-term recovery requires stronger social protection, economic stability, and improved peace and governance.

Economic Pressures on Myanmar Households

Myanmar’s economy has sharply declined since the 2021 military takeover, with rising inflation, increasing poverty, and weakened investment, employment, and human capital development. While military elites and connected cronies remain financially insulated, ordinary workers, farmers, and low-income households bear a much heavier burden.

Many businesses struggle with rising costs and weak purchasing power, leading to factory layoffs and hardship for street vendors under the “100-Day Project”. Ongoing conflict, civilian deaths, and forced conscription have pushed more households into poverty, particularly female-headed households, which are more vulnerable due to limited gender-sensitive support.

Conflict, rising agricultural costs, disrupted trade, and currency depreciation continue to reduce farmers’ and exporters’ incomes. At the same time, overlapping crises including COVID-19, cyclones, earthquakes, inflation, and environmental degradation continue to damage livelihoods and housing. Despite rising living costs, salaries remain largely unchanged.

Weak law enforcement has also allowed cyber scam syndicates to target vulnerable Myanmar citizens increasingly. Overall, Myanmar people continue to endure a polycrisis driven by governance failures and compounding environmental shocks.

Households’ Coping Mechanisms and their Costs

Working Multiple Jobs

Worsening economic conditions have forced many Myanmar households to rely on multiple jobs to survive. Even before 2018, one in three Myanmar people reportedly held more than one job, with many combining full-time work and informal side jobs such as farming, casual labour, and small businesses. Although this may provide temporary income and financial security, it often results in stress, exhaustion, health problems, and reduced time for family and personal development. As household welfare remains fragile and the middle class continues to shrink, holding multiple jobs has become a survival strategy rather than a sustainable long-term solution.

Reliance on Informal Work

In the absence of stable formal employment, many households rely on informal work, which made up 80.7% of the workforce by 2020 and accounts for 50.1% of Myanmar’s GDP. Informal work includes activities such as street vending, farming, domestic work, and transport services, offering accessible income opportunities with low entry barriers, alongside flexible hours and home-based arrangements. However, workers often lack contracts, paid leave, health benefits, legal protection, and stable income. Women are particularly vulnerable to low pay, discrimination, poor working conditions, and mental health risks. Although informal work can continue during crises, unstable income and limited upward mobility continue to contribute to rising inequality.

Risky and Illegal Livelihoods

As a Myanmar proverb goes, “an empty sack cannot stand upright“ — when economic hardship deepens, some people turn to risky and illegal activities that reportedly pay several times more than ordinary jobs. Since the 2021 coup, job shortages, travel restrictions, and conscription have pushed many toward cyber scam work, including in border-area scam compounds where many face coercion, forced labour, and human rights abuses.

Illegal gambling has also expanded significantly, including two-digit and three-digit lotteries, football betting, and online gambling, driven by hopes of quick income despite risks of addiction, debt, and financial instability. Cyber scammers have exploited this desperation by promoting illegal gambling as a path to overnight wealth. Economic pressures have similarly pushed some women into sex work to support household expenses, exposing them to abuse, violence, HIV/AIDS, and social stigma due to limited legal protection.

At the same time, robberies, thefts, and other petty crimes have increased across post-coup Myanmar amid worsening economic hardship and weak law enforcement, which has prioritised cracking down on political activists and releasing criminal perpetrators. Although these activities may provide temporary income, they remain unsafe and unsustainable, exposing individuals to exploitation, violence, health risks, and even death.

Migration

A well-known Myanmar proverb states that “those who do not move to a new village will not rise to greatness,” reflecting the long-standing belief that migration can improve livelihoods. Since the 2021 coup, migration has become a major coping strategy, mainly for employment and conflict-related reasons. Many migrate to neighbouring countries seeking better wages and stable income. However, around 25% of migrants’ earnings are reportedly seized by the regime through unfair exchange rates, while undocumented workers often face exploitation, abuse, arrest, discrimination, wage theft, and limited access to healthcare, education, and social security. Stricter migration controls and military restrictions have further increased uncertainty, with some workers reportedly arrested even while waiting for brokers to transport them to jobs or falling victim to human traffickers. Although migration can improve income, it is increasingly driven by desperation rather than opportunity.

Asset Depletion, Borrowing, and Under-Consumption

Many Myanmar households survive by selling assets, depleting savings, borrowing money, reducing spending, and consuming less food. However, selling productive assets and relying on debt can weaken long-term financial stability and trap households in debt cycles. Borrowing from relatives may also strain personal relationships, while informal lenders often charge excessive interest rates and sometimes resort to threats and abuse.

Reducing food consumption has become a common coping mechanism, with many households eating less or switching to cheaper food options, increasing risks of malnutrition and starvation, particularly among children, pregnant women, and older people. Many households also reduce spending on healthcare and education, which weakens health, productivity, and long-term human capital development. Although these strategies may provide temporary relief, they significantly reduce long-term recovery capacity.

Recommendations

Skills Training and Livelihood Programmes

Expanding access to flexible and market-oriented skills training programmes, such as digital work, repair services, food processing, and sewing, can strengthen livelihoods. Improving women’s access to skills development and employment opportunities can also support household incomes and local socio-economic recovery.

Support for Small Businesses and Informal Workers

Support for small businesses and informal workers should include micro-grants, low-interest loans, and licensing systems that recognize their role in the economy. At the same time, government spending priorities should be rebalanced to better support economic recovery and household welfare, rather than being concentrated on military operations. Expanding legal protection and investing in infrastructure such as solar energy, clean water, sanitation, drainage, and storage facilities can improve working conditions and reduce dependence on unstable electricity and fuel supplies. These efforts should also be supported by stronger monetary management to control inflation and ensure that financial support remains effective and sustainable.

Strengthen Local Supply Chains

Investment in processing, transport, and storage systems can strengthen local supply chains. For example, reopening key trade corridors such as the Myawaddy–Hpa-an road for cargo movement is essential to improve market access and trade flow. Agricultural support should include input subsidies, fair pricing systems, climate-resilient farming methods, and improved access to affordable fertilizer, farm equipment, and irrigation systems. Promoting local production, reforestation, mangrove restoration, and sustainable resource management can also strengthen livelihoods and resilience while reducing climate-related risks.

Support Safe Migration and Remittance Systems

Safer migrant labour pathways require stronger legal protection, safer recruitment systems, and enforcement against abusive practices. Migrant workers should also receive greater awareness of labour rights and foreign labour laws. In addition, remittance systems should be safer, faster, and more accessible for migrant workers and their families, supported by a sound remittance policy and the abolition of multiple exchange rate policies.

Strengthen Household Social Protection

Strengthening social protection initiatives can improve societal well-being. Expanding cash-for-work programmes, direct cash assistance, and flexible loan repayment arrangements can help reduce financial pressure and prevent debt traps.

Improve Access to Basic Needs

Improving access to basic needs requires stabilizing fuel prices and essential commodity costs. Healthcare and education services should also continue through community-based approaches such as mobile clinics and temporary learning centres, particularly in conflict-affected and displaced communities.

Strengthen Community and Local Support Systems

Strengthening cooperation with NGOs and humanitarian organizations that already support vulnerable communities can support more localized and community-driven solutions. Community mutual support networks should also be strengthened to help households cope during crises and improve social and economic resilience.

Promote Long-Term Economic Recovery

Long-term recovery requires rebuilding stable labour markets, promoting positive international engagement, improving the investment environment, and implementing policy reforms that reflect on-the-ground economic realities. Since ongoing instability, conflict, inflation, and sanctions continue to weaken livelihoods, long-term household stability depends on peace, governance stability, and national economic recovery. Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) approaches remain essential for supporting both immediate needs and sustainable long-term recovery.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s economy has increasingly shifted toward survival-based livelihoods, with many households relying on unstable and informal income sources to cope with daily hardship. However, these coping mechanisms are often temporary and unsustainable. Therefore, sustainable recovery requires stronger social protection, livelihood opportunities, economic stability, and improvements in peace and governance.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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In many cities across Myanmar, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find accessible public green spaces where people can relax, exercise, or escape from crowded urban environments.

Key Takeaways:

• Rapid urbanization and population growth are increasing pressure on public spaces in Myanmar’s cities.

• Unequal access to green spaces affects social well-being, public health, and urban resilience.

• Green spaces should be recognized as essential urban infrastructure rather than optional amenities.

Parks, playgrounds, and community recreational spaces remain limited, while commercial buildings and housing developments continue to expand. During the last few years, major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay have experienced rapid population growth due to economic, social, and political pressures. According to the census data, Yangon’s population increased from 2.7 million in 1983 to around 5 million in 2024. Despite growing urban density, green spaces are still often treated as optional amenities rather than essential public infrastructure.

Factors behind Populated Cities

Migration to urban areas in Myanmar is driven by several economic, social, and political factors. One of the main reasons is that employment opportunities, education, and public services are concentrated in major cities such as Yangon. Migration from other states and regions to Yangon in search of economic and social opportunities has significantly contributed to the city’s high population density.

Rural-to-urban migration has accelerated since 2010, especially in Yangon, where internal migration represented a more significant trend than international migration. However, political instability following the 2021 military coup, combined with economic decline, inflation, and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, further added pressure to economic hardship and displacement pressures across the country. As a result, cities are facing growing demands for housing, transportation, and public infrastructure, while overcrowding and pressure on public spaces continue to increase.

Social Life in Myanmar

Myanmar society has traditionally been community-oriented, with strong social practices centred around religious events, cultural festivals, tea shops, markets, and neighbourhood spaces. These informal gathering places have long played an important role in building social cohesion and a sense of belonging. Social participation and community bonding are essential parts of social sustainability and urban resilience, particularly during periods of crisis and uncertainty. Communities with stronger social ties are often better able to support one another during disasters, economic hardship, and other social stresses.

Despite rapid urbanization, social trust and neighbourhood relationships remained relatively strong in Myanmar’s cities before the crises. However, urban density, privatization, and changing lifestyles are reducing communal interaction spaces. Housing limitations in Yangon, particularly in small apartments and informal rental accommodation, can reduce opportunities for community interaction and shared social life. Moreover, there are limited accessible public spaces where people can gather and socialize without needing to spend money.

Accessible public green spaces can therefore play an important role in strengthening community engagement, social inclusion, and mental well-being. Well-maintained public spaces with social and cultural activities can encourage interaction between diverse communities while reducing social isolation.

Urban Planning Failure and Its Impacts

Rapid urbanization in Yangon has taken place without systematic and long-term urban planning. Since 2021, many people have moved in search of safety and livelihood opportunities due to conflict, insecurity, and displacement . This could also have added pressure to Yangon’s housing, infrastructure, public services, and public spaces. As the population increased, traditional low-rise housing was gradually replaced by high-density apartments to accommodate growing urban populations. Moreover, this transition has also reduced open spaces and social infrastructure within the city.

Urban expansion has increasingly prioritized commercial and residential development over public welfare and environmental sustainability. In some cases, governance challenges and corruption have undermined the protection of public spaces, allowing commercial interests to take precedence over community and environmental needs. Urbanization in Yangon has expanded into agricultural land and open spaces, contributing to the gradual decline of public green areas. Public open spaces have also been privatized through real estate and commercial projects over the past two decades. For example, 10 acres of Kanthaya Park in North Okkalapa Township, Yangon, were replaced by a supermarket development.

At the same time, many low-income residents, migrants, and industrial workers are moving into suburban areas with limited infrastructure and public amenities. Residents living in dense apartment communities can experience stress related to the lack of recreational and social spaces, negatively affecting quality of life and community resilience. As green spaces continue to decline, cities face growing environmental challenges such as urban heat, flooding, air pollution, and overcrowding, while social cohesion and overall urban well-being are increasingly weakened.

The Need for Green Spaces

Green spaces are important not only for environmental purposes but also for social well-being, public health, and community resilience. In the context of urban sustainability, access to open spaces, local amenities, and green areas is considered important tangible elements that support quality of life, while social cohesion, inclusion, and a sense of belonging are equally important intangible aspects of social sustainability. In rapidly urbanizing cities like Yangon, the lack of green spaces and community facilities can weaken social participation and reduce opportunities for traditional and social activities.

As urban populations continue to grow, the need for accessible public spaces is becoming increasingly urgent. Yangon’s population is projected to continue rising significantly in the coming decades, increasing pressure on already limited public spaces. Without proactive efforts to preserve and develop green areas, the scarcity of communal spaces is likely to increase further.

Green spaces also provide multiple health benefits. Research has shown that access to nature and urban greenery can reduce stress, improve mental well-being, encourage physical activity, and strengthen social cohesion. Exposure to natural environments has been associated with lower stress levels and reduced symptoms of anxiety and depression. Parks and walkable green areas can also encourage recreational activities such as walking, jogging, and community exercise, which contribute to healthier lifestyles.

In addition, green spaces can help improve air quality, reduce urban heat, buffer noise pollution, and mitigate flooding risks. Well-maintained public spaces can also encourage community interaction and reduce social isolation, particularly among children, elderly people, and low-income residents. In this sense, green spaces should be viewed not as luxury amenities, but as essential urban infrastructure that supports healthier, more inclusive, and more resilient cities.

Current Gaps and Inequalities

Despite the growing importance of public green spaces, access to them remains highly limited and unequal, especially in Yangon. Yangon currently has far less green space per person than the minimum standard recommended by the World Health Organization. According to an official statement by the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC) in 2016, Yangon’s parks covered a total of 211.25 hectares, providing only 1.74 square meters of green space per person. Several townships still have no public parks at all, while many existing parks are concentrated in the Central Business District and Inner Urban City Zone. As a result, access to green spaces often depends on where people live and their socioeconomic conditions.

In densely populated areas, the shortage of public recreational facilities can further limit opportunities for social interaction and leisure. Some public parks and recreational spaces are also perceived as unsafe or poorly maintained, particularly for women and vulnerable groups. In addition, certain green areas such as private golf courses and open areas are located within exclusive zones or semi-private developments with limited public accessibility.

Although Yangon was once known as the “Garden of the East,” rapid urbanization since 2012 has intensified pressure on public spaces while urban planning has struggled to keep pace with population growth. Real estate development and commercial expansion continue to reduce accessible green areas, while clear standards for creating new parks and public spaces remain limited. At the same time, the unequal distribution of green spaces reflects broader social and spatial inequalities within the city.

Nevertheless, some local organizations and urban initiatives have started advocating for the preservation and revitalization of public spaces in Yangon, including heritage restoration and community-focused urban regeneration projects.

Recommendations

Addressing the shortage of green spaces in Myanmar’s cities requires stronger urban planning, long-term policy commitment and enforcement, and community participation. Public awareness campaigns can also play an important role in changing perceptions of green spaces from optional amenities to essential urban infrastructure. At the same time, stronger advocacy and collaboration with relevant government departments are needed to ensure that green space preservation and development become priorities in urban planning and decision-making. Existing public and urban greenery should be protected from commercial conversion, while future urban development plans should include accessible parks, community spaces, and pedestrian-friendly environments. This requires stronger governance, transparent and corruption-free permitting processes, and effective enforcement to prevent the loss of public spaces to unsustainable development. Neglected and underutilized urban spaces could also be transformed into community green spaces that encourage recreation, social interaction, and creative activities. One example is the Yangon Alley Garden Project led by Doh Eain, which revitalized previously neglected alleyways into community spaces with gardens, playgrounds, seating areas, and street art. At the same time, regularly evaluating existing projects can help identify challenges, learn from past experiences , and inform the design of future green space initiatives.

Moreover, public spaces should be safe, inclusive, and accessible to different groups, including women, children, elderly people, and low-income communities. Maintaining public parks and organizing social and cultural activities can also strengthen community engagement and social cohesion.

Conclusion

As Myanmar’s cities continue to grow under economic, political, and social pressures, the need for accessible public green spaces is becoming increasingly urgent and essential. Rapid urbanization, population growth, and unplanned development have reduced many communal and recreational spaces, particularly in densely populated urban areas. At the same time, growing urban stress, overcrowding, and environmental challenges have highlighted the importance of healthier and more inclusive urban environments.

Green spaces should not be viewed as luxury amenities available only to certain communities. They are essential urban infrastructure that supports social cohesion, mental and physical well-being, environmental sustainability, and community resilience. Accessible public spaces can create opportunities for social interaction, relaxation, and community engagement, especially during periods of uncertainty and crisis.

Building more sustainable and livable cities in Myanmar will require recognizing that green spaces are not optional additions to urban development, but an essential part of urban life and public well-being.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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The global transition toward renewable energy and electric vehicles has accelerated demand for rare earth minerals, placing Myanmar’s conflict-affected borderlands at the center of emerging critical mineral supply chains. As rare earth extraction expands in Kachin State following the 2021 coup, environmental degradation, weak regulation, and fragmented governance structures have increasingly shaped the country’s role in the global green economy.

Key Takeaways:

• Myanmar has become the world’s third-largest producer of rare earth elements, after the US and China, for advanced renewable energy technologies, as China increasingly shifts environmentally destructive extraction beyond its borders into Myanmar’s weakly regulated frontier regions.

• The rapid expansion of rare earth mining in Kachin State after the 2021 coup reflects fragmented governance systems involving militias, armed actors, informal taxation networks, and opaque cross-border business arrangements operating with limited environmental oversight or accountability.

• Myanmar’s rare earth frontier exposes a deeper contradiction within the global green transition: while wealthier societies pursue cleaner energy and “greener” cities, the environmental and human costs of extracting critical minerals are increasingly displaced onto conflict-affected and politically fragile regions, creating zones of ecological sacrifice that remain largely invisible within global climate narratives.

Introduction

Rapidly reducing dependence on fossil fuels and accelerating the transition toward renewable energy have become central to global climate strategies and the pursuit of a net-zero future. Electric vehicles, wind turbines, batteries, and other low-carbon technologies are increasingly viewed as essential tools for addressing climate change and advancing sustainable development goals. Yet the technologies driving this transition depend heavily on critical minerals, particularly rare earth elements essential for renewable energy systems and advanced manufacturing industries.

As global demand for critical minerals intensifies, governments and industries face growing challenges surrounding supply chain security, environmental sustainability, and geopolitical competition. While the expanding critical mineral economy presents economic opportunities for resource-rich developing countries, it also risks reproducing patterns of environmental degradation, corruption, conflict, and unequal resource governance commonly associated with the “resource curse.”

Myanmar has emerged as an increasingly important supplier within regional rare earth supply chains linked to China’s processing industries. According to Global Witness, Myanmar’s exports of rare earth minerals to China increased dramatically from approximately US$1.5 million in 2014 to nearly US$780 million by 2021. Much of this extraction has concentrated in Kachin State along Myanmar’s northern borderlands, where long-standing conflict dynamics and contested territorial authority continue to shape local governance systems.

As extraction rapidly expands, Myanmar’s rare earth frontier increasingly reveals a deeper contradiction at the heart of the global green transition: while renewable energy technologies are promoted as environmentally sustainable solutions, the environmental and governance costs associated with critical mineral extraction are increasingly displaced onto fragile border regions affected by conflict and weak regulation.

Myanmar’s Rare Earth Boom and China’s Supply Chain Shift

Rare earth minerals have become strategically important because of their essential role in renewable energy technologies and advanced manufacturing industries. Heavy rare earth elements such as dysprosium and neodymium are particularly valuable because they are used in permanent magnets essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, batteries, smartphones, and high-performance electronics. As governments accelerate climate goals and low-carbon industrial strategies, global demand for these minerals has surged dramatically.

China has dominated the global rare earth industry since the 1980s and continues to control much of the world’s processing and refining capacity. However, the environmental consequences of rare earth extraction within China became increasingly severe over the past decade. Illegal mining, toxic waste, poisoned waterways, and long-term ecological degradation generated mounting environmental concerns, particularly in Jiangxi Province, often referred to as China’s “rare earth kingdom.”

In response, Chinese authorities intensified environmental enforcement measures after 2016 and shut down many domestic heavy rare earth mining operations. Yet while China reduced environmentally destructive extraction within its own territory, global demand for rare earth minerals continued to rise rapidly. Rather than reducing extraction overall, mining activities increasingly shifted across the border into Myanmar’s weakly regulated frontier regions. While China argues for a non-interference policy in the Myanmar crisis for Western powers, they are exploiting the Myanmar Civil War as a tool to increase China’s influence in Myanmar by dealing with both the military-led government and the ethnic military. China’s cooperation with KIA for rare earth minerals from Kachin state is evidence of China’s double standard in its own foreign policy towards Myanmar.

A six-month investigation by Global Witness documented how this highly polluting industry expanded rapidly into Myanmar’s Kachin Special Region 1, a semi-autonomous territory controlled by militia groups affiliated with Myanmar’s military establishment. Within just a few years, the region became one of the world’s largest suppliers of heavy rare earth minerals.

Reports indicate that thousands of Chinese workers and technicians crossed into Myanmar between 2016 and 2019 to establish and operate mining sites using the same in-situ leaching methods previously employed in Jiangxi. The mines continue to supply Chinese state-owned processing companies that dominate the global rare-earth refining industry. Commodity research firm Roskill noted in 2021 that nearly all major Chinese state-owned enterprises involved in heavy rare earth processing had become dependent on Myanmar as a source of raw materials.

The expansion of extraction into Myanmar demonstrates how stricter environmental governance in one country can displace ecological harm into weaker regulatory environments elsewhere. As one industry expert cited by Global Witness observed, “the environmental challenges that come with this type of mining in China have spread to a neighbouring nation.”

Fragmented Governance After the Coup

The rapid expansion of rare earth extraction in Myanmar cannot be understood solely through global market demand. It is also deeply connected to fragmented governance systems that intensified following the 2021 military coup.

Rather than producing a simple absence of governance, the post-coup crisis generated overlapping systems of competing authority involving military actors, militias, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), border business networks, and informal economic actors. In many extraction zones across northern Myanmar, governance operates through negotiated control, informal taxation systems, and localized power arrangements rather than centralized state regulation.

In Kachin Special Region 1, mining operations reportedly function through opaque agreements involving militia-controlled authorities and cross-border commercial actors. Although foreign investment in small- and medium-scale mineral extraction is technically illegal under Myanmar law, enforcement remains limited in conflict-affected borderlands where competing systems of authority overlap.

The Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar (ISP) reported that militia leaders and affiliated business networks have become central brokers in the rare-earth economy, facilitating mining operations, granting access to extraction sites, collecting informal taxes, and controlling cross-border trade routes into China. In many cases, Myanmar-registered companies reportedly function as fronts for Chinese investment operating through informal and opaque commercial arrangements.

The post-coup political environment has further weakened environmental oversight and institutional accountability. Under fragmented governance conditions, extraction activities continue with limited regulatory monitoring, while armed actors and border business networks benefit economically from the rapid expansion of rare earth mining.

Myanmar’s rare earth sector, therefore, illustrates how conflict-affected borderlands can become integrated into global supply chains through systems of shadow governance and informal extraction economies operating beyond effective environmental regulation.

Environmental Consequences in Kachin State and Beyond

The environmental consequences of rare earth extraction in Myanmar increasingly mirror the ecological devastation previously witnessed in China’s Jiangxi Province, where decades of poorly regulated mining contaminated waterways, destroyed forests, and generated massive long-term cleanup costs. China’s “Take profit without responsibility” policy in neighbouring countries for Rare-earth mining clearly downgrades China’s role as a global normative actor.

Mining operations in Kachin State commonly use in-situ leaching methods that inject chemical solutions such as ammonium sulfate directly into mountainsides to extract rare earth minerals. While highly profitable and relatively inexpensive, this process leaves behind toxic wastewater, contaminated soil, deforested landscapes, and unstable terrain vulnerable to erosion and landslides.

Global Witness documented how mining sites across Kachin State have expanded rapidly across mountainous terrain, with thousands of chemical collection pools identified near river systems and forest areas. Local communities have reported worsening access to clean water, dying fish populations, contaminated farmland, and the disappearance of wildlife from nearby forests. Residents also described growing fears about surrounding toxic exposure, respiratory illnesses, and long-term environmental destruction linked to chemical leaching processes.

The environmental consequences are no longer confined to isolated mining zones. Recent environmental monitoring in Thailand detected alarming levels of arsenic contamination in transboundary river systems linked to mining activities upstream in Myanmar, including areas associated with rare earth extraction. Investigations reported by Mongabay found growing concerns along the Salween River basin, where communities increasingly fear the impacts of toxic contamination on fisheries, agriculture, drinking water systems, and local livelihoods.

These developments highlight how environmental harm generated within Myanmar’s conflict-affected borderlands increasingly carries regional ecological and human security consequences. The contamination of shared river systems demonstrates that the environmental costs of weak extraction governance do not stop at national borders.

The long-term implications may prove severe. In China’s Jiangxi Province, authorities estimated that environmental cleanup costs linked to rare earth mining could exceed US$5.5 billion, with ecological recovery potentially taking up to a century. Myanmar currently lacks both the institutional capacity and regulatory mechanisms necessary to manage environmental remediation on a comparable scale.

The Hidden Contradiction of Global Green Transition

Myanmar’s rare earth frontier reveals a critical contradiction at the heart of the global green transition. Renewable energy technologies are frequently presented as environmentally sustainable solutions to climate change. Yet, the extraction systems that support these industries often impose severe environmental and social costs in politically fragile regions.

The environmental burdens associated with critical mineral extraction are not distributed equally. Instead, they are increasingly externalized onto vulnerable borderland communities where governance systems remain weak, fragmented, and conflict-affected. A green transition that ignores the social and environmental impacts on local communities is not truly green; it is simply greenwashing under the language of sustainability. While industries and consumers elsewhere benefit from electric vehicles, renewable energy infrastructure, and advanced technologies, the ecological and political consequences of extraction are concentrated in frontier regions such as northern Myanmar.

This dynamic raises broader questions about environmental governance, supply chain accountability, and the political economy of climate transition policies. Efforts to accelerate renewable energy adoption without addressing extraction governance risk reproduce new forms of environmental injustice and conflict-linked resource exploitation.

Myanmar’s rare earth frontier ultimately reveals a critical paradox at the heart of the global green transition: technologies designed to secure a sustainable future increasingly depend upon extraction systems rooted in environmental destruction, fragmented governance, and conflict-affected borderlands. Without stronger environmental accountability and conflict-sensitive supply chain governance, the pursuit of clean energy risks reproducing new forms of ecological injustice under the banner of sustainability.

Policy Recommendations

Addressing the environmental and governance challenges of rare earth extraction in Myanmar requires stronger international cooperation, conflict-sensitive environmental governance, and improved supply chain accountability.

Key priorities include:

• Strengthening environmental monitoring in conflict-affected extraction areas and tightening regulations on rare earth trade linked to environmentally harmful practices, particularly within Chinese-linked supply chains.

• Improving transparency and traceability in critical mineral supply chains, including the potential use of blockchain technologies to reduce illicit trade and improve accountability.

• Expanding responsible sourcing standards for companies and governments reliant on rare earth minerals for renewable energy, electric vehicles, and advanced manufacturing.

• Enhancing regional cooperation to address transboundary environmental impacts such as river pollution and ecological degradation. Local actors, including the NUG and EAOs, should also consider long-term environmental consequences in governance decisions.

• Encouraging ASEAN to take a more active role in addressing regional environmental risks stemming from Myanmar’s extractive and ecological crises.

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Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

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အီးဒ်ဒွလ်အသွာဟာလို့ ခေါ်ဆိုကြတဲ့ ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းက အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်တွေရဲ့ အသားစွန့်လှုမှု အလှုဒါနပွဲတော်ကို နှစ်စဥ်ကျင်းပကြတာဖြစ်ပြီး အဓိက အားဖြင့် ကျွဲ၊နွား၊ဆိတ်၊သိုးနှင့် ကုလားအုတ် စသည့် စမြုပ်ပြန်နိုင်တဲ့ သတ္တဝါ အမျိုးအစား ၅ မျိုးကို အဓိက စွန့်လှုကြကာ စွန့်လှုအသားများကို ၃ ပုံ အညီအမျှခွဲဝေပြီး ပထမတစ်ပုံကို လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း လူမျိုး၊ဘာသာမရွေးဆင်းရဲ့နွမ်းပါး၍အသားဓာတ်ချို့တဲ့သူများ၊ ဒုတိယတစ်ပုံကို ဆွေမျိုးရင်းချာများနှင့်လူမျိုးဘာသာမရွေးမိတ်ဆွေအပေါင်းအသင်းများ၊ တတိယတစ်ပုံကို ကာယံကာရှင်၏ မိသားစုအတွက် စသဖြင့် ခွဲခြမ်းကြရတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဆိုပါ အသားစွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ကို ရေရှည်တည့်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှု ၏ အဓိက ဒေါက်တိုင် ၃ ခုဖြစ်သော သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်၊ လူမှုဘဝနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ရူ့ထောင့် ၃ ခုမှ နေ၍ ယခုဆောင်းပါးတွင် ဆွေးနွေးတင်ပြသွားမှာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ယေဘုယျအားဖြင့် သတ္တဝါမွေးမြူရေးလုပ်ငန်းသည် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်ကျင်ရူ့ထောင့်ကြည့်လျှင် ရင်းမြစ်များစွာကို အသုံးပြုရသလို၊ သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိခိုက်မှုလည်း ရှိကာ လေထုထဲ ကာဗွန်ဒိုင်အောက်ဆိုဒ် ထုတ်လွှတ်မှုလည်း ကြီးမားတဲ့ လုပ်ငန်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ တစ်ဖန် ၂၁ ရာစုလူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း တိရိစ္ဆာန်အခွင့်အရေးကိုပါ အလေးထားစဥ်စားလာကြသည့်ယခုအချိန်တွင် အသားစွန့်လှုမှု အလှုဒါန ပွဲတော်နှင့်စပ်လျဥ်း၍ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုရူ့ထောင့်မှ လည်းကောင်း၊ အစားအစာထုတ်လုပ်မှုစနစ်တွေဟာ အချိန်တိုအတွင်း၊ မြင်သာထင်သာရှိတဲ့ အချိန်ကာလတစ်ခုအတွင်းမှာ ဘယ်လိုပြုမူလုပ်ကိုင်သလဲဆိုတာကိုလည်း လေ့လာဖို့ ဒီစွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ဟာ အခွင့်အလမ်းကောင်းတစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

သို့သော် အီးဒ်ရဲ့ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ သက်ရောက်မှုတွေဟာ အသားစွန့်လှုခြင်း ဆိုသည့် ဘာသာရေးထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာတစ်ခုတည်းနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်တာမဟုတ်ပါဘူး။ ယင်းစွန့်လှုမှုကိုဗဟိုပြုပြီး တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးထုတ်လုပ်မှု၊ လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးမှု၊ မြို့ပြစျေးကွက်များနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဖြန့်ဖြူးမှုစနစ်များ တိုးတက်ပြောင်းလဲလာပုံကြောင့်လည်း သက်ရောက်မှုတွေဟာ မူရင်း ဘာသာရေးအရ စွန့်လှုမှု ဆိုတာကြောင့်ဆိုတာထက် ပိုလာပါတယ်။

အီးဒ်အသားစွန့်လှုမှုဟာ သီးခြား ဘာသာရေး၊ယဉ်ကျေးမှုဆိုင်ရာ အခမ်းအနားတစ်ခုအနေနဲ့ လည်ပတ်နေတာထက်၊ ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးစီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းတွေရဲ့ အချိန်ကာလတစ်ခုအတွင်း ဝယ်လိုအားနှင့် ရောင်းလိုအား အရှိန်မြှင့်တင်မှုတစ်ခုအနေနဲ့ သက်ရောက်မှုရှိနေတာလည်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်မတိုင်မီရက်သတ္တပတ်များအတွင်းမှာ၊ တိရစ္ဆာန်များကို ကျေးလက်စားကျက်မြေများမှ မြို့ပြနှင့် မြို့ပြအနီးပတ်ဝန်းကျင်စျေးကွက်များဆီသို့ သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ကြပြီး၊ ထိုနေရာမှာ မြင့်တက်လာသည့် ဝယ်လိုအားကို ဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းကြတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အီးဒ်စွန့်လှုမှုအလှုဒါနအတွက် ဈေးကွက်ဝယ်လိုအားပေါ်မူတည်၍ အပြောင်းအရွေ့များကြောင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ဖိအားအသစ်ပုံစံမျိုးကို ဖန်တီးခြင်းထက်၊ လက်ရှိ ရှိနှင့်နေပြီးသား မွေးမြူရေးလုပ်ငန်းနယ်ပယ်၏ လုပ်ငန်းလည်ပတ်မှုသဘောတရားအရ သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ်သက်ရောက်မှုများကို ပိုပြီးထင်သာမြင်သာ တွေ့မြင့်ခွင့်ရတာသာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးထုတ်လုပ်မှုလုပ်ငန်း၏ဂေဟဗေဒခြေရာ (စမြုပ်ပြန်တိရစ္ဆာန်များမှ မီသိန်းဓာတ်ငွေ့ထုတ်လွှတ်မှု၊ စားကျက်မြေအသုံးပြုမှု၊ နှင့် အစာထုတ်လုပ်မှုစနစ်အတွက် ရေလိုအပ်ချက်) စသည် တစ်နှစ်ပတ်လုံး တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေး၊ထုတ်လုပ်မှုလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်တစ်လျှောက် ကာဗွန်ထုတ်လွှတ်မှုကို တွက်ချက်တာဖြစ်ပြီး၊ အီးဒ်အတွင်း ပြောင်းလဲသွားတာကတော့ သားကောင်ကို စွန့်လှုရန် ဇီဝိန်ချုပ်ခြင်း၊ သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ခြင်းနဲ့ ဖြန့်ဖြူးခြင်းတို့ရဲ့ အရှိန်နဲ့ အချိန်ကာလအပိုင်းအခြားပဲဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ရှုထောင့်ကကြည့်ရင်၊ ရက်သတ္တပတ်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်း ဝယ်လိုအားလွန်စွာ မြင့်တက်မှု့ကြောင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် အပေါ်သက်ရောက်မှုဟာ အခြေခံအားဖြင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ထိခိုက်မှုအသစ်တွေအဖြစ်ထက်၊ ဒေသအလိုက် တိရိစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူးရေးလုပ်ငန်းနှင့် စွန့်လှုသည့် နေရာများတွင် သက်ရောက်မှုတွေ ရုတ်တရက်ဖြစ်စေတာမျိုးဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဥပမာ။ မြို့ပြများရှိ သားသတ်ရုံများနှင့်ဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများသည် အချိန်တိုအတွင်း အော်ဂဲနစ်စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းအမြောက်အမြား (သွေးရည်ကြည်၊ အသားအကြွင်းအကျန်များ)နှင့် ထုပ်ပိုးမှုလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်မှ အမှိုက်များ အပါအဝင် သည် ရက်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်း အမှိုက်ထုတ်လုပ်မှုမြင့်တက်လာခြင်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

သို့သော်လည်း ဒေသအလိုက် သဘာဝတ်ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ်ညစ်ညမ်းမှုများဟာ တစ်နေရာနှင့် တစ်နေရာ တူညီမှုမရှိပါဘူး။ စနစ်တကျအားကောင်းသည့် မြူနီစပါယ်စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုများလုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်သည့်နေရာများနှင့် အအေးခန်းကွင်းဆက်စနစ်များ စနစ်တကျရှိသော ဒေသများတွင်၊ သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ် ဆိုးကျိုးသက်ရောက်မှုဖိအားကို ပိုမိုထိရောက်စွာ လျော့ကျနိုင်စေပါတယ်။

စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှာအားနည်းသော၊ အရင်းအမြစ်နည်းပါးသော ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်များတွင်မူ၊ အမှိုက်အညစ်အကြေးများ စုပုံခြင်းနှင့် ပျက်စီးယိုယွင်းခြင်းတို့သည် ပိုမိုမြင်သာစေနိုင်တဲ့ သက်ရောက်မှုတွေဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဆိုပါ ထိခိုက်မှုများသည့် စားသုံးသူကြောင့်ဖြစ်သော ထိခိုက်မှုသက်သက်ထက် အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံဆိုင်ရာ ကွာဟချက်များကို ဖော်ထုတ်ပြသနေခြင်းလည်း ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

လူမှုရေးရူထောင့်အရဆိုရင်၊ အီးဒ်ဟာ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများကို ပြန်လည်မျှဝေခြင်းနှင့် စုပေါင်းသက်သာချောင်ချိရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံမူများနဲ့ နက်ရှိုင်းစွာ ဆက်နွယ်နေတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ စွန့်လှုအသားကို မိသားစုဝင်များ၊ ဆွေမျိုးများနှင့် လိုအပ်နေသူများကြားတွင် ခွဲဝေပေးသည့် ကျင့်သုံးမှုသည် သိသာထင်ရှားသည့် အစားအစာမျှ (ရင်းမြစ်များကို) မျှဝေခြင်းယန္တရားကို ဖန်တီးပေးကာ ဝင်ငွေနည်းအိမ်ထောင်စုများစွာအတွက် တိရစ္ဆာန်ပရိုတင်းကို လက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်မှုကိုလည်း ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဤပြန်လည်မျှဝေခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းသည် နောက်ဆက်တွဲလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်တစ်ခုမဟုတ်ပဲ၊ ဘာသာရေးထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာ၏ အဓိကကျင့်ဝတ်ဆိုင်ရာ အစိတ်အပိုင်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုအရဆိုရင်၊ ၎င်းသည် တရားဝင်နိုင်ငံတော်၏ လူမှုဖူလုံရေးစနစ်များအပြင်ဘက်တွင် လည်ပတ်နေသော လူမှုရေးဖှုလုံရေးကွန်ရက်ပုံစံတစ်ခုကို ကိုယ်စားပြုပါတယ်။ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင်၊ လျင်မြန်သော မြို့ပြအသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုနှင့် စားသုံးမှုပုံစံများ ပြောင်းလဲလာမှုသည် ဤပြန်လည်ခွဲဝေမှု မည်သို့ဖြစ်ပွားသည်ကို ပြောင်းလဲစေပြီး၊ မြို့ကြီးများစွာတွင် ထုပ်ပိုးထားသော အသားဝန်ဆောင်မှုများနှင့် အလုပ်အပ်နှင်းခံရသည့် သားသတ်လုပ်ငန်းများအပေါ် မှီခိုမှု တိုးလာလျက်ရှိပါတယ်။

စီးပွားရေးအရဆိုရင်၊ အီးဒ်သွလ်အသွာဟာဟာ တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူရေးစီးပွားရေးအတွက် ရာသီအလိုက် စျေးကွက်အရှိန်မြှင့်တင်ပေးမှုတစ်ခုအဖြစ် လည်း သက်ရောက်စေပါတယ်။ ကျေးလက်ဒေသထုတ်လုပ်သူများသည် စွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ကို အဓိကဝင်ငွေရကာလတစ်ခုအဖြစ် မှီခိုလေ့ရှိပြီး၊ လပေါင်းများစွာ တိရစ္ဆာန်မွေးမြူမှုကို ငွေကြေးစီးဆင်းမှု (ဝင်ငွေ) အဖြစ် အချိန်တိုအတွင်း ပြောင်းလဲရောင်းချကြတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဤရာသီပေါ် ဝယ်လိုအားသည် မွေးမြူရေးနှင့် အသေးစားလယ်သမားများအတွက် အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်းမှုကို အထောက်အကူပြုကာ၊ ကျေးလက်-မြို့ပြ စီးပွားရေးဆက်သွယ်မှုများကို အားဖြည့်ပေးပါတယ်။ သို့သော် ၎င်းသည် မတည်ငြိမ်မှုကိုလည်း ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေပြီး၊ အထူးသဖြင့် အီးဒ်မတိုင်မီရက်သတ္တပတ်များအတွင်း တိရစ္ဆာန်စျေးနှုန်းများ သိသိသာသာ မြင့်တက်လာတတ်ခြင်းသည့် မြို့ပြစျေးကွက်များတွင် အချို့သောအိမ်ထောင်စုများကို စွန့်လှုရာတွင် အပြည့်အဝပါဝင်နိုင်မှုမရှိအောင် ကန့်သတ်ထားသလိုဖြစ်စေပါတယ်။ ခေတ်သစ်ကုန်သွယ်မှုကွန်ရက်များသည် ဤသယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းအများစုကို လွှမ်းမိုးထားပြီး၊ အသေးစားထုတ်လုပ်သူများအတွက် လက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်မှုကို ဖန်တီးပေးသလို၊ စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ကြီးကြပ်မှုအတွက် စိန်ခေါ်မှုများလည်း ဖန်တီးပေးပါတယ်။

မျက်မှောက်ခေတ်ကာလတွင် အီးဒ်၏ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုကို ပုံဖော်နေသော အဓိကပြောင်းလဲမှုတစ်ခုမှာ ပွဲတော်ကို အခြေပြု၍ စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းသဘောသဘာဝ ပိုမိုကြီးထွားလာခြင်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ရိုးရာ၊ ရပ်ရွာဗဟိုပြု သားကောင်ကိုဇီဝိန်ချုပ်၍ စွန့်လှုခြင်းအလေ့အထများမှသည် စက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းဆန်ဆန်၊ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုအခြေပြု အီးဒ်စီးပွားရေးများဆီသို့ ကူးပြောင်းခြင်းသည် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ရောက်မှုအတွက် သိသာထင်ရှားဆုံး အနှုတ်လက္ခဏာဆောင်သည့် ဖိအားများထဲမှ တစ်ခုအဖြစ် ပေါ်ထွက်လာပါတယ်။

ဤစီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းတွင် ထုပ်ပိုးထားသော အသားပို့ဆောင်မှုဝန်ဆောင်မှုများ၊ သားကောင်းကို ဇီဝိန်ချုပ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ အဆောက်အအုံများ၊ ဗဟိုမှ ချုပ်ကိုင်သည့်တိရစ္ဆာန်စျေးကွက်များနှင့် စူပါမားကတ်များက မောင်းနှင်သည့် တိရစ္ဆာန်ဝယ်ယူမှုများ ပါဝင်ပါတယ်။ ဤစနစ်များသည် သန့်ရှင်းရေး၊ ထောက်ပံ့ပို့ဆောင်ရေးစွမ်းဆောင်ရည်နှင့် အဆင်ပြေမှုကို ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်စေနိုင်သော်လည်း၊ ထောက်ပံ့ရေးကွင်းဆက်၏ ရှုပ်ထွေးမှုကို တိုးမြှင့်စေပြီး သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေး၊ အအေးခန်းထားရှိမှုနှင့် ပြုပြင်ထုတ်လုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများမှတစ်ဆင့် စွမ်းအင်သုံးစွဲမှုကိုလည်း တိုးပွားစေပါတယ်။ အရေးကြီးတာက၊ ဤဖွဲ့စည်းပုံဆိုင်ရာ အသွင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုသည် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ အနှုတ်ပြသည့်အကျိုးဆက်များကို ပိုမိုပုံဖော်လာနေခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ဘာသာရေးထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာ အီးဒ်ပွဲတော်ကကိုယ်တိုင်က ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေတာမဟုတ်ပါဘူး။ ယနေ့ခေတ် အီးဒ်၏ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုမှုဆိုင်ရာ စိန်ခေါ်မှုသည် သားကောင်းကို စွန့်လှူရန် အသက်ဇီဝိန်ချုပ်ခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်မှ မဟုတ်ပဲ၊ ထိုစွန့်လှုမှုလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်၏ အတိုင်းအတာကြီးမားလာမှု၊ စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းအဖြစ်အဖြစ်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းနှင့် မြို့ပြနှင့် ပေါင်းစည်းလာမှုတို့ကြောင့် အဓိက ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

နည်းလမ်းများစွာဖြင့် စီးပွားဖြစ် အီးဒ်စနစ်ပုံစံဆီသို့ ကူးပြောင်းခြင်းသည် ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ စားသောက်ကုန်လုပ်ငန်းစီးပွားရေးတွင် ကျယ်ပြန့်သော အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုတစ်ခုကို ကိုယ်စားပြုပါတယ်။ ၎င်းမှာ ဒေသအလိုက်၊ လူမှုရေးအရ အခြေပြုထားသော အလေ့အထများမှ စက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းဆန်ဆန်၊ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုကို ဦးတည်သည့် စားသုံးမှုကွင်းဆက်များဆီသို့ ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဤအပြောင်းအလဲသည် ဘာသာရေးအရ စွန့်လှုပြန်လည်မျှဝေခြင်းယန္တရားကို အားနည်းစေပြီး၊ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင် ဗဟိုမှချုပ်ကိုင်သည့် ထောက်ပံ့ပို့ဆောင်ရေးနှင့် ထုပ်ပိုးမှုစွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းများမှတစ်ဆင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ခြေရာကို တိုးမြှင့်စေနိုင်ပါတယ်။ ဤသို့ဖြစ်၍ အီးဒ်စွန့်လွှတ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သတ်၍ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ ဆွေးနွေးငြင်းခုံမှုသည် မူလအစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာ၏ လမ်းညွှန်ချက်များနှင့် ၎င်းပတ်လည်တွင် ကြီးထွားလာသော စီးပွားရေးခေတ်သစ်စနစ်များကို ပိုင်းခြားသိမြင်ရန်လိုအပ်မည်ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ဤသို့ခွဲခြမ်းစိတ်ဖြာချက်အရ၊ အီးဒ်ဒွလ်အသွာဟာစွန့်လှုမှု၏ လူမှုရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ အကျိုးကျေးဇူးများကို ထိန်းသိမ်းပေးရင်း သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ရောက်မှုများကို လျှော့ချပေးနိုင်မယ့် မူဝါဒလမ်းညွှန်ချက်များစွာ ပေါ်ထွက်လာစေနိုင်ရန်အရေးကြီးတာကို တွေ့နိုင်ပါတယ်။

• ပထမဦးစွာ၊ အစိုးရများနှင့် ဒေသဆိုင်ရာမြူနီစပါယ်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် မြို့ပြအတွင်းရှိ စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှု ဖိအားကို လျှော့ချရေးနှင့် သန့်ရှင်းရေးနှင့် စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းထိန်းချုပ်မှုကို ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်စေမယ့် ဗဟိုချုပ်ကိုင်မှုလျှော့ချထားသော်လည်း စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းရှိသည့် သားသတ်ခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများတွင် ဖန်တီးရာတွင်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• ဒုတိယအနေဖြင့်၊ ရပ်ရွာအဆင့်တွင် အအေးခန်းကွင်းဆက်နှင့် အသားသိုလှောင်မှုစနစ်များကို အားဖြည့်ပေးခြင်းသည် စွန့်လှုမှုပွဲတော်ကာလအတွင်း ပျက်စီးယိုယွင်းမှုနှင့် အစားအစာစွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းကို သိသိသာသာ လျှော့ချပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• တတိယအနေဖြင့်၊ ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာပြီး တရားမျှတသော တိရစ္ဆာန်စျေးကွက်များကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးသည့် မူဝါဒများသည် စျေးနှုန်းမတည်ငြိမ်မှုကို တည်ငြိမ်စေရင်း အသေးစားလယ်သမားများကို ခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်သော ပွဲစားများထံမှ ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• စတုတ္ထအနေဖြင့်၊ ပွဲတော်အချိန်ကာလအတွက် အထူးဒီဇိုင်းထုတ်ထားသော တရားဝင်စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းစီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုစနစ်များ (ဥပမာ အော်ဂဲနစ်စွန့်ပစ်ပစ္စည်းစုဆောင်းခြင်းနှင့် ပြုပြင်ခြင်းစနစ်များ) ကို ပေါင်းစည်းခြင်းသည် မြို့ပြဗဟိုဌာနများတွင် ကာလတိုသဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ညစ်ညမ်းမှုကို လျှော့ချပေးနိုင်ပါတယ်။

• နောက်ဆုံးအနေဖြင့်၊ ရိုးရာအစဉ်အလာအတိုင်း အသားပြန်လည်ခွဲဝေခြင်းကွန်ရက်များ (ပရဟိတဖြန့်ဖြူးရေးစနစ်များ အပါအဝင်) ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ်ခြင်းနှင့် ပံ့ပိုးခြင်းသည် စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်း ကျယ်ပြန့်လာသည်နှင့်အမျှ အီးဒ်စွန့်လှုမှု၏ လူမှုတန်းတူညီမျှမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကျိုးကျေးဇူးများ ဆုံးရှုံးမသွားစေရန် ဂရုပြုရန်လိုအပ်ပါတယ်။

အချုပ်အားဖြင့်၊ အိီးဒ်အသွာဟာ၏ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုကို ၎င်း၏ ဘာသာရေးအခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်များတစ်ခုတည်းက ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်မဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ ခေတ်သစ်အစားအစာဖြန့်ဝေရေး စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုစနစ်များက ၎င်း၏ကျင့်သုံးမှုကို မည်သို့ထိန်းညှိပေးနိုင်မလဲ ဆိုသည့်အချက်က အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပါတယ်။

စီးပွားဖြစ်လုပ်ငန်းများ အရှိန်မြှင့်လာသည်နှင့်အမျှ၊ အဓိကစိန်ခေါ်မှုမှာ အသားစွန့်လှုမှုအီးဒ်ရှိသင့်၊ မရှိသင့်ဆိုတာမဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ ခေတ်စနစ်နှင့်အညီ ပြောင်းလဲလာသော အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများကို သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ ခံနိုင်ရည်ရှိမှု၊ လူမှုတန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် စီးပွားရေးအရအကျိုးအမြတ်ရနိုင်မှုတို့ကြား မည်သို့ မျှတအောင် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်မလဲဆိုတာပဲ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

တင်သျှိုင်းအောင်သည် ပေါ်တူဂီနိုင်ငံ လစ္စဘွန်းတက္ကသိုလ် မှ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲ၍ဟန်ချက်ညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ သုတေသီတစ်ဦးဖြစ်ဦး လက်ရှိတွင် ရွှေတောင်သာဂသူစင်တာ၏ အတိုင်ပင်ခံဒါရိုက်တာလည်း ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

“ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ရေးလှုံ့ဆော်ရင်းအနာဂတ်ကိုတည်ဆောက်ကြစို့”

Help Sustain The Sabai - Myanmar’s Voice for Sustainable Development Support The Sabai

Myanmar is facing a severe and often hidden mental health crisis, shaped by ongoing conflict and systemic disruption. This article examines the key drivers, impacts, and current responses to mental health challenges within the country’s polycrisis context.

Key Takeawys:

• Myanmar’s mental health crisis is driven by conflict and systemic limitations, creating both visible and invisible burdens.

• Community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible short-term solutions.

• Long-term progress depends on political stability and sustained system strengthening.

Political unrest has severe effects on population health, particularly increasing the mental health burden. People living in conflict settings commonly experience anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, and suicidal thoughts. Evidence from Afghanistan and Ukraine also shows high levels of PTSD and depression in conflict settings.

In Myanmar, the ongoing conflict has led to a sharp rise in mental health problems. Depression and anxiety increased from 14.3% and 22.2% in mid-2021 to 61.39% and 58.02% by October, and by late 2022, one in four people experienced moderately severe to severe depression. Therefore, mental health remains a severe and often hidden public health crisis.

Mental Health in Myanmar’s Polycrisis Context

Mental health is not regarded as a priority due to competing needs, as families struggle to survive in a context of multiple overlapping crises. In 2021, a military coup overthrew the elected government, triggering widespread anti-coup protests across Myanmar. These peaceful demonstrations were met with violence, human rights violations, and attacks on civilians. Many people were killed, arrested, or displaced, and repression later expanded beyond protesters, with journalists being killed or detained. Women have also faced sexual violence, causing lasting psychological trauma. Forced conscription of adults aged 18 and above into frontline conflict pushed many young people to flee abroad or move to urban areas. At the same time, three in four Myanmar youths are no longer engaged in education or training due to unsafe learning environments, unaffordable educational costs, and limited scholarship opportunities, particularly among low- and middle-income families. As a result, many youths, who are essential to the country’s future resilience and recovery, face growing distress and anxiety over an uncertain future.

Ongoing conflict has displaced thousands of families, leaving them without adequate shelter or basic services, while also causing family separation. At the same time, the targeting of social service providers and the withdrawal of government workers under the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) have significantly weakened essential public services, including healthcare. Many CDM workers face arrests, torture, and threats against their families. Some are forced to move between safe houses for safety. In addition, the military regime has restricted passport issuance for CDM workers and increased questioning and detention at airports to prevent them from leaving the country. Without documentation and under constant risk of arrest or imprisonment, many CDM members continue to live in fear, insecurity, and anxiety.

Since the coup, inflation has risen to 28.58%, while the poverty rate reached 32.10%, leaving nearly one-third of the population in poverty. Agricultural productivity has declined by 16%, and around 15 million people are at risk of food insecurity. Meanwhile, the cost of essential goods and unemployment have both increased significantly. Salaries, however, have remained largely unchanged, making even daily commuting a financial burden. Many can no longer afford basic leisure or personal items. Some are forced to skip meals or reduce spending. Under such conditions, survival takes priority over mental health care, which costs between $7 and $12 per session.

Stigma is another major barrier. Mental health problems are often viewed as a source of shame, linked to evil spirits or karma, reflecting a limited understanding. Seeking professional care remains highly stigmatized, making people reluctant to access services. Many fear burdening others, hospitalization, or discussing their condition. As a result, individuals often endure problems silently and hide their condition, leading to underestimation of mental health needs.

The lack of adequate mental health care further worsens the situation. There is a major imbalance between professionals, facilities, and patients, especially between urban and rural areas. Only 1.4% of government health spending is allocated to mental health, and although the National Mental Health Policy (2021–2025) was approved, its implementation has stalled due to political unrest and limited resources. Consequently, stigma, low awareness, and limited access to care continue to deteriorate mental health outcomes.

At the same time, Myanmar citizens face additional crises such as COVID-19, cyclones, and earthquakes, causing loss of loved ones, livelihoods, and housing, creating compounded trauma. When these crises overlap, their impacts intensify, making recovery extremely difficult. Weak disaster governance and poor preparedness further worsen these impacts.

As a result, many Myanmar people are carrying invisible wounds. Rising prices have made simple activities unaffordable for many. Rising crime and worsening public transport have increased insecurity. Safety concerns also extend online, as user data has been handed over to the military. Daily life is further disrupted by power cuts, fuel shortages, and strict refuelling limits, while travel restrictions and detentions limit mobility. Anxiety has become a daily reality, driven by insecurity, forced conscription, limited opportunities, and uncertainty about the future.

The Hidden Costs of Mental Health Crisis

The psychological impact of the Myanmar polycrisis does not end with ceasefire agreements. It may contribute to trans-generational trauma, shaping families and communities. For example, people born in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide have experienced trauma passed down over time. Children are especially vulnerable, as violence and displacement impair development and learning. In some cases, trauma may alter gene expression, increasing the risk of future mental health problems and creating cycles of inherited distress.

Mental health issues not only affect a person’s mind but also their physical health. They can lead to alcohol and substance abuse, as well as other coping behaviors, and in severe cases, suicide. Anxiety and chronic stress can significantly reduce work productivity and income, while also placing emotional and economic burdens on families. High out-of-pocket healthcare costs further strain households. Over time, it contributes to reduced human capacity and increased pressure on the country’s overall economic and social systems.

Current Responses and Limitations

The institutional infrastructure, regulation, and oversight of mental health services in Myanmar remain limited, with a significant imbalance between care providers and patients. Individuals with severe mental distress require professional support at higher levels of the Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) care pyramid. Due to system neglect, cultural beliefs, and stigma, many rely on traditional approaches such as support from Buddhist monks, religious practices, or meditation. Online community groups also provide peer support. While useful for daily coping, these methods are not sufficient for severe conditions.

Mobile psychiatric clinics offer free services through periodic community visits, but this may increase workload and burnout among providers. Earlier efforts to integrate mental health into primary healthcare were also not fully implemented. The parallel government, NUG, prioritizes mental health by offering free telemental health services and awareness campaigns. However, the lack of in-person care limits support for frontline and on-ground individuals, especially those who have lost family members or suffered severe injuries, requiring intensive emotional support. For instance, some civilians have survived junta airstrike while losing family members. Such experiences leave survivors with severe trauma while caring for remaining family members with little or no access to mental health support.

NGOs and international organisations, such as UNFPA, also contribute through online platforms and training programs. At the same time, there has been a rise in short-term training courses, many lacking regulation and proper standards. Some individuals with minimal training offer services, raising safety and quality concerns. While approaches like Psychological First Aid are useful, they should be part of a broader system with proper training and supervision. More structured, evidence-based counselling programmes are needed.

Comments and Way Forward

Given the current polycrisis, community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible in the short term. However, long-term improvement requires a coordinated approach that includes policy reform, workforce strengthening, awareness, and integration into primary healthcare. Political stability is also critical due to its direct and indirect impacts on mental health systems and overall well-being. At the primary care level, clear guidelines and better training are required. Community volunteers can provide basic psychosocial support locally. Reducing stigma is critical. Community-based outreach, culturally appropriate education, and engagement with local and religious leaders are essential. Digital campaigns can reach wider populations. Mental health information should also be provided in multiple ethnic languages to reflect Myanmar’s diversity.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s mental health crisis is deeply shaped by the current polycrisis, making it widespread and complex. While existing responses provide some relief, they remain insufficient for long-term needs. Addressing this crisis requires coordinated efforts, along with improved political stability, to strengthen systems, reduce stigma, and expand access to care.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Myanmar is a resource-rich country with abundant deposits of jade, gold, and rare earth minerals, yet it faces increasing environmental degradation and social harm.

Key Takeaways:

1. Weak governance, not resource scarcity, is the main driver of environmental degradation and social harm in Myanmar’s mining sector.

2. The benefits of mining are concentrated among powerful actors, while local communities bear the environmental, health, and livelihood costs.

3. Unregulated extraction is linked to conflict economies and cross-border impacts, making mining a regional governance and sustainability issue.

Introduction

Mining activities often fail to comply with laws and Environmental Impact Assessment procedures, leading to land loss, water scarcity, and severe pollution that directly affect local communities. This pattern reflects a long history of extractive waves driven by global demand. Since the 2021 military coup, governance breakdown has accelerated unregulated mining, intensifying these impacts. Mining in Myanmar is therefore not only an environmental issue, but also a broader social and governance crisis.

Background: Mining and Governance Context

Myanmar’s mining sector has long been central to its economy, supported by abundant deposits of minerals such as tin, tungsten, copper, jade, and gemstones, and shaped by successive political regimes from independence to military rule and partial democratisation. Across these periods, mining has expanded under different governance systems, but weak enforcement of environmental laws and fragmented control among the government, military, ethnic armed groups, and foreign actors have limited effective oversight.

During the post-independence period (1948–1962), the government sought to develop the mining sector through national planning and partnerships with foreign companies, but progress was constrained by internal conflict and limited institutional capacity. Under military rule (1962–2010), mining governance became increasingly centralised yet opaque, with the expansion of state control and military-linked enterprises alongside widespread illegal and artisanal mining, leading to growing environmental degradation and social impacts. Many laws and governance structures during this period were still based on outdated colonial-era legal frameworks. The democratic transition period (2011–2021) introduced legal reforms and opened the sector to foreign investment, but governance remained weak, as the Permanent Secretaries of every ministry were appointed by the previous administration, which created a barrier for the NLD-appointed ministers to plan for the reform.

Since the 2021 military coup, these challenges have intensified as the rule of law deteriorated and illegal mining activities surged, contributing to widespread deforestation and environmental damage. International sanctions reduced foreign investment, pushing the military regime to rely more heavily on natural resources to finance its operations. This has accelerated the expansion of rare earth mining, particularly in border regions controlled by armed groups and foreign-linked actors. On the other hand, after the 2021 coup, environmental and climate-related initiatives were disrupted as international funding withdrew, and many civil society organisations reduced or redirected their activities due to political instability and security concerns. As a result, Myanmar’s mining sector increasingly reflects an “open-access” system, where overlapping authorities and weak governance enable uncontrolled extraction and concentration of benefits among powerful actors.

Governance Framework and Its Gaps

Myanmar has established a formal governance framework to regulate its mining sector, including the Myanmar Mines Law (2015), Mining Rules (2018), and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures, which require companies to minimize environmental damage and comply with environmental standards. These frameworks are supported by institutional oversight from the Environmental Conservation Department (ECD), and in principle align with international practices by incorporating environmental management plans and compliance requirements. However, while regulatory systems exist, their implementation remains weak. Even before 2021, only a small proportion of EIA-related reports were approved due to limited institutional capacity and poor-quality submissions, highlighting long-standing weaknesses in enforcement that have likely worsened under current governance conditions. Monitoring is also inadequate, as compliance inspections are often conducted only in response to complaints rather than through regular enforcement mechanisms.

Significant governance gaps persist across the sector. Transparency and accountability are limited, with local communities often lacking access to information about mining projects and decision-making processes. The post-coup crisis also weakened local civil society participation, as many organisations reduced environmental activities and some community leaders were arrested or unable to engage due to security risks. Overlapping authorities and unclear jurisdiction further complicate governance, while enforcement of regulations remains weak during project implementation. In many cases, consultation processes are superficial and can be influenced by economic incentives or pressure, undermining genuine community participation. As a result, governance in Myanmar’s mining sector exists formally through laws and regulations, but fails functionally in practice.

Governance Breakdown in Practice

In practice, governance of Myanmar’s mining sector is highly fragmented, with control divided among military-linked actors, ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), and foreign stakeholders, particularly in border regions. These actors operate with limited coordination, and local communities are largely excluded from decision-making processes despite being directly affected by mining activities. Rather than approaching natural resources from a sustainable development perspective, many military actors and armed groups increasingly treat mining as a source of revenue to strengthen their financial and political position during the ongoing conflict. In many areas, extractive projects are closely tied to political and economic interests, where access to resources provides both financial benefits and strategic power for armed groups and elites.

Mining is deeply embedded in Myanmar’s conflict economy. Revenues generated from resource extraction often fund armed actors, reinforcing cycles of conflict and instability. In regions such as Kachin State, ethnic armed organisations have taken on governance-like roles, controlling mining activities and taxation systems linked to cross-border trade. At the same time, China acts as a double-edged sword by engaging with both the military and ethnic armed groups, while exploiting Myanmar’s weak rule of law to sustain continued extraction and secure access to rare earth minerals for global markets.

Since the 2021 military coup, these dynamics have intensified. The breakdown of law and order has led to a surge in illegal and informal mining, especially in remote areas. The number of rare earth mining sites has increased rapidly, reflecting a broader expansion of unregulated extraction. As governance weakens, mining activities continue to grow without effective oversight, prioritising short-term gains over environmental sustainability and social protection.

Environmental Costs

Mining activities in Myanmar have caused severe environmental damage, particularly to water resources. The use of toxic chemicals such as mercury, cyanide, and acids contaminates rivers and groundwater, making water unsafe for drinking, agriculture, and aquatic life. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining along the Ayeyarwady River has long served as an important livelihood strategy for local communities with limited economic alternatives. In some mining areas, water samples have been found to pose substantial risks to ecosystems and are entirely unsuitable for human use. These impacts are intensified by the expansion of large-scale and mechanized mining, which increases pressure on water resources and contributes to widespread pollution. Evidence from border areas shows that toxic discharge from mining has entered tributaries linked to the Thanlwin (Salween) system, contaminating downstream water sources and affecting agriculture and fisheries in nearby communities.

Deforestation and land degradation are also major consequences of mining. Forest clearing for extraction has led to significant forest loss, estimated at around 46,000 hectares, particularly in resource-rich regions such as Kachin and Sagaing. Mining activities accelerate soil erosion, reduce agricultural productivity, and damage local ecosystems. Biodiversity loss follows as habitats are destroyed and ecosystems collapse, affecting both terrestrial and aquatic species.

Environmental disasters, including landslides and flooding, are increasingly common in mining areas, causing long-term ecological damage and risks to human life. These impacts are not accidental but are directly linked to weak governance systems. Historically, Myanmar’s governance system has prioritized state revenue collection, including taxes on the extraction of state-owned resources. Without effective regulation and accountability, mining continues to operate unsustainably, while the exclusion of local communities from decision-making further limits environmental protection.

Social Costs of Mining

Mining in Myanmar also imposes high social costs, particularly on communities living near extraction sites. Livelihoods are increasingly undermined as agricultural land is lost to mining activities and access to forests and clean water is reduced, contributing to long-term economic insecurity. In many cases, mining operations have damaged homes, farmland, and community spaces without compensation, leaving local populations with limited means of recovery.

Public health risks are also severe. Exposure to contaminated water and toxic chemicals has led to respiratory illnesses, skin diseases, and other chronic health conditions among both workers and nearby communities. A health survey conducted in an artisanal and small-scale gold mining community in Mandalay Region found that 9 out of 18 miners showed warning levels of mercury contamination, while 3 out of 18 miners displayed neurological signs and symptoms associated with chronic mercury intoxication. Workers face especially dangerous conditions, including frequent landslides and accidents in mining areas. For example, deadly jade mine collapses in Kachin State have killed hundreds of miners in recent years, highlighting the extreme risks associated with poorly regulated extraction. Many workers receive little or no medical support or compensation, even in cases of injury or death.

The risks and benefits are unequally distributed, while local communities have little opportunity to raise concerns under the military regime. Profits are concentrated among powerful actors such as military-linked groups and foreign stakeholders, while local communities bear the environmental and social burdens. Mining revenues also contribute to conflict, reinforcing instability in resource-rich regions. Weak governance enables this imbalance, shifting the costs of extraction onto vulnerable populations while concentrating gains among those with power.

Why This Is a Governance Issue

The environmental and social impacts of mining in Myanmar should not be understood as isolated outcomes of extractive activities, but as symptoms of deeper governance failures. At its core, the issue is not the existence of mining itself, but the conditions under which it operates. Sustainability means maintaining the equilibrium among social, economic, and environmental well-being through effective governance. After the coup weakened governance, the entire system came under stress, showing that this is fundamentally a governance issue. In the case of Mogok’s ruby mines, control over the area has shifted between the junta and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), with reports indicating that the TNLA returned the area following China-mediated negotiations and diplomatic pressure. These challenges are further worsened by political instability, forming part of a broader polycrisis in which conflict, economic pressures, and environmental degradation reinforce one another. In this context, mining reflects deep-rooted dynamics of power, control, and conflict.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Myanmar’s mining crisis is not only environmental, but also deeply social and rooted in governance failures. Its impacts extend beyond national borders, as pollution from mining contaminates rivers and ecosystems in neighboring countries such as Thailand, while broader environmental decline contributes to regional instability and displacement. Addressing these challenges requires stronger enforcement, improved transparency and accountability, and conflict-sensitive resource governance. Similarly, local communities must be meaningfully included in decision-making processes. Looking ahead to 2026, ongoing political uncertainty and parallel governance structures will continue to shape the sector. Myanmar is going to face more and more climate-related disasters, and this could increase the vulnerability of local communities. Without governance reform, resource wealth will continue to drive environmental degradation and social inequality rather than sustainable development.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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The devastating earthquake in Myanmar has exposed the junta’s mismanagement.

Key takeaways:

• Myanmar’s military regime has prioritised its interest in fuelling the war and maintaining political control over disaster preparation, worsening the earthquake devastation.

• Discrimination under the junta has left minority communities more vulnerable to the earthquake’s impact.

• The military’s post-quake response shows continued mismanagement and disregard for the Myanmar people.

Already struggling under the weight of the world’s longest-running civil war, genocide, war crimes, and climate-related disasters, Myanmar was struck by a devastating earthquake on March 28th. The magnitude 7.7 tremor, centred along the Sagaing Fault, caused a slip of up to five meters within just ninety seconds. This catastrophic event, followed by a magnitude 6.4 aftershock, wreaked havoc across major cities, including Mandalay, Nay Pyi Taw, and Sagaing, as well as historic towns such as Ava and Amarapura. Even in Yangon, hundreds of miles away, people fled into the streets as buildings swayed violently.

By May 9th, Myanmar’s military-run state media had reported over 3,800 deaths, with more than 5,000 injured. However, local sources suggest the actual toll could be significantly higher, with the US Geological Survey estimating that the final death count could exceed 10,000. In response, the military junta declared a week of national mourning, with flags flown at half-mast until April 6th.

Seismologists Judith A. Hubbard and Kyle Bradley noted that, “As with all great earthquakes on known active faults, this M7.7 earthquake was both completely expected (the location and magnitude), and completely unexpected (the timing).” This observation raises a critical question: What disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures, if any, did Myanmar have in place before the quake, and how has the government handled disaster management in its aftermath?

Myanmar military’s mismanagement

Since gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar has been dominated by military rule, which has profoundly shaped its political landscape. From direct military governance and the so-called Myanmar Way to Socialism to a power-sharing arrangement under the 2008 Constitution, military control has remained a central feature. The 2008 Constitution granted the military 25% of parliamentary seats, control over key ministries, and the power to nominate a vice president. However, in 2021, the military, led by third-generation dictator Min Aung Hlaing, staged a coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Since seizing power, the junta has severely undermined Myanmar’s disaster risk management and climate adaptation efforts, which had been gradually developed under semi-democratic administrations between 2011 and 2021. Despite adopting the National Disaster Management Law in 2013, the military has largely ignored the Myanmar National Framework for Community Disaster Resilience, a critical guideline for building community-level disaster preparedness.

The Myanmar Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction was once a vital blueprint for enhancing community resilience and preparing for natural disasters. However, following the 2021 coup, the junta shifted its priorities dramatically, diverting vast resources to its military operations. In the fiscal year 2024-25, the military allocated a staggering 41 trillion kyats (≅ €17.38 billion) to sustain its ongoing civil war—a record-high figure—while quietly siphoning 400 billion kyats ≅ €169.6 million) from the Myanmar National Disaster Management Fund. Initially intended for disaster relief, this money was rerouted into the State Economic Promotion Fund, aimed at propping up an economy battered by international sanctions. In essence, the junta prioritised its grip on power over protecting its citizens from foreseeable disasters.

This raises a critical question: If scientists had long warned of the seismic risks along the Sagaing Fault, why did the military divert essential disaster funds elsewhere? How frequently were residents in cities like Mandalay, Nay Pyi Taw, or Sagaing provided with earthquake awareness programs or preparedness drills? While the collapse of ancient pagodas, mosques, and churches can partly be attributed to their age, the structural failure of modern buildings, such as the Sky Villa and the newly built Buddhist monastery complex in Mandalay, exposes glaring deficiencies in enforcing construction regulations.

Additionally, this disaster highlights broader concerns about the rule of law in Myanmar. Were construction sites properly inspected to ensure compliance with building standards? Did negligence play a role in the collapse of buildings that should have been able to withstand seismic shocks? Or is systemic corruption from high-ranking officials like Min Aung Hlaing down to junior officers ultimately responsible for these failures? The military’s mismanagement of disaster preparedness and infrastructure safety further underscores its incompetence as a governing body.

Moreover, the higher death toll from last year’s Typhoon Yagi in Myanmar, despite the storm striking indirectly, compared to Vietnam, a country directly in the typhoon’s path, serves as another stark example of the military’s failure in disaster response and management.

A Nationalist agenda and systemic discrimination

The military’s nationalist agenda and decades-long discriminatory policies have also exacerbated the earthquake’s devastation. Centuries-old mosques, many of which had been denied even basic maintenance, such as leak repairs to prevent water damage, suffered extensive damage. Reports indicate that over 130 mosques were destroyed, with more than 700 Burmese Muslims dying during Friday prayers. This disproportionate death rate compared with just 5% of the Burmese Muslim population in Myanmar highlights deliberate neglect and systemic discrimination, the military’s direct responsibility for preventable deaths, exposing its failure to protect all communities during a disaster.

This raises another critical question: In the aftermath of the earthquake, will the military permit the rebuilding of collapsed mosques and churches, or will its oppressive policies continue to obstruct the restoration of vital places of worship for minority communities? The answer to this question will determine whether the junta is genuinely willing to support all communities in their recovery or whether it will persist in its pattern of exclusion and discrimination.

The military’s recent actions are telling, it has refused to allow international media into Myanmar to cover earthquake updates, continued bombing civilian areas, rejected a ceasefire request from revolutionary forces, and blocked a Taiwanese rescue team from assisting victims. Additionally, it made the controversial decision to reschedule the national Grade 12 examination on June 16th for students in earthquake-affected regions, such as Mandalay and Sagaing, following the destruction of their original answer sheets in a fire at Mandalay University caused by the earthquake. While the students have no responsibility since they have done what they need to do, these inhumane actions reflect a regime disconnected from the needs of the people it claims to govern, showing little concern for the suffering of its citizens.

Despite saffron washing itself as the protector of Myanmar and its dominant religion, Buddhism, the military’s actions have plunged the country into a state of polycrisis, exacerbating both natural and man-made disasters. Its reckless mismanagement and discriminatory policies have left Myanmar more vulnerable to future disasters, revealing the depth of its governance failures.

Conclusion

The military’s failure to prioritise disaster preparedness, mismanagement of vital resources, and systemic discrimination are the underlying causes of the catastrophic damage caused by the earthquake in Myanmar. As the country struggles to recover, it is painfully clear that the military’s incompetence has deepened the crisis, leaving its citizens to bear the brunt of the devastation. The junta’s refusal to address these systemic issues and its continued disregard for the well-being of Myanmar’s diverse communities make it increasingly clear that it is unfit to govern. It must be held accountable for its failures, as the evidence of its mismanagement continues to mount.

Tin Shine Aung is the Consulting Director at the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). In addition to his professional roles, Tin Shine Aung is pursuing a PhD in Sustainability Science at the University of Lisbon, Portugal.

The 2026 Israel-Iran war is shaking up energy markets around the world. In Myanmar, this has led to fuel shortages, rising costs, and greater pressure on agriculture and people’s livelihoods.

Key Takeaways

• Myanmar’s heavy reliance on imported fuel (over 90%) leaves it highly exposed to global disruptions, with instability in the Strait of Hormuz triggering shortages, price spikes, and long fuel queues domestically.

• Rising fuel and fertiliser costs are disrupting agriculture, reducing productivity, and increasing food prices, putting pressure on farmers and worsening food insecurity across the country.

• Fragmented government policies, combined with crony control of sectors like the EV market, allow elites to benefit during the crisis while ordinary citizens face shortages, higher living costs, and limited access to resources.

Introduction

The U.S.-Israel-Iran war, often known as the 2026 Iran war, started on February 28, 2026. Coordinated Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran started the conflict, which rapidly intensified once the Iranian supreme leader and civilians were killed. As the Middle East is a key hub for energy production and international shipping routes, instability in the region can have widespread economic consequences. One of the most critical factors is the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping route between Iran and Oman. It is one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, with around a quarter of global crude oil shipments passing through it daily. On April 22, WTI crude futures stayed above $89 per barrel after peace talks between the US and Iran failed, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is mostly blocked.

These problems have had significant effects on global supply chains, especially because fuel prices are going up and energy flows are being limited. Myanmar is especially vulnerable because it is an underdeveloped country that has been affected by internal conflict and relies heavily on imported fuel, which makes up more than 90% of its domestic consumption. Myanmar relies heavily on suppliers in the region, like Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. They are also imposing export controls as a precaution because of global uncertainty, while domestic production in Myanmar accounts for only about 3% of consumption. This article argues that the Israel-Iran War has intensified Myanmar’s economic fragility by disrupting fuel imports, increasing agricultural costs, and worsening economic inequality, while exposing governance limitations and policy gaps.

Why is Myanmar highly vulnerable?

1 Dependence on Structure and Energy Insecurity

Dependency theory explains why Myanmar is so vulnerable to the global fuel crisis. It shows how economies on the edge rely on resources from outside the nation’s borders. Approximately 90–95% of the petroleum products that the country uses come from other countries, which shows that it is dependent heavily on foreign sources. At the same time, there isn’t sufficient refining capacity in the country, and local production only meets a small part of national demand. In the largest city, Yangon, long queues at gas stations usually take around 5 hours to buy the limited amount of petrol in the heat, which causes fainting. Myanmar’s ability to import fuel is limited by insufficient foreign exchange reserves, resulting in this structural imbalance being significantly worse. Because of this, outside shocks, like problems with the global oil supply, lead to shortages and higher prices at the national level.

2 Insufficient Oil Production despite oilfields

Experts and former oil industry workers say that Myanmar does make crude oil, although it can’t refine it adequately for use in the country, so it has to rely heavily on imported fuel. One big reason is that the country’s refinery factories are old and do not have the latest technology, so they can’t turn crude oil into high-quality petroleum that meets industrial standards. Also, crude oil made in the area is often of low quality and needs chemical refining, which makes things more expensive and complicated. The situation is even worse because there isn’t enough electricity, and there are security problems in some oil-producing areas that have been controlled by local revolutionary forces. Limited government budgets also make it hard to invest in refinery and energy infrastructure improvements. In consequence of this, Myanmar is still structurally dependent on foreign refined fuel, even though it holds its own oil resources.

3 Agricultural Sector in Myanmar

The Iran conflict is also impacting the availability of critical raw materials. The region is a major exporter of fertilisers, petrochemicals, and energy-based products used in agriculture and manufacturing. Any disruption would strike the imports of Myanmar fertilisers worth over USD 500 million a year. People are queuing to purchase fuel to irrigate their fields and harvest their summer rice fields during this summer rice planting season, and it is difficult to get plenty to plant in their farms. A severe shortage of diesel, necessary for agricultural machinery, threatens food security. The increase in diesel price and oil shortage is leading to unable to operate their tractors and irrigation pumps for rice farming, as well as transportation to the market. Farmers are struggling with fuel prices, which are nearing 4,000 kyats per litre. Planting could be delayed, and yields could drop. On 21 March, Myanmar Rice Federation (MRF) made a statement, urging the stakeholders in the industry to avoid panic buying of fuel and fertilizers. However, MRF cannot control fuel prices or global shortages directly. The price of agricultural products, especially in the rice market, will dramatically increase along with the other food markets if the situation continues in the next three months.

4 Vulnerability of Myanmar Civilians

The crisis is not limited to farmers, but it is also severely affecting day-to-day workers who depend on transportation to earn a living. Low-income workers, particularly trishaw drivers (scooters with sidecars used for local passenger transport), taxi drivers, and those commuting daily from suburban or rural areas, are facing escalating fuel costs. As a result, their income is shrinking while the cost of essential goods continues to rise. At the same moment, the government’s increased airstrikes on civilian areas are compounding these hardships by disrupting local economies, displacing communities, and increasing insecurity. Recent reports say that airstrikes have killed hundreds of civilians in many areas and caused a lot of damage to schools, clinics, and religious buildings. This doubled pressure, economic strain from the fuel crisis, and continuous airstrikes make it even more challenging for civilians.

Government and NUG Responses

1 Government’s Actions

The head of Myanmar’s junta, Min Aung Hlaing, has swapped his uniform for the top civilian office and become the president on 3 April. In response to the worsening fuel crisis triggered by the Israel-Iran conflict, the new regime led by President Min Aung Hlaing has implemented a series of short-term measures to reduce domestic fuel consumption. Between March 7 and April 3, authorities introduced multiple fuel control systems, including the odd–even license plate policy, which disrupted transportation-dependent businesses, reducing operating capacity and income for logistics providers, small traders, and service workers. The old and revised Barcode/QR distribution systems a mechanism that allocate fuel based on vehicle engine type. This QR system has revealed systemic misconduct that goes beyond inefficiency. Because of the system’s reliance on static data, legal owners are unable to access their own fuel quotas, allowing actors with fake license plates to take control of them. In addition to making illegal trade easier, this crack puts car owners who are harmed by a flawed regulatory system under a great deal of financial and psychological strain. Also, authorities are conducting office work from home on Wednesdays of each week. These rapidly changing policies suggest a lack of preparedness for an urgent crisis of this scale. At the same time, Energy Minister U Ko Ko Lwin travelled to China and Russia, where discussions focused on long-term fuel imports at lower prices, including electricity cooperation and fertiliser imports, but the implementation will not solve the current economic recession.

On the other hand, ASEAN countries have taken steps to lessen the economic shock. For instance, Malaysia has fiscal space in its budget to deal with outside pressures because its currency is stable, inflation is under control, and its bond markets are strong. Indonesia has set aside about 381.3 trillion rupiah (about USD 22.5 billion) for energy subsidies. This includes paying state-owned businesses to keep fuel and electricity prices low. The Philippines has also introduced targeted subsidies to help with rising oil prices and the costs of basic goods. Vietnam, on the other hand, has taken proactive steps to make sure that fuel supplies stay stable during global disruptions.

However, Myanmar lacks comparable fiscal power or policy flexibility. The current regime already relies on printing money to make up for its budget shortfall, so it is unlikely to give out a lot of subsidies. Instead, it is focusing on getting fuel for the military instead of for civilians. In consequence of this, farmers, workers, and low-income families bear an unfair share of the burden of rising food and fuel prices, making the situation harder for those who are already struggling financially and starving.

2 Cronies & Myanmar EV market

Myanmar’s electric vehicle (EV) market is largely controlled by businesses linked to Min Aung Hlaing’s family, particularly his children, who dominate EV imports and distribution. This reflects their close ties, through crony capitalism, to the current president, who emerged from the widely criticised 2025 “sham election.” The existing regulatory framework is biased in favour of military-related organizations, and competition is restricted, which contributes to economic inequality. During the current Israel-Iran conflict, the public was restricted to fuel, including the “odd-even” policy, which exempted EVs, which boosted the demand artificially in a market dominated by military-related companies. As a result, EV prices surged dramatically, with some models rising from around 195 million (about US$44,318) to 285 million kyats ($64,777). This lack of regulation permits price fixing and monopoly, which explains how patronage networks can help elites to make money under crisis circumstances, as normal citizens remain trapped in fuel shortages and rising living costs.

2 Role of NUG in the Oil Shortage

The National Unity Government (NUG) has responded to Myanmar’s fuel crisis, mainly in areas under its control. It has introduced a fuel transit permit system to regulate and monitor petroleum flows, requiring official approval for transportation into regions such as Kachin, Chin, and Rakhine, primarily to prevent supplies from reaching the military junta. However, this policy has created friction with Chin and Rakhine allies, as this letter can create potential dissent among the public. The NUG also uses fuel control as a wartime strategy to weaken the regime’s logistics capacity. However, these restrictions have contributed to local shortages, higher prices, and logistical delays in some areas. Overall, its role is indirect and politically driven rather than solving structural fuel supply problems.

Recommendation & Implementation

1. Myanmar should monitor and adjust fuel allocation policies, learning from successful practices in neighbouring countries to reduce the risk of severe fuel shortages.

2. The country needs to strategically diversify fuel import channels, expand national energy reserves, and reduce dependence on limited external suppliers.

3. The NUG, EAOs, and other local defence forces should reach a mutual consensus on fuel management strategies and oil control policies to prevent misuse by military actors.

4. In the long term, the agricultural sector must transition from fuel-dependent mechanised farming to a hybrid resilience model, combining limited diesel use with renewable energy and cooperative farming systems.

5. Above all, Myanmar needs political stability since no technological or economic programme can be successfully implemented or maintained in the absence of transparent institutions and decent administration.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s crisis illustrates how geopolitical conflicts can deepen economic instability in vulnerable states, highlighting the urgent need for resilience-building policies. Energy prices are a key factor in supply chain operations because industries such as the agricultural sector, the manufacturing sector, and logistics depend heavily on fuel. When oil and gas prices increase, transportation and production costs rise, profit margins shrink, and consumers face higher prices. This creates ongoing pressure for supply chain professionals to improve efficiency and manage cost fluctuations effectively.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

Key Takeaways

• AI strengthens state power in fragile authoritarian contexts by expanding capacity without sufficient accountability, increasing risks of surveillance and misuse.

• AI amplifies existing systems of propaganda by accelerating and scaling disinformation and narrative control.

• AI-driven development can deepen inequality due to unequal data representation, digital access gaps, and low levels of AI literacy.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly embedded in governance systems worldwide, reshaping public administration, security infrastructures, and service delivery mechanisms. Governments are adopting AI-driven tools not only to enhance efficiency but also to advance development objectives aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in healthcare, education, and economic growth.

In response, a growing number of jurisdictions have developed AI governance frameworks emphasising risk-based regulation, data protection, and ethical standards. Prominent examples include the frameworks advanced by the EU AI Act, the OECD AI Principles, and the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. These models promote transparency, accountability, and human-centred AI.

However, these frameworks largely presuppose the existence of stable democratic institutions, regulatory capacity, and accountability mechanisms. Using Myanmar as a case study, this article argues that AI does not simply enhance governance in fragile and authoritarian contexts; it also reshapes state power, amplifies information control, and risks reinforcing structural inequality.

Artificial Intelligence and Governance under Polycrisis

Artificial intelligence has the potential to transform development outcomes across sectors. In healthcare, AI supports disease detection and treatment optimisation; in agriculture, it enables precision farming and climate adaptation; and in education, it expands access through digital learning platforms. These applications highlight AI’s potential to support inclusive development. However, the effectiveness of AI depends heavily on governance conditions. Its impact is increasingly shaped by what scholars describe as a polycrisis, the intersection of multiple, overlapping crises such as political instability, economic disruption, technological change, and information disorder. In contexts like Myanmar, these crises do not occur in isolation. Political instability following the 2021 Myanmar Coup, combined with digital fragmentation, economic constraints, and social inequalities, creates a complex environment in which AI systems are introduced and deployed.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often framed as a tool for enhancing state capacity. Yet in contexts where governance structures are weak, it may instead produce unaccountable capacity. In Myanmar:

• Regulatory institutions are limited

• Legal safeguards are weak

• Oversight mechanisms are minimal

According to Access Now (2023), the rapid and unchecked deployment of AI systems, particularly in surveillance and public-sector decision-making, creates conditions in which these technologies operate without the necessary transparency, accountability, or safeguards. Rather than strengthening governance, AI risks reinforcing centralised control without checks and balances.

AI and Information Control in a Fragile Authoritarian Country

In authoritarian contexts, artificial intelligence is increasingly used to enhance information manipulation and political control. The governments of several countries have drawn on disinformation techniques originally pioneered in Russia to implement sophisticated information operations that spread messages via fake Facebook accounts and false news stories, in cases intentionally contributing to communal violence against religious minorities. Across the region, governments, activists, and non-state armed groups actively use social media to gain domestic and international support for their cause. Similarly, in Myanmar, propaganda and disinformation are not new; they have long been embedded in state and military communication strategies.

Recent reporting by The Irrawaddy shows how the military regime has institutionalised its information operations. For example, the junta has established a multilingual propaganda body to counter international criticism, demonstrating a coordinated effort to shape narratives beyond domestic audiences. In another case, the regime dismissed reports of civilian casualties as “fake news”, reflecting a broader strategy of denying accountability and controlling information flows.

These examples illustrate that information manipulation in Myanmar is already systematic and strategic. Social media platforms such as Facebook have further amplified this dynamic, enabling the rapid dissemination of misleading content and contributing to public confusion and polarisation.

The emergence of AI technologies significantly intensifies these existing practices. AI-generated content, including synthetic images, videos, and text, can:

• scale propaganda production rapidly

• produce highly realistic but fabricated content

• enable targeted and adaptive disinformation campaigns

Scholarly research on synthetic media highlights how these technologies can erode trust in information ecosystems and undermine accountability, particularly in environments with weak media literacy and restricted access to independent information (see Pawelec, 2022). Myanmar has long experienced state-led information control, but digital technologies have significantly expanded its reach. Social media platforms, particularly Meta’s Facebook, play a central role in shaping public discourse, often acting as the primary source of information.

A notable case in Myanmar illustrates how emerging technologies intersect with existing propaganda practices. The junta was accused of using deepfake technology to support corruption allegations against Aung San Suu Kyi, after releasing a video confession by a detained official. The footage triggered widespread public skepticism, with observers noting inconsistencies such as unsynchronised lip movements and unusual audio patterns. While experts debated whether the video was definitively a deepfake or a coerced statement, the incident highlights a critical issue: in low-trust and restricted information environments, the mere possibility of AI manipulation is enough to shape public perception and generate uncertainty.

At the same time, misinformation does not always require advanced AI. A recent report by Agence France-Presse found that social media posts falsely presented an old image of Aung San Suu Kyi as a recent photo, demonstrating how easily misleading content can circulate in Myanmar’s information environment. Public discourse has pointed to suspected manipulated or synthetic content, which has fueled speculation and public anxiety, particularly regarding high-profile political figures. In this context, AI acts as a force multiplier - scaling both the speed and reach of information manipulation. Such cases show that low-tech misinformation and high-tech AI-generated content exist on the same spectrum, reinforcing each other.

In Myanmar, where verification is already difficult due to censorship and limited media freedom, AI-generated or AI-suspected misinformation presents even greater risks. These risks are further amplified by the growing use of encrypted platforms such as Telegram, where military-linked channels and affiliated networks have been reported to circulate large volumes of unverified and, in some cases, AI-generated videos related to the ongoing conflict. In the wake of the 2021 coup, the military regime, or State Administration Council (SAC), quickly shifted its primary information operations from Facebook to alternative platforms, including Telegram, highlighting the adaptability of disinformation networks. The closed and decentralized nature of such platforms makes monitoring and verification significantly more difficult, allowing misleading or fabricated content to spread rapidly with limited accountability.

At the same time, there are rising concerns about the use of AI tools to generate non-consensual and sexually explicit content, particularly targeting women. Reports and public discussions indicate that manipulated or synthetic 18+ videos have been used to harass, intimidate, and discredit female activists, journalists, and public figures. These practices reflect a broader pattern in which digital technologies are weaponised along gendered lines, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and reinforcing social harms.

AI, Inequality, and Digital Literacy Gaps

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often presented as a tool for improving access to information and expanding opportunities. However, its impact is deeply shaped by existing social and digital inequalities. In contexts such as Myanmar, these inequalities are not only economic or geographic; they are also reflected in uneven access to digital knowledge, skills, and information systems. AI systems are fundamentally dependent on data, making them highly sensitive to existing structural inequalities. In fragile and linguistically diverse contexts such as Myanmar, these inequalities are not only social but also embedded in digital infrastructures.

Key challenges include:

• unequal access to digital infrastructure between urban and rural communities

• limited inclusion of minority groups and languages in digital systems

• significant gaps in digital and AI literacy across different segments of society

These factors influence who benefits from AI and who is left behind. Communities with limited connectivity or lower levels of digital literacy are less able to access AI-driven services, while also being more vulnerable to misinformation and manipulation.

A critical dimension of this challenge is the generational divide in digital and AI literacy. Younger populations, particularly in urban areas, are generally more active users of social media and digital platforms. They are more likely to engage with emerging AI tools and integrate them into everyday activities such as learning, communication, and content creation. However, this familiarity does not always translate into critical understanding. People need to have digital literacy to verify the information and not contribute to the rapid spread of misinformation.

In contrast, older generations often face barriers in accessing and navigating digital technologies. Limited exposure, lower confidence in using AI tools, and difficulties in evaluating online information can lead to exclusion from digital services or increased susceptibility to misleading content. In some cases, this results in dependence on informal information networks, which may further amplify misinformation.

Platforms such as Facebook and Telegram play a central role in shaping these dynamics. Information spreads rapidly across these platforms, often without effective verification mechanisms. In such environments, both overconfidence among younger users and limited digital literacy among older users contribute to an existing fragile information ecosystem.

These structural gaps shape how AI systems interpret and represent reality. When datasets exclude or simplify certain populations, AI outputs risk becoming systematically biased, incomplete, or misleading. A particularly illustrative example is Myanmar’s long-standing use of Zawgyi encoding, a non-standard font system historically used across digital platforms. Unlike Unicode, which is internationally standardised, Zawgyi is not fully compatible with modern computational systems. For example, during the transition period, Facebook reported that identical posts written in Zawgyi and Unicode were treated differently by its algorithms, affecting content visibility, moderation, and information retrieval. Google similarly noted measurable improvements in search and input tools following Unicode standardisation. This demonstrates a critical point: when linguistic systems are fragmented, AI systems inherit and reproduce that fragmentation.

Therefore, AI does not create inequality, but it encodes, scales, and amplifies existing disparities across data, language, and generational access. AI does not create inequality, but it can significantly amplify it.

Fragmented Governance and Emerging Actors

Myanmar’s governance landscape is increasingly fragmented, with alternative actors such as the National Unity Government (NUG) playing a growing role. While the National Unity Government (NUG) actively counters military narratives through official statements, social media engagement, and diaspora-supported networks, it does not yet operate a formalised AI governance or verification system. As a result, its responses to misinformation remain largely reactive and decentralized rather than systematic.

At the same time, the absence of trusted, institutionalised verification mechanisms combined with the proliferation of AI-generated and manipulated content contributes to a broader environment of information uncertainty. In such conditions, competing narratives circulate simultaneously, making it increasingly difficult for the public to distinguish credible information from misinformation.

This raises important questions about the future of AI governance:

• Can alternative actors develop more accountable digital systems?

• How can AI support service delivery in contested areas?

• What role can decentralised governance play in shaping technology use?

At present, these dynamics remain underdeveloped, highlighting a critical area for further research and policy engagement.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Context-Sensitive AI Governance Frameworks

Global AI governance models must be adapted to fragile contexts. This includes prioritising minimum safeguards, even in low-capacity environments, such as transparency standards and basic oversight mechanisms. Efforts to strengthen AI governance in Myanmar should also consider broader regional developments in Southeast Asia. Several countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, have already adopted national AI strategies or ethical frameworks to guide investment, innovation, and risk management (see). These initiatives highlight a growing regional trend toward integrating AI into economic development and public service delivery.

However, Myanmar remains significantly behind in terms of AI readiness, governance capacity, and digital infrastructure. At the same time, past cases such as the role of social media in amplifying violence against the Rohingya population underscore the risks of unregulated digital ecosystems

2. Investment in AI Literacy and Public Capacity

Improving AI literacy is essential to reduce misuse and vulnerability to misinformation. Targeted education initiatives should focus on:

• digital literacy

• critical media skills

• responsible use of AI tools

3. Addressing Data Inequality

Efforts should be made to ensure more inclusive data systems by:

• incorporating minority languages

• improving rural data representation

• supporting equitable digital infrastructure

4. Safeguarding Information Ecosystems

International organisations and civil society actors should prioritize:

• monitoring disinformation

• supporting independent media

• strengthening fact-checking systems

5. Supporting Alternative Governance Innovation

Emerging governance actors should be supported in developing:

• transparent digital systems

• accountable AI applications

• inclusive service delivery models

Ultimately, strengthening AI governance in Myanmar requires more than technical solutions; it demands coordinated efforts across institutions, society, and regional partnerships. Without such efforts, AI risks reinforcing existing patterns of inequality, misinformation, and political control. Ensuring that AI contributes to inclusive and accountable development will depend on sustained investment in capacity, trust, and governance.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Extreme heat is becoming a serious and growing risk to public health in Myanmar’s cities.

Key Takeaways

• Extreme heat in Myanmar is increasing rapidly, with record-breaking temperatures and rising heat-related deaths showing it is already a serious public health risk.

• Urban conditions, such as dense infrastructure, limited green space, unreliable electricity, and ongoing conflict, are intensifying heat exposure, especially for vulnerable groups.

• Despite growing impacts, heat stress remains under-recognised and under-addressed, requiring urgent, coordinated action at both national and urban levels.

1. Importance of addressing the problem

Across Southeast Asia, heatwaves are becoming more frequent, longer, and more intense due to global warming. Recent years have seen record-breaking heat causing deaths, hospitalisations, school closures, and economic losses. Scientists warn that this trend will continue, with each year becoming hotter than the last.

Myanmar is part of this regional pattern and is highly vulnerable to climate change. Temperatures have already increased over recent decades, and extreme weather events, including heatwaves, are becoming more frequent and intense. Limited capacity to respond further increases the country’s risk.

Heat stress is driven mainly by climate change, which increases temperatures and leads to more frequent and intense heatwaves. Natural factors like El Niño can worsen extreme heat, while human activities, such as deforestation, land-use change, and rapid urbanisation, reduce natural cooling and make cities hotter.

Despite these risks, extreme heat is still not widely recognised as a major public health issue, with gaps in data, research, and policy attention. As a so-called “silent killer,” heatwaves are likely causing more deaths than reported, especially in urban areas where exposure is highest.

2. Evidence of Extreme Heat Stress in Myanmar

Evidence shows that extreme heat in Myanmar is increasing in both frequency and intensity. Temperature data indicate a clear warming trend. Myanmar’s mean annual temperature has risen by about 0.82°C over the past 50 years and is projected to increase by up to 2.07°C by 2060. Long-term projections also suggest that both minimum and maximum temperatures could rise by up to 2.7°C by the end of the century. In recent years, temperatures during the hot season have regularly exceeded 40°C, with some areas experiencing temperatures above 44°C. This reflects a broader global pattern, as the past decade has been the warmest on record.

Historical records show that extreme heat events have occurred before, but are becoming more severe. For example, a heatwave in 2010 recorded temperatures as high as 47°C in Mandalay.

More recently, new records have been set. In April 2024, Myanmar recorded its highest-ever April temperature of 48.2°C in Chauk, while Yangon exceeded 40°C and Mandalay reached 44°C. According to Eldorado Weather, four cities from Myanmar have been listed among the world’s 15 hottest cities in March 2026. At the same time, projections indicate that sea levels could rise by 20–41 cm by the 2050s (up to 83 cm by the 2080s), potentially submerging 30% of the Ayeyarwady Delta and leading to 43% land loss .

These data confirm that climate risks in Myanmar are increasing rapidly year by year.

3. Urban Heat Stress & its Contributing Factors

Urban areas in Myanmar face higher heat stress due to a combination of environmental and socio-economic factors.

Changes in land use, including the loss of vegetation, reduce the ability of the environment to regulate heat. One key driver is the urban heat island effect. Dense buildings, concrete, and asphalt surfaces absorb and retain heat, making cities significantly hotter than surrounding areas. Rapid urbanisation, combined with limited green spaces, reduces natural cooling and prevents temperatures from dropping, especially at night. Rapid urbanisation is worsened by corruption and weak land-use regulation in Myanmar, leading to the conversion of green spaces into built-up areas. In cities like Yangon, high humidity combined with trapped heat in crowded living environments makes it even harder for residents to cope with extreme temperatures. As urban populations grow, these challenges are expected to worsen.

Beyond environmental factors, broader sustainability challenges also increase vulnerability. Ongoing conflict has displaced many people into temporary or poorly ventilated shelters, where protection from extreme heat is limited. At the same time, the conflict has forced people to move from rural areas to cities like Yangon, placing additional pressure on already overstretched urban centers like Yangon.

Limited access to electricity further worsens the situation. Many households experience unstable and insufficient power supply, making it difficult to use fans or air conditioning during extreme heat. Electricity has increasingly become a luxury rather than a basic service for the public, due to structural challenges, resource shortages, and political instability. In many areas, power is available for only around eight hours per day, often at unpredictable times due to supply shortages. Although there are other alternative energy sources, such as solar power, access to them remains limited, as high installation costs make them affordable only for wealthier households.

These factors together make urban populations in Myanmar particularly exposed to heat stress.

4. Heat Stress Impacts in Myanmar: Evidence and Trends

The rise in extreme heat is already having serious impacts on human health in Myanmar.

Heatwaves are prolonged periods of unusually high temperatures that can harm both human health and ecosystems. Health risks are especially high in urban areas, where dense infrastructure and limited cooling increase exposure.

Recent events show the scale of these impacts. During the 2024 heatwave, at least 1,473 people reportedly died from heat-related causes in a single month. This represents a significant increase compared to 2010, when 260 heat-related deaths were recorded during the summer. Such figures suggest that heat-related mortality is rising rapidly alongside increasing temperatures.

While people in Myanmar are accustomed to high temperatures, increasingly deadly heat extremes are being recorded. This can create a false sense of safety, as some may believe they are prepared for the heat. However, those who do not seek information on heat-related risks may face higher exposure during heatwaves. As a result, heat stress is emerging as a significant but often overlooked public health risk in Myanmar.

5. Public Health Risks

Extreme heat poses serious and wide-ranging public health risks in Myanmar, particularly for vulnerable populations.

Exposure to high temperatures can lead to a range of health problems, including heat exhaustion, heatstroke, dehydration, and worsening of cardiovascular and respiratory conditions. Evidence from Myanmar also shows that people experience symptoms such as fatigue, headaches, skin problems, and difficulty concentrating during heatwaves. In many cases, these effects can last beyond the heatwave period and increase the risk of mortality.

The impacts are not evenly distributed. Older people are particularly vulnerable, as their bodies are less able to cope with extreme heat, and most excess deaths during heatwaves occur among the elderly. Children are also at higher risk, as heat can affect their physical and cognitive development. Outdoor workers, such as construction workers and street vendors, face prolonged exposure and a higher risk of heat-related illness.

Social and economic inequalities further increase vulnerability. Low-income communities and those living in informal settlements often lack proper housing, ventilation, and access to cooling, increasing their exposure to heat. Women, especially those who are pregnant or postpartum, also face additional health risks, as exposure to extreme heat has been linked to higher risks of preterm birth, low birth weight, stillbirth, congenital abnormalities, and neonatal mortality, yet gender-sensitive responses remain limited.

Current conditions in Myanmar can further worsen these risks. Fuel shortages have led to long queues at petrol stations, with people waiting for hours under extreme heat. Some reports on social media and certain sources suggest that individuals have fainted or even died while queuing in these conditions.

These patterns show that heat stress is not only a health issue, but also a question of social inequality in Myanmar’s context.

6. Recommendations to mitigate and adapt to the risks

Addressing heat stress in Myanmar requires both immediate responses and long-term planning.

In Myanmar, some initiatives are already being implemented, although they remain limited. The Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) has been supporting communities through early warning messages, awareness campaigns, first aid services, and the creation of shaded spaces during heatwaves. However, these efforts face constraints due to limited resources and ongoing political challenges, which restrict wider implementation. Since the 2021 military coup, reductions in international funding, the withdrawal of aid programmes, and increasing restrictions on NGO operations have significantly weakened the capacity of civil society organisations to deliver services and support vulnerable communities. In addition, Myanmar still lacks advanced heat monitoring systems, such as standardised heat stress measurement tools, which limits effective early warning and response.

At the regional level, neighbouring countries are adopting more structured approaches. For example, Bangkok has introduced cooling centres and public cooling spaces, along with a heat warning system to guide public behaviour during extreme heat. Other Countries in Southeast Asia are also using data and technology to improve responses. Singapore applies climate modelling and urban monitoring systems to inform heat-resilient urban planning, while cities like Malacca use low-cost sensors and nature-based solutions to reduce urban heat.

In the short term, expanding green spaces, improving access to water, strengthening public education and awareness on the risks of extreme heat, and ensuring access to electricity for cooling are critical to reduce immediate risks. In the long term, improving urban design, strengthening early warning systems, and addressing energy supply issues are essential to build resilience against rising temperatures.

Heat stress in Myanmar is a silent and growing crisis, caused by both climate change and ongoing structural challenges. Without greater recognition and integration into policy and response systems, it will continue to increase risks, especially for the most vulnerable.

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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This article analyses the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as a high-stakes geopolitical bypass, where Beijing’s pursuit of energy security through a fragmented Myanmar risks permanent regional instability.

Key Takeaways

• The Strategic Bypass: The Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and the Muse-Mandalay railway provide China with a critical “back door” to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the naval vulnerabilities of the Straits of Malacca.

• Institutional Dependency: Myanmar increasingly functions as a “sub-contractor” state, with the junta setting up special committees to expedite Chinese projects like the Muse-Mandalay railway despite a complete lack of territorial control.

• Local Marginalisation: Large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Kyaukphyu SEZ threaten the livelihoods of over 5,000 fishing households and risk the relocation of 20,000 people, fuelling deep-seated local resentment.

The Strategic Imperative: Bypassing the Straits

For Beijing, Myanmar represents not merely a neighbouring state but a critical geographic solution to a persistent strategic vulnerability. China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma”, its dependence on energy imports transiting the narrow and potentially contested Strait of Malacca, has compelled policymakers to conceptualize the Bay of Bengal as an alternative strategic corridor. Within this framework, the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port in Rakhine State functions as a central node.

The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is designed to operate as a dedicated conduit for China’s economic and energy security. By linking the Rakhine coastline directly to Yunnan Province through operational oil and gas pipelines (established in 2013 and 2017, respectively) and the proposed Muse–Mandalay railway, China can circumvent contested maritime zones, particularly those in the South China Sea. This infrastructure significantly reduces geopolitical exposure while enhancing logistical efficiency.

The Role of the Junta: A Centralised Partner in a Fragmented State

Recent reporting indicates that Myanmar’s military government is actively attempting to demonstrate its strategic relevance to Beijing. The junta has established a dedicated administrative body to expedite the Muse–Mandalay railway project, which is intended to connect the Chinese border with central Myanmar. This initiative reflects a broader pattern in which military leadership emphasises the continuity of Chinese-backed infrastructure projects despite ongoing internal conflict.

However, China’s engagement in Myanmar is becoming increasingly fragmented. While Beijing traditionally favours a centralised, top-down governance model, the authority of the military government is progressively eroding. Of Myanmar’s total foreign investment stock of approximately $43 billion, China accounts for roughly 32% (approximately $14 billion). A transition toward a decentralized or federal political system could compel China to renegotiate existing agreements with multiple subnational actors, thereby increasing political and contractual complexity.

The “Subcontractor” Model and Labor Enclaves

The governance structure of major infrastructure projects in Myanmar reveals a pronounced asymmetry in power relations. Within the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), the China-based CITIC Consortium retains dominant decision-making authority. In contrast, the Myanmar state assumes a more limited role, functioning effectively as a “subcontractor” responsible for land acquisition and regulatory facilitation. At the same time, China provides capital investment, technological expertise, and, in many cases, labor.

This model has generated significant local contention, particularly because it relied on imported Chinese labor. By circumventing domestic labor markets, such practices restrict employment opportunities for local populations, thereby limiting the distribution of economic benefits. At the same time, local communities remain disproportionately exposed to environmental degradation and social disruption.

The Myitsone Dam project further exemplifies these dynamics. Situated at the headwaters of the Irrawaddy River, the country’s “spinal cord” was structured to export 90% of its electricity to China, fuelling concerns of resource extraction without domestic benefit. According to International Rivers, the venture was a lopsided partnership: the China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) was to retain 70% of the profits, leaving only 20% for the Myanmar government and 10% for the local firm Asia World as a service fee. This lopsided profit-sharing highlights Myanmar’s role as a junior partner in its own strategic development.

Community Concerns and Territorial Control

Residents in Kyaukphyu express deep dejection as the deep-sea port project, a 4,200-acre cornerstone of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” moves forward with little community transparency. Despite the port providing Beijing a critical strategic bypass to the Bay of Bengal for oil imports, the joint venture remains heavily asymmetric, with China controlling 70% of the project compared to Myanmar’s 30%. As the two governments prepare to begin construction on a 600-acre site this year, villagers face widespread job losses and remain marginalised from the decision-making process.

It is estimated that over 5,000 households may lose access to fishing grounds, while the International Commission of Jurists warns that up to 20,000 individuals could face displacement. These developments have contributed to rising local discontent.

The Conflict and Governance Focus

The current landscape of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is defined by a profound disconnect between official administrative authority and de facto territorial control. While the State Administration Council (SAC) in Naypyidaw acts as the formal gatekeeper, signing high-level addendums to revive the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and forming committees to expedite the Muse-Mandalay Railway, its actual power is increasingly confined to isolated urban centers. In a strategic shift to win local compliance in Myitkyina, the junta is now promising that the majority of the electricity generated will remain in Myanmar for domestic and residential use from the Myitsone Dam mega-project, which was suspended in 2011 over environmental and humanitarian concerns. By projecting a narrative of “business as usual,” the junta attempts to maintain the image of a stable investment partner despite losing significant ground to resistance forces.

In contrast, the physical security of these corridors is now dictated by Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government (NUG). In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) has achieved what the Institute for Strategy and Policy- Myanmar describes as full or partial control over the majority of Chinese projects, effectively encircling the Kyaukphyu SEZ. Similarly, the Three Brotherhood Alliance maintains a stranglehold on the Northern Shan State transit routes due to China’s intervention in 2025. In total, the regime has reclaimed about 11.3% of the territory it lost in Northern Shan State, securing control over 44.4% of the Mandalay–Muse trade route. Meanwhile, the NUG challenges the SAC’s legal legitimacy by warning Beijing that agreements signed with an illegal junta may not be honoured by a future democratic government. Through its “10-Point Policy,” the NUG offers a tactical alternative, promising to safeguard legitimate Chinese investments while firmly rejecting “lifeblood“ sacrifices like the Myitsone Dam. This creates a fragmented reality where China must balance its long-term infrastructure goals against the shifting frontlines of a nation in revolt.

Historical Continuity: From 1988 to the Lancang–Mekong Fund

China’s relationship with Myanmar’s military establishment can be traced to the post-1988 period, during which Beijing emerged as a principal economic and political partner for a regime isolated by Western sanctions. Over time, this relationship has evolved into a multilayered framework encompassing both large-scale infrastructure investments and smaller development initiatives.

Between 2017 and 2025, Myanmar received 132 projects valued at approximately $38.6 million through the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Special Fund, with over 100 projects implemented. This funding mechanism enables China to extend its influence at the local level while simultaneously supporting the military government’s broader strategic infrastructure agenda.

Implications and Recommendations

1. The Risk of the “Stability Trap.”

China’s current approach reflects a strategic gamble predicated on the assumption that the military government can eventually restore stability and secure key economic corridors. However, continued support for the junta risks entrenching conflict dynamics by positioning Chinese investments as targets for resistance groups. Failure to address local grievances, particularly those related to environmental degradation and socioeconomic exclusion, may result in long-term instability that undermines the viability of these projects.

2. Navigating the “Civilian” Pivot

The anticipated shift to an “elected” government, likely generals in civilian attire, will mirror the Thein Sein era, where project suspensions are used as tactical “reform” signals to lift Western sanctions. To mitigate this, China must move beyond fragile military-to-military deals toward a legalised investment framework ratified by parliament. By insisting on multi-stakeholder oversight, Beijing can gain “political insurance,” ensuring projects aren’t used as bargaining chips by a pseudo-civilian regime desperate to prove its independence or legitimacy.

3. Engagement with Territorial Stakeholders

China should broaden its diplomatic engagement to include EAOs and the National Unity Government (NUG). Agreements concluded solely with a central authority lacking territorial control are inherently fragile, both legally and operationally.

4. Reform of the Labor Model

To reduce local opposition, the current subcontractor model should be restructured. Future project phases, including the Muse–Mandalay railway and Kyaukphyu SEZ, should incorporate mandatory local employment quotas alongside investments in vocational training to enhance workforce capacity.

5. Environmental Accountability

All major infrastructure initiatives should be subject to transparent and independent Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs). These assessments must include enforceable provisions capable of halting projects if significant risks to ecosystems, such as mangrove forests or local water systems, are identified.

Sevil Khikmatova is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and a Policy Analyst at STEAR with a focus on climate governance and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Myanmar’s disaster response is weak due to poor systems, political issues, and lack of coordination, affecting people, the economy, and the environment. At the same time, non-state and international groups bring both challenges and opportunities to improve disaster management.

Key Takeaways:

• Disaster impacts are driven not only by hazards but by governance failures.

• Non-state actors are essential but face major constraints.

• Inclusive and effective governance is critical for improving disaster response.

The common classification of disasters as natural or man-made is misleading. The United Nations emphasises that a hazard becomes a disaster only when it affects vulnerable populations lacking protection due to poverty, exclusion, or social disadvantage.

Myanmar is highly exposed to disaster risks and is the most climate hazard–prone globally due to its geographical location and diverse topography. The country is also highly vulnerable, with weak coping capacity and limited ability to support long-term recovery.

Governance plays a key role in reducing disaster impacts. Evidence shows that higher government effectiveness is linked to lower disaster mortality. Understanding governance gaps is therefore essential to explain failures in disaster management and reduce future risks.

State-Driven Disaster Governance Gaps

1. Restrictions on Humanitarian Aid Delivery

The military regime imposes strict controls on humanitarian aid, especially in conflict-affected areas where needs are greatest. It restricts and monitors aid, limiting access for local and international actors and worsening conditions. After the 2025 Sagaing earthquake, rescue teams were denied immediate entry and required official approval despite urgent needs. Aid was confiscated, preventing delivery to areas most in need, particularly those controlled by the NUG and ethnic resistance groups. Curfews further delayed operations.

Restrictions also affect international organisations. The 2022 Registration Law requires disclosure of staff, funding, and operations, restricts engagement with local actors, and imposes penalties for non-compliance. Since the 2021 coup, hundreds have reportedly been arrested under these rules, while travel authorisations are frequently delayed or denied.

Information control further limits response. Internet shutdowns, media restrictions, and bans on digital platforms reduce public awareness. Similar patterns were observed during Cyclone Nargis (2008) and Cyclone Mocha (2023), where aid delivery was delayed and restricted.

2. State Negligence and Abuse During Disasters

The military regime has failed to fulfil its obligation to protect affected populations. During the 2025 earthquake, military involvement in relief was minimal, with limited troop deployment and reports of looting by soldiers. Support prioritised government and military groups, particularly in Naypyitaw, while vulnerable populations such as IDPs were neglected.

Despite announcing ceasefires, the military continued airstrikes in affected areas, causing civilian casualties and damaging shelters, including religious buildings. In one case, a monastery hosting medical teams was targeted. These actions have been widely criticised as inhumane and indicative of disregard for human rights. Similar patterns occurred during Typhoon Yagi and Cyclone Mocha. Rescue support was limited, evacuation efforts were inadequate, and aid was redirected to military-aligned areas. Entire communities, especially Rohingya and resistance-aligned groups, lacked food and shelter.

Overall, humanitarian aid has been politicised, used to reward loyalty and restrict opposition rather than to save lives.

3. Weak Disaster Preparedness

Despite high exposure to hazards, preparedness remains weak due to limited infrastructure and coordination. Disasters therefore cause greater damage and casualties than in comparable countries. This is evident in Typhoon Yagi (2024). Countries like Vietnam implemented early warnings, evacuations, and large-scale mobilisation, while Myanmar’s response was limited. Although affected only by storm remnants, Myanmar recorded a comparable death toll, highlighting governance failures.

Existing disaster frameworks are undermined by poor implementation, weak coordination, and limited community engagement. Although Myanmar has a formal disaster management structure, gaps persist due to centralised control, weak institutional capacity, and inadequate local resources. State priorities often focus on military operations rather than disaster response, increasing risks to civilians.

4. Fiscal Prioritisation and Underinvestment

Financial allocation remains a major challenge. Military spending far exceeds disaster investment, with defence expenditure nearly 200 times higher. The government relies on limited reserve funds covering less than 1% of disaster damage, while the National Natural Disaster Management Fund provides minimal support. Budget rigidity limits flexibility during emergencies. These issues have worsened. In 2022, disaster funds were diverted to economic support, reducing resources for emergency response. During the 2025 earthquake, shortages of equipment and support highlighted severe underinvestment.

5. Limited Manpower In Disaster Response

Myanmar faces significant human resource constraints. There is a shortage of trained rescue personnel, and state responders are often absent, with some reports of misconduct. Response efforts, therefore, rely heavily on local communities and volunteers.

The workforce has further declined due to arrests, killings, forced conscription, and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Unlike past disasters with large-scale mobilisation, recent responses involve small, less coordinated volunteer groups. The healthcare workforce is also critically insufficient. Even before the crisis, workforce numbers have dropped below WHO standards, worsened by arrests and killings of health workers. During the 2025 earthquake, limited facilities were overwhelmed, particularly in Mandalay.

Weak institutional capacity and coordination further limit effective emergency response, increasing dependence on local networks.

Role of Political Opposition and International Actors

1. National Unity Government (NUG)

The NUG has emerged as a parallel governance actor since 2021. It provides humanitarian aid in areas under its influence, often working with EAOs, and coordinates through its Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, with local communities, CSOs, and international partners.

A key strength of the NUG is its ability to deliver structured and transparent responses despite limited resources. During Cyclone Mocha, it established coordination mechanisms, issued early warnings, supported evacuations, and allocated funds for relief and recovery. Engagement with international actors has also increased since 2024, with actors such as the United States, the European Union, and some UN agencies.

However, its reach is restricted by the SAC restrictions on access, as well as resource constraints, relying on domestic fundraising and diaspora support with limited international funding. Institutional challenges, including limited human resources, technical capacity, and administrative systems, further affect its ability to coordinate large-scale responses and deliver aid consistently.

2. Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs)

EAOs have become key service providers in many regions. Their strengths include local access, territorial control, and strong community trust. Organizations such as the Karen National Union (KNU), with established governance structures, have developed dedicated administrative systems to deliver social services and coordinate emergency response for local populations. During Cyclone Mocha, groups such as the Arakan Army conducted early warning, needs assessments, and relief operations. Their efforts are often supported by strong community trust and collaboration with CSOs and NGOs.

However, they face key limitations. Resource constraints limit large-scale response, while fragmentation and lack of recognition hinder coordination and engagement with international actors. Ongoing conflict further restricts operations, and some groups face concerns related to human rights and environmental practices, affecting credibility.

3. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and International Actors

CSOs, CBOs, NGOs, and international actors are primary humanitarian providers, especially in hard-to-reach areas. Local actors deliver frontline responses, while international actors provide funding and technical support.

However, effectiveness is constrained by access restrictions, funding limitations, and capacity gaps. Tensions between local priorities and international neutrality requirements also affect cooperation. Many INGOs are reluctant to partner with informal actors due to legal and donor constraints, and top-down funding systems reinforce unequal power dynamics and slow delivery. Finally, humanitarian funding has declined due to competing global crises and donor caution, compounded by military restrictions on banking transactions, which disrupt fund transfers and limit operational capacity.

Impacts of Disaster Governance Gaps

1. Social Impacts

Cyclone Nargis (2008) caused over 77,000 deaths. In 2024, Typhoon Yagi affected around 887,000 people, while the 2025 earthquake resulted in about 9,000 deaths and injuries. Health conditions worsen due to damaged water systems, leading to disease outbreaks. Displacement into temporary shelters increases risks of infection, while repeated shocks, conflict, and displacement create psychological trauma, especially for children. Disasters often cause shortages of food, clean water, shelter, medicine, and electricity. Education is also disrupted, with thousands of schools affected, and temporary learning spaces remain insufficient. Disasters have caused widespread destruction of homes, roads, bridges, and communication systems. Essential facilities as well as cultural heritage sites have been damaged. Human rights are often compromised due to restricted aid, delayed response, and attacks on civilian areas. Some communities lack adequate food, shelter, or evacuation support, increasing risks. Restrictions on information further limit access to life-saving assistance. Displacement remains severe, with millions internally displaced and increased migration.

2. Economic Impacts

Livelihoods are heavily affected, with damage to agriculture and fisheries reducing income. For example, Typhoon Yagi (2024) flooded farmland during a key planting season. The 2025 earthquake affected over 3.5 million workers, with losses up to US$36.8 million per day. Infrastructure damage disrupts economic activity and supply chains, increasing poverty rates. Recovery often exceeds initial damage estimates, placing long-term pressure on public finances.

3. Environmental Impacts

Disasters damage water systems, causing contamination and scarcity. Disasters contribute to soil degradation and land loss. Riverbank erosion is a major issue in regions such as Ayeyarwady. Floods and extreme weather damage crops, irrigation, and storage, reducing agricultural output. Disasters harm ecosystems and severely damage mangrove forests and surrounding ecosystems. Disasters alter landscapes through landfall, landslides, and ground fractures, as seen during Cyclone Nargis and the 2025 earthquake.

4. Governance Impacts

Repeated failures reduce public trust, weakening cooperation and policy implementation. Disasters strain already fragile public systems, limiting their ability to respond effectively. All the above impacts are intensified by limited preparedness, weak coordination, and constraints in response and recovery capacity.

Recommendations

Disasters cannot be prevented, but their impacts can be reduced through effective governance. Given Myanmar’s limited institutional capacity and reliance on external support, responsibility extends to the international community. As structural challenges are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the following recommendations focus on strengthening non-state and international actors.

Disaster governance should be decentralised, inclusive, and effectively implemented at all levels, especially locally. Strong coordination among CSOs, EAOs, NUG, and NGOs/INGOs is key, with a focus on conflict sensitivity and vulnerable groups. Invest in resilient infrastructure, essential supplies, and community preparedness. Strengthen human capacity through training and support, improve early warning systems, and ensure flexible, well-prioritised disaster funding. Support local actors as primary responders and simplify funding access. Strengthen partnerships between local and international organisations to improve coordination and aid effectiveness.

Conclusion

Disaster governance in Myanmar is weak due to poor planning, limited resources, and restricted aid. Non-state actors try to help, but face political, financial, and coordination challenges. As a result, disasters have severe impacts. Improving this requires more inclusive, locally led efforts with stronger international support.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Around one million Rohingya refugees have been living in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district since the large-scale persecution by Myanmar’s armed forces in Rakhine State in 2017. However, the camps are facing significant reductions in international humanitarian aid, increasing Bangladesh’s burden to sustain the livelihoods and security of the refugee population. This article examines the policy challenges surrounding Rohingya repatriation and explores options for the long-term and sustainable management of the refugee camps.

Key Takeaways

• The 2026 hearings at the International Court of Justice increase international accountability for the persecution of the Rohingya. Still, they do not address the current long-term humanitarian conditions faced by Rohingya refugees living in camps in Cox’s Bazar.

• Rohingya refugee camps are experiencing significant reductions in international humanitarian aid, creating growing challenges for both the refugees and the host country, Bangladesh.

• Bangladesh continues to advocate for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State, but any sustainable solution will require strong international coordination and guarantees of safety and rights for returnees.

The Rohingya: the background

The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority who are primarily located in the Rakhine State (formerly Arakan State) in western Myanmar, particularly in the northern townships bordering Bangladesh. Despite their long presence in the country, they have been denied citizenship under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, which excludes them from the list of officially recognised ethnic groups. As a result, the Rohingya have been rendered effectively stateless and have faced decades of discrimination, restrictions on movement, and periodic violence by the Tatmadaw, the armed forces.

Most Rohingya lived in Rakhine State, a coastal region bordering Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal. The situation escalated dramatically in August 2017 when the Myanmar military launched large-scale “clearance operations.” These operations resulted in mass killings, sexual violence, and the destruction of villages. Estimates suggest that at least 6,700 people were killed in the first month alone, while more than 730,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.

According to the United Nations, the Rohingya are widely described as the “most persecuted minority in the world.” Today, the Cox’s Bazar region hosts the largest refugee settlement globally, with more than one million Rohingya living in camps. Meanwhile, approximately 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, where they continue to face severe restrictions on movement, access to healthcare, and economic opportunities.

Refugees in Bangladesh also experience significant challenges, including restrictions on employment, limited access to education, growing security concerns, and increasing exposure to climate-related disasters. As international humanitarian funding declines partly due to shifting global priorities and evolving donor policies, particularly under the second administration of Donald Trump, which has emphasised reduced foreign aid commitments and an “America First” approach, Bangladesh faces mounting pressure regarding the long-term hosting of Rohingya refugees. Consequently, a key policy debate has emerged: whether Bangladesh should pursue the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar or continue hosting them while seeking alternative, durable solutions.

International Legal Context: The ICJ Case

The year 2026 marked an important moment for the Rohingya community as proceedings continued before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The case, The Gambia v. Myanmar, concerns alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The case was filed by The Gambia, which argues that Myanmar committed acts of genocide against the Rohingya population during the military operations of 2016 and 2017. During hearings, Gambian representatives presented witness testimony describing widespread violence, including killings, sexual assault, and the burning of villages.

Myanmar, however, rejects these allegations. Its representatives argue that the military operations were legitimate counter-terrorism measures carried out in response to attacks by armed groups in northern Rakhine State. Myanmar also disputes the reliability of evidence presented by international investigators and maintains that questions related to citizenship and identity are unrelated to genocide claims.

The NUG claims to represent the democratic will of the Myanmar people and has distanced itself from the military’s policies toward the Rohingya. It generally supports accountability for crimes committed during the military operations. It has expressed concern that allowing the junta to represent Myanmar in international courts could undermine the principles of the United Nations and the rule of law.

Domestic attitudes toward the Rohingya in Myanmar

Another complication in the case concerns who legitimately represents Myanmar before international institutions. Following the 2021 Myanmar military coup, a parallel government known as the National Unity Government (NUG) was formed by elected lawmakers and activists.

Domestic public opinion in Myanmar has also played a significant role in shaping attitudes toward the Rohingya and the genocide case. Among many within the Buddhist majority, perceptions of the Rohingya are strongly influenced by religious nationalism and Islamophobia. These concerns have been amplified by nationalist movements such as the 969 Movement and organisations like Ma Ba Tha.

In addition, the Rohingya are widely portrayed as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, often referred to as “Bengalis,” rather than as an indigenous ethnic group. Influential monks, including Ashin Wirathu, have helped spread anti-Muslim narratives through sermons and social media campaigns. These narratives have contributed to the denial or justification of violence against the Rohingya, with military operations often framed domestically as necessary counter-terrorism measures.

Camps in Bangladesh: humanitarian, environmental, and security concerns

Despite increasing international legal attention to the Rohingya crisis, legal proceedings do little to address the immediate humanitarian conditions faced by refugees in Bangladesh. The camps in Cox’s Bazar remain extremely overcrowded and are highly dependent on international humanitarian aid.

Refugees face severe restrictions on employment and education, while access to healthcare and formal schooling remains limited. At the same time, Bangladesh faces growing financial and security pressures related to the long-term hosting of such a large displaced population.

Environmental risks further complicate the situation. Both Bangladesh and Myanmar rank among the countries most vulnerable to extreme weather events. Cox’s Bazar is particularly prone to cyclones, floods, and landslides. The Cyclone Mocha damaged thousands of shelters and affected millions of people across the region.

Another relocation site, Bhasan Char, currently hosts around 32,574 Rohingya refugees but lies only about two meters above sea level, making it highly vulnerable to storm surges and sea-level rise.

These environmental risks contribute to secondary displacement and have pushed some Rohingya to undertake dangerous maritime journeys. In 2023 alone, around 4,500 Rohingya attempted irregular sea crossings, with more than 569 reported missing or dead. According to UNHCR, the number of Rohingya fleeing by boat increased to 9,195 in 2024, which is more than double the number recorded the previous year.

In addition to humanitarian and environmental challenges, the prolonged presence of a large refugee population has generated growing security concerns both for the refugees and for Bangladesh. The camps in Cox’s Bazar creatе conditions that increase vulnerability to crime, trafficking, and the activities of armed groups. One group that has drawn particular attention is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed organisation that originally emerged in Rakhine State. Although the majority of Rohingya refugees are civilians with no involvement in militant activities, the presence of armed factions and criminal groups has contributed to instability within the camps and raised national security concerns, urging Bangladesh to start the repatriation.

Bangladesh’s leadership has increasingly framed the protracted refugee situation as a long-term security and governance challenge. During discussions with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus reiterated the government’s position that “the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar remains the only sustainable solution to the crisis.” Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which means that it is not legally bound by the international framework that defines refugee rights and state obligations, thus hosting the Rohingya primarily on humanitarian grounds.

Implications and Recommendations

1. Prioritise safe and voluntary repatriation with international guarantees.

Bangladesh should continue advocating for safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar. However, the repatriation should occur only under internationally monitored conditions, guaranteeing security, citizenship rights, and freedom of movement or a safe zone for refugees.

2. Increase international responsibility sharing

The Rohingya crisis should not be solely Bangladesh’s burden. Donor states and international organisations must increase financial humanitarian contributions to Cox Bazar’s camps and support long-term assistance programs that target disaster risk prevention and access to livelihood opportunities.

3. Strengthen security governance in camps

Bangladesh should strengthen security governance in camps to address criminal networks, human trafficking, and armed group activity. However, security policies should not go against the human rights of refugees.

4. Reassess engagement with Myanmar’s evolving political landscape

Recent political developments in Myanmar, including a military-organised election led by Min Aung Hlaing following the 2021 Myanmar coup, may signal a shift from direct military rule to a nominally civilian government. While this transition could be presented internationally as a step toward legitimacy, in practice, the leadership and power structures are likely to remain unchanged, particularly regarding Rohingya rights.

Bangladesh and the international community should therefore approach engagement cautiously, ensuring that any negotiations or repatriation initiatives are based on verifiable improvements on the ground rather than formal political changes alone.

Sevil Khikmatova is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She is also a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and a Policy Analyst at STEAR with a focus on climate governance and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Khant Eaint Hmoo is a Research Assistant at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and a Bachelor of Economics (Hons) student from Albukhary International University, Malaysia.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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Water insecurity in Myanmar is a multifaceted crisis driven by environmental change, weak governance, economic decline, and social inequality, requiring coordinated infrastructure, community, and policy solutions to ensure sustainable access to safe water.

Key Takeaways

• Water insecurity in Myanmar is driven by environmental factors, governance failures, economic decline, and social inequalities.

• Limited access to safe water impacts on health, education, livelihoods, ecosystems, and institutional capacity.

• Addressing the crisis requires integrated solutions combining infrastructure investment, community capacity building, and stronger governance coordination.

Introduction

Although water covers 70% of the planet, only about 3% is freshwater that we can drink or use to irrigate our farm fields. In Myanmar, access to safely managed drinking water has improved over the past two decades, rising from 27.11% in 2000 to 58.83% in 2020, yet water insecurity remains a critical challenge. Water insecurity happens when water is insufficient for human daily needs. More than 60% of households still lack safely managed drinking water services, and over 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) require WASH assistance.

Drivers of Water Insecurity

1. Environmental Factors

According to meteorologist U Tun Lwin, rising temperatures and deforestation are two key environmental causes of water scarcity, with impacts further intensified by disasters. Climate change has contributed to increasingly erratic rainfall, shifting monsoon cycles, and prolonged dry seasons. In addition, over the past three decades, the Central Dry Zone has experienced an approximate 2.4°C increase in baseline temperature, contributing to prolonged dry seasons and more frequent droughts. These climatic shifts have reduced the reliability of surface water sources. For example, in Rakhine State, ponds and small lakes are drying up, limiting water available for drinking and cooking. Similarly, in Htoke Kaw Koe Village in Karen State, wells that traditionally sustained local communities now fail during peak dry months. Consequently, households have to rely on shallow, unprotected, and often contaminated water sources. Extreme weather events further intensify these vulnerabilities. For example, Cyclone Mocha in May 2023 caused storm surges that contaminated unprotected community ponds with saline water. Moreover, earthquakes can disrupt groundwater systems, causing fluctuations in groundwater levels and damage to wells. Following the 2025 Sagaing earthquake in Myanmar, many tubes and dug wells were displaced or damaged.

2. Governance Failures

Weak policy implementation, limited regulatory enforcement, and insufficient investment in water infrastructure have undermined water management systems and disaster preparedness. In some areas, poor oversight has contributed to declining water quality, including arsenic contamination in some areas. Institutional weaknesses also limit effective disaster response. Limited preparedness and coordination can delay recovery efforts, leaving affected communities without reliable access to safe water following disasters. For example, in April 2025, approximately 1.6 million people in Myanmar lost access to clean water following disaster-related disruptions.

Governance failures are further compounded by weak intersectoral coordination and restrictions on humanitarian assistance. Since the 2021 military takeover, access limitations have hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly for IDPs. Conflict has also damaged critical water infrastructure. Reports indicate that wells, water tanks, and supply routes have been destroyed in some areas during armed confrontations. Such actions disrupt water supply systems and affect civilian populations who depend on these sources for daily survival.

Mass displacement represents another governance-linked driver of water insecurity. Ongoing political instability has displaced nearly 3.5 million people nationwide. Many displaced populations live in overcrowded camps where water supply systems are limited. In such environments, residents frequently rely on unsafe sources such as collected rainwater stored in temporary containers, highlighting the link between governance failures and water insecurity.

3. Economic Decline

Since the 2021 political crisis, the national economy has contracted while inflation has surged to approximately 28.6%, pushing the poverty rate to 32.1%, reducing both government capacity to invest in water infrastructure and household ability to secure safe water. At the structural level, economic decline limits public spending on water infrastructure, maintenance, and service delivery. Water utilities face shrinking operational budgets, constraining system expansion and repair. Economic shocks, including natural disasters, such as the, 2025 earthquake, have further damaged water systems and intensified supply disruptions. At the household level, declining incomes reduce the ability of families to afford safe water. Many low-income households have to depend on private water vendors. Although wholesale mineral water prices range between US$0.42 and US$1.64 per kilogram (minimum wage US$1.9 per day), these costs represent a significant burden for low-income families. As a result, 16.3% of households lack sufficient water for daily needs.

4. Social Inequalities

Rural–urban disparities remain significant. Urban populations benefit more frequently from piped water systems and municipal treatment facilities, while rural communities often rely on natural sources such as ponds, rivers, and shallow wells. With roughly two-thirds of Myanmar’s population living in rural areas, uneven infrastructure development creates structural disparities in water access.

Education and awareness also influence water practices. Limited knowledge of safe water storage and sanitation practices contributes to the use of untreated water and poor hygiene behaviours. Social marginalisation further intensifies vulnerability. Communities located in border regions, mountainous areas, and conflict-affected zones often face infrastructure neglect and barriers to humanitarian assistance. Government restrictions on aid delivery, together with regulatory pressures and operational risks, have constrained humanitarian operations and led many international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to scale down or relocate their activities. As a result, communities that previously depended on externally supported WASH services face reduced assistance, while many displaced communities rely on temporary camps and aid-dependent water systems with limited storage capacity.

Impacts of Water Insecurity

1. Economic Impacts

At the household level, families often spend additional income purchasing water from vendors. Health risks associated with unsafe water can also increase medical expenses and reduce working time due to illness. In water-scarce areas, households may spend several hours per day collecting water, reducing opportunities for income-generating activities. At the national level, widespread water insecurity can affect workforce productivity and place additional pressure on healthcare systems. Reduced agricultural productivity and labor capacity can slow economic growth and lower overall economic performance.

2. Social Impacts

Unsafe water increases the spread of waterborne diseases. In late 2025, approximately 300 people were affected by a cholera outbreak in Myanmar, with several confirmed deaths. Displacement camps have reported widespread cases of diarrhea and other illnesses associated with contaminated water sources. These risks have been further exacerbated by the reduction of international humanitarian support following the withdrawal or relocation of many INGOs, which has disrupted WASH service provision and weakened disease prevention and response capacity in vulnerable communities. Children face particularly high vulnerability. In fragile contexts, children under five are significantly more likely to die from diarrheal diseases linked to unsafe water. Long-term exposure to contaminated groundwater also poses serious health threats, including arsenic contamination in regions such as the Ayeyarwady Delta. Beyond disease, the physical burden of carrying water over long distances contributes to musculoskeletal pain. Education outcomes are also affected. School attendance is closely linked to proximity to water sources, where collection requires long hours, and absenteeism and dropout rates increase. Water collection responsibilities also reinforce gender inequality. Women and girls are typically responsible for collecting water and may travel long distances to reach water sources. In conflict-affected areas, these journeys expose them to risks of harassment, assault, and violence.

3. Environmental Impacts

Reduced water availability disrupts plant physiological processes, limiting nutrient uptake, slowing photosynthesis, and restricting plant growth. Declining soil moisture reduces crop yields and agricultural productivity. Prolonged drought conditions can also degrade soil health by reducing microbial activity and weakening soil structure. Groundwater over-extraction can further accelerate environmental degradation. Excessive pumping lowers water tables and reduces groundwater discharge to connected rivers and streams, diminishing water availability in surrounding ecosystems. These pressures are evident in urban areas such as Yangon, where population growth and post-2021 displacement have increased water demand. More than half of the city’s population relies on groundwater, with widespread extraction through private wells. Studies indicate that actual groundwater abstraction far exceeds official estimates, placing severe stress on aquifer systems. Excessive extraction has been linked to declining groundwater levels, increased risk of land subsidence, saltwater intrusion, and broader environmental degradation.

4. Governance Impacts

Waterborne diseases, sanitation-related illnesses, and outbreaks linked to unsafe water significantly increase patient loads, stretching already limited medical resources. Water insecurity can place additional strain on existing water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) systems. Furthermore, inadequate water infrastructure in rural and displacement settings makes consistent service delivery difficult. These pressures extend beyond the health sector. Reduced productivity due to illness and time spent collecting water can influence economic performance and public sector functioning.

Recommendations

1. Infrastructure and Technical Solutions

Strengthening physical water infrastructure is essential to ensure a reliable and climate-resilient water supply in Myanmar. At the national and municipal levels, governments should invest in dual-purpose water infrastructure systems that provide reliable water services while enhancing resilience to natural hazards. This includes the protection and management of raw water sources, as well as investment in water treatment plants, storage facilities, pumping stations, and distribution networks, supported by robust monitoring, control, and maintenance systems.

In rural and drought-prone regions, decentralized technical solutions, often implemented through community initiatives or by NGOs, can play a key role. Solar-powered water systems are particularly suitable in these areas, where solar panels can power groundwater pumps while reducing dependence on fuel. Rehabilitation of dug wells, including roofing, aprons, and proper drainage, can improve water quality and reduce contamination risks. In upland areas, gravity-flow systems that channel water from higher elevation streams into village storage tanks offer a low-cost and low-maintenance solution.

At the community and household levels, smaller-scale interventions can further enhance water security. These include rainwater harvesting systems, basic water treatment technologies such as chlorination, pond rehabilitation, restoration of wells and boreholes, salinity barriers in coastal areas, emergency water tankering, and improved household water storage facilities.

2. Institutional and Community Capacity

Infrastructure alone is insufficient without institutional and community capacity. At the community level, WASH education programs should be implemented in villages and schools to improve hygiene practices and safe water storage. Training residents in the operation and maintenance of water systems can strengthen local ownership and ensure long-term sustainability. At the governance level, decentralized water management should be strengthened at village and township levels through the establishment or reinforcement of local water management committees with clear responsibilities and accountability mechanisms. Restoring damaged public water systems is particularly critical in conflict-affected areas. Integrating water management planning into broader climate adaptation and environmental policies will further enhance resilience.

In addition, the governance bodies have to facilitate humanitarian access to ensure emergency WASH assistance reaches internally displaced and vulnerable populations. At the same time, INGOs should maintain engagement in Myanmar by adopting more adaptive and locally grounded approaches despite ongoing regulatory constraints and security risks. In particular, they should strengthen collaboration with civil society organisations, which have access and contextual knowledge to reach hard-to-reach and conflict-affected areas. INGOs should also support and accelerate the 2023 UN-led localization strategy by expanding consultation and support for locally led aid operations, thereby improving the effectiveness and reach of humanitarian assistance.

3. Financial Support

The national government should prioritise budget allocation for water infrastructure development, system maintenance, and rural water supply programs. Targeted subsidies can help vulnerable households overcome affordability barriers to safe water access. Public–private partnerships may mobilize additional resources to support water system expansion and service delivery. At the same time, international financial assistance should be adapted to the current operational context in Myanmar. Given existing governance and access constraints, reliance on traditional delivery channels alone may limit the effectiveness of aid distribution. Thus, donors should expand direct and flexible funding to civil society organisations, such as increased risk-sharing, simplified compliance requirements, and the use of pooled funding mechanisms to ensure that financial resources reach vulnerable populations more efficiently.

Conclusion

​​Water insecurity in Myanmar is a complex problem caused by environmental changes, social inequalities, and weak institutional systems. Climate change, groundwater depletion, and disasters have made water sources less reliable, while unequal infrastructure and conflict have made access more difficult. The withdrawal or reduced presence of international actors and ongoing access restrictions have also limited the delivery of WASH services, especially for vulnerable communities.

To address this crisis, practical and coordinated actions are needed. Improving climate-resilient infrastructure, promoting community-based water systems, and supporting civil society organisations can help improve access to safe water. At the same time, more flexible and localised funding approaches are important to ensure that assistance reaches those most in need. Without sustained efforts, water insecurity will continue to affect human well-being and future development in Myanmar.

Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

“Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”

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When Myanmar’s military seized power on 1 February 2021, the immediate consequences were political: mass protests, violent repression, and the collapse of a fragile democratic transition. Five years later, the deeper consequences are institutional. Myanmar is now experiencing a prolonged polycrisis, armed conflict, economic contraction, displacement, and humanitarian emergency, but at its core lies a crisis of governance.

Key Takeaways

• After five years of the military coup, Myanmar’s healthcare system has shifted from a fragile public service to a fragmented and increasingly privatised survival mechanism.

• Service disruption, funding instability, and institutional fragmentation have weakened Myanmar’s healthcare system.

• Workforce depletion, declining immunisation coverage, and rising out-of-pocket spending demonstrate a reversal in progress toward Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3).

Healthcare provides one of the clearest indicators of governance failure. Before the coup, Myanmar’s health system was fragile but was gradually improving. Public spending remained limited, yet vaccination coverage was rising, HIV and tuberculosis (TB) programs were expanding, and international partnerships were strengthening service delivery. The trajectory was uneven, but it was forward. Since 2021, that trajectory has reversed.

Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3) commits states to universal health coverage, financial risk protection, and epidemic preparedness. These are governance obligations requiring institutional capacity, fiscal prioritisation, territorial coordination, and professional autonomy. Myanmar’s post-coup experience demonstrates how quickly these foundations can erode.

This regression can be understood through three interrelated governance failures:

(1) collapse of access to healthcare;

(2) disruption of financing and financial risk protection; and

(3) institutional and territorial fragmentation driven by Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) participation and mass displacement.

1. Collapse of Access: Institutional Erosion and Service Breakdown

The most visible consequence of post-coup governance failure is declining access to healthcare. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), escalating conflict, displacement, and economic collapse have created a severe humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, with 19.9 million people requiring humanitarian assistance, including 12.9 million in need of humanitarian health services (WHO, 2025). Conflict-affected areas, including Sagaing, Rakhine, Kachin, Kayah, and northern Shan, face repeated disruptions to clinics, referral systems, and outreach services. Since 2021, approximately 433 attacks on healthcare facilities have been reported, according to WHO surveillance data (WHO, 2024).

Workforce depletion has critically weakened service capacity. Before the coup, Myanmar’s health workforce density stood at 17.8 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 population (WHO, 2024), already below the WHO benchmark of 22.8 required for SDG-compatible service coverage. By 2022-2023, reported figures fell to roughly 1.01 doctors and 1.96 nurses per 10,000 population (WHO, 2024). Nursing availability declined by an estimated 73 percent between 2019 and 2022 (WHO, 2024). These figures indicate systemic incapacity rather than temporary disruption.

Preventive services have similarly regressed. WHO and UNICEF WUENIC estimates show DTP3 coverage declining to around 48 percent in 2021 before partially recovering to 76 percent in 2023 (WHO, 2024). WHO estimates that around 1.2 million children in Myanmar are zero-dose or under-immunised, reflecting major disruptions to routine immunisation services following the political crisis (WHO, 2023). The WHO Global TB Reports (2024) document declines in TB case detection following the coup compared to pre-2021 notification levels. HIV testing and treatment continuity were also disrupted in conflict-affected regions (WHO, 2024f). Treatment interruptions increase risks of transmission and drug resistance, undermining previous gains.

Analyses in global health journals similarly highlight how conflict, health worker participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement, and infrastructure disruptions have collectively weakened routine healthcare delivery (BMJ Global Health, 2026; The Lancet, 2024).

2. Funding Disruption and the Re-Privatisation of Health Risk

Healthcare sustainability depends on financial protection as much as service availability. The 2023 Myanmar National Health Accounts show that 71 percent of total health expenditure was out-of-pocket (WHO, 2024g), among the highest in Southeast Asia. While public spending remained limited, international funding played a stabilising role in HIV, TB, malaria, and immunisation programs.

Several international humanitarian programmes have also been disrupted or suspended since the coup. Before 2021, international NGOs played a central role in supporting Myanmar’s health sector, particularly in HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria control, and maternal and child health services. However, political instability, operational restrictions, and new registration requirements have forced many organisations to scale back or suspend activities. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that Myanmar’s national HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis programmes effectively “shut down” after the coup as the public health system collapsed and partnerships with the Ministry of Health were disrupted (The New Humanitarian, 2021). Although other funding did not disappear entirely, coordination weakened, and long-term system strengthening stalled.

Simultaneously, domestic fiscal priorities shifted toward security expenditures amid economic contraction and declining tax revenues (WHO, 2024).Investigative reporting by Athan News has highlighted how public hospitals increasingly require patients to purchase medicines and supplies externally. The economic crisis has sharply increased household vulnerability. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study warned that the combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 military coup could push up to 25 million people, nearly half of Myanmar’s population, below the national poverty line, reversing over a decade of poverty reduction (UNDP, 2021). When 76 percent of health expenditure was already out-of-pocket prior to the coup, further fiscal retrenchment deepens financial vulnerability and shifts health risk directly onto households (WHO, 2024g). Financial risk protection, central to SDG 3, has eroded, widening inequality.

3. CDM Participation, Displacement, and Territorial Fragmentation

Institutional fragmentation represents the third structural driver of health system unsustainability. Following the coup, an estimated half of the public-sector health workforce participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), withdrawing from state institutions in protest against military rule (Amnesty International, 2021). The mass walkout of doctors, nurses, teachers, and other civil servants significantly disrupted public service delivery, including healthcare, education, and social welfare systems.

While the CDM has been a central component of resistance to military rule, the withdrawal of large numbers of public-sector professionals created additional pressures on already fragile service systems. These disruptions occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and amid escalating conflict, further constraining the health sector’s ability to maintain routine services and emergency response capacity. At the same time, conflict-related displacement has fragmented service delivery across regions, weakening referral systems and continuity of care.

Moreover, procurement systems and medical supply chains have deteriorated due to import licensing delays, transport insecurity, and currency instability. Restrictions on transporting medicines and medical equipment to conflict-affected and opposition-controlled areas have further complicated humanitarian delivery, particularly in territories outside military control. These constraints have contributed to shortages of essential medicines, including tuberculosis drugs and other life-saving treatments.

Conflict escalation has displaced millions. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 19.9 million people were estimated to require humanitarian assistance in 2025, including approximately 4 million internally displaced persons and 1.5 million refugees (OCHA, 2024). Displacement disrupts vaccination records, HIV and TB treatment adherence, maternal health services, and chronic disease management. Health systems depend on territorial coherence, stable populations, referral networks, and administrative coordination. In Myanmar, territorial control is increasingly fragmented, and service provision varies significantly by region.

Long-established ethnic health systems in areas administered by organisations such as the Kachin Independence Organization and the Karen National Union have historically maintained parallel healthcare governance structures and community-based service networks. These systems have helped sustain basic services in some conflict-affected regions. However, newly contested territories under resistance forces such as the Sagaing Region aligned with the National Unity Government often lack comparable institutional infrastructure (BMJ Global Health, 2026). In such areas, healthcare provision frequently relies on mobile clinics, community volunteers, or humanitarian actors, resulting in uneven coverage and limited continuity of care (BMJ Global Health, 2026; WHO, 2024). Prolonged fragmentation risks institutionalising geographic inequalities in access to healthcare.

Implications and Recommendations

Myanmar’s health crisis demonstrates that humanitarian assistance cannot substitute for governance recovery. Sustainable progress toward SDG 3 requires restoring institutional functionality alongside emergency support.

Protection of health workers and facilities must be prioritised to safeguard service continuity and professional autonomy. Financial risk protection mechanisms require stabilisation through accountable pooled financing that supports essential medicines and primary care, particularly for displaced and low-income populations. Strengthening transparency and oversight in health financing and procurement is also critical. Even before the coup, Myanmar’s health system faced governance challenges, including weak regulatory oversight and risks of corruption in procurement and pharmaceutical supply chains. Since 2021, institutional collapse and severe staff shortages have further weakened accountability, with reports indicating that patients in some public hospitals have been forced to pay informal fees or bribes to access treatment and basic services (Frontier Myanmar, 2023). Finally, adaptive coordination among state, ethnic, and community-based providers is necessary to mitigate fragmentation and expand equitable coverage.

Health outcomes will remain the clearest indicator of whether governance recovery is taking place. Without institutional resilience, fiscal prioritisation of social sectors, and territorial coordination, healthcare will continue shifting from a public good to a private burden borne disproportionately by the poor and displaced.

References

Amnesty International Thailand. (2021). After coup, Myanmar military puts chokehold on people’s basic needs.

BMJ Global Health. (2026). Health system disruption and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.

Frontier Myanmar. (2024). Myanmar’s public hospitals are failing their patients.

Human Rights Watch. (2025). Myanmar: Junta assault on health care hinders quake response.

Insecurity Insight. (2022). Myanmar: Attacks on health care in 2021 – Factsheet.

The Lancet. (2024). Health and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup.

The New Humanitarian. (2025). Myanmar healthcare and disease prevention are neglected casualties of war.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2021). COVID-19, coup d’état and poverty: Compounding negative shocks and their impact on human development in Myanmar.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2024). Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2023). Decreasing zero-dose children threefold amidst pandemic and political unrest in Myanmar.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024a). Myanmar External Public Health Situation Analysis.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024b). Global tuberculosis report 2024. Geneva: WHO.

Frontier Myanmar. (2023). “No remedy”: A broken public health system fosters neglect and corruption.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2024c). Global Health Expenditure Database: National Health Accounts country profile.

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.

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